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Digital services have a significant impact on the lives of many individuals and organisations.
Trust influences decisions regarding potential service providers, and continues to do so once
a service provider has been selected. It is common to refer to the entity that is trusting as the
trustor, and to the entity that is trusted as the trustee. There is no globally accepted model to
describe trust in the context of digital services, nor to evaluate the trustworthiness of entities.
Trust is commonly used in the context of digital services, yet it is overloaded with meaning and
difficult to interpret.
This thesis presents a novel model to describe and evaluate an entity’s trustworthiness. The
model is referred to as the trustworthy ecosystem model. It is based on four building blocks: a
data model, a rulebook, trustworthiness evaluation functions and instance data.
The data model is expressed in First Order Logic. Rulebooks, which consist of constraints
that reflect a particular context for reasoning about trustworthiness, are described using predi-
cates. The entity that is evaluating is referred to as the evaluator, and the entity that is evaluated
is the evaluation subject. The evaluator corresponds to a potential trustor, and the evaluation
subject to a potential trustee.
Verifying whether the constraints are satisfied over a set of instance data allows an evaluator
to evaluate the trustworthiness of an evaluation subject. For this purpose trustworthiness eval-
uation functions are specified. The functions takes as input a rulebook, i.e. a set of constraints,
and a set of data. A rulebook contains amandatory and a discretionary part. Themandatory part
describes the constraints that must be satisfied to have the minimal basis for relevant execution
of the discretionary rules. The discretionary part allows the evaluator to specify a trustworthi-
ness evaluation policy by selecting discretionary constraints. The data represents real world
information about the potential trustee and its context. The outcome of the evaluation provides
evidence that can be used by the evaluator to decide to interact with the evaluation subject in
the relationship of trustor–trustee.
To demonstrate the practical feasibility of the proposed framework, a partial implementa-
tion is presented. The data model was implemented in OWL, a logic language that was es-
tablished by the Worldwide Web Consortium (W3C). The data model was complemented by
a data import and transformation mechanism which transforms data from public and authori-
tative sources into the data model and stores it in a graph database. A sample rulebook and
trustworthiness evaluation function were implemented in the form of SPARQL queries. The
implementation is partial because it implements only two particular rulebooks, inspired by the
European legislation for trust services, and because it uses a specific set of data sources for its
instance data.
The approach was validated by implementing the model, importing real world data, per-
forming selective evaluations of trustworthiness and comparing their outcome to other ap-
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proaches such as PKI and the Web of Trust verification.
The scientific contribution of the thesis can be summarised as follows:
• A thorough investigation of the current academic field on trust and trustworthiness was
performed through a literature review, to identify potential improvement points and thus
create the basis for the thesis.
• An integrated set of requirements for trust, i.e. things which must hold for an entity, or
the outcome of an interaction to be regarded as trustworthy, were proposed on the basis
of the literature review and the findings of the FutureTrust research project.
• Based on these requirements, a new way to logically model providers and consumers of
digital services as well as the providers of trust services as participants in a digital ecosys-
tem was proposed. It is based on a data model, a rulebook, trustworthiness evaluation
functions and instance data.
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AE example rulebook for the evaluation of an ecosystem
AP example rulebook for the evaluation of a participant
AB Accreditation Body
Agreement predicate of the form Agreement(pid , rid , [ tm], [ cm]) where
pid stands for the participant that agrees to be bound by the rulebook
rid stands for the rulebook
tm stands for an optional time mark
cm stands for an optional commitment mark
Attestation predicate of the form Attestation(pid , T, [ tm], [ cm]) where
pid stands for the issuer of the attestation
T stands for the triple (subject, attribute, value)
that makes up the core information of the attestation, where
tm stands for an optional time mark
cm stands for an optional commitment mark
ttestationpid () projection function on Attestation that allows
the selection of its issuer
ttestationtatt() projection function on Attestation that allows
the selection of the triple’s attribute
ttestationtsub() projection function on Attestation that allows
the selection of the triple’s subject
ttestationtval () projection function on Attestation that allows
the selection of the triple’s attribute value
ℂ allowed character set, unless specified otherwise it corresponds to
the Latin alphabet defined in ISO/IEC 8859-1:1998 [182]
with permitted sub and superscripting for readability
 claim identification set
Claim predicate of the form Claim(cid , rid , ccla, Se, claimstate, [tm], [cm])
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where cid and rid stand for the identification of the claim
and the applicable rulebook, and
Se stands for the set of evidence for which claimstate is claimed
by the claimant ccla
cm commitment mark,
optional set of attributes that express commitment of the creator
CsSP claim status service provider, a participant that provides
status information about a claim
 evidence identification set
EnDo endorser, a participant that proposes and supports a rulebook
Endorsement predicate of the form Endorsement(pid , rid , [tm], [cm])
EnFo enforcer, a participant that enforces (rejects/confirms) claims
Enforcement predicate of the form Enforcement(pid , rid , [tm], [cm])
Evidence predicate of the form Evidence(eid , iid , eevsp, Ssav, [tm], [cm])
where Ssav consists of (subject, attribute, value) triples
EvSP evidence service provider, a participant that provides
evidence services to interacting participants
fcomcreate(pid , predicate) commitment creation function where
(pid) is the invoking participant,
predicate is what (pid) wants to commit
fcomprep(pid1,pid2) commitment preparation function where
(pid1) is the invoking participant,
(pid2) is the participant whose commitment
can be created and
can be verified using the commitment validation data
returned in the form CVD(pid1, (pid2, commitment-validation-data, data))
fcomverif (A, CVD()) commitment verification function of the form
fcomverif (A, CVD(pid1, (pid2, commitment-validation-data, data)))
which verifies the predicate A’s time and commitment mark,
returning true if the verification was successful and false otherwise
fia property attestation function for identity attributes
fra property attestation function for role attributes
fre rulebook endorser attestation function
fga property attestation function for general attributes
FOL first order logic
FuSC functional service consumer
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FuSP functional service provider
 interaction identification set
Interaction participant interaction of the form Interaction(iid , Sip, information, cre)
where Sip stands for the interaction’s participants and information
stands for a (possibly empty) string representing information
transferred or stored/retrieved
 participant identification set
 rulebook identification set
SA set of all actors
Sabr set of all base role attestations
Saio set of attributes for identity of organisations
Saip set of attributes for identity of natural persons
Sag set of general attributes, equal to {seq ℂ} with ℂ
as the allowed characterset
Sagr set of all agreements
Sarb set of all base roles, equal to {RFuSP , RFuSC , REnDo, REnFo,
RAB, REvSP , RCsSP
Sattn set of all attestations
Scla set of all claim predicates
Sds set of all data sources
Se set of evidence predicates embedded within a claim
Send set of all endorsements
Sevi set of all evidence predicates
Sint set of all interaction predicates
Sip set of participants in an interaction
SPT set of all participants
SR set of all rulebooks
Ssav set of (subject, attribute, value) triples
SSOD1 first segregation of duty set, equal to
{REvAA, REvSPMo, RCsAA, RCsSPMo }
SSOD2 second segregation of duty set, equal to
{REnDo, REnFo, RFuSP , RFuSC }
Ssup set of all supervision attestations
  trustworthy ecosystem
tm time mark, optional set of attributes that express time of creation (cre),
start of validity (sov), and end of validity (eov)
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CAB Conformity Assessment Body
CsSP Claim Status Service Provider
EnDo Endorser
EnFo Enforcer
EvSP Evidence Service Producer
FuSC Functional Service Consumer
FuSP Functional Service Producer
GDPR General Data Protection Regulation
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
ICT Information and Communication Technology
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force
IRI Internationalised Resource Identifier
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
QTSP Qualified Trust Service Provider
SB Supervisory Body
TSP Trust Service Provider
TTP Trusted Third Party
TwsMo Trustworthiness Monitor
URI Uniform Resource Identifier




This chapter describes the motivation and methodology for the work described in
this thesis, and specifies the research challenges that have been addressed. The
scientific contributions and the publications that resulted from the work are sum-
marised. Finally, an outline of the thesis, which consists of three main parts, is
given.
1.1 Motivation
1.1.1 The importance of trust
Electronic platforms have a significant impact on the lives of many. On some platforms, preda-
tors can pose as a 14-year-old girl. More often than not, such platforms are operated by for-profit
giants, performing unknown functions in an unknown manner. The algorithms used by search
engines and their relationship with advertising agencies are not always disclosed. Nevertheless,
for a variety of reasons, users often trust such services.
Trust is important because its presence or absence can have a strong influence on what we
choose to do or not do, both as an individual and as a group. Trust decisions are made by all
of us, and today automata are increasingly confronted with such decisions. Each time a trust
decision is made, something is put at risk. It may be a human life, an animal or a material
thing. Trust decisions are based on a mixture of experience and expectation. The one that is
trusting is commonly referred to as the trustor, the one that is trusted is the trustee. The trustee
may or may not live up to the trustor’s expectation. Betrayal of trust is the responsibility of the
trustee, not of the trustor. The negative consequences of betrayal of trust may, however, impact
the trustor.
Trust has been extensively studied from many perspectives. In the social sciences, trust
is discussed from a number of different points of view. A thorough treatment can be found
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for example in the work of Deutsch [70]. Trust, as studied from the social point of view, is a
complex subject from which a rich terminology has emerged. This terminology has influenced
the study of trust in an information technology context where, unfortunately, the terms trust
and trustworthiness are far from having a common definition or interpretation, as pointed out
below.
1.1.2 The meaning of trust
It is important to consider the meaning of the terms trust and trustworthiness, and how to in-
terpret claims of trust and of trustworthiness, because these terms are commonly used in the
field of information technology without a precise definition or agreement on their meaning.
The following definitional issues are particularly significant, and are discussed in greater detail
below.
• There is a lack of clarity in, and agreement on, the meaning of the term trust. Despite
this, technology dependent on the notion of a trusted third party, such as Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) schemes, are widely used.
• The term trust is ambiguous, as it is used as both a positive and a negative characteristic.
• The terms trust and trustworthiness are used with different meanings in Europe and in
the United States of America.
• Various initiatives have attempted to provide an agreed meaning for trust, but they have
so far had limited effect.
1.1.3 Lack of clarity
High-level definitions of trust exist, such as those of Castelfranchi and Francone [46], Gam-
betta et al. [119] and Cofta [62]. Castelfranchi and Francone [46] state that ‘trust is in fact a
deficiency of control that expresses itself as a desire to progress despite the inability to control’.
This can be paraphrased as ‘trust is accepted dependence’. This idea is elaborated by Gollmann
[131], who argues that it would be generally helpful if authors avoided references to trust. Trust
is a natural term to use in psychology but not in computer science. He provides examples of
the use of the terms trust and trustworthiness, including the following.
• A Trusted Computing Base (TCB) is defined according the Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria [322] in 1985 as ‘the totality of protection mechanisms within a com-
puter system— including hardware, firmware, and software -– the combination of which
is responsible for enforcing a security policy.’ Using this terminology, if a trusted com-
ponent fails, security can be violated, i.e. trusted components are those that can hurt you.
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Components that signal errors and unexpected behaviour, i.e. that come with evidence of
their failure, are called trustworthy.
• Code-based access control has been proposed as an alternative to identity-based schemes
[132]. In code-based access control, access privileges are assigned to code, not to users.
It is customary to refer to code running with many privileges as trusted code and to
code running with few privileges as untrusted code. A flaw in code running with system
privileges might be exploited by an attacker. The same flaw in code that runs with limited
privileges would have less serious implications. In this sense, trusted (privileged) code
is a component that can hurt you. However, calling code trusted may also insinuate that
this is code you can trust, i.e. trustworthy code, which can easily lead to confusion.
On this basis Gollmann concludes that having to rely on trust is bad for security. Blasco
Alís [33] analyses the use of generally-trusted applications such as Microsoft Excel to evade the
security that is offered by Data Leakage Protection systems. For a general treatment of trust,
see Gambetta et al. [119].
The term trust is used in many domains. Even when restricted to the Information and Com-
munication Technology (ICT) domain, the meaning of the term trust is unclear. In the ICT do-
main trust is often based on a combination of cryptographic safeguards and procedural controls,
sometimes with support from legislation. The meanings of trust and trustworthiness need to be
agreed before entities such as natural persons or organisations can be considered trustworthy by
other entities. However, the many different approaches taken make claims of trustworthiness
difficult to compare.
In the execution of electronic transactions, there are often controls and safeguards in place,
and service providers such as Trusted Third Parties (TTPs), Identity Providers (IdPs) and Trust
Service Providers (TSPs) claim they can be trusted. However, what is actually meant by such
trust claims is often described in vague terms, and is hard for users of the service to understand.
Questions related to understanding what a specific trust claim actually means, what it is based
on, as well as why it should be considered valid are hard to answer, and there is often room for
multiple interpretations.
1.1.4 Ambiguity
Trust can be positive or negative. In natural language, trust is perceived as a positive term,
such as trust between husband and wife, trust between business partners, and trust provided by
a Trust Service Provider under the European eIDAS Regulation [103]. In the US, the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has a well-established working group called the
‘trusted identities group1’. Here again, trust seems to be seen as positive. However, trust is
1https://www.nist.gov/itl/applied-cybersecurity/tig
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also used as a negative term, in that we should try to avoid the need for trust. As noted above,
Gollmann [131] states that relying on trust is bad for security.
As this ambiguity is a consequence of the widespread use of the term and the fact that
English is a natural language, a rigorous framework to reason about trust, that at least clarifies
some of the meanings, is a natural topic for further investigation.
The terminology related to trust also varies between European and US contexts.
• In Europe, the eIDAS Regulation [103] terminology separates identity and attribute ser-
vices from signature and related services, and refers to the latter as trust services.
• In the US ‘Strategy for Trusted Identities’ [288], the term trust framework is used to
describe the management of identities but this excludes signature and related services.
1.1.5 A lack of semantic precision
A number of initiatives have been launched with the goal of defining large-scale trust ecosys-
tems; however they are typically not precise in their use of the terms trust and trustworthiness.
Whether themeaning of the term trust in this context could bemademore precise, and if so, how
this could be done, are challenging research questions. The following two examples demon-
strate this lack of precision.
The lack of concrete agreements on the topic of trust made by the United Nations Com-
mission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) serves as a first example. UNCITRAL was
established in 1966 as a subsidiary body of the UN General Assembly with the mandate to
further the harmonization and unification of the laws of international trade. UNCITRAL pre-
pared a range of conventions, model laws and other instruments dealing with the substantive
law that governs trade transactions and other aspects of business law which have an impact on
international trade. Trust is a recurring topic in their activities.
The UNCITRAL work is publicly available2. The current UNCITRAL publications do not
contain a convention, model law or proposals for definitions of trust or trustworthiness. Rather
they contain a series of documents that describe legal issues regarding identity management
and trust services.
The second example is the absence of a definition of trust in the European eIDAS Regula-
tion [103], enacted in 2014. The Regulation was established by the initiative of the Directorate
General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology (DG Connect) of the Euro-
pean Commission. Article 3 of the Regulation lists a series of definitions. Trust services are
defined here without defining trust itself. When consulting its authors regarding the lack of a
definition of trust or trustworthiness in the legal text, they explained it is left to practitioners
2http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/4Electronic_Commerce.html
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to agree upon the definition or meaning of trust. The Regulation is complemented by a series
of implementing acts and technical standards, none of which specifically address trust or trust-
worthiness. The implementing acts address cross-border authentication as well as trust services
such as signing, sealing, timestamping and validating. The supporting CEN and ETSI technical
standards address interoperability and technical criteria at system level for PKI-based systems.
1.1.6 Lack of a precise trust definition for PKI
ETSI published a study [99] on the global acceptance of EU trust services. The report analyses
trust services that operate in various regions of the world, and their possible mutual recognition
and global acceptance. The study aimed to identify steps which could be taken to facilitate
cross recognition between EU trust services, based on ETSI standards supporting the eIDAS
Regulation, and other trust services with differing foundations. The study focussed on existing
PKI-based trust services. It covers 37 PKI schemes and makes 18 recommendations. For Eu-
ropean trust services, the main trust mechanism is the set of the EU national trusted lists. We
make two observations regarding this study.
• The ETSI study covers what it refers to as the four main elements of a trust service,
namely legal context, supervision and audit, technical standards, and trust representa-
tion. The study posits that trust is based on supervision and audit, together with technical
standards. The meaning or semantics of trust are not addressed; the closest term that is
defined is the notion of ‘trust representation’. Trust representation is said to ‘address the
way the approval and the level of reliability of a TSP supporting given trust services is
represented and disseminated; or more precisely how the confirmation that a TSP sup-
porting given trust services meets the approval criteria applied by the supervision and
auditing systems used for acceptance under the requirements of the legal context.’ It is
stated that such a representation can be implemented in various ways such as ‘trusted
lists, trust service stores, by root-signing or cross-certifying trust services, or through
bridging mechanisms.’
The trust representations that the report describes are short and focus on how trust is
specified. They vary widely, and include the following:
– UNCITRAL [318]: ‘No current consensus on trust representation’,
– ISO 21188:2018 [167]: ‘No requirements specified’,
– WebTrust: ‘represented in the use of a licensed seal’,
– CertiPath: ‘a bridge certificate’,
– SAFE-BioPharma: ‘a list of cross-certified TSPs’,
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– Google Chrome, Mozilla, Apple, Microsoft: ‘the underlying Operating System root
store’.
In the cases of the national trust definitions for Argentina, Columbia, Switzerland and
China, it was not possible to identify the chosen trust representation. Other countries
such as India, Hong Kong, and Japan publish a trusted list.
• The study concludes that there remain significant issues to be overcome before global
interoperability of trust services and acceptance of EU trust services can become a reality.
The descriptions of trust revealed by the study are still rather coarse. A number of recom-
mendations are given, and the report concludes that significant issues remain to be overcome.
1.1.7 Trust and this thesis
There is no globally accepted model to describe trust in the context of digital services, nor to
evaluate the trustworthiness of entities. The major contribution of the thesis is the proposal
of a novel framework for assessing claims of trustworthiness, to partially fill this gap. It is
based on four building blocks: a data model, rulebooks, trustworthiness evaluation functions
and instance data. An implementation of this framework can be used by a potential trustor to
evaluate the trustworthiness of a potential trustee.
The motivation for the work performed can be summarised as follows. The terms trust
and trustworthiness are commonly used in the context of information security. However, the
following observations can be made.
• As described in Section 1.1.3, there is a general lack of clarity regarding the terms.
• Section 1.1.4 pointed out that the term trust is ambiguous, as it is used for both positive
and negative characterisation of entities.
• Section 1.1.5 listed some large-scale initiatives related to trust. However, they have not
(yet) contributed to clearer definitions.
• As described in Section 1.1.6, PKI is the dominant security model but its semantics of
trust are still rather vague.
The purpose of the work described in this thesis was to understand this better, and to inves-
tigate whether improvements could be identified. The purpose was also to investigate whether
these terms could be defined more precisely, because this could lead to more effective ways of
limiting interpretations and reducing inconsistency when taking trust-related decisions. This
would help to better articulate what is meant by related terms such as trust model and trust
policy.
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1.2 Research challenges
1.2.1 Problem statement
The digital society will continue to increase its reliance on electronic transactions. Such trans-
actions are conducted between Service Providers and Service Consumers, possibly with the
use of intermediaries. The term ‘trust’ originates in social sciences and has been adopted by
the digital society, particularly in the domain of computer security. While the notion of trust
is in widespread use, interpretations of its meaning vary widely. This is a problem because it
potentially leads to inconsistency.
Trust has been studied for a long time from different perspectives, including as a societal
phenomenon that long predates computers. Interestingly, one could argue that the concept of
trust itself is flawed; ideally, one should not ‘trust’ but rather take an informed decision on the
basis of evidence and reasoning.
We are specifically interested in decision-making, where entities such as human or software
agents want to interact with other entities. Two types of decision are of particular interest. The
first is selecting which entity, service or ICT system to interact with, in cases where there is a
choice. The second is whether to rely on the outcome of a transaction. We argue that it is to the
benefit of potential trustors that such decisions are based on a trust model with semantics and
evidence that are understandable to them.
1.2.2 Hypothesis
The following assumptions underpin the hypothesis which this thesis sets out to test.
• Formal semantics increase trustworthiness and enable interoperability. It is assumed
that defining formal semantics for trust-related terms can be instrumental in increasing
trustworthiness and in enabling interoperability across ecosystems. Such ecosystems can
be organised locally or globally. Interoperability is based onmutual understanding, which
requires definitions that are sufficiently precise, clear and understandable to all parties
involved. Formal semantics can contribute to such definitions, and can go beyond this by
also enabling automated reasoning, and providing an explanation of the outcome of such
reasoning.
• Use of information from qualified sources increases trustworthiness. It is assumed that
relevant trust-related information is provided by external information providers that have
varying degrees of authority and of independence with regard to other stakeholders. Ex-
amples of such information providers include business registers, institutions that publish
statements of accounts, and regulatory supervisors. These information providers make
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artefacts available that offer contextual information, some of which can be used in rea-
soning about trust claims.
• Linking the data from different and independent sources contributes to establishing a
more complete set of information regarding a potential trustee. This allows a trustor to
rely on inputs from different sources.
On the basis of preliminary research, it was concluded that the creation of a single unifying
terminology (vocabulary, ontology) to express heterogeneous trust evidence and validation is
too ambitious to be addressed in a single PhD thesis. Therefore this thesis focuses on elements
that can become building blocks of such a single unifying terminology.
The hypothesis underlying the work described in this thesis is as follows.
Where machine processable information about actors is available, it is desirable
and possible to automate reasoning about the properties of these actors to support
trust-related decision-making based on formal semantics.
1.2.3 Research questions
The following research questions are addressed in this thesis with the goal of testing the above
hypothesis.
1. How can trust and trustworthiness be meaningfully described in the context of the elec-
tronic society?
2. What type of reasoning could assist in automating trust claim verifications?
3. What type of information would be required to support such reasoning?
4. How can such information be harvested and transformed into a format that allows rea-
soning?
1.3 Research methodology
The thesis was developed according to the traditional scientific methodology (Popper [274]).
A hypothesis and research questions were formulated on the basis of observations. An induc-
tive approach was followed to propose a solution for the specific problem of how to improve
interpretations of trustworthiness. The proposed solution was specified in First Order Logic.
To demonstrate the practical validity of the hypothesis, a partial implementation was devel-
oped and tested. An analysis was performed of the relationship of the proposed approach to
commonly accepted trust concepts. Finally, the effectiveness of the approach in meeting the
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previously defined objectives was compared to that of major rival techniques, including PKIs,
the Web of Trust and certain other trust-related ontologies.
1.4 Contributions
The work performed towards the PhD has resulted in the following contributions in the domain
of modelling and evaluating of trustworthiness.
• A detailed literature-based review of the notions of trust and trustworthiness was per-
formed. The review and an analysis of its findings are described in Chapter 3. The focus
was on the semantics of trustworthiness and methods for the automation and interpreta-
tion of claims thereof. A classification scheme based on the formalisms and reasoning
mechanisms used by the current state of the art was developed and used to identify the
topics for further work.
• A novel and integrated set of requirements for trust, i.e. things which must hold for an
entity to be regarded as trustworthy, is presented in Chapter 5. These requirements arise
from two sources: the analysis in the structured literature review in Chapter 3, and the
findings of the FutureTrust research project.
• A new approach was specified to define and evaluate trustworthiness to support the de-
cision taking of a potential trustor regarding interacting with a potential trustee. It is
referred to as the   framework. It is based on the requirements developed in Chapter
5.
The   framework is a new approach for defining and evaluating trustworthiness in-
tended to support decision-taking by a potential trustor regarding possible interactions
with a potential trustee. It is designed to meet the requirements given in Chapter 5. The
specification consists of the following main parts.
– The Data Model is described as a set of predicates in First Order Logic (FOL) in
Chapter 7.
– Using the predicates defined in the Data Model, the concept of a Rulebook is given
in Chapter 8. A Rulebook is a set of constraints that reflect a particular context for
reasoning about trustworthiness. A Rulebook has a mandatory and a discretionary
part.
∗ The mandatory part contains the constraints instantiating the basic conditions
for execution of the discretionary rules.
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∗ The discretionary part allows a trustworthiness evaluation policy to be speci-
fied by selecting those constraints that correspond to the trustor’s expectations
for the trustworthiness of the potential trustee.
– Chapter 9 specifies the trustworthiness evaluation approach, which involves the fol-
lowing four steps:
∗ choosing whether to evaluate the trustworthiness of a participant or an ecosys-
tem;
∗ selecting a particular rulebook and a set of instance data;
∗ selecting discretionary constraints from the rulebook that are relevant to the
trustor’s decision;
∗ executing the participant or ecosystem trustworthiness evaluation function to
verify whether the mandatory and the selected discretionary constraints are
satisfied by the selected instance data.
• A partial implementation of the   framework was designed and developed to demon-
strate the practical feasibility of the proposed solution.
– The Data Model was implemented in the Description Logic OWL (see Chapter
11). It combines existing W3C ontologies with new classes and properties that
were specifically created to allow semantically meaningful reasoning about trust-
worthiness.
– A dedicated approach for data selection, import and transformation was imple-
mented (see Chapter 12). The novel element is that it combines information about
potential trustees from different and independent sources, using the DataModel that
was implemented in OWL, in a single graph which can be queried.
– A specific rulebook, inspired by the eIDAS Regulation [103] was implemented in
the form of mandatory and discretionary constraints (see Chapter 13).
– A trustworthiness evaluation approach was implemented using the rulebook and the
data stored in the graph (see Chapter 14).
The key novel elements of the   framework and its implementation can be summarised
as follows.
• Information about potential trustees is obtained from multiple authoritative data sources,
and combined in a graph. This is addressed as follows.
– Requirement IR7 ‘Obtaining credible data’ was formulated in Section 5.5.7 as fol-
lows.
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As a participant in an electronic ecosystem I can understand the origin and the type
of data that is used in the evaluation of trustworthiness of participants, so that I can
claim the outcome of the trustworthiness evaluation is based on credible data.
– For this purpose, the role Authentic Source was introduced in Section 6.5.1, and the
attestation LegalQualification was included in the data model in Section 7.10.5.
– The discretionary rule IR4-D302, included in Table 8.18, specifies that a participant
in the role of authentic source must be attested by a legal act.
– The selection criteria for data sources include the requirement that the data source
must be authoritative for the data it provides. This is addressed in Section 12.2.
Each data source that was selected for the implementation meets this requirement.
An analysis of possible data sources is given in Appendices F – J. Data integration
is described in Appendix L.
• Data from the selected sources was combined in a graph, using the   data model that
was specifically created to allow the evaluation of trustworthiness. This data model, de-
scribed in Section 7.2, specifies well-defined semantics for trust and trustworthiness, and
thereby improves their interpretation. This combined use of multiple authentic sources
under a single data model provides an improvement over centralised hierarchical trust
models.
• As the information in the selected data sources is stored in formats different from the  
data model, the information could not be used in its original form. Transformations from
the data source formats into the   data model format were created to address this issue.
The information in the graph is tagged with provenance information to allow the potential
trustor to trace the source of the information used in the reasoning. This provides a new
way to use existing information to logically reason about trustworthiness. It is described
in Section 12.2.3. Sample transformation code is provided in Appendix K.
• The formal modelling of qualifications improves the freedom of choice of the potential
trustor when evaluating a potential trustee. A potential trustor can decide whether to rely
on qualifications depending on the nature of the associated attestation, notably whether
they are self-attested or attested by another entity. When attestations by another entity
are allowed, it is also possible to specify requirements regarding the qualifications of that
entity, and chains of qualifications can be modelled. A wide range of qualification types,
including technical and legal qualifications, can be taken into account. The qualifications
are specified in the rulebook. The concept of a rulebook is defined in Chapter 8. A spe-
cific rulebook instance, inspired by the eIDAS Regulation [103], is described in Chapter
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13. The practical use of the   framework for the evaluation of trustworthiness, using
increasingly stringent rules, was demonstrated in Chapter 14.
1.5 Publications
1.5.1 Publications in international conferences
The following articles, closely related to the thesis, were published in the proceeding of inter-
national conferences.
• M. Sel and D. Karaklajic [298], Internet of Trucks and Digital Tachograph Security and
Privacy Threats, Securing Business Processes – Proceedings of the ISSE 2014 Confer-
ence, Sachar Paulus, Norbert Pohlman and Helmut Reimer (editors), Vieweg+Tuebner,
Springer Science+BusinessMedia, ISBN 978-3-658-06707-6, pages 230–238. This arti-
cle analyses the use of a Europe-wide PKI and trustworthy hardware to secure the digital
tachograph system. This contributed to an understanding of the use of PKI and Trusted
Third Parties, as formalised in Chapter 2.
• M. Sel [294], Using the Semantic Web to generate Trust Indicators, Securing Busi-
ness Processes – Proceedings of the ISSE 2014 Conference, Sachar Paulus, Norbert
Pohlman and Helmut Reimer (editors), Vieweg+Tuebner, Springer Science+Business
Media, ISBN 978-3-658-06707-6, pages 106–119. This article analyses the use of classes
and properties of existing semantic vocabularies (W3C, Dublin Core) to generate indica-
tors of trustworthiness. The idea was elaborated in Chapters 7 and 11.
• M. Sel [295], AComparison of Trust Models, Securing Business Processes – Proceedings
of the ISSE 2015 Conference, Sachar Paulus, Norbert Pohlman and Helmut Reimer (ed-
itors), Vieweg+Tuebner, Springer Science+Business Media, ISBN 978-3-658-10933-2,
pages 206–215. This article compares the EU eIDAS and US ICAM trust models. These
trust models were further analysed in Chapter 2. On the basis of this article I was invited
to join the FutureTrust project, to work on a trust model.
• M. Sel [296], Improving Interpretations of Trust Claims, IFIPTM 2016, Darmstadt, Ger-
many, July 18-22, 2016, Proceedings, published in Trust Management X — 10th IFIP
WG 11.11 International Conference, pages 164–173. This article proposes a preliminary
approach for the evaluation of trustworthiness and the creation of a prototype in.
This approach was elaborated in Chapter 9 and partially implemented in Chapter 14.
• O. Delos, T. Debusschere, M. De Soete, J. Dumortier, R. Genghini, H. Graux, S. Lacroix,
G. Ramunno, M. Sel and P. Van Eecke, [67], A pan-European Framework on Elec-
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tronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions in the Internal Mar-
ket, Securing Business Processes – Proceedings of the ISSE 2015 Conference, Sachar
Paulus, Norbert Pohlman and Helmut Reimer (editors), Vieweg+Tuebner, Springer Sci-
ence+Business Media, ISBN 978-3-658-10933-2, pages 173–195. This article discusses
the pan-European framework established by eIDAS [103]. This framework was used as
input to Chapter 13.
• D. Hühnlein, T. Frosch, J. Schwenk, C.-M. Piswanger, M. Sel and T. Hühnlein, T. Wich,
D. Nemmert, R. Lottes, J. Somorovsky, V. Mladenov, C. Condovici, H. Leitold, S. Stalla-
Bourdillon, N. Tsakalakis, J. Eichholz, F.-M. Kamm, A. Kühne, D. Wabisch, R. Dean,
J. Shamah, M. Kapanadze, N. Ponte, J. Martins, R. Portela, C. Karabat, S. Stojicic, S.
Nedeljkovic, V. Bouckaert, A. Defays, B. Anderson, M. Jonas, C. Hermanns, T. Schubert,
D. Wegener, and A. Sazonov [161], FutureTrust – Future Trust Services for Trustworthy
Global Transactions, Open Identity Summit 2016, 13–14 October 2016, Rome, Italy,
Detlef Hühnlein, Heiko Roßnagel, Christian H. Schunck and Maurizio Talamo (editors),
GI (publisher), LNI series, volume P-264, pages 27–41. This article proposes the exten-
sion of the existing European List of Trusted List towards a ‘Global Trust List’, and the
development of an Open Source Validation Service and a Preservation Service for elec-
tronic signatures and seals. These ideas were considered in the elaboration of Chapter
9.
• M. Sel and C. Mitchell [299], Automating the evaluation of trustworthiness, Proceedings
of TrustBUS 2021: September 2021. Springer-Verlag, 2021 (forthcoming). (Lecture
Notes in Computer Science). This article summarises all key elements of the thesis.
The following article, related to trust and trustworthiness in general, was published in the
proceeding of an international conference.
• M. Sel, H. Diedrich, S. Demeester and H. Stieber [297], How smart contracts can im-
plement ‘report once’. This article analyses the use of a blockchain and smart contracts
for trustworthy reporting. A prototype, developed by the authors and implemented on a
private Ethereum blockchain, is also described. The prototype was demonstrated at the
Data For Policy 2017 conference, 6-7 September, London.
1.5.2 Publications from research projects
I participated in the Horizon2020 FutureTrust project3, which ran between 2016 and 2020 and
overlapped to some degree with the focus of this thesis. I was responsible for the following
3See http://www.futuretrust.eu, the project received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020
research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 700542
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work packages, and was lead author of the corresponding deliverables listed below.
• M. Sel, E. Üstündağ Soykan and E. Fasllija [229], Deliverable 2.5 On Trust and Trust
Models. The concepts described in this project deliverable were used as input for Chap-
ters 5 and 7.
• M. Sel, G. Dißauer and T. Zefferer [230], Deliverable 2.6 Evaluation Scheme for Trust-
worthy Services. The concepts described in this project deliverable were used as input
for Chapters 8 and 9.
The work presented in the thesis builds on the ideas developed in these work packages.
However, the work presented in the thesis is entirely my own work.
1.6 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organised in three parts, together with a number of appendices.
The main contents of the various parts of the thesis are summarised immediately below.
1.6.1 Part I Background
Part I Background introduces the concepts of trust and trustworthiness, and provides detailed
backgroundmaterial built on in the remainder of the thesis. A literature survey is presented, and
the logic used for formalisation of trustworthiness in Parts II and III of the thesis is introduced.
Chapter 2 on trust and trustworthiness describes the context for the key topics within the set-
ting of Chapter 1. Introductory information sources that address topics relevant to the research
questions are given. The identified topics related to trust and trustworthiness are summarised
from both social and formal science perspectives, and applications of trust and trustworthiness
are reviewed.
Chapter 3 provides a thorough review and analysis of the literature on trust and trustwor-
thiness. A survey was conducted using a structured methodological approach, resulting in a
shortlist of articles that are reviewed in detail. On the basis of the shortlist, an analysis was
made of the state of the art on terminology related to trust and trustworthiness, as well as an
evaluation of methods used for formalisation and evaluation of trustworthiness. Potential im-
provement points were identified.
Chapter 4 introduces the logic used to model the proposed claims and evaluations of trust-
worthiness. The basic notation used is described, and the implementation of  as OWL
is discussed as this was used for the implementation.
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1.6.2 Part II Modelling trustworthiness
Part IIModelling trustworthiness describes a new approach to the creation and interpretation of
claims of trust and trustworthiness. Chapter 5 specifies requirements for describing an entity as
trustworthy. Chapter 6 analyses the root causes for the problems that underlie the current state
of the art and situates trustors and trustees in the   ecosystem. This is a system of systems in
which actors interact at their discretion. The ecosystem is structured in three planes (the enabler
plane, the trustworthiness provision plane and the functional plane). The trustworthiness of en-
tities is addressed by the   framework. The next three chapters specify the main constituents
of the framework.
• Chapter 7 presents the data model for the   framework, which consists of a set of
predicates in First Order Logic (FOL).
• Chapter 8 introduces the concept of a Rulebook, i.e. a set of constraints that reflect a
particular context for reasoning about trustworthiness. Whilst the notion of a rulebook is
a general one, a particular instance of a rulebook is also described which has been derived
from the requirements developed in Chapter 5.
• Chapter 9 presents a formal approach to evaluating trustworthiness using the   frame-
work.
1.6.3 Part III Using trust and trustworthiness
Part III Using trust and trustworthiness illustrates how the approach can be applied to improve
interpretations of trust claims. The practical feasibility of the   framework based system is
demonstrated by a partial implementation.
• Chapter 10 presents an overview of the partial implementation of the model. The imple-
mentation is described in detail in the following chapters.
• Chapter 11 presents an implementation of the data model in the Description Logic OWL.
It combines existing W3C ontologies with new classes and properties that were specifi-
cally created to allow semantically meaningful reasoning about trustworthiness.
• Chapter 12 is concerned with the data import and transformation techniques that were
developed to enable reasoning using data obtained from a range of sources in a variety of
formats. The selection of data sources for the prototype implementation is also described,
as well as the criteria that were used to select them.
• Chapter 13 describes the implementation of a specific rulebook inspired by the European
eIDAS Regulation [103].
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• Chapter 14 presents how the trustworthiness evaluation functions improve the interpre-
tation of trustworthiness.
• Chapter 15 presents experimental results from the partial implementation, and a compar-
ison with the prior art.
• Chapter 16 presents a summary of the framework and its partial implementation, the
conclusions of the thesis, and ideas for future work.
1.6.4 Appendices
The following appendices can be found at the end of the thesis.
• Appendix A provides background to the literature survey that was performed.
• Appendices B and C contain the longlist and shortlist from the survey.
• Appendix D provides a short description of ontology modelling.
• Appendix E contains the description of the   data model in formal notation.
• Appendices F and G provide background information on the European trusted lists and on
the list of trusted lists that were implemented as a consequence of the eIDAS regulation
[103].
• Appendix H describe how accreditation and conformity assessment are organised.
• Appendices I and J describe sources of company data and of natural persons used in the
prototype implementation.
• Appendix K provides examples of the data transformations used in the prototype.
• Appendix L describes how the output files of the transformations were combined into a
single file that can be loaded into an OWL-capable tool such as a graph database.
• AppendixM contains additional SPARQL codewhich demonstrates howSPARQLqueries






Trust, trustworthiness and related
concepts
This chapter introduces the concepts of trust and trustworthiness, together with
certain related ideas. Some of the key interpretations of the terms from the social
and formal sciences are introduced. This is followed by an introduction to the
applications of trust in an ICT setting.
2.1 Introduction
Continuing technological advances have resulted in widespread adoption of ICT-based solu-
tions to gain functional efficiency and monetary benefits. This adoption shows no sign of
decreasing. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that the digital society will continue to
increase its dependence on electronic transactions. Many such transactions are conducted be-
tween providers and consumers of services, possibly with the use of intermediaries. Relying
on the outcome of a transaction performed via an ICT system, or selecting which system to use
in the first place, forces the user to take a trust-related decision.
The terms trust and trustworthiness are in widespread use. This includes the common in-
formal use of statements such as trusting one’s doctor, or trusting those democratically elected
not to misuse their power.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines trust as ‘firm belief in the reliability, truth, or ability
of someone or something; confidence or faith in a person or thing, or in an attribute of a person
or thing,’ and trustworthiness as ‘worthy of trust or confidence; reliable, dependable.’
The close relationship between trust and dependability is illustrated by Avizienis et al. [13]
who define dependability as ‘The ability to deliver service that can justifiably be trusted.’ Other
definitions include the following.
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• Castelfranchi [46] states ‘trust is in fact a deficiency of control that expresses itself as a
desire to progress despite the inability to control.’
• Menezes et al. [241] describe the use of a trusted third party (TTP) to overcome problems
of entities that deny having signed a message or other entities falsely claiming having
signed a message. In order to overcome such problems a trusted third party (TTP) or
judge is required.
• The NIST framework [136] specifies trustworthiness as ‘an aspect that concerns the
avoidance of flaws in privacy, security, safety, resilience and reliability.’
More recently, the question has arisen whether a news item is to be trusted, or to be consid-
ered fake news. In all these situations, the meaning of these terms is not uniquely defined and
differing interpretations can lead to diverging opinions.
This section provides an introduction by setting the context of this chapter. Section 2.2
discusses social science approaches to understanding and using trust and trustworthiness. This
includes studies from sociological, psychological and legal points of view. Section 2.3 discusses
formal science approaches. This includes a review of how logic can be applied to trust rela-
tionships followed by a computational treatment of trust. Section 2.4 discusses the application
of trust and trustworthiness. This includes the relationship between trust and dependability
and a discussion of distributed trust, of trust and the semantic web and of multidisciplinary
approaches to trust. The chapter concludes with a summary in Section 2.5.
2.2 Social science approaches
The notions of trust and trustworthiness have been examined widely in a social sciences context.
In this section we review some of the main approaches of this type to the understanding of trust.
2.2.1 Sociological perspectives
Luhmann published a seminal work, originally in two parts and in German, in 1973 (Vertrauen)
[224] and 1975 (Macht) [225]. It was published in 1979 in English, as a single work, Trust
and Power [226]. His main thesis is that trust allows the complexity of society to be reduced.
Luhmann considers this complexity a problem for agents that want to align themselves with
society, or adapt to it. If the complexity level is too high, it blocks adaptation. Trust allows this
complexity to be reduced, and thus facilitates adaptation. As complexity increases, the need for
help with adaptation also increases.
Another sociological view is presented by Barber [21], who studied the limits of trust. His
view is that trust is an aspect of all social relationships. It also implies expectations about the
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future based on relationships and social systems. Barber states that while ‘technically compe-
tent role performance’ can be monitored (for example on the basis of results, if nothing else), an
expectation regarding ‘fiduciary obligations and responsibilities’ is different and more difficult.
Often there exists an asymmetrical position where the trustor knows less than the trustee about
such obligations. Hence the trustee must be trusted not to use this power against the trustor. The
question whether trust can be transferred or generalized across relationships is also addressed.
He concludes that ‘It should be an axiom of social analysis that actors who perform compe-
tently or show great fiduciary responsibility in one social relationship or organization may not
necessarily be trusted in others. Trust cannot necessarily be generalized.’ So a doctor’s com-
petent role performance and the meeting of fiduciary obligations may be generalizable to other
patients, but not to other roles (e.g. to fix a car that has broken down). Barber thus gives three
meanings to trust. One very general meaning, of trust in the moral social order, and two specific
ones, technical competence and fiduciary responsibility. He also asserts that trust functions as
a social control, particularly regarding the two specific meanings.
In The evolution of cooperation [15], Axelrod and Hamilton investigate how cooperation
can emerge and persist by applying game theory. They show that even where trust is limited
and the chance of communication slim, cooperation may still evolve under certain conditions.
This is illustrated by the Prisoner’s Dilemma from game theory. The concept was developed by
Flood and Dresher and published in an internal RAND research report. Tucker [316] formalized
the game and named it the Prisoner’s Dilemma, presenting it as follows:
• Twomembers of a criminal gang are arrested and imprisoned. Each prisoner is in solitary
confinement with no means of communicating with the other.
• The prosecutors lack sufficient evidence to convict the pair on the principal charge, but
they have enough to convict both on a lesser charge.
• Simultaneously, the prosecutors offer each prisoner a bargain. Each prisoner is given the
opportunity either to betray the other by testifying that the other committed the crime, or
to cooperate with the other by remaining silent.
• The offer is:
– If A and B each betray the other, they will both serve two years in prison;
– If A betrays B but B remains silent, A will be set free and B will serve three years
in prison (and vice versa);
– If A and B both remain silent, they will both serve only one year in prison (on the
lesser charge).
51
2.2. Social science approaches 2. Trust, trustworthiness and related concepts
Mutual defection is the only strong Nash equilibrium in the game (i.e. the only outcome from
which each player could only do worse by unilaterally changing strategy). The dilemma is
that mutual cooperation yields a better outcome than mutual defection but is not the rational
outcome because the choice to cooperate, from a self-interested perspective, is irrational.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma game has been studied extensively, including in the 1980 tour-
nament documented by Axelrod [14], in which a number of well-known game theorists were
invited to submit strategies to be run by computers. In the tournament, programs played games
against each other and themselves repeatedly. Each strategy specified whether to cooperate or
defect based on the previous moves of both the strategy and its opponent. The winner of the
tournament was the TIT FOR TAT strategy, which cooperates on the first move and then does
whatever its opponent has done on the previous move.
Social and philosophical views of trust are combined by Gambetta. He is both the editor
of the collection Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations [119] and author of the
final chapter of this collection, Can we trust trust? He defines trust as follows: ‘trust (or,
symmetrically, distrust), is a particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent
assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action, both before he
can monitor such action (or independently of his capacity ever to be able to monitor it) and in
a context in which it affects his own action.’ So in his view trusting a person means that the
trustor takes a chance that the trustee will not behave as expected. As there is a risk involved
in trusting, people tend to attempt to remove the need for trust, for example by establishing
constraints. These may for example take the form of contracts, which may not be binding but
are costly to fail to honour. Gambetta’s paper ends with a discussion of whether or not trust is
a sensible option, i.e. can we trust trust?
He also addresses the question of what could be done when either trust is so low that con-
ditions for cooperation are not available, or when trust is not great enough to sustain potentially
beneficial cooperation. It is stated that economising on trust is in general not a good strategy
because it is at least as risky to fail to understand how trust works and how it relates to the
conditions of cooperation. Factors such as the importance of long term arrangements, the ab-
sence of aggressive devices, the lack of ambiguity in what is cooperated about, and a step by
step increase in risks involved in cooperation are seen as important. It is stated that neither
trust nor potential sources of trust can be induced at will. Historical evidence is presented that
it makes sense to trust trust, including a study by Vélez-Ibanez [52] of Mexican credit asso-
ciations, where there is a culture construct, confianza en confianza. Within boundaries, trust
is set high enough for tentative cooperation not to be inhibited by paralysing suspicion. It is
stated that rational persons can be expected to seek evidence for their beliefs, and to offer such
evidence to others. Within limits, trust can be increased or decreased by gathering information
about the characteristics and past record of others. Whenever the gaps left by asymmetric infor-
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mation are detrimental, they can be bridged by reputation enhancement, pre-commitment and
promises. However, evidence is not seen as sufficient in its own right for trust, because trust is
predicated not on evidence but on the lack of contrary evidence.
The following reasons to trust trust are put forward. If one does not trust trust, one can
never find out. Trust begins with being open to evidence, acting as if one trusted, at least until
more stable beliefs can be established by further information. Also, trust is not a resource that
is depleted through use, instead the contrary. Trust is rather depleted by not being used. Trust
can uncover dormant preferences for cooperation. If one is not prepared to trust trust, one will
find that the alternatives are worse.
Bacharach and Gambetta jointly wrote Chapter 5 of Trust in Society [18]. They provide a
theoretical framework for determining when trust and its fulfilment are to be expected. Trust
is described as a particular belief which arises in games with a certain pay-off structure. They
also discuss the detailed structure of the semiotics of trust. The primary problem of trust is
introduced as ‘Can I trust this person to do X?’ This is studied as a two-player, non-cooperative
game where pay-off is determined by the players’ trust, knowledge and the possibilities for
rewards and punishment. The secondary problem of trust is the ‘judgement of apparent signs.’
The unobservable properties of a person are called krypta. Trust-warranting properties in a trust
game are called t-krypta in that game. A person’s manifesta correspond to his or her observable
features. A manifestum may be directly observable. Multiple manifesta might take the form
of e.g. a passport. Manifesta may be evidence of krypta and t-krypta. In a game setting, the
trustor needs to know the trustee, to reason about future pay-off. However, identity itself is
a krypton. Because signalling theory addresses ways of signalling identity, it is important in
trust problems. It can be observed that the concepts introduced in this theory are already related
to authentication. They can also be linked to Sybil attacks, where the cost of establishing an
identity is too low to deter an opponent from creating multiple identities as part of its attack
strategy.
The increasing deployment of robots has led to research on the social interaction and trust
between humans and robots. Trust as well as deception have been studied in this setting by
Arkin [10].
2.2.2 Psychological perspectives
In psychology, trust relates to beliefs regarding whether the person who is trusted (the trustee)
will do what is expected, as studied by Deutsch. In his foundational work ‘Cooperation and
trust’ [69] his definition includes the term ‘perceives’, so it can be deduced his view on trust is a
subjective one. Different agents will see beneficial or harmful outcomes differently, according
to their subjective interpretations. He further elaborates the idea that cost/benefit analysis is part
of taking a trust-related decision. When cooperation is considered, costs and benefits become
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increasingly important. However, this raises the problem that calculating the costs and benefits
for each individual outcome of a situation is time-consuming. Hence it makes sense to put
limits on such calculations. Through abstraction, trust allows such limits to be implemented. It
allows the trustor to treat certain things as ‘given’, thus avoiding the need to make calculations.
In later work [70], Deutsch suggests different circumstances for trust-related choices. They
include trust as social conformity, trust as virtue, and trust as confidence. The idea of trust as
confidence also features in the work of various other authors, particularly Cofta [62].
2.2.3 Legal perspectives of on-line transactions
Both European and North American legislation addresses objectives related to increasing trust
in on-line transactions for the benefit of dematerialisation of service provision and commerce.
The scope appears similar, i.e. the primary focus is either on European cross-border transactions
(both for identity and trust services), or in the US on ‘interstate or foreign commerce’ (with an
original focus on electronic signatures, later enlarged). Mason [236] published a seminal work
on electronic signatures in law. He argues that legal non-repudiation should be considered as
inherently different from cryptographic non-repudiation. His article about the Single European
Digital Market [237] addresses this in detail. Sel [295] provides an introduction to the trust
models used in Europe and in the United States.
2.2.3.1 The European Union
European legislation is created by the European Member States, the European Commission (a
source of initiatives, leading to proposals eventually implemented through programs, actions
or legislation), the European Parliament (where proposals are discussed and amended, and
approved/rejected) and the European Council (uniting the Ministers of the Member States).
Within the European Commission, DG Connect (the Directorate General for Communications
Networks, Content & Technology) took the initiative for the eIDAS regulation, covering elec-
tronic identification, authentication and trust services. The main legal document related to
electronic identification and trust services is the eIDAS Regulation [103]. It is remarkable that
the term trust is nowhere defined in the Regulation. There are also Implementing Decisions and
Implementing Regulations for electronic identification [104, 105, 108, 109], as well as for trust
services [106, 107, 110, 111]. Trust is not defined there either. Additional regulation addresses,
amongst others things, reference numbers for eSignature products, Points of Single Contact and
Trusted Lists. The European Commission publishes an entry point to the Trusted Lists in the
form of a List of Trusted Lists. The implementation of eIDAS is technically supported by ETSI
and CEN, including the development of standards.
Delos et al. [67] describes how every Member State is free to organise its trust ecosystem
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within the European Union. Engelbertz [86] reviews the security of eIDAS. The FutureTrust
project [161] researched the foundations of trust and trustworthiness and provided Open Source
software components and trustworthy services.
Regarding identity, Member States act in a sovereign way. EachMember State organises the
identity of its citizens at its discretion. Most Member States provide some form of an electronic
authentication mechanism. These mechanisms include userid/password schemes, smart cards
and mobile apps.
A Member State may notify one or more identity management systems to the Commission,
which (after acceptance by the other Member States) leads to mutual recognition across the
Member States. For this purpose, a set of minimum identity attributes has been defined [104]
for natural and legal persons.
Regarding trust services, aMember Statemay set-up a Supervisory Body in order tomonitor
Trust Service Providers (TSPs), including Qualified Trust Service Providers (QTSPs). While
the Supervisory Body is a Public Sector body, most TSPs and QTSPs are private enterprises.
The Supervisory Body will call upon the services of a Conformity Assessment Body (CAB)
to evaluate TSPs and QTSPs. Such CABs are typically private enterprises, accredited by a
National Accreditation Body (NAB).
The relations between these entities can be summarised as follows. Prospective QTSPs
must be audited (‘conformity assessed’) by a CAB. There are no prescribed standards for this
purpose. However, the following applies.
• A CAB needs to be accredited by a NAB.
• A CAB must make its conformity assessment scheme public.
• The European cooperation for Accreditation1 (EA) adopted Resolution EA 2014 (34) 22
[76] to use an eIDAS accreditation scheme based on ISO/IEC 17065 [176] supplemented
by ETSI EN 319 403 [87] as one possible way for CABs to assess conformity with the
relevant requirements of the eIDAS Regulation [103].
Terminology and basic definitions for electronic signatures are specified in eIDAS Article 3.
Three levels of increasing reliability and protection against potential misuse are defined. For
trust services, particularly electronic signatures, these are basic, advanced, and qualified. The
Commission offers an anchor point from where evaluation and validation of identity and trust
services can be initiated. This anchor point is legal, functional and technical. It is based on
the combination of a set of legal acts and the on-line publication of signed metadata. For trust
services, the List of Trusted Lists (LOTL), both in human and machine readable format, is
1The EA is the body recognised under Regulation 765/2008 [100] to manage a peer evaluation system across
European NABs
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publicly available. From this meta-data anchor point, parties such as Supervisory Bodies can
be identified, and each such Supervisory Body can publish the Trusted List for its territory.
Within these Trusted Lists, Trust Services Providers are identified. Qualified TSPs are subject
to mandatory supervision and conformity assessment, including bi-annual audits and the use of
qualified hard and software.
Regarding trust services, eIDAS Chapter III defines general provisions, the organisation of
supervision, and mutual assistance amongst supervisor bodies. It defines specific requirements
for TSPs and QTSPs, such as the bi-annual audit and the security breach notification require-
ment. Dedicated sections of eIDAS Chapter III define requirements for electronic signatures
and seals, as well as electronic time stamps, electronic registered delivery services, and website
authentication.
2.2.3.2 The United Kingdom
The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) is the supervisory body for electronic trust ser-
vices in the UK. According to the description on its website2, the ICO has responsibility for
supervision of the trust service provisions of the UK eIDAS Regulations. The ICO can grant
and revoke qualified status for trust service providers established in the UK, approve or re-
ject qualified trust services, report on security breaches, carry out audits and take enforcement
action.
The UK legislates electronic trust services through the UK eIDAS Regulations [292]. The
ICO provides guidance on this topic3. These UK eIDAS Regulations set out rules for UK
trust services and establish a legal framework for the provision and effect thereof. They are an
amended form of the EU eIDASRegulation and retainmany aspects of the EU regulation but are
tailored for use within the UK. They include no provisions relating to electronic identification
schemes, and exclude chapter II of the EU eIDAS regulation on this topic.
Post-Brexit, UK Statutory Instrument 2019 No. 89 [293] puts European legislation on elec-
tronic identity and trust services into UK law, and can be summarised as follows.
• Chapter II of the eIDASRegulation [103] regardingmutual recognition and interoperabil-
ity between public bodies has been revoked, including the UK implementing legislation.
• Chapter III regarding regarding mutual recognition and interoperability of trust services
between EU Member States is retained and amended to preserve the regulatory frame-
work for UK trust services. In particular, the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO)
is preserved as the supervisory body for trust services in the UK. The implementing leg-




2.2. Social science approaches 2. Trust, trustworthiness and related concepts
of EU 2015/1506, the Implementing Act on formats for signatures and seals [107], and
EU 2016/650, Standards for the Security Assessment of Qualified Signature and Seal
Creation Devices [111].
• Chapter IV is retained.
At the time of developing the implementation described in Chapter 10, the ICO was not
registered in the European LOTL as TLSO.
In addition, the tScheme4 is a not-for-profit organisation that serves organisations in the
trust service provider sector. tScheme works with two recognised tScheme assessors, KPMG
and LRQA, where tScheme uses the term assessor rather than conformity assessment body.
Nevertheless, like conformity assessment bodies, tScheme’s assessors make use of norms when
performing their assessment. As a consequence it seems that the responsibilities of these as-
sessors correspond sufficiently to those of a conformity assessment body for the purpose of the
classifying them as CABs in the   framework. At the time of developing the implementation
described in Chapter 10, tScheme was registered in the European LOTL as TLSO.
2.2.3.3 United States
In the United States, the federal ESIGN Act [320] grants electronic signatures the same legal
status as handwritten signatures throughout the United States. The ESIGN Act addresses elec-
tronic signatures as well as electronic records, both of which are commonly used in commerce
today. The focus of the ESIGN Act is on interstate commerce. Due to federal preemption,
the ESIGN Act allows electronic signatures when federal law applies. Where federal law does
not apply, every state has an electronic signature law, most following the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act (UETA) [253].
The source of the UETA is the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) which provides law com-
plementary to Federal US law. It is also known as the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws. The ULC provides States with legislation that brings clarity and sta-
bility to critical areas of state statutory law. The ULC published the UETA, enacted by many
states, covering retention of paper records (including cheques) and the validity of electronic
signatures.
The UETA is relevant from an electronic identity and trust services perspective. It deals
with enforceability of agreements and with record retention, as well as with the validation and
implementation of electronic signatures and electronic records. It is limited to transactions
between willing parties. The actual meaning and effect of signatures are deferred to other sub-
stantial law. However it does cover legal recognition and attribution as well as effect.
4urlhttps://www.tscheme.org/about-us/international-relationships
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In the US public sector, a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is used to establish a trust infras-
tructure. The General Services Administration (GSA) Office of Government-wide Policy acts
as the Federal Public Key Infrastructure (FPKI) Management Authority. It manages the design
and development, and implements and operates the Production FPKI Trust Infrastructure. The
FPKI is required for federal agencies to comply with Homeland Security Presidential Directive
12 [40] and Executive Office of the President (EOP) Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
MemorandumM-11-11 [319] to accept personal identification cards and third-party credentials
as directed by the OMB VanRoekel Memorandum [326].
In the US private sector, trust services such as electronic signatures are used extensively
by members of the SAFE BioPharma5 association. Also the Electronic Signature and Records
Association6 promotes the use of electronic signature and records.
2.3 Formal science approaches
In parallel, trust and trustworthiness have also been studied in the formal sciences. We review
below some of the key aspects of the study of trust in this context.
2.3.1 Applying logic to trust relationships
Logic has been widely used to model trust and trustworthiness.
2.3.1.1 Logic
The Oxford English Dictionary7 classifies logic as a branch of philosophy and defines it as
follows.
The branch of philosophy that treats of the forms of thinking in general, and more
especially of inference and of scientific method. (Prof. J. Cook Wilson.) Also,
since the work of Gottlob Frege (1848–1925), a formal system using symbolic
techniques and mathematical methods to establish truth-values in the physical sci-
ences, in language, and in philosophical argument.
Among the important properties that logical systems can have are consistency (no theorems
contradict another), validity (proof rules do not allow a false inference from true premises),
completeness (if a formula is true, it can be proven), soundness (if any formula is a theorem of
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Decidability To apply logic to trust relationships requires identification of the entities for
which the relationships (who to trust, who to consider trustworthy) hold. When a relationship
specifies exclusion constraints8 it is important that the entities’ identities can be established in
a globally unique way, because otherwise satisfaction of the constraint cannot effectively be
verified. In the context of an electronic society, authentication (the confirmation that an entity
is who it claims to be) is equally important.A decidable logic is required to model establishment
and authentication of identity.
According to Hitzler et al. [148], a logic is decidable if there is a decision procedure for this
logic. A decision procedure is a sound and complete algorithm that is guaranteed to terminate
on all inputs.
• A deduction logic is sound with respect to a given semantics if every proposition set P’
that can be derived from a set of propositions P by means of the deduction logic is a
semantic consequence. Formally P ⊢ P’ implies P ⊧ P’.
• A deduction logic is complete if every proposition set P’ that is semantically entailed by a
proposition set P can also be deduced by means of the provided deduction rules; formally
if P ⊧ P’ implies P ⊢ P’.
Note that the existence of a sound and complete deduction logic does not necessarily lead
to a decision procedure that, given P and P’, eventually terminates and correctly answers the
questionwhetherP ⊧P’. There are arbitrarilymanyways to apply the deduction rules, so in order
to turn a deduction logic into a decision procedure there must also be a method determining
which rules to apply and when to stop. There are logics with a sound and complete deduction
calculus that are undecidable, where a logic is decidable if there exists an algorithm that will
always return a correct true or false value.
Also according to Hitzler et al. [148], propositional logic is decidable, whereas in general
First Order Logic (FOL) and predicate logic are not. However FOL fragments or subsets may
be.
2.3.1.2 Applying logic to trust relationships
Burrows et al. [38] elaborated a logic formalism to study the authentication of principals in dis-
tributed computing systems. This formalism became known as the Burrows-Abadi-Needham
(BAN) logic. They introduce semantic constructs to express concepts such as believes, once
said, has jurisdiction over and sees. They make a distinction between two epochs, the past and
8E.g. separation of duty, which has as its primary objective to prevent fraud and errors. The objective is achieved
by disseminating the tasks and associated privileges for a specific process among multiple users. This principle is
demonstrated in the requirement for two signatures on a cheque.
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the present, and introduce rules such as the message meaning rule and the jurisdiction rule.
These are used to analyse truth and true beliefs in authentication protocols. The same authors
[39] later enlarged this analysis. The BAN logic helps its users determine whether exchanged
information is trustworthy, secured against eavesdropping, or both. The BAN logic was criti-
cised [256] because it lacks a good semantics with a clear meaning in terms of knowledge and
possible universes. Its critics argued that, in its idealized environment, the security of a protocol
rests on two different properties. First it must distribute information to a subset of the principals.
The exact nature of the predicate depends on the security protocol goals. Second the protocol
must also distribute information in such a way that another subset of the population is denied
access to it. In order to work properly, a security protocol must drive the state of knowledge
within a distributed system so that both predicates are satisfied. The BAN logic is limited in that
it only establishes predicates of the first kind. There are no postulates in the logic that deal with
predicates of the second kind. This has led in the 1990s to the abandonment of BAN-family
logics in favour of other proof methods. A further set of semantic constructs including is told,
possesses, once conveyed and believes and rules including being told, possession, freshness,
recognisability and message interpretation were introduced by Gong et al. [133].
Jøsang [188, 189, 190] proposed Subjective Logic, a calculus for subjective opinions which
in turn represent probabilities affected by degrees of uncertainty. It uses a generalisation of
Bayes’ Theorem to enable reasoning about subjective opinions. It can be used to allow reason-
ing about the relative trustworthiness of information sources and the reliability of the informa-
tion they provide. Jøsang [191] studied the relationship between risk and trust. Jøsang et al.
[192] explored various types of trust propagation.
Küsters et al. [211] formally define accountability and its relationship to verifiability. They
describe symbolic and computational accountability in terms of fairness and completeness.
2.3.2 Computational treatments of trust
Saltzer and Schroeder published a seminal paper [286] on the protection of information in
computer systems in 1975. They explore the protection of computer-stored information from
unauthorised use or modification. Required functions, design principles, and examples of ele-
mentary protection and authentication mechanisms are analysed. Descriptor-based protection
mechanisms are elaborated, and the relation between capability systems and access control list
systems are discussed. The use of segregation of duty to make ICT security solutions trustwor-
thy was introduced in the Clark-Wilson model [60] in 1987.
Marsh [234] addresses trust from a computational perspective. A heuristic formalism is
presented in Chapter 4, both in temporal and non-temporal forms, together with three types of
trust, namely basic trust, general trust and situational trust. Marsh asserts that situational trust
is of most importance in considering cooperative situations, such as in everyday life. Trust is
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looked at from the perspective of agents, sets of agents, and societies of agents. He further
distinguishes and formalises knowledge (e.g. x knows y), importance (e.g. of a to x), and utility
(e.g. of a to x). Basic trust is formalised as trust of x. General trust is formalised as trust of x
in y. Situational trust is formalised as trust of x in y for a. Trust is represented as a continuous
variable over the range [-1, +1]. Values are calculated as weighted probabilities.
Section 8 of a report contained in Appendix C of Marsh [234] discusses the order of trust,
and whether trust can be transitive. He states that trust has no ordering because it is subjective,
and what one agent may call 0.5 another agent may call 0.8. As these values cannot be compared
to one another, this implies that it is impossible to establish transitive relations.
The Trusted Computing Group (TCG)9, an industry standards group, has published specifi-
cations for a Trusted PlatformModule (TPM), designed to enable trust in computing platforms.
TPMs have been widely deployed, and form part of the larger notion of trusted computing (see,
for example, Martin [235]).
JTC 1, a joint committee of the ISO and IEC, has published the TPM specification as the
multi-part standard ISO/IEC 11889:2009 [169], [170], [171], [172].
PKIs are used to establish a level of trust in the association between an identifier and a
public key and/or a set of attributes. PKI trust is discussed in various Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF) Requests For Comments (RFCs), including RFC 5217 [252]. The IETF
operated a working group10 to develop Internet standards to support X.509-based PKIs. A set
of provisions to organise the roles and responsibilities within a PKI are defined in IETF RFC
3647 [59].
The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has developed [254] a de-
scription of PKI trust models and how to establish trust relations. Some widely discussed PKI
trust models are illustrated in Figure 2.1, and include:
• dedicated domain CAs, where trust only applies to the certificates in the same domain,
• shared domain CAs, where certificates with the same root CA are trusted, of which a
bridge CA [210] is a specific implementation,
• mutual exchange of certificates among domains and users,
• trust based on the issuing CAs listed in a trusted list.
Sel and Karaklajic [298] analysed the security and privacy threats to the Digital Tachog-
raphy system. The security of the system is based on electronic authentication and electronic
signatures. These are supported by a EU-wide PKI, of which the root CA is operated by the
EU’s Joint Research Centre in Italy, and trustworthy hardware installed in trucks.
9The TPM specifications are available from https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resources/
10https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/pkix/
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Figure 2.1: Four common PKI trust models.
Non-repudiation as provided by electronic signatures has also been studied. It typically
involves an actor in the role of a Trusted Third Party, responsible for key distribution. For an
introduction see Zhang [387], Coffey [61] or Onieva [265]. For an overview of how cryptogra-
phy and its standards support security primitives such as non-repudiation see for example Dent
and Mitchell [68].
2.4 Applications of trust
The notions of trust and trustworthiness have been applied in many settings. In this section we
review some of the main uses of trust and trustworthiness in the context of ICT. An example of
a multidisciplinary approach is also included.
2.4.1 Dependability and trust
A seminal article by Avizienis et al. [13] describes the relationships between dependability,
security and trust. Here dependability is defined as that property of a computer system en-
abling reliance to be justifiably placed on the service it delivers. Depending on the application,
emphasis may be put on various aspects of dependability, including:
• the property readiness for usage leads to availability;
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• the property continuity of service delivery leads to reliability;
• the property non-occurrence of catastrophic consequences on the environment leads to
safety;
• the property non-occurrence of unauthorized disclosure of information leads to confi-
dentiality;
• the property non-occurrence of improper alterations of information leads to integrity;
• the property aptitude to undergo repairs and evolution leads to maintainability.
Information security is widely defined to be themaintenance of confidentiality, integrity and
availability for information assets (the so-called CIA triad) -– see for example Gollmann [130].
Following Laprie [214], dependability is related to dependence and trust, and is also connected
to survivability, trustworthiness and high-confidence. Five fundamental system properties can
be identified: functionality, performance, dependability, security, and cost. Laprie [214] also
defines a system life cycle, and a taxonomy of faults. The relationship between faults, errors and
failures is described as a chain. The chain starts with either the activation of an internal dormant
fault or the occurrence of an external fault. This leads to an error in a system component, which
can be further propagated within the component or via a service interface into another system
component. In the second system component it becomes an input error, which may propagate
until it impacts a service interface, where it might lead to failure in the provision of correct
service. Definitions of dependability and security are elaborated. ‘The ability to deliver service
that can justifiably be trusted’ is provided as the first (original) definition for dependability.
‘The ability of a system to avoid service failures that are more frequent or more severe than
is acceptable’ is provided as an alternate definition. Security is defined using the composite
notion of confidentiality, as prevention of unauthorised disclosure, integrity, as the prevention
of unauthorised amendment or deletion of information, and availability as the prevention of
unauthorised withholding of information. The notions of dependence and trust are reiterated:
• The dependence of system A on system B represents the extent to which system A’s
dependability is (or would be) affected by that of system B.
• Trust is accepted dependence.
Accepted dependence is explained as the dependence allied to a judgement that this level of
dependence is acceptable. It is stated that such a judgement might be explicit and laid down in a
contract, implicit, or even unthinking or unwilling (if there is a lack of other options). It is stated
that the extent to which A fails to provide means of tolerating B’s failure is a measure of A’s trust
in B. More attributes of dependability and security are then introduced as secondary attributes.
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These include robustness, as dependability with respect to external faults as well as security,
accountability, authenticity and non-repudiability. It is also stated that the four concepts of
dependability, high-confidence, survivability and trustworthiness are essentially equivalent in
their goals and address similar threats. Means to attain dependability and security are discussed.
The focus is on fault prevention, tolerance, removal and forecasting. The conclusion states that
simultaneous consideration of dependability and security is relevant because in many cases
a user needs an appropriate balance of their various properties. A refined dependability and
security tree is presented for this purpose.
2.4.2 Distributed trust
A range of additional security and trust issues arise in the context of distributed as opposed to
centralised systems.
Abbadi and Martin [1] state that the relationship between trustor and trustee in a cloud
setting depends on the stakeholder type. A trustor might be interested in establishing trust in a
Cloud Provider, Cloud infrastructure, and/or a Cloud user. The main properties that contribute
to operational trust, namely adaptability, resilience, scalability and availability, are considered.
The role of security and privacy by design for trust in the cloud is analysed. The meaning of
trustworthiness is specified as ‘the service performs its job as expected, which includes but
not limited to considering security and privacy by design when performing any action’. The
calculation of operational trust properties is discussed as a topic for further research.
Schneider and Zhou [291] consider how to implement trustworthy services using replicated
state machines. They investigate the interactions of replication with threshold cryptography to
achieve distributed trust. Central to maintaining system state synchronised across distributed
nodes is consensus about data values. Consensus across nodes is achieved through their par-
ticipation in a consensus protocol. The types of fault tolerated by the consensus protocol are
an important factor. A common distinction is made between crash faults and Byzantine faults.
A crash fault is a malfunction, whereas a Byzantine fault presents conflicting symptoms to dif-
ferent observers. The description by Lamport et al. [213] of the Byzantine generals problem in
1982 laid the foundation for Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) computing. Here the difference
is made between loyal generals and traitors. Acquiring consensus while tolerating Byzantine
faults requires significant overhead.
When deployed within a single enterprise, or operated by a trusted authority, a crash fault-
tolerant (CFT) consensus protocol might be adequate. Many such CFT protocols have been
defined, including Paxos by Lamport [212]. Alternatively, in a multi-party, decentralized use
case, a Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT) consensus protocol might be required. The Byzantine
fault model asserts that a faulty component can exhibit arbitrarily malicious behaviour. BFT
consensus has been implemented but decreases performance and throughput. The Lamport-
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Shostak-Pease protocol [213] was the first BFT consensus protocol. Both CFT and BFT con-
sensus protocols find applications in distributed ledger technologies. A distributed ledger is
a ledger that is shared and synchronized, and distributed across a set of nodes. It is designed
to be tamper-evident, append-only and immutable, containing confirmed transaction records.
Distributed ledgers are a decentralised storage mechanism with characteristics that contribute
to trustworthiness. Karame and Androulaki [196] analyse the security of blockchains.
2.4.3 Trust and the Semantic Web
The SemanticWeb is a collaborativemovement led by theWorldWideWebConsortium (W3C).
The expression ‘Semantic Web’ was coined by Berners-Lee [30, 301] for a web of data that can
be processed by machines, where much of the meaning is machine-readable and hence can be
processed automatically. Berners-Lee introduced the concept of the Oh Yeah browser button,
by which the user can express their uncertainty about a document being displayed. The button
addresses the topic of how to know information can be trusted. Upon activation of the button,
the software retrieves metadata about the document, listing trust assumptions.
Semantic models are flexible and open conceptual models, examples of which include ter-
minologies, taxonomies and ontologies.
• A terminology is a collection of terms used in a field.
• A taxonomy is a controlled vocabulary organised according to the hierarchical (is-a) re-
lationships between its terms.
• An ontology is a taxonomy where each class has restrictions on its relationships to other
classes or on the properties a particular class is allowed to possess. This enables consis-
tency checking and inferencing. The root of ontologies can be found in Kripke’s Naming
and Necessity [207].
An important area of ontology research is related to the Semantic Web. The Semantic Web
Stack11 is amodel for the hierarchy of technologies and languages, where each layer exploits and
uses capabilities of the layers below. Trust is situated near the top of the stack12, as illustrated
in Figure 2.2.
Description Logic (DL) [281] has been widely used for ontology development and process-
ing (see, for example Baader [16], Markus Krötzsch et al. [208]).
As DL is used in this thesis as themodelling language, an introduction is provided in Section
4.3.3.
11https://www.w3.org/standards/semanticweb/
12https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantic_Web_Stack, retrieved August 2019
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Figure 2.2: Semantic Web Stack
Viljanen [330] classified thirteen different computational trust models using nine trust de-
cision input factors. She states there are three distinct problem areas surrounding trust, namely:
• to define the facts that support trust,
• to find the appropriate rules to derive consequences of a set of assumptions about trust,
and
• how to use information about trust to take decisions.
Viljanen focuses on the first problem, although reasoning logics or negotiation protocols
are not discussed. A trust taxonomy is proposed, based on nine factors. These are:
• awareness of identity,
• action (i.e. target or purpose),
• business value,
• competence (with regard to the action),
• capability,
• confidence (reflecting reputation and uncertainty),
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• context,
• history (experience, evidence, local reputation), and
• third party (open trust models accept information from third parties, while closed models
do not).
Van De Ven [324] studied automated legal assessment using OWL 2. An active community
continues to work on legal knowledge based systems13.
TheW3C’s ProvenanceWorking Group created PROV-O, a provenance ontology14. Prove-
nance plays a role in the semantic web stack’s trust layer. Moreau [245] analysed how prove-
nance contributes to trust. Ding [72] researched a provenance and trust aware inference frame-
work in the context of US Homeland Security based on a Bayes model of belief confidence.
Lyle andMartin [227] demonstrate how Trusted Computing can be used for provenance and
present an architecture for a trusted provenance system based on the hash chain mechanism im-
plemented in a TPM. In the proposed provenance architecture, every platform is equipped with
a TPM and is issued with an Attestation Identity Key, signed by a Certification Authority. Each
platform will collect the information from its authenticated boot process. This information, to-
gether with each job request and result, make up the provenance data captured by the platform.
This allows the provision of verifiable evidence regarding the software that was executed on
the platform. The security features of the TPM contribute to guaranteeing the integrity of the
provenance data.
2.4.4 Multidisciplinary approaches to trust
Cho et al. [57] provide a multidisciplinary survey on trust modelling. They address the con-
cept of trust, its measurement, constructs and properties, as well as applications and challenges.
They introduce the concept of composite trust, deriving from the interplay of unique character-
istics of different layers of a network. They propose trust dimensions should be constructed in
a given context, and trust should be formalised and validated according to metrics or models.
These are the prerequisites for making trust assessments that can be the basis for decision-
making. However, an indication of how this formalisation and validation should be done is not
provided.
Mitchell [243] considers the role of trust in relationships between key parties in the 5G
ecosystem and examines ways in which such trust can be provided and suggests the following.
• It is likely to be difficult for the large numbers of interacting participants in a 5G system
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might gain the degree of trust that they require.
• The absence of the appropriate levels of knowledge and trust could distort the market,
and costs for all parties could be significantly higher than they need to be.
• There is a need for a framework for developing an understanding the necessary trust
levels, and the way in which trust can be developed.
A potential multidisciplinary framework is introduced.
• Governmental Responsibilities: These should address the balance between governments
and the market.
• Industry Organisation Responsibilities: These should address to what degree and how
industry organisations should work within an industry ecosystem governance framework,
and how such a framework should manage the boundaries of responsibility, power and
rights of each stakeholder in the industry ecosystem.
• Technology: The question is raised whether the market can choose the most appropriate
security solutions based on customer requirements, assuming governments and industry
organisations are able to find ways to work together effectively to establish a system with
clear boundaries of responsibility, power and rights.
2.5 Summary
Social scientists have studied trust and trustworthiness from sociological, psychological and
legal points of view.
• Sociological perspectives deal with relationships between social agents and their coop-
eration. Trust is studied as a mechanism to reduce complexity and facilitate adaptation.
The asymmetrical relation between a trustor (which typically has little information) and
trustee (which typically has more information) is analysed. Game theory, when applied
to trust scenarios such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, indicates that even when the conditions
are such that trust is limited, cooperation may evolve. Gambetta points out that if one is
not prepared to trust trust, the alternatives are worse. Together with Bacharach he stud-
ied the difference between the primary and the secondary problem of trust. The primary
problem consists of finding an answer to the question ‘Can I trust this person to do X?’
The secondary problem is the ‘judgement of apparent signs.’ Such judgement involves
signalling theory for the signalling of identity or attributes, which is particularly relevant
in an electronic context where participants in transactions may not have met prior to the
transaction, or may never meet at all.
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• Psychological perspectives address perception and subjective interpretation. Trust is re-
lated to the belief that the trustee will do what is expected. Such a belief is subjective, as
different agents will see harmful or beneficial outcomes differently, based on their subjec-
tive interpretation. Trust allows an agent’s individual calculations to evaluate potential
outcomes to be limited.
• The legal perspective differs in Europe and the United States.
– In the European Union, the eIDAS regulation regulates the concepts of electronic
identity, authentication and trust services. It is remarkable that, although many
concepts related to trust such as trust services and trusted lists are defined, the term
trust itself is not defined in the legislation. Within the European Union, Member
States organise their trust ecosystem at will. Regarding identity, the main objective
is to support the single market and to have recognition of electronic identity and
authenticity. Regarding electronic signatures and related trust services, the objec-
tive to support the single market remains valid but additional attention is paid to
implementing standards. European regulation is intended to be as technologically
neutral as possible and avoids mentioning terms such as PKI in legal texts. Nev-
ertheless PKI is the main underlying technology for authentication, signatures and
the distribution of trust.
– The United States trust ecosystem is mainly based on the federal ESIGN Act which
granted electronic signatures the same legal status as handwritten signatures through-
out the United States. Due to federal preemption, the ESIGN Act allows electronic
signatures when federal law applies. Where federal law does not apply, every state
has an electronic signature law, most following the UETA, created by the Uniform
Law Commission (ULC) which provides law complementary to Federal US law.
The UETA deals with enforceability of agreements and with record retention, as
well as with the validating and effectuating of electronic signatures and electronic
records. As in the European Union, PKI is the predominant technology in the US
public sector for establishing a trust ecosystem.
In the formal sciences trust and trustworthiness have been studied from the points of view
of logic and computation. Logic-based trust research focusses on a range of topics, including
decision taking, decidability and interpretation. Regarding decision-taking in an electronic so-
ciety, it can be observed that what Gambetta and Bacharach call the secondary problem of trust
(the ‘judgement of apparent signs’) is a crucial part of the decision whether or not to engage
with a participant. This decision precedes the decision whether to rely on the outcome of a
transaction. Subjective Logic has been proposed as a probabilistic calculus for subjective opin-
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ions. From the computational perspective, research into the protection of information systems
and their security has been conducted. Protection against unauthorised use or modification has
been a paramount consideration. Marsh published an influential PhD thesis addressing trust
from a computational perspective. He distinguishes basic trust, general trust and situational
trust. Basic trust is formalised as trust of x. General trust is formalised as trust of x in y. Situ-
ational trust is formalised as trust of x in y for a. The latter is of most importance in decisions
related to cooperation.
Cryptography is a technology intimately related to security and trust. Of particular rele-
vance here, digital signature techniques form the basis for PKI-based systems. In general, the
use of cryptography gives rise to the need to distribute large numbers of keys in a secure and
reliable way, which has led to the term trusted third party (TTP).
To better understand how to apply trust, the relationship between dependability, security and
trust has been studied. Security has been recognised as a triad, composed of the attributes con-
fidentiality, integrity and availability. Dependability is defined as that property of a computer
system such that reliance can justifiably be placed on the service it delivers. Across multiple
applications emphasis may be put on various facets of dependability. Dependability is analysed
as a fundamental system property. Threats to dependability and security as well as the means to
attain them share common elements. Dependability is defined as the ability to deliver services
that can justifiably be trusted. Trust can also be seen as accepted dependence.
The Semantic Web is a collaborative movement led by the World Wide Web Consortium
(W3C). The expression ‘Semantic Web’ refers to a web of data that can be processed by ma-
chines, where much of the meaning is machine-readable, and hence can be processed automat-
ically. To make such processing trustworthy it is common to rely on metadata. To process
both the data and the corresponding metadata, semantic models have been proposed. These are
commonly classified as terminologies, taxonomies and ontologies. A terminology is a collec-
tion of terms used in a field. A taxonomy is a controlled vocabulary organised according to
the hierarchical (is-a) relationships between its terms. An ontology is a taxonomy where each
class has restrictions on its relationships to other classes or on the properties a particular class is
allowed to possess. This enables consistency checking and inferencing, which is relevant to es-
tablishing trustworthiness. The W3C standardised OWL as a Web Ontology Language. There
exist decidable versions of OWL, allowing the creation of ontologies that can be processed by
automated reasoners in a reasonable time. Using OWL to automate legal assessment has been
studied. It has been studied how provenance can be formalised in an OWL ontology, and how
it contributes to trust.
Trust can also be seen from a multidisciplinary point of view, which leads to the concept of
composite trust. Its components can be derived from the characteristics of the different element
that are involved, e.g. the layers of a network. These characteristics can be aggregated into trust
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dimensions. On this basis a composite trust model can be constructed.
The following critical observations can be made.
• While it seems reasonable to expect definitions of trust and trustworthiness to be pro-
vided, as there is an explicit trust layer in the semantic web stack (see Figure 2.2), these
definitions are lacking.
• The European eIDAS Regulation [103] that specifically covers trust services does not
include a definition of trust.
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Chapter 3
A structured literature review
This chapter provides a detailed literature-based review of the notions of trust and
trustworthiness, and an analysis of its findings.
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present the results of a formally structured review of the literature on trust
and trustworthiness, focusing on those aspects of the greatest relevance to the main focus of
this thesis. The main purposes of this review were to obtain a better understanding of the prior
art, and to identify areas where further work is needed.
A particular focus was on the semantics of trustworthiness and methods for the automation
and interpretation of claims thereof. The scope of the review was limited to formal models of
trust and trustworthiness with a focus on semantic models.
This chapter consists of the following sections. Section 3.2 describes the methodology used
to conduct the review. The protocol used and details of the realisation of the methodology are
given. Section 3.3 describes the first phase of the review. It covers the preparatory steps, includ-
ing the definition of the scope and purpose of the survey, and the identification of search terms
and information sources. Section 3.4 covers the search over the selected information sources.
The criteria for creating an initial list (‘longlist’) were defined and the information sources were
searched using these criteria. This led to the selection of 125 articles. This selection was nar-
rowed by defining a second set of criteria. Applying these criteria led to the creation of the final
list (‘shortlist’) which contained 33 articles. Section 3.5 describes the analysis performed on the
articles in the shortlist. This included a classification according to the formalisms and reason-
ing mechanisms used, which resulted in five clusters. Further research topics were identified.
Section 3.6 summarises the work done.
Appendix A provides additional information on the survey. The articles included in the
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longlist and shortlist are listed in Appendices B and C.
3.2 Design of the review methodology
The details of the methodology that was used to conduct the literature review are specified.
This includes the specification of the protocol used and a breakdown of the work performed. A
critique on the methodology is also provided.
3.2.1 Protocol
As the research domain was broad, the need to use a structured method was identified. The pro-
tocol used is a combination of those proposed by VomBrocke [331] and Okoli [260], introduced
below. As the review was carried out by the author alone, there was no need for synchronisa-
tion with other researchers. Searches were performed in the order described, using the RHUL
Library Search facilities. When an article was identified during multiple searches, it is only
reported in the first search. Lists of articles are ordered according to the last name of the first
author.
3.2.2 Background to the approach
As noted above, the approach used for the survey is based on Vom Brocke et al. [331] as refined
by Okoli [260]. VomBrocke proposed an approach to performing a systematic literature review,
formalising the need for researchers to document such searches. The Vom Brocke literature
search framework consists of five phases. In the first phase, the review’s scope and flavour
are defined. Vom Brocke suggests basing reviews on the Cooper literature review taxonomy
[64] which contains six characteristics, namely focus, goal, organisation, perspective, audience
and coverage of the review. The second phase studies the key topics within the scope of the
review and identifies the main relevant concepts. This helps consolidate existing information
and identify areas where new knowledge may be needed. The third phase involves the actual
literature search, in journals and databases of articles and proceedings. Phase four consists of
analysis and synthesis, which is followed by writing up questions for future research in the fifth
and final phase.
Okoli [260] further elaborated Vom Brocke’s work. He refined Vom Brocke’s approach to
the third phase by dividing it into eight detailed steps. These are:
• Purpose of the literature review,
• Protocol and training,
• Searching for the literature,
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• Synthesis of studies,
• Writing of the review.
These steps were used for the creation of a specific approach for the survey.
3.2.3 Approach used
3.2.3.1 Breakdown of work
Building on the schemes of Vom Brocke and Okoli, the following breakdown of work was
defined.
• Preparation:
– Specification of scope, purpose and survey questions,
– Identification of:
∗ candidate search terms,
∗ candidate information sources,
– Selection of search terms and information sources,
• Execution:
– Search and creation of longlist,
– Qualification of articles and creation of shortlist,
• Analysis:
– Review of articles included in the shortlist,
– Identification of future research topics.
3.2.3.2 Critique
The above method is not without bias, and is by no means the only one possible. A key area for
possible critique is how selections are made. The above method included three selections:
• information sources,
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• search terms,
• articles.
A broad set of potential information sources was surveyed, as described in Section 3.3.3.
The Web Of Science Core Collection was used as a starting point. However, it is clearly im-
possible to guarantee completeness.
Furthermore, the choice to use search terms can be challenged. It is equally possible to




• other factors, such as references, further citations, quality of abstract or introduction,
quality of writing, etc.
Regarding the selection of articles, two techniques were used to try to minimise the risks
of the exclusion of potentially valuable articles:
• the introduction of a longlist and a shortlist, each created on the basis of its specific
longlist and shortlist selection criteria, and
• survey and review articles were considered.
However, the definition and application of the longlist and shortlist selection criteria might
suffer from incompleteness, lack of depth or incorrect application. This may also apply to the
survey and review articles.
3.3 Preparation
Preparation for the search involved defining the scope and purpose, specifying motivating ques-
tions, and selecting search terms and information sources.
3.3.1 Scope, purpose and questions
The scope of the review was limited to formal models of trust and trustworthiness with a fo-
cus on semantic models. Where probabilistic models overlap with this scope, they have been
included.
The purpose of the review was to build an understanding of the semantics of trust and
trustworthiness, as well as methods for the automation and interpretation of claims thereof.
The following questions were prepared to motivate the review.
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• What is today’s perspective on formal and semantic models of trust and trustworthiness?
• How is trustworthiness formalised and evaluated today, how are claims interpreted?
• What are the main potential improvement points?
3.3.2 Search terms
Candidate sources such as the Web of Science1 (WOS) suggest various ways of formulating
search terms. The following are common ways of expressing a terminology and search terms
for a domain:
• Unstructured, or natural language vocabularies, where there is no restriction on the vo-
cabulary, and
• Structured vocabularies, where restrictions are imposed:
– Controlled vocabularies provide a way to organize knowledge for subsequent re-
trieval. They are used in subject indexing schemes, subject headings, thesauri, tax-
onomies and other form of knowledge organization systems. Controlled vocabulary
schemes mandate the use of predefined, authorised terms that have been preselected
by the designer of the vocabulary, in contrast to natural language vocabularies.
– Taxonomies are created according to a scientific protocol, consisting of identifying
and naming species and arranging them into a classification.
– Ontologies formally represent knowledge as a set of concepts within a domain, and
the relationships between those concepts. An ontology can be used to reason about
the entities within that domain and may be used to describe the domain.
Both structured and unstructured vocabularies were used to identify the initial search terms.
3.3.2.1 Natural language vocabulary
To identify the initial search terms using a natural language vocabulary, a combination of an
English dictionary with a historical background and two modern electronic search engines was
used:
• the Oxford English Dictionary2,
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• Microsoft Academic4.
The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) is an authority on the English language, providing
basic descriptions of words. The OED provides a guide to the meaning and history of more than
280,000 terms. As an historical dictionary it is different from dictionaries of current English
where the focus is on present-day meanings. It contains the following descriptions:
• Trust: Firm belief in the reliability, truth, or ability of someone or something; confidence
or faith in a person or thing, or in an attribute of a person or thing.
• Trustworthiness: Worthy of trust or confidence; reliable, dependable.
For semantics of trust or trustworthiness, no dictionary entries were found. Hence no spe-
cific candidate search terms were identified.
The Google Scholar user interface allows querying through search terms and natural lan-
guage. It uses underlying structures which are not made public. Hence it was regarded as a
natural language vocabulary. The selection that Google Scholar makes is not transparent. It
ranks the search results and shows only the first 1,000 results of any search, based on algo-
rithms that Google changes at their discretion. A search for ‘trust’ with the period not specified
returned about 3,700,000 results. Specifying the period as 2009-2019 returned about 1,690,000
results. Details can be found in Appendix A.1.1.
Microsoft Academic allows searching by author, author institution, paper publication title,
journal, topic and conference. Like Google Scholar it is not transparent about the classifica-
tion algorithms used for searches. Nevertheless, as the tool covers a wide range of academic
sources, searches including trustworthiness were conducted. These searches returned thousands
of results. Details can be found in Appendix A.1.2.
3.3.2.2 Structured vocabularies
Providers of information that make use of structured vocabularies include:
• the Web of Science5 (WOS),
• the 2012 ACM CCS Classification6,
• the IEEE taxonomy7, and







3.3. Preparation 3. A structured literature review
Details on the analyses performed on these structured vocabularies can be found in A.1.4.
Key aspects are as follows.
• The WOS makes use of keywords, and 252 subject categories mapped to 151 broadly
defined research areas, including Engineering, Chemistry, Computer Science, Physics,
and Mathematics. No keywords, categories or research areas are directly related to trust
or trustworthiness.
• The 2012 ACM Computing Classification System (CCS) is a poly-hierarchical ontology,
integrated into the search capabilities and topic displays of the ACM Digital Library9. A
search in the on-line ACMCCS at the top level yielded four results for the term trust, and
no results for the term trustworthiness.
• The IEEE publishes the IEEE Taxonomy, made up of three hierarchical levels under
each term-family (or branch) formed from the top-most terms of the IEEE Thesaurus.
This is a controlled vocabulary of about 10,100 descriptive engineering, technical, and
scientific terms as well as IEEE-specific society terms. The taxonomy did not yield any
useful search terms. No matches were found for trustworthiness. The thesaurus yielded
a number of terms. Those are listed in Table A.4.
• The Computer Science Ontology (CSO) [285] is a large-scale ontology of research ar-
eas that was automatically generated using the Klink-2 algorithm [268] on the Rexplore
dataset [269]. This dataset consists of about 16 million publications, mainly in the field
of Computer Science. A search for ‘semantics’ returned 13 results, listed in Table A.5.
No matching CSO concept was identified for the terms ‘semantics of trust’ or ‘semantics
of trustworthiness’.
Details on the selection of the search terms are given in Appendix A.1.3. The resulting
search terms were:
• From the unstructured sources:
• semantic trust model,
• evaluation of trust,
• computational trust models,
• ontology based reasoning about trustworthiness,
• ontologies for trustworthy solutions,
• trustworthy fulfilment of commitments,
9https://dl.acm.org/
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• trustworthiness measurement from knowledge graph,





3.3.3.1 Candidate information sources
The identification of candidate sources was based on discussions with my supervisor, a study
of the Royal Holloway University of London’s Information Security Group training material
on the topic, a review of trust related and semantic web related conference proceedings (IFIP
TM, DEXA/TrustBus, ISWC) and on-line research. Candidate sources were divided into two
tiers. The first tier consists of providers that make citation indexing and ranking a core part of
their offering. The second tier consists of providers that mostly focus on offering access to in-
formation repositories, including libraries, search engines and publishers. Details are provided
in Appendix A.1.5.
3.3.3.2 Selection criteria for information sources
The following selection criteria were defined to select sources for searching. The search was
designed to use both broad and deep information sources of verifiable quality. For broadness,
electronic research repositories such as Web of Science, IEEE, Elsevier, and ACM were in-
cluded. For depth, this was complemented by sources that are specifically dedicated to topics
related to the research questions of the review.
3.3.3.3 Searches for information sources
The Web of Science Core Collection (WOS CC) was used as the initial source. The WOS
indexes bibliographic records, split into citation indexes. Given the scope of the review, the
Science Citation Index Expanded (SCIE) is the primary index to consider, complemented by
the Emerging Sources Citation Index (ESCI). A first search of the WOS Master Journal List10
(MJL) was conducted for the WOS Core Collection, using ‘trust’ as search term. The names of
two journals were returned:
• Game and Wildlife Conservation Trust Review (annual), Game and Wildlife Conserva-
tion Trust, ISSN: 1758-1613,
10http://mjl.clarivate.com
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• Journal of Trust Research11 (semi-annual), Routledge Journals, Taylor and Francis, ISSN:
2151-5581.
The scope of the first journal did not match the review scope, and hence this was not con-
sidered. The second journal describes itself as an inter-disciplinary and cross-cultural jour-
nal dedicated to advancing cross-level, context-rich, process-oriented, and practice-relevant re-
search. The journal addresses the fundamental nature of trust (e.g. psychological attitude and/or
behavioural choice; trustfulness and/or trustworthiness), the key components of trust, and the
distinction and link between cognitive (rational and instrumental), affective (emotional and sen-
timental), norm-related (cultural and ethical), and rule-related (market and legal) components
of trust. Its scope did not match that of the review, and hence this journal was not considered
further.
A second search was conducted of the WOS MJL, in the WOS Core Collection, using trust
semantic as search term. This search returned no result.
A third searchwas conducted of theWOSMJL, in theWOSCore Collection, using semantic
as search term. This search returned three journals:
• International Journal of Semantic Computing (quarterly), World Scientific Publishing
Company PTELTD, 5 Toh Tuck Link, Singapore, Singapore, 596224, ISSN: 1793-351X,
index: Emerging Sources Citation Index,
• International Journal on Semantic Web and Information Systems (quarterly), IGI Global,
701 E Chocolate Avenue, STE 200, Hershey, USA, PA, 17033-1240, ISSN: 1552-6283,
index: Science Citation Index Expanded,
• Semantic Web (bimonthly), IOS Press, Nieuwe Hemweg 6B, Amsterdam, Netherlands,
1013 BG, ISSN: 1570-0844, index: Science Citation Index Expanded.
The Association for ComputingMachinery (ACM) publishes conference proceedings, jour-
nals, magazines, books and newsletters. They publish two journals that have trust within their
scope:
• Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems (TCPS), whose scope includes Trustworthy Sys-
tem Designs. It is indexed by most indexing mechanisms but its most cited articles can-
not be directly identified from the journal’s website. Its most cited articles are, however,
likely, to be included in the WOS searches.
11https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rjtr20/current
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• Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC), focusing on the intersection of
computer science and economics. Its scope includes computational social choice, rec-
ommendation/reputation/trust systems, and privacy. This overlapped less with the scope
of the literature review.
The ACM also publishes the Transactions on Privacy and Security (TOPS), previously re-
ferred to as TISSEC, but its focus does not explicitly include trust or trustworthiness.
The ACM organises a number of Special Interest Groups, with SIGSAC12 focussing on
Security, Audit and Control. There was no immediate reference identified to trust or trustwor-
thiness in its activities or publications.
Elsevier publishes the Journal of Web Semantics as well as Computers & Security, the
journal of Technical Committee 11 (Computer Security) of the International Federation for
Information Processing (IFIP).
IOS publishes 95 journals, including the Semantic Web Journal (SWJ) and the Journal of
Computer Security (JCS). Both the SWJ and the JCS are indexed by most indexing mechanisms
but its most cited articles cannot be directly identified from the journal’s website. It is assumed
their most cited articles are included in the WOS searches.
IEEE produces many publications, of which the most relevant within the search scope ap-
pear to be:
• IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing (TDSC),
• IEEE Computer Society’s Technical Committee on Security and Privacy13
– Magazine on Security and Privacy,
– Proceedings from conferences, workshops and symposia on Security and Privacy.
The publications from the IEEE Computer Society’s Technical Committee on Security and
Privacy (the magazines and conference proceedings) were browsed on-line (2/8/2019). It was
subsequently concluded that there was little if any work published regarding the semantics of
trust and trustworthiness, and hence these were not further investigated.
With Marsh as editor, SpringerOpen published a dedicated Journal of Trust Management14
in the past. However, this ceased publication as of 15 June 2017.
3.3.4 Selection
Using the search terms across the information sources returned a variety of results that re-
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topic (wildlife conservation, psychological attitude and/or behavioural choice), the WOS MJL
returned three journals that cover semantics: International Journal of Semantic Computing
(World Scientific Publishing Company), International Journal on Semantic Web and Informa-
tion Systems (IGI Global), and Semantic Web (IOS). On trust semantics the WOSMJL returned
no useful results. ACM TCPS appeared to be a relevant source, but given the lack of direct
searching possibilities it was assumed its articles are included in WOS searches. Elsevier and
IOS have dedicated publications regarding semantics. Elsevier publishes the Journal of Web
Semantics, while IOS publishes the Semantic Web Journal. The IEEE has a variety of interest-
ing publications but these do not cover semantics.
To make sure sufficiently broad sources were included, it was decided to include the con-
ference proceedings from the TrustBus and the IFIP TM conferences, as publications from
the Journal of Trust Management often referred to articles that appeared in those proceedings.
Furthermore the services from the Digital Bibliography & Library Project (DBLP)15, Google
Scholar16 and Microsoft Academic17 were added as these are broad sources of information.
On this basis, the following sources were selected:
• WOS,
• TrustBus and IFIP TM conference proceedings,
• Journal of Web Semantics,
• Computers & Security journal,
• Journal of Trust Management,
• DBLP,
• Google Scholar and Microsoft Academic.
3.4 Execution
The creation of an initial ‘longlist’ and its refinement into a focused ‘shortlist’ are discussed.
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3.4.1 Longlist criteria
The longlist was created using a screening process. Articles, including literature reviews and
surveys, were included in the longlist if they appeared in the search result of at least one of the
sources identified in the previous section, and either
• their title or abstract indicated they address a problem that is the same or closely related
to the problem described in the thesis problem statement, defined in Section 1.2.1, or
• They address the research questions described in Section 1.2.3.
3.4.2 Performing the search
A longlist was created by searching the information sources selected in Section 3.3.4 using
the search terms defined in Appendix A.1.4.2 and selecting articles on the basis of the longlist
criteria defined above. This resulted in the following selection:
• WOS: 25 articles were included,
• IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing: 5 articles were included,
• TrustBus and IFIP TM conference proceedings: 48 articles were included,
• Journal of Web Semantics: 5 articles were included,
• Computers & Security journal: 5 articles were included,
• Journal of Trust Management: 2 articles were included,
• DBLP: 16 articles were included,
• Google Scholar: 7 articles were included,
• Google Scholar and Microsoft Academic were additionally searched for surveys and lit-
erature reviews, from where 11 articles were included.
3.4.3 Longlist and shortlist
As a result of the search the longlist contained 125 articles, listed in appendix B. The articles in
the longlist were screened according to their relevance. For this purpose the following shortlist
criteria were adopted.
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• Shortlisted articles must match the defined scope of the thesis, namely semantic and
formal models of trust and trustworthiness. The focus was on models based on logic
rather than on statistics, probability, social networks or reputation. Probabilistic models
were excluded from the scope as they are based on statistics rather than on logic.
• They must have the potential to contribute to addressing the research questions given in
Section 1.2.3.
• They must be based on sound and transparent research methodologies.
On the basis of these criteria, 33 articles were included in the shortlist, including five sur-
vey/review articles. The shortlist is provided in appendix C.
3.5 Analysis
All articles were analysed to determine whether they contribute to building an understanding
of the semantics of trustworthiness and/or methods for the automation and interpretation of
claims thereof, as described in Section 3.3.1. In a first step the surveys and reviews were anal-
ysed. The focus was on the identification of trends and themes, and on areas for improvement.
Subsequently all remaining articles were analysed. Here the focus was on the formalisms used,
both for data modelling and for reasoning. For those articles that were found to be relevant to
the thesis, a short criticism was provided.
The bibliographic references in the text use the name of the author(s) for articles that have
maximum two authors. When an article has more than two authors, the name of the first author
is used, followed by et al. The full list of authors can be found in the bibliography.
In the tables the models are referred to using the name of their first author for the sake of
brevity.
3.5.1 Surveys and reviews
3.5.1.1 Overview
Two surveys contain material particularly relevant to the scope and objectives of the thesis:
• The survey by Cho et al. [57] on trust modelling introduces a four-dimensional compos-
ite trust model with dimensions communication trust, information trust, social trust and
cognitive trust. Cho et al. conclude that, as networks become more complex and interwo-
ven, deriving trust becomes highly complex. For quantification of trust the identification
of key trust dimensions is the first step, followed by formalising trust and validating its
metrics or models. Only then can accurate trust assessments be made.
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• The review by Mahmud and Usman [231] covers trust establishment and estimation in
cloud services. The article starts with a background discussion of the NIST cloud model
and cloud computing [239], and introduces trust management. A trust establishment and
evaluation framework is presented that starts from security, privacy and SLA measures.
From this ‘rooted trust’ is derived. There are however no goals or objectives defined
hence it is hard to conclude whether the measures achieve their intended goals. A tax-
onomy is presented, divided into policy based trust models (in fact based on legislation
rather than policy) and miscellaneous schemes, estimation frameworks, statistical and
probabilistic methods, fuzzy logic, multiple criteria decision making and algorithmic so-
lutions. The analysis covers trust factors, experiments, benefits and limitations. The
term trust factor is not explicitly defined, but covers a wide range of concepts such as
security, risk, privacy, auditability, scalability etc. The future research directions include
trust transparency, bio-inspired methods, trust in mobile cloud, higher order statistics,
and evidence-based trust.
The following three articles provided interesting background reading but did not yield rel-
evant observations:
• Govindaraj’s review [134] of trust models refers to trust management as introduced by
Blaze et al. [34] and to the US NIST models of cloud deployment [221]. One section is
devoted to the semantics of trust but it is rather short, referring to the different roles of
trustor and trustee. The actual meaning of trust is not discussed.
• The survey by Habib et al. [139] focuses on trust and reputation (TR) systems. However
interesting the survey, reputation-based systems are not in the scope of this thesis.
• The review by Kirrane et al. [202], titled Privacy, Security and Policies: A Review of
Problems and Solutions with Semantic Web Technologies, does not address trust or trust-
worthiness.
3.5.1.2 Observations
From the survey and review articles, two observations relevant to the scope and objectives of
the thesis were made:
• The survey by Cho et al. [57] identifies three steps to make accurate trust assessments:
– the identification of key trust dimensions,
– the formalisation of trust, and
– the validation of its metrics or models.
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A formalisation of these steps seems a relevant research topic.
• The review by Mahmud and Usman [231] introduces the term trust factor without ex-
plicitly defining it. It covers a wide range of concepts such as security, risk, privacy,
auditability, scalability etc. A more explicit definition of the term trust factor seems a
relevant research topic.
3.5.2 Articles
The shortlisted articles were analysed in terms of their main objectives, the formalism used for
representation, and the reasoning mechanism. From this analysis five clusters emerged:
• Trust-related ontologies specified in OWL,
• Other trust-related ontologies,
• Models based on logic other than OWL,
• Probabilistic models, and
• Other models.
For each cluster the models’ main objectives, chosen representation formalisms/semantics
and reasoning approach are summarised in a table. Only the first two clusters contain work that
is directly relevant to this thesis, and hence the work in these two clusters has been analysed in
greater detail. In particular, a short set of open questions that have not been addressed by the
prior art is derived from the analysis of the first cluster. In the case of the final three clusters,
the analysis is restricted to a brief review of the data representations and reasoning methods
used.
3.5.2.1 Trust-related ontologies in OWL
The first cluster included trust-related models based on OWL ontologies. These models are
summarised in Table 3.1.
Discussion Bernabé et al. [26] propose SOFIC/Trust-DSS, a Decision Support System for in-
tercloud trust and security, to allow secure interoperability in a trusted heterogeneous multido-
main. It consists of SOFIC (an OWL ontology) and Trust-DSS (SWRL rules over the ontology
and a quantification of assertions using Fuzzy logic).
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Model Main objectives Representation formal-
ism
Reasoning
Bernabé [26] Decision Support Sys-
tem for intercloud trust











Karthik [197] Trust framework for
sensor-driven pervasive
environments
OWL ontology Security rules in
SWRL
Karuna [198] Trust model for on-
line health information
systems
Taxonomy of trust factors
and a User’s Trust Pro-
file Ontology (UTPO) in
OWL which defines trust
factors as classes, taking
particularly their relation
to the user into account
Recommender
algorithms
Kravari [205] Internet of Things trust
management (short paper













fusion as a decision sup-










Sel [296] Trust modelling based on
logic
















Table 3.1: Trust-related ontologies in OWL
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• The Security Ontology For the InterCloud is the ontology on which the system is based.
It is modelled in OWL 2 and builds on the mOSAIC ontology [248]. SOFIC is based on
the concepts from NIST SP800-53 [255], the Cloud Security Alliance’s (CSA) Clouds
Control Matrix18 and the ENISA guide to monitoring security service levels in cloud
contracts [151]. The trust estimations use Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL19) rules
over the OWL ontology and are quantified using Fuzzy logic.
• The Trust and Security Decision Support System (Trust-DSS) calculates security ex-
pectations and trust values about others cloud services in order to determine if a Cloud
Service Provider can trust another one for a given context, at a given time. Trust-DSS
contains meta rules (which do not need to be customised) and regular rules (which do
need to be customised to a specific assessment). An example of ameta-rule is the verifica-
tion that the value of a parameter such as SecurityAssessmentParameter has a normalised
value that is low (e.g. 0.2), or below a threshold. This parameter might e.g. represent the
percentage of successful data migrations of the service provider, or a numerical value
that represents a similar parameter.
The SOFIC/Trust-DSS model has the following issues.
• There is a lack of analysis regarding the evidence data that is required to operate the
model. It is stated that ‘The security evidences about a cloud service can be obtained
directly from the observations of the behavior of the service.’ While there is an analysis
provided of the type of evidence required, whether this information is available or how it
could be obtained is not addressed.
• The actual SOFIC ontology could not be analysed since it has not been made public. Two
references were identified20 (in the article and on the homepage of the author), but both
were deactivated.
Karthik and Ananthanarayana [197] define a trust ontology in OWL that can be used by
each node in a pervasive environment to define its own security rules in SWRL. The ontology’s
key classes are trust management process, trust establishment, trust update, subject and object
nodes. The subject node trusts another node with the help of the trust management process.
The object node is trusted. This trust is expressed in a value between -1 and +1, calculated on
the basis of collected evidence. The SWRL security rules are mentioned but not explained or
provided. An illustration of such a rule is available in pseudo code, where it can be seen that
18https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/cloud-controls-matrix/
19https://www.w3.org/Submission/SWRL/
20The article includes the url http://reclamo.inf.um.es/sofic as a reference to the actual ontology, and
author’s homepage has the url http://selfnet.inf.um.es/sofic/.
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decisions are taken depending on whether the value of the calculated trust is above or below
0.3.
This model has the following issues.
• The actual trust model ontology could not be analysed since it has not been made public.
The SWRL rules for calculating trust values have also not been published. This can be
interpreted as a lack of transparency.
• The relationship between the ontology’s classes and properties and the security rules is
not specified.
• An explanation is not given for the meaning or semantics of the calculated trust value.
• There is a lack of analysis regarding the data required to operate the model. The model
requires data to reason about. However whether this information is available or how it
could be obtained is not addressed.
Karuna et al. [198] propose UTPO. Their objective is to model trust in online health infor-
mation systems. They elaborate a taxonomy of trust factors and validate it through a user survey
based on nine responses. On this basis they formulate an ontology in OWL for a recommender
system. Given the limited number of user responses used for validation, and the specific fo-
cus on health information system recommendation, this article is not considered further in this
thesis.
Kravari and Bassiliades [205] propose ORDAIN, an general-purpose ontology for trust
management in the Internet of Things. It includes data and semantics about trust principles,
involved parties, characteristics of entities, rating parameters, rule-based mechanisms, confi-
dence and dishonesty in the environment. The ontology covers types of trust (communication,
information, social and cognitive trust), types of control (centralized and distributed), the roles
(Trusters, Trustees, Recommenders or Witnesses) and characteristics of Involved Parties, as
well as information context, sources and aggregation as main classes. As it is a short paper, the
description and implementation are schematic.
This model has the following issues.
• The actual trust model ontology could not be analysed since it has not been made public.
The inference mechanisms and the rules used have also not been published.
• It is stated that ‘involved parties can have any of the four potential roles: Truster, Trustee,
Recommender and Witness’. However, no rationale is given why these roles have been
selected, and why there could not be other roles.
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• It is stated that ‘at a specific time point they comply only with one of them. As a result,
the role classes, subclasses of class Entity, are disjoined in ORDAIN.’ However, an entity
could at one time act as a Truster and later in another role such as Trustee, Recommender
or Witness. How this is to be addressed is not covered.
Oltromari and Cho propose ComTrustO [261], a composite ontology of four layers (com-
munication trust, information trust, social trust and cognitive trust) rather than a single unifying
one. From each layer, corresponding trust can be inferred. Five common attributes are proposed
for categorisation of trust attributes across trust domains. These are reliability, availability, con-
fidentiality, integrity, and certainty.
Sub-attributes under each of these attributes can vary on the basis of the contextual features
of a system. The structure of ComTrustO is based on the Descriptive Ontology for Linguistic
and Cognitive Engineering (DOLCE) and is an extension of the CRATELO [262] ontology.
ComTrustO uses information and decision fusion as a decision support system for trust in hu-
mans. Its focus is on information-based inference and decision fusion. Trust is modelled as
a quality of the class Trustee, where trust can be represented by means of what is referred to
as conceptual spaces. An automated reasoner such as Hermit [127] can be used to classify
(sub)-attributes as (un)-trustworthy.
This model has the following issues.
• Although the article provides example attributes and sub-attributes corresponding to a
trust type, there is little if any justification why these (sub)-attributes were selected, and
how they contribute to the trust relationship between Trustee and Trustor.
• What data would be required to operate the model is not described. Whether this infor-
mation is available for each of the layers, or how it could be obtained is not addressed.
• While it is explained a reasoner can be used to classify (sub)-attributes as (un)-trustworthy,
it is unclear how this would be aggregated to draw conclusions from a set of attributes.
Earlier work of the author [296] proposes the Trust Claim Interpretation (TCI) model for
semantic modelling of large-scale trust ecosystems. An OWL model is described where the
creation of classes and properties are based on an extension of existing vocabularies (W3C,
Dublin Core). These classes, together with related properties, are used to create assertions
that represent information harvested from on-line information sources. This allows automated
classification via a reasoner, as well as queries that support use cases from various actors. A
general approach is presented, as well as results from a prototype implementation based on the
European eIDAS and US FICAM trust ecosystems.
This model has the following issues.
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• The justification of the creation of classes is not based on an analysis of requirements.
• The analysis regarding the nature of the data that would be required to operate the model
is limited. What information would be required, whether this information is available or
how it could be obtained, is only addressed at a high level.
Sullivan et al. [307] propose an OWL ontology for trust-terms to define security require-
ments and metrics. They claim that terms such as security and privacy, accountability and
anonymity, transparency and un-observability are vital for defining security requirements but
often substituted for one another in discussions. This leads to imprecise security and trust re-
quirements and hence poorly defined metrics for evaluating system security. They propose a
trust-terms ontology for defining the components of ICT security and trust. Central to their on-
tology is transparency, which requires both measurability and data, and implies accountability.
Both accountability and anonymity relate to trust in their ontology:
• accountability enables auditing, is based on identification, and facilitates responsibility
which implies liability;
• anonymity facilitates privacy.
This model has the following issues.
• They state that the ‘trust-terms ontology represents an attempt at amalgamating these
inputs to arrive at a preliminary high-level description of ICT trust.’ However, no method
is specified for arriving at a description of ICT trust.
• Much time is spent on informally comparing two ontology editors (CMapTools and Pro-
tégé) while the proposed ontology itself is only briefly discussed.
• The ontology is shown in a screenshot as a collection of 15 classes, connected via prop-
erties. Four object properties are defined that are intended as descriptive properties with
varying strength. The following is stated.
‘Requires’ and ‘facilities’ suggest binary type properties and these phrases are used for
the more technical elements of the ontology. ‘Implies’ and ‘fosters’ are less specific and
best describe relationships where other indefinite factors come into play.
These definitions are broad, and they do not discuss onwhat basis they can be instantiated.
Candidate points for further research From the above summary and analysis we can extract
the following questions for further research.
• How can we semantically define trustworthiness?
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• How can we reason about trustworthiness?
• On what can reasoning to qualify an entity as trustworthy be based?
• How can we obtain information for use in supporting such reasoning about ‘real world’
entities?
3.5.2.2 Other trust-related ontologies
The second cluster includes ontology-based models that are specified in formalisms other than
OWL. These models are summarised in Table 3.2.
Discussion Carpanini and Cerutti [44] propose an ontology of trust for situational under-
standing. They also propose a computational methodology for assessing the impact of trust
associated with sources of information in situational understanding activities. They examine
the Wakefield case, on the alleged links between vaccination and autism, and use it as a case
study. They propose the SitUTrustOnto ontology, and illustrate its application to the case study.
The ontology contains the classes Source (of information, blog posts, twits, scientific papers),
Trust (describes the relationship between a source of information, a query, and a trust descrip-
tor), TrustDescriptor (with a type ranging from CompletelyReliable to Unreliable), and Query
(the situation that needs to be understood). Rules are defined in ORL [154], a language for
expressing Horn clause rules. They show how their computational methodology supports situ-
ational understanding by drawing conclusions from defaults, as well as highlighting issues due
to conflicts between sources of information that demand further investigation to be solved.
This model has the following issues.
• The model allows provision of a context but is limited to that. It qualifies sources of in-
formation as ‘trusted’ but whether the information itself can be ‘trusted’ is not addressed.
• The ontology was developed on the basis of a single case study (theWakefield case on the
alleged links between vaccination and autism). Whether and how this could be expanded
to other cases is not discussed.
Ceolin et al. [51] propose an ontology for trust in web data specified in RDF21. This is
an elaboration of an earlier ontology presented in O’Hara [199]. The model includes a belief
operator that maps logical propositions to values that quantify their believed truth, e.g., by
means of subjective opinions. A graphical representation of a trust ontology is presented.
21As RDF is used to model and implement the framework proposed in the thesis, Section 4.3.1 contains a de-
scription of it.
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plemented in Java
Table 3.2: Trust-related ontologies not using OWL
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This model has the following issues.
• They state that the risk of taking a ‘leap of faith’ when relying on third party agents or
information can be reduced by sharing trust and trustworthiness values, along with their
provenance. How provenance should be recorded or how it contributes to trustworthiness
is not addressed.
• Trustworthiness is not modelled explicitly. They state that ‘we consider an object o to
be trustworthy by virtue of the fact that it is part of an RDF triple that is asserted.’ The
mere fact that a triple is asserted in a graph thus makes it trustworthy. This implies that
only trustworthy triples will be included in the graph. How triples that are not deemed
trustworthy are rejected is not discussed.
• Semantics follow the interpretation of RDF semantics, and it is stated that semantic in-
terpretation is to be known by the trustor. It thus seems that the semantics are in fact left
to the trustor, rather than specifying them.
Fatemi et al. [114] describe a trust ontology for business collaboration. They observe that
existing ontologies for business collaboration model a situation in which all business actors can
be trusted, which is not true in practice. To add trust to the business ontology, the e3 value
ontology [3] is extended. The e3 model consists of a graphic part and a computational part.
The graphic part is an Entity-Relationship diagram and the computational part is a spreadsheet
with algorithms that can perform Net Present Value (NPV) estimations. A minimal approach is
taken by providing only the extension that allows an actor to reason about trusting other actors,
rather than adding all the nuances of the concept of trust. These extensions are the entities
Value Object, Value Exchange and Actor. As the work is at a high level, it is difficult to analyse
it further.
TheHuang and Fox ontology of trust [155] aims to identify the semantics of trust, to develop
a logical model of trust and to prove the transitivity of trust. The model is represented in
situation calculus using fluents. A fluent is a property whose value changes when the situation
does. The changing world is represented as a set of fluents. Trust and belief are defined as
fluents. The model focuses on the relations among trust-related fluents, which are called state
constraints. Only the case of certainty is addressed in the article, where believing will certainly
lead to willingness to be vulnerable. Themodel distinguishes between trust in belief and trust in
performance. Trust in performance is ‘the trust in what a trustee performs’. Its formal semantics
are defined in the form of a fluent using an entail predicate and a definition of context. Trust
in belief is ‘the trust placed on what the trustee believes.’ Three types of trust sources are
discussed: direct trust (resulting from interaction between trustor and trustee), relational trust
(derived through trust propagation in social networks) and system trust (based on stable or
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predictable functions of a system, such as institutional trust, membership based trust etc). They
show that trust in belief is transitive in the context of social networks.
This model has the following issues.
• The model only covers the case of certainty, where believing will certainly lead to a
willingness to be vulnerable. The complementary case of uncertainty seems equally im-
portant but is not addressed.
• How to obtain reliable information regarding a trustor’s expectancies, particularly regard-
ing belief is not discussed. Possible incentives for a trustor to share its true beliefs are
not discussed.
Jacobi et al. [185] propose a framework for rule-based trust assessment on the semantic web.
They argue that a data axis and a rule axis should be taken into account for such a framework,
as well as two categories of data, content and meta-data. The framework proposes the Web
Rule Language AIR and two ontologies. The first ontology is a rule ontology consisting of a
set of rules which fire when a graph pattern specified in AIR is matched. The second ontology
defines properties such as isTrustedWith (expressing a resource is trusted with respect to certain
data) and trustValue (relating a numerical value to a resource). They claim that provenance22
can be used to capture data generation. The provenance assertions together with meta-data and
content assertions can be assessed using declarative rules.
This model has the following issues.
• They do not discuss how properties such as isTrustedWith and trustValue are established,
or what role provenance plays in this.
• The property trustValue is given a numerical value such as the integer 75. How this
should be interpreted is not discussed.
Sherchan et al. [303] define a reputation-based trust ontology for semantic services. Trust
evaluation is based on feedback ratings provided by service consumers. Trust is defined as an
8-tuple: Trust[Trustee, Trustor, TimeStamp, TrustValue, EvaluationCriteria, Confidence, Eval-
uationPeriod, NumOfInteractions]. A Trustee is a service provider to which the Trust refers.
A Trustor is the entity whose level of trust on the trustee is captured by the Trust. A Trust-
Service provides functionalities such as trust bootstrapping, evaluation, update, composition
and propagation. Types of trust include Bootstrapped Trust, Global Trust, Personalised Trust,
Direct Trust, Composite Trust and Propagated Trust. TrustValue is the actual trust value such
22Provenance refers to the history of ownership of a valued object or information. The Oxford English Dictionary
defines provenance as ‘the source or origin of an object; its history and pedigree; a record of the ultimate derivation
and passage of an item through its various owners.’
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as ‘7’(numerical) or ‘very trustworthy’(fuzzy). Central to the evaluation of trustworthiness are
the raters (consumers willing to share their experiences) and the ratings (the feedback given).
This model has the following issues.
• The system uses trust values (DirectTrustValue, GlobalTrustValue, etc) such as ‘7’(nu-
merical) or ‘very trustworthy’(fuzzy). How the consistency of trust values is maintained
across different raters is not addressed.
• The raters and their ratings determine the trust. Why and how raters should be motivated
to act honestly, and how this can be managed or at least understood is not discussed.
However this is fundamental to the trustworthiness evaluation.
Questions for further research The analysis of this cluster reinforces the observations made
in the analysis in Section 3.5.2.1. It would seem, that very few authors discuss possible sources
of information with which to reason.
3.5.2.3 Models based on logic other than OWL
The third cluster includes models based on logic other than OWL. The models are summarised
in Table 3.3.
Review of representation and reasoning Aldini [4] describes a calculus for trust and reputa-
tion systems that models processes. The semantics are based on labelled transition systems. A
trust label transition system tlts is defined as (set of states, initial state, labels, state transitions,
trust predicates, labelling function). State formulae allow modelling of trust predicates.
Ferdous et al. [116] propose a model for trust issues in federated identity management.
Trust is modelled between entities such as users, service providers and identity providers in
federations. A distinction is made between direct and indirect trust, and a set of trust scopes
is defined. Trust strength is defined as subjective trust (low, medium, high), level of assurance
and federation trust (untrusted, semi-trusted, restricted-trusted and fully-trusted). Trust is then
modelled in proof rules, both in dynamic and static federations.
Henderson et al. [146] describe an approach to modelling trust structures for PKI, they use
predicate logic to represent a range of PKI topologies, including mesh PKIs, hierarchical PKIs
and PKI bridges. Their model is designed to describe how trust is referenced within a public
key. A trust anchor is any Certification Authority (or rather their certificate or public key) which
is trusted without the trust being referenced through the PKI certificates. Users keep a set of
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Liu [220] Modelling Certificate
Management Systems
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are provided as transi-
tions that change states
of the CMS. Predicate
logic models the state
transitions.
Table 3.3: Models based on logic other than OWL
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trusted public keys of users and trust anchors. Trust is not precisely described, but a trusted
certificate is ‘one that is used in verification’.
Liu et al. [220] describe how to formally model trust structures for PKI and Certificate
Management Systems (CMSs) using predicates and a state-based model. The topology and
states of a CMS are formalised in axioms, as is a general CMS security policy. Formal descrip-
tions for the main CMS functions, including certificate issuing, revocation and rekeying, are
formalised in predicate logic as transitions that change states of the CMS. For example, a CMS
policy can contain predicates such as Trusts(X,C). This means that if X trusts the certificate C,
the predicate Trusts(X,C) holds. Inference rules for verification of certificates are presented,
based on the predicates. However, what the predicate Trusts(X,C) means that is not defined,
except that (as for Henderson et al. [146]) a trusted certificate is one that is used in verification.
Observations The semantics of trust in a PKI have not been defined in the work reviewed.
Given that PKI has been studied extensively for several decades, this suggests that defining trust
in this domain is non-trivial.
3.5.2.4 Probabilistic models
The fourth cluster includes probabilistic models. The models are summarised in Table 3.4.
Review of representation and reasoning Alexopoulos et al. [5] defineM-STAR, an evidence-
based software trustworthiness framework. Trust is defined as an estimate by the trustor of the
inherent quality of the trustee, i.e. the quality to act beneficially or at least non-detrimentally to
the relying party. This estimate is based on evidence about the trustee’s behaviour in the past,
in this case past vulnerabilities and characteristics of software.
Cho and Chen [58] propose PROVEST (PROVEnance-baSed Trust model) to achieve ac-
curate peer-to-peer trust assessment and to maximise the delivery of correct messages received
by destination nodes while minimizing message delay and communication cost. A node’s trust
is estimated in response to changes in the environmental and node conditions. Trust is quanti-
fied as a real number in the range [0,1], and trust evidence, either direct or indirect, is modelled
by the Beta distribution [164]. Trust in a node is assessed in three dimensions: availability,
integrity and competence (remaining battery lifetime and cooperativeness).
The trust management framework by Fan and Perros [112] covers objective and subjec-
tive trustworthiness. Central to the framework are Trust Service Providers (TSPs), mediation
agents between users and providers of cloud services that are independently maintained and
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Table 3.4: Probabilistic models for trust and trustworthiness
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operated. They derive trust from monitoring. A combination of four trust models (local ob-
jective/subjective and global objective/subjective) is proposed together with a network of TSPs
for trust sharing. Trustworthiness is expressed in terms of objective trustworthiness (Quality
of Service, security, privacy protection and service parameters) and subjective trustworthiness
(user perception and belief). A TSP derives a Cloud Service Provider’s objective trust from
the trust information received from monitoring agents. Subjective trust is derived by collecting
trust feedback ratings sent by Cloud Service Users for services they have used. Evaluation is
structured in an objective and a subjective layer.
Habib et al. propose methods to quantify the level of security capabilities in [140], us-
ing CertainLogic operators [276]. The security capability information can be based on self-
assessments. CertainLogic is used to quantify the security capabilities. To facilitate human
interpretation, approaches to visually communicate security capabilities are presented.
Huang and Nicol [157] propose a trust calculus for PKI and identity management, defining
semantics of trust and distrust. Trust reasoning is defined for trust in belief and performance.
Trust in performance is expressed as trust_p(d, e, x, k) ≡ madeBy(x, e, k) ⥰ believe(d, k ⥰
x). Trust in belief is expressed as trust_b(d, e, x, k) ≡ believe(e, k ⥰ x) ⥰ believe(d, k ⥰ x).
The uncertainty of trust is expressed in a measurable ‘trust degree’, based on probability. Trust
propagation in networks modelled as directed acyclic graphs can be calculated on the basis of
the degree of trust. Applications to certificate chains, hierarchical and mesh PKIs are proposed,
and it is shown how to calculate trust in belief and trust in performance values in the range [-1,
+1]. These calculations are based on sequence and parallel aggregations of nodes in a network
and probabilities.
Jøsang et al. propose Subjective Logic [190], a probabilistic logic where arguments contain
degrees of uncertainty and where belief ownership is explicitly expressed. It uses a generalisa-
tion of Bayes’ theorem to make it applicable to subjective opinions. It is used for modelling and
analysing situations characterised by uncertainty and incomplete knowledge, e.g. for modelling
trust networks and Bayesian networks. Subjective logic has also been used for legal reasoning
[189].
Ries and Heinemann [277] propose CertainTrust, a model for expressing opinions that han-
dles probabilities subject to uncertainty. CertainTrust refers to an opinion oA as the truth of a
proposition A, given as oA = (average_rating, certainty, initial_expectation_value) where the
rating and certainty are in the interval [0, 1], and the initial expectation value in (0,1). They
further state that the average_rating indicates the degree to which past observations support
the truth of the proposition. The certainty indicates the degree to which the average rating is
assumed to be representative for the future. The initial expectation expresses the assumption
about the truth of a proposition in the absence of evidence.
Ries et al. [276] propose CertainLogic, building on the concepts of CertainTrust. In Cer-
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tainLogic, operators of propositional logic are defined compliant with the evaluation of propo-
sitional logic terms in a probabilistic approach. When combining opinions, the operators take
care of the (un)certainty assigned to its input parameters, and reflect this (un)certainty in the
result.
Shekarpour and Katebi [302] propose algorithms for propagation and aggregation of trust.
They analyse four well-known methods for modelling and evaluation of the semantic web,
namely the centralised model, the distributed model, the global model and the local model.
Trust calculation and rating methods are categorised based on experimental results. A method
for evaluating trust is proposed, associated with algorithms for propagation and aggregation.
The propagation algorithm utilises statistical techniques while the aggregation algorithm is
based on a weighting mechanism. The efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed method
are illustrated by experimental results.
Observations The models in this cluster are probabilistic and do not primarily focus on the
semantics of trust. In addition, approaches relying on quantification can be criticised for being
unrealistic because there is no way to make the calculated values comparable. For example,
does a value of zero indicate untrust (ignorance) or distrust (lack of trust)?
3.5.2.5 Other models
The fifth cluster includes models that do not fit any of the preceding categories. The models of
the fifth cluster are summarised in Table 3.5.
Review of representation and reasoning Balduccini et al. [19] propose an ontology-based
reasoning approach about the trustworthiness of cyber-physical systems. The paper enriches the
model from the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) framework [136]
by applying ontological approaches and reasoning techniques using the rule-based language
Answer Set Programming (ASP) [233]. The Aspect Trustworthiness deals with the avoidance
of flaws in Privacy, Security, Safety, Resilience and Reliability.
Huang and Nicol [156] state that the major PKI specification documents do not precisely
define what trust exactly means in PKIs. Instead they rely on implicit trust assumptions, some
of which may not be always true. These implicit trust assumptions may give rise to differences
in understanding regarding the meaning of certificates and trust, which may possibly cause a
misuse of trust. They argue that trust in PKI serves the logic of certification path validation,
as defined in IETF RFC 5280 [63]. For certificates, three semantics are defined, followed by
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Model Main objectives Representation formal-
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ing a semantic description
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ing rules to represent
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thiness
Zhu [392] Trust requirements mod-
elling and analysis of web
services
Trust ontology, based on
social beliefs, formalised
in Natural Language
Rules in the form of
predicates plus a repu-
tation score algorithm
Table 3.5: Other models
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another for trust in a PKI system. Two more semantics are defined for cross-domain architec-
tures. Trust in Certification Authorities is studied, and they conclude that some of the defined
semantics are lacking in commonly used IETF PKI specifications, and others are only implicitly
present in the specifications of certificate path validation.
Li et al. [215] propose an Quality of Service (QoS) ontology based on the W3C QoS re-
quirements for web services, with the addition of a special context to model social relationships
between Internet of Things (IoT) devices. Mechanisms for decentralized trust propagation and
service discovery based on social recommendations are designed.
Oltramari et al. [263] propose PrivOnto, a semantic framework to represent annotated pri-
vacy policies. The taxonomy of Heurix et al. [147] for privacy enhancing technologies is used
to structure the discussion on techniques. PrivOnto has been used to analyse a corpus of over
23,000 annotated data practices, extracted from 115 privacy policies of US-based companies.
A set of 57 SPARQL queries has been defined to extract information from the PrivOnto knowl-
edge base, to answer privacy-related questions.
Qu et al. [275] present the Trusted Ontology (TO) schema, intended to address the lack of
a semantic description for information about the trustworthiness of Semantic Web Services.
A Trusted Domain is divided into a Trustworthy Object Domain and a Trust Subject Domain.
A series of subject and object types are defined. The TO ontology is defined as a set of six
collections including domain concepts, concept attributes, and relationships and hierarchies
among these concepts. Axioms, reasoning rules and a process to evaluate the trustworthiness
of a Semantic Web Service are described.
Zhu and Jin [392] present a formalism for modelling trust requirements and analysing web
services, using a trust ontology. The model adopts a social view of trust which includes beliefs
that a trustor has on a trustee. Natural language is used rather than a formalism such as OWL.
Constraints are defined in the form of rules for the various types of belief. An algorithm that
computes a reputation score is proposed, to support the reputation belief.
3.5.3 Research topics
On the basis of the above analysis the following questions for further research were identified.
• How can we semantically define trustworthiness?
• How can we reason about trustworthiness?
• On what can reasoning to qualify an entity as trustworthy be based?
• How can we obtain information for use in supporting such reasoning about ‘real world’
entities?
These four questions are explored further below.
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3.5.3.1 Improving the semantic definition of trustworthiness
Many of the reviewed models offer, or work towards offering, a semantic definition of trust.
The main problems that can be identified are as follows.
• Most models are limited to a specific context or problem. No model is widely applicable
or flexible enough to cover multiple problems.
• While PKI has been deployed at large scale since the 1980s, and the term Trusted Third
Party is in common use, it is not clear what ‘trusted’ actually means. Huang et al. [156]
state that the major PKI specification documents do not precisely define what trust means
in a PKI, and there are implicit trust assumptions, some of which may not be always true.
These implicit assumptions may give rise to differences in understanding regarding the
meaning of certificates and trust, which could lead to a misuse of trust.
Also, as outlined in Section 1.1.2, the lack of consensus regarding whether trust is desirable
in the first place contributes to ambiguity and lack of clarity. Where the distinction between
trust and trustworthiness is made, there is consensus that trustworthiness is desirable. Hence it
seems logical to focus on trustworthiness rather than on trust.
Nomodel for the semantics of trustworthinesswas identified that works inmultiple contexts.
As a consequence the improvement of the semantic definition of trustworthiness appears to be
an important topic for further research
3.5.3.2 Reasoning about trustworthiness
A number of authors have devised ways to express trustworthiness as a numerical value — see,
for example, Marsh [234], Jacobi et al. [185] and Sherchan et al. [303].
However, it is hard if not impossible to define semantics for numbers, and ratings or reputa-
tions of trustworthiness are subjective (what one person rates as 0.7 might be rated differently
by another person). As a consequence performing calculations using numerical ratings is prob-
lematic, as is using them to model transitivity. This therefore suggests that symbolic logic is
more appropriate for reasoning about trustworthiness than using a calculus based on numerical
values. Devising an appropriate formalism to enable reasoning about trustworthiness is there-
fore a second important topic for further research. As can be seen from Tables 3.1, and 3.2
Description Logics such as OWL seem particularly relevant.
3.5.3.3 Possible bases for regarding an entity as trustworthy
Given a method to reason about trustworthiness, criteria are needed to enable a decision to
be made regarding whether an entity is trustworthy (or at least sufficiently trustworthy for the
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particular context). Mahmud and Usman [231] introduce trust factors. However these trust
factors such as ‘security’ are only broadly defined, and neither is it specified precisely why and
how they contribute to trust or trustworthiness. Thus a third important topic for further research
involves identifying criteria regarding whether an entity is trustworthy
3.5.3.4 Obtaining information for use in reasoning
Assuming appropriate mechanisms can be defined to reason about trustworthiness and it is
possible to qualify an entity as trustworthy based on such reasoning, then such mechanisms will
require information about the entities to use as input. Reasoning about ‘real world’ entities will
require a range of information sources and information types. As a consequence, the selection
of information sources and information types is a fourth key topic for further research.
3.6 Summary
This chapter describes the process used, and the results of, a formal review of the relevant
literature on trust and trustworthiness. The focus was on the semantics of trustworthiness and
methods for the automation and interpretation of claims thereof. The scope was limited to
formal models of trust and trustworthiness with a focus on semantic models. The following
survey questions were put forward.
• What is today’s perspective on formal and semantic models of trust and trustworthiness?
• How is trustworthiness formalised and evaluated today, and how are claims interpreted?
• What are the main potential improvements points?
The survey methodology was constructed on the basis of the structure proposed by Vom
Brocke et al. [331] as refined by Okoli [260]. The survey was performed in three phases: prepa-
ration, execution and analysis.
The preparatory phase included defining the scope and purpose of the survey, and the se-
lection of search terms and information sources. Performing the survey involved the following
steps. First the criteria for creating an initial list (‘longlist’) were defined. The information
sources were then searched using these criteria, which led to the selection of 125 articles. This
selection was narrowed by defining a second set of criteria. Applying these criteria led to the
creation of the final list (‘shortlist’) which contained 33 articles. In the analysis phase the mod-
els described in the selected articles were classified into five clusters:
• Trust-related ontologies in OWL,
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• Trust-related ontologies other than specified in OWL,
• Models based on logic other than OWL,
• Probabilistic models, and
• Other models.
Ther formalisms and reasoning introduced in the various papers were analysed. For the
first two clusters, a short criticism was also provided. On the basis of the above analysis the
following questions for further research were identified.
• How can we semantically define trustworthiness?
• How can we reason about trustworthiness?
• On what can reasoning to qualify an entity as trustworthy be based?




Logic and the Semantic Web
This chapter introduces the logic used to model claims and evaluations of trust-
worthiness. The basic notation used is described, followed by a short discussion of
first-order logic. Subsequently, Description Logics are introduced, and 
is described. The implementation of  as OWL is discussed, as this will be
used later as the particular Description Logic for the formalisation of trust claims.
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present the logical foundation for the framework that forms the core of this
thesis, which is designed to capture claims and evaluations of trustworthiness. The framework,
introduced in Chapter 6, is described in the Web Ontology Language (OWL). OWL is based
on the  Description Logic (DL). DLs are a type of first-order logic, building on set
theory.
To help ensure the use of a consistent notation for the framework, the basic terminology of
sets and logic are introduced and the essential characteristics of first-order logic are discussed.
As the detailed specification and implementation of the framework have been performed using
semantic web software whose OWL capabilities are based on the Resource Description Frame-
work (RDF), this framework is also described. DLs and how they can be used for knowledge
representation are discussed, as these are the formalisms for our model.
This chapter consists of the following sections. Section 4.2 introduces the notation for sets
and logic used to formalise the proposed model for claims and evaluations of trustworthiness.
This is followed by a short discussion of first-order logic, including its syntax and semantics.
Section 4.3 describes the semantic web formalisms that are used in the proposed model. It
covers RDF and DLs with a focus on , the particular Description Logic that will be
used later for the formalisation of trust claims. OWL is introduced and the correspondence
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between  and OWL is discussed. Section 4.4 summarises the chapter.
4.2 Formal logic
4.2.1 Sets and logic — basic terminology
4.2.1.1 Sets
The terminology defined by Hitzler et al. [148] is used. Braces { } delimit the members of a set,
where {p1, p2} represents a set containing the propositions p1 and p2, ∈ denotes ‘is an element
of’ and ⊆ indicates a subset. ⊤ and ⊥ represent true and false.
4.2.1.2 Propositional logic
Propositions are statements which can be true or false. Propositional logic1 is a branch of
logic that deals with propositions and argument flow. The symbol ¬ means negation. If P is a
proposition, then ¬P is also. The symbol ∧ means logical ‘and’. The symbol ∨ means logical
‘or’.
Compound propositions are formed by connecting propositions using logical connectives.
The connective symbol := corresponds to assignment. Propositions without logical connectives
are called atomic propositions. Given a specific logic, the set of all its propositions is denoted
by ℙ.
Argument flow makes use of sequents, consisting of premises that allow the deduction of
a conclusion. Sequents are represented as premises ⊢ conclusion.  ⊢  indicates that  can
be syntactically derived from . The forward arrow → represents the implication connective,
which is also known as material conditional, material implication, material consequence, or
simply implication, implies, or conditional. It is used to form statements of the form p → q
which is read as ‘if p then q’. Such statements are termed conditional statements. In terms of
semantics, the statement p → q means ‘if p is true then q is also true’, such that it is false only
when p is true and q is false. The conditional statement p→ q does not conventionally specify
a causal relationship between p and q, and ‘p is the cause and q is the consequence from it’ is
not a generally valid interpretation.
The symbol ≡ represents equivalence, and⊩ represents the satisfaction relation.
An axiom is a statement that is taken to be true, to serve as a premise or starting point for
further reasoning and arguments. A model is a mathematical structure that satisfies axioms.
A logical system is said to have the soundness property if and only if every formula that can
be proved in the system is logically valid with respect to the semantics of the system. A system
1Propositional logic is also known as propositional calculus, statement logic, sentential logic or zeroth-order
logic.
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is called complete with respect to a particular property if every formula having the property
can be derived using that system, i.e. is one of its theorems. The term ‘complete’ is also used
without qualification, with differing meanings depending on the context, mostly referring to the
property of semantic validity. Intuitively, a system is called complete in this particular sense if
it can derive every formula that is true.
The symbol ⊨ denotes the models or entails relation for logics. It is used to indicate a con-
clusion that follows semantically from a premise. {p1, p2}⊨ {p3, p4} represents the entailment
of a second set of propositions by a first set of propositions. A logic  is composed of a set of
propositions together with an entailment relation and can be denoted by  = {ℙ,⊨}.
4.2.2 First-order Logic
4.2.2.1 Syntax
First-order logic2 (FOL) is used to model the trust ecosystem introduced later in this thesis,
which we denote by   .
FOL uses quantified variables and allows the use of sentences that contain variables. Thus,
rather than propositions such as ‘Aristotle is a man’, one can have expressions in the form ‘there
exists X such that X is Aristotle and X is a man’. The expression there exists is a quantifier
while X is a variable. This distinguishes first order logic from propositional logic, which does
not use quantifiers or relations. Propositional logic can be seen as the foundation of first order
logic.
FOL consists of sets of symbols for constants, variables, functions and predicates. Con-
stants are used to refer to certain elements of the domain of interest, and are specified in up-
percase. Variables are used as place holders, and are specified in lowercase. Functions are a
particular form of relation (set of pairs), where each domain element has only one correspond-
ing range element. Functions may be nested. The term predicate has various uses in logic. Here
it is used to refer to relations, including properties.
The symbols ∃ and ∀ represent the traditional quantifiers there exists and for all in first-
order logic. ∃! expresses the uniqueness quantification. When sets are used, the symbols have
their usual meaning, including the symbol | which is used to characterise the elements of a set.
Following Hitzler et al. [148], a signature (V, C, F, P) of a first-order language consists of
sets of variables V, constant symbols C, function symbols F and predicate symbols P, where
functions and predicates are associated with a non-negative integer known as its arity3.
From this basis, terms and formulae can be defined inductively. Variables such as t are
terms, and if f is a function symbol with arity k, then f[t1,...,tk] is also a term.
2First-order logic is also known as predicate logic or quantificational logic.
3Arity is the number of arguments or operands that a function or predicate takes.
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Formulae can also be defined inductively. If p is a predicate symbol with arity k, then
p[t1,...,tk] is an atomic formula. If F is a formula, then ¬F is also. Conjunction and disjunction
of formulae are defined using ∧ and ∨. A formula does not need to be true.
The set of all first-order predicate logical formulae over (V, C, F, P) is called the first-order
language over (V, C, F, P).
A sentence is defined as a first-order predicate logical formula in which all variable occur-
rences are bound. Bound means that substitution may no longer take place. A theory is a set of
sentences. For a more detailed treatment see Barwise [24].
Predicate logic can be realised with or without equality. In a realisation with equality, there
is a relationship symbol that represents the identity relation. The symbol = is typically used for
this purpose. The symbol ≠ represents its opposite. For a more detailed treatment see Kresel
and Krivine [206].
4.2.2.2 Translation into logic
To formalise reasoning that is described in natural language in logic requires a form of adapta-
tion to which we refer here as translation. There is no fixed prescribed way for performing this
translation. However the four statements described by Aristotle [9] and known as Aristotelian
forms are well-known and form a common basis for such translation. They are:
• all Ps are Qs, translated as ∀x (P(x)→ Q(x)),
• no Ps are Qs, translated as ∀x (P(x)→ ¬ Q(x)),
• some Ps are Qs, translated as ∃x (P(x) ∧ Q(x)),
• some Ps are not Qs, translated as ∃x (P(x) ∧ ¬ Q(x)).
These forms can be combined, allowing the following examples of translations
• ‘everyone loves someone else’ as
∀p (Person(p) → ∃ q (Person(q) ∧ p ≠ q ∧ Loves(p,q))), and
• ‘there is someone everyone else loves’ as
∃p (Person(p) ∧ ∀q(Person(q) ∧ p ≠ q → Loves(p,q))).
4.2.2.3 Semantics
Using FOL, the validity of an argument is determined by its logical form, not by its content. That
is, validity is solely determined by the form, and not by the content of the arguments. However,
110
4.3. Semantic web formalisms 4. Logic and the Semantic Web
when studying meaning, it is common to use the representation⊢ for the case where can
be syntactically derived from, and ⊨ for the case where follows semantically from.
What is understood by the term follows semantically needs to be defined. For propositional
logic this is simply an assignment of truth values to each of the atomic formulae present in the
formula. However, formore complex logics, this is insufficient because, for example, quantifiers
may need to be considered. Defining the semantics of FOL is a broad topic. As this thesis
employs a Description Logic (DL), a particular type of FOL, for modelling, the semantics of
DL are addressed in more detail in Section 4.3.3.
4.3 Semantic web formalisms
4.3.1 Resource Description Framework
4.3.1.1 Specification
The W3C defined RDF4 as a standard model for data interchange on the Web. RDF is a frame-
work for expressing information about resources, which can include documents, people, physi-
cal objects, and abstract concepts. The W3C published the first RDF specification, the ‘Model
and Syntax Specification’ [333] in 1999. This describes the RDF data model and an XML se-
rialisation. This was replaced in 2004 by a set of six specifications [337], [336], [340], [338],
[339], [341] establishing RDF 1.0. These were superseded in 2014 by the following documents
defining RDF 1.1, the current version.
• RDF 1.1 Primer [359] provides the knowledge required to use RDF. It introduces the
basic concepts of RDF and provides concrete examples of the use of RDF.
• RDF 1.1 Concepts and Abstract Syntax [358] defines an abstract syntax (a data model)
which serves to link all RDF-based languages and specifications. The abstract syntax
has two key data structures. RDF graphs are sets of subject-predicate-object triples,
where the elements may be Internationalised Resource Identifiers (IRIs), blank nodes,
or datatyped literals; they are used to express descriptions of resources. RDF datasets
are used to organise collections of RDF graphs, and comprise a default graph and zero or
more named graphs. Key concepts and terminology are also introduced, and datatyping
and the handling of fragment identifiers in IRIs within RDF graphs are discussed.
• RDF 1.1 XML Syntax [363] defines an XML syntax for RDF called RDF/XML; it con-
sists of Namespaces in XML, the XML Information Set and XML Base.
4https://www.w3.org/RDF/
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• RDF 1.1 Semantics [361] describes a precise semantics for RDF 1.1. It gives a num-
ber of distinct entailment regimes and corresponding patterns of entailment. It defines a
model-theoretic semantics for RDF graphs and the RDF and RDFS vocabularies, provid-
ing an exact formal specification of when truth is preserved by transformations of RDF
or operations which derive RDF content from other RDF.
• RDFSchema 1.1 [360] provides a data-modelling vocabulary for RDF data. RDFSchema
is an extension of the basic RDF vocabulary.
• RDF 1.1 Test Cases [362] lists the test suites and implementation reports for RDF 1.1
Semantics as well as the various serialization formats.
4.3.1.2 RDF features
RDF is intended for use in situations in which information on the Web needs to be processed
by applications, rather than only being displayed to people. RDF provides a framework for
expressing this information so that it can be exchanged between applications without loss of
meaning.
The RDF data model is based upon the idea of making statements about resources (in par-
ticular web resources) in the form of subject-predicate-object expressions. In RDF terminology
these expressions are known as triples. The subject denotes the resource, and the predicate de-
notes traits or aspects of the resource and expresses a relationship between the subject and the
object. For example, one way to represent the notion ‘The sky has the color blue’ in RDF is as
the following triple: a subject denoting ‘the sky’, a predicate denoting ‘has the color’, and an
object denoting ‘blue’. A set of triples can be represented in the form of a directed graph, where
the nodes represent subjects and objects, and a directed edge from subject to object represents a
predicate. Such graphs can be merged. The W3C semantic web wiki5 provides a starting point
for further information.
It it interesting to observe that RDF swaps uses of the words object for subject as they
are used in the terminology of an entity–attribute–value model within object-oriented design,
where one would refer to object (sky), attribute (color) and value (blue).
4.3.1.3 Examples of use
RDF is used in a variety of settings.
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• In the United Kingdom, The National Archives publish all UK legislation8 on behalf of
HM Government. The legislation is published in various formats including RDF9.
• Also in the United Kingdom, ‘The Gazette’10 is an official journal of record which con-
sists largely of statutory notices. It was established in 1665 and is published by The
Stationery Office (TSO) under the superintendence of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office
(HMSO), part of The National Archives. Its data is published in various formats11 in-
cluding RDF.
• The regional government of Flanders publishes12 its Central Address ReferenceDatabase,
the decisions of local government entities and the register of Flemish public entities, in
RDF.
For more applications of RDF and semantic web technology see Hitzler et al. [148], Chapter
9.
4.3.1.4 Syntax and semantics
RDFmodels can be expressed using a number of syntaxes [363] including N3, N-triples, Turtle
(Terse RDF Triple Language) and RDF/XML.
RDF semantics can be defined intuitively in the following way.
• The Internationalised Resource Identifiers (IRIs) used to name the subject, predicate, and
object are ‘global’ in scope, i.e. they name the same thing each time they are used.
• Each triple is ‘true’ exactly when the predicate relation exists between the subject and
the object.
• An RDF graph is ‘true’ exactly when all the triples in it are ‘true’.
The model-theoretic semantics for RDF graphs and the RDF and RDFS vocabularies [361]
describe a precise semantics for RDF 1.1. RDF is intended for use as a base notation for nota-
tions such as OWL, whose expressions can be encoded as RDF graphs which use a particular
vocabulary with a defined meaning. Also, particular IRI vocabularies may be given meanings
by other specifications or conventions.
One of the benefits of RDF having declarative semantics is that logical inferences can be
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some circumstances deduce that other triples must, logically, also be true. It is said that the
first set of triples entails the additional triples. The inference is calculated by a reasoner, which
can also sometimes deduce that the given input triples contradict each other. Many different
kinds of reasoning are possible, and a collection of types of reasoning forms what is known as
an entailment regime. Several entailment regimes are specified in the RDF Semantics [361].
Additional SPARQL entailment regimes [364] specify which entailment relation is used, which
queries and graphs are well-formed for the regime, how the entailment is used, and what kinds
of errors can arise.
W3C also published the RDFS recommendation [360], specifying RDF Schema (RDFS),
a vocabulary to express schema knowledge. It complements RDF’s type definition rdf:type
with an rdfs:class definition. This allows class hierarchies and more refined semantics. Hit-
zler et al. [148] provides a description of the model-theoretic semantics for RDFS.
4.3.2 SPARQL
4.3.2.1 SPARQL defined
SPARQL13 is an RDF query language, i.e. it is a semantic query language to retrieve andmanip-
ulate data stored in RDF format. It was standardised by the RDF Data Access Working Group
(DAWG) of the W3C. The current version is SPARQL 1.1 [367]. The specifications consist of
the following documents.
• SPARQL 1.1 Query Language [369] — the description of the SPARQL query language
for RDF;
• SPARQL Query Results XML Format [372], SPARQL 1.1 Query Results JSON Format
[371] and SPARQL 1.1 Query Results CSV and TSV Formats [370] — apart from the
standard SPARQL query results in XML Format, JavaScript Object Notation (JSON),
Comma Separated Values (CSV) and Tab Separated Values (TSV) formats are allowed
for query answers;
• SPARQL 1.1 Federated Query [365] — a specification defining an extension of the
SPARQL 1.1 Query Language for executing queries distributed over different SPARQL
endpoints;
• SPARQL 1.1 Entailment Regimes [364] — a specification defining the semantics of
SPARQL queries under entailment regimes such as RDF Schema, OWL, or RIF;
• SPARQL 1.1 Update Language [375] — an update language for RDF graphs, allowing
insertion and deletion of data from graphs, as well as graph management;
13a recursive acronym for SPARQL Protocol and RDF Query Language
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• SPARQL1.1 Protocol for RDF [368]—a protocol definingmeans for conveying arbitrary
SPARQL queries and update requests to a SPARQL service;
• SPARQL 1.1 Service Description [373] — a specification defining a method for discov-
ering and a vocabulary for describing SPARQL services;
• SPARQL 1.1 Graph Store HTTP Protocol [366] — as opposed to the full SPARQL pro-
tocol, this specification defines minimal means for managing RDF graph content directly
via common HTTP operations;
• SPARQL 1.1 Test Cases [374] — a suite of tests for understanding corner cases in the
specification and assessing whether a system is SPARQL 1.1 conformant.
4.3.2.2 Queries, the heart of SPARQL
SPARQL allows a query to consist of triple patterns, conjunctions, disjunctions, and optional
patterns. Four query forms are supported:
• SELECT, which extracts values from a SPARQL endpoint, returning the results in a table
format.
• ASK, which provides a True/False result for a query on a SPARQL endpoint.
• DESCRIBE, which extracts an RDF graph from the SPARQL endpoint, the content of
which is left to the endpoint to decide based on what the maintainer deems as useful
information.
• CONSTRUCT, which extracts information from the SPARQL endpoint and transforms
the results into valid RDF.
4.3.3 Description Logics
4.3.3.1 Introduction
Description Logics are based on FOL. They were developed with the goals of providing formal,
declarative meanings to semantic networks and frames, and of showing that such representa-
tion structures can be equipped with efficient reasoning tools. Baader et al. [16] provides a
treatment of the formal aspects and evolution of DLs. DLs build on cognitive notions such as
network structures and rule-based representations derived from experiments on recall from hu-
man memory and human execution of tasks such as puzzle solving. Information is modelled as
network structures, where the structure of the network represents sets of individuals and their
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relationships. The basic elements of a DL are unary predicates, denoting sets of individuals,
and binary predicates, denoting relationships between individuals.
According to Baader et al. [16], the following evolution took place.
• Research in the area of DLs began under the label terminological systems, emphasising
that the representation language was used to establish the basic terminology adopted in
the modeled domain.
• Later the emphasis shifted to the set of concept-forming constructs admitted in the lan-
guage, giving rise to the name concept languages.
• As attention moved further towards the properties of the underlying logical systems,
the term Description Logics became popular. Over time the formal and computational
properties of reasoning (such as decidability and complexity) of various description for-
malisms have been investigated in detail.
• Network-based representation structures were studied, formalising the elements of a net-
work into nodes and links. Nodes are used to characterise concepts, i.e. sets or classes of
individual objects, and links are used to characterise relationships amongst them.
• In some cases, more complex relationships are themselves represented as nodes; these
are distinguished from nodes representing concepts. In addition, concepts can have sim-
ple properties, often called attributes, which are typically attached to the corresponding
nodes.
• In much of the early work both individual objects and concepts were represented by
nodes. Properties were usually called roles, expressed by a link from the concept to a
node for the role. A precise characterisation of the meaning of a network can be given by
defining a language for the elements of the structure and by providing an interpretation
for the strings of that language.
4.3.3.2 Semantics
The basic concepts of semantics were introduced in 4.2.2.3. For propositional logic the defi-
nition of the term follows semantically is simply an assignment of truth values to each of the
atomic formulae present in the formula.
For DLs, the definition of the term follows semantically is more complex because an as-
signment of truth values to each of the atomic formulae present in the formula is insufficient
because variables and quantifiers (∃, ∀) also need to be taken into account
For such logics, defining formal semantics involves providing a consequence relation that
determines whether an axiom logically follows from a given set of axioms. This is achieved in
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a model-theoretic way, making use of the concept of an interpretation. This can be summarised
as follows.
• An interpretation consists of an interpretation domain and an interpretation function.
• The purpose of the interpretation function is to determine whether axioms are satisfied.
• This satisfaction is used to define the consequence relation.
Interpretation At syntactic level the signature of a DL defines its vocabulary, which contains
the names of individuals, concepts and roles. Elements from the vocabulary can be used to
formulate axioms. Interpretation is defined at a semantic level. An interpretation is normally
denoted by  and consists of
• the domain ▵I that contains all individuals existing in the world that  represents, and
• an interpretation function .I that maps the syntactical elements (the names of individuals,
concepts and roles) to ▵I by providing
– for each individual name a ∈ N a corresponding individual aI ∈ ▵I ,
– for each concept name C ∈ N a corresponding set CI ⊆ ▵I (CI is allowed to be
empty),
– for each role name r ∈ N a corresponding set rI of ordered pairs of domain ele-
ments.
This is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
As an example, consider the following signature:
• the set of individual namesN ={Europe, Africa, Asia, North_America, South_America,
Atlantic, Indian, Pacific}
• the set of concept names N = {Continent, Ocean}
• the set of role names N = {liesNorthOf, liesEastOf}
An interpretation I = (▵I , .I ) is defined as follows. Let the domain ▵I contain the following
elements: , ,  , , ,  , ℵ, ℶ, ℷ. Let the interpretation function .I be defined as:
• Europe.I= , Africa.I= , Asia.I=  , North_America.I= , South_America.I= 
• Atlantic.I= ℵ, Indian.I= ℶ, Pacific.I= ℷ
• Continent.I= {,   , ,  }, Ocean.I= {ℵ, ℶ, ℷ }
• liesNorthOf.I ={(, ), (, )}, liesEastOf.I ={(ℵ, ), (ℵ, ), (, ℷ) }
This is illustrated in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Illustration of the structure of a DL interpretation
Satisfaction of axioms To determine the semantics of a DL it is not only necessary to deter-
mine the truth of simple vocabulary elements such as individual names, but also of concepts,
roles and axioms. Rudolph [282] defines how this can be done by extending the interpretation
function .I to complex expressions. This approach can be summarised as follows.
• The interpretation function is extended from role names to roles by introducing the uni-
versal role which connects any two individuals of the domain, and also every individual
with itself. The inverted role and its interpretation are also defined.
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• The interpretation function for concepts is defined by describing
– the additional concepts of ⊤ (the concept which is true for every individual) and ⊥
(the concept which has no instances),
– the interpretation of sets,
– the interpretation of ¬C, C ⊓ D, C ⊔ D, quantifiers ∀R.C, ∃R, ∃R.self
– the interpretation of ⩽nr.C and ⩾nr.C
Whether an axiom holds given a specific interpretation is defined by describing how
• axioms for role inclusion and disjointness hold,
• the axiom for general concept inclusion holds,
• axioms for assertion of concepts and roles hold.
When an axiom  holds for a specific interpretation  it is said that  is a model of  or that
 satisfies , written  ⊨ . Once an interpretation  is defined as a model of an axiom, this
notion can be extended to entire knowledge bases.  is a model of a given knowledge base
(or  satisfies, written  ⊨) if it satisfies all the axioms of, i.e. if  ⊨  for every 
∈ . A knowledge base is called satisfiable or consistent if it has a model, and unsatisfiable
or inconsistent otherwise.
Consequence relation The consequence relation determines whether an axiom is true with
respect to an interpretation. It is commonly denoted by ⊨ and is defined as follows. An axiom
 is a consequence of (or entailed by) a knowledge base  (written  ⊨ ) if every model
of  is also a model of . That is, if for every  with  ⊨  it also holds that  ⊨ .
For a detailed treatment see Rudolph [282] or Hitzler et al. [148]. Rudolph discusses the
details of DL knowledge bases including their syntax, semantics and reasoning capabilities.
Hitlzer presents model-theoretic semantics of the OWL DL, and a translation of it into FOL
predicates.
4.3.3.3 Open World Assumption
The non-finiteness of the domain and the open-world assumption (OWA) are distinguishing
features of DLs with respect to the modelling languages developed in the study of databases.
Hitzler et al. [148] defines OWA as the complement of the closed world assumption (CWA).
The CWA states that everything which is not explicitly true is deemed to be false. Conventional
databases are interpreted under the CWA. That is, if something is not stated in the database, it
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is assumed not to be the case. The OWA leaves such things undefined; if it not stated whether
or not something is the case, then under the OWA it is assumed to be unknown. The OWA is
not formally defined, but RDF(S) and DLs such as OWL adhere to it.
Monotonicity of entailment is a property of logical systems that means that the hypotheses
of any derived fact may be freely extended with additional assumptions. Monotonic logics
adhere to the OWA.
4.3.3.4 Inference
The basic means of inference on concept expressions in DLs is subsumption, typically written
as C ⊑ D. Determining subsumption is the problem of checking whether the concept denoted
by C (the subsumee) is less general than the one denoted by D (the subsumer). In other words,
subsumption checks whether the first concept always denotes a subset of the set denoted by the
second.
4.3.4 Knowledge representation and the Attributive Language
4.3.4.1 Tbox and Abox
A DL knowledge base typically contains components of two types, referred to as TBox and
ABox. The TBox contains intensional knowledge in the form of a terminology (hence the term
TBox) and is built through declarations that describe general properties of concepts. Because
of the nature of the subsumption relationships among the concepts that constitute the terminol-
ogy, TBoxes are usually thought of as having a lattice-like structure; this mathematical struc-
ture arises from the subsumption relationship, and has nothing to do with any implementation.
The ABox contains extensional knowledge, also called assertional knowledge (hence the term
ABox), i.e. knowledge that is specific to the individuals of the domain of discourse.
4.3.4.2 DL languages
DLs are subsets of first-order logic, as discussed by Borgida [36]. For practical purposes, decid-
able fragments of FOL are most relevant. The languages used to express DLs are distinguished
by the constructors they provide. The foundational language is (Attributive Language), in-
troduced in 1991 [289] as a minimal practical language. The other languages of this family are
extensions of . Concept descriptions in  are formed according to the following syntax
rule:
C, D ⟶ A | ¬A | ⊤ | ⊥ | C ⊓ D | ∀R.C | ∃R.⊤
A family of  languages can be defined by adding additional constructors. The union of
concepts is written as ⊔ and is indicated by the letter . Full existential qualification is written
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as ∃R.C and is indicated by the letter  . This is different from limited existential qualification in
that arbitrary concepts are now allowed to occur in the scope of the existential quantifier (rather
than only ⊤).
Number restrictions are indicated by the letter and arewritten as≥nR (at-least restriction)
and ≤nR (at-most restriction), where n ranges over the non-negative integers. The negation of
arbitrary concepts (indicated by the letter  for complement) is written as ¬C .
Extending by any subset of these constructors yields a particular-language. These
are named using a string of the form [ ][][ ][], where a letter in the name stands for
the presence of the corresponding constructor. From the semantic point of view, however, these
languages are not all distinct. The semantics enforce the equivalences C ⊔ D ≡ ¬(¬C ⊓ ¬D)
and ∃R.C ≡ ¬∀R.¬C. Hence, union and full existential quantification can be expressed using
negation. It is customary to write the letter  instead of the letters  in language names. So
 is written instead of  , and  instead of .
4.3.4.3 The DL 
Many different description logics have been introduced, characterised by the types of construc-
tors and axioms that they allow. These are often a subset of the constructors in the language
known as . For a description of , including its decidability, see Horrocks et
al. [153].
The description logic  is the fragment of  that allows no RBox axioms and
only ⊓, ⊔, ¬, ∀ and ∃ as its concept constructors. It is often regarded as the most basic DL; see
for example Hitzler et al. [148].
The extension of  with transitive roles is traditionally denoted by the letter  . Some
other letters used in DL names hint at a particular constructor, such as inverse roles , nominals
, qualified number restrictions , and role hierarchies (role inclusion axioms without compo-
sition). For example, the DL named extends with role hierarchies, inverse
roles and qualified number restrictions. The letter  commonly refers to the presence of role
inclusions (⊏ indicates inclusion), local reflexivity Self, and the universal role U, as well as the
additional role characteristics of transitivity, symmetry, asymmetry, role disjointness, reflexiv-
ity, and irreflexivity. This naming scheme explains the name , the DL central to this
thesis and which is discussed next.
4.3.5 The Description Logic ()
4.3.5.1 Defining ()
In this thesis, the Description Logic () is used to describe the concepts required to
formulate trust claim interpretations. () adds the following to , observing that
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the term role is frequently used as a synonym for property.
• Role chains express, as their name implies, a chaining of roles. A simple example of
chaining is provided by hasParent ◦ hasBrother ⊑ hasUncle. In predicate logic this can
be expressed as ∀x ∀y (∃z ((hasParent(x,z) ∧ hasBrother(z,y)) → hasUncle(x,y))). This
is denoted by + role chains = .
• Transitivity, for which hasAncestor ◦ hasAncestor ⊑ hasAncestor provides a straightfor-
ward example.
• Role hierarchies, for which hasFather ⊑ hasParent provides a simple example. This is
denoted by  =  + role hierarchies.
• Nominals are used to create closed classes. A simple example of such creation of closed
classes is provided by MyBirthdayGuests ≡ {Danny, Brendan, Steven, Els}. This is de-
noted by .
• Individual equality and inequality, without the unique name assumption. An example
thereof is provided by Danny = Godot hence {Danny} ≡ {Godot}, and Danny ≠ Godot
hence {Danny} ⊓ {Godot} ≡ ⊥.
• Inverse roles, for which hasParent equiv ℎasCℎild− , and Orphan ≡ ℎasCℎild−.Dead
provide an example.
• Qualified cardinality restrictions, such as Car ⊑ = 4hasTyre.⊤.
• Roles can be declared to be transitive, symmetric, asymmetric, reflexive, irreflexive, func-
tional (can only take one value) and inverse functional. This is referred to as role charac-
teristics.
• Datatypes, which allows datatype literals. This is denoted by .
• Capabilities to express
– Self, illustrated by PersonCommittingSuicide ≡ ∃kills.Self.
– Disjointness of properties, illustrated by Disjoint(hasParent, hasChild).
– Anonymous individuals, instead of named individuals.
4.3.5.2 () constructors
 offers constructors as basic building blocks, which can be assembled into axioms.
Syntax and semantics are defined for constructors (concepts, roles and individuals) as well as
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for axioms (T-, R- and A-boxes). Constructors exist for individuals, roles and concepts. Axioms
are combined to form a Knowledge Base, alternatively referred to as an ontology.
Every ontology is based on three finite sets of signature symbols: the set NC of concept
names, the setNR of role names, and the setNI of individual names. The set of  role
expressions R over this signature is defined by R ∶∶= U |NR|NR− where U is the universal
role which always relates all pairs of individuals. Concepts can be created using disjunction,
conjunction, negation, universal restriction and existential restriction. Two specific class names,
⊤ (top) and ⊥ (bottom), denote the concept containing all individuals and the empty concept,
respectively.
Formally, the set of  concept expressions is defined as C ∶∶= NC | (C ⊓C) | (C ⊔
C) |¬C |⊤ |⊥ | ∃R.C | ∀R.C | ≥ nR.C | ≤ nR.C | ∃R.Self | {NI}where n is a non-negative
integer.
4.3.5.3 Using () to build a Knowledge Base
A  Knowledge Base (KB) is a set of axioms consisting of terminological (T- and R-
boxes) and assertional (A-boxes) parts. The T-boxes capture the terminology and universal
statements of the modelled domain. R-boxes capture roles. A-boxes include concept assertions
(such asMusician(David)), datatype property assertions (such as :hasAge :David “21”ˆˆxsd:integer)
and role assertions (such as Married(David, Iman)). The semantics of a KB take into account
all possible situations in which the axioms would hold. This is referred to as the Open World
Assumption. Unspecified information is kept open rather than being allocated a default value.
The more axioms an ontology with a finite domain contains, the more constraints it imposes on
its interpretations, and the fewer interpretations exist that satisfy all axioms. An interpretation
 consists of a set called the interpretation domain △I , and an interpretation function .I . The
interpretation function .I maps a concept name A to a subset AI of △I , a role name R to a
binary relation RI over △I , and an individual name i to an element iI of △I .
For a KB to be free of inconsistencies and modelling errors, there should be at least one
interpretation that satisfies all the axioms. Such a KB is called consistent, and such an inter-
pretation is called a model of the ontology. To ensure the existence of reasoning algorithms
that are correct and terminating, additional restrictions must be placed on the syntax. These are
called structural restrictions, since they apply to the entire set of axioms. For  these
restrictions are simplicity and regularity. Simplicity enforces some restrictions on disjointness
of roles and on concept expressions. Regularity enforces some restrictions on R-boxes to limit
cyclic dependencies between them.
Once a KB  is created, inference is possible to verify whether  captures the intended
entailments, expressed as C ⊆ D with regard to  iff for every model  of , CI ⊆ DI .
Furthermore it is possible to verify that:
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•  is consistent, i.e. it is possible to have at least one interpretation that satisfies all axioms;
•  is minimally redundant, i.e. there are no unintended synonyms, expressed asC is equiv-
alent to D with regard to  iff for every model  of , CI = DI ;
•  is meaningful, i.e. concepts can have individuals, expressed as C is satisfiable with
regard to  iff there exists some model  of  such that CI ≠ ∅.
 can then be queried to learn:
• the subsumption hierarchy of all atomic concepts;
• all the individuals known to be instances of a certain concept;
• whether  entails a certain axiom C(a);
• whether a given concept is (un)satisfiable;
• whether x is an instance of C with regard to  iff for every model  of , xI ∈ CI ;
• (x,y) is an instance of R with regard to  iff for every model  of , ( xI , yI ) ∈ RI .
For a more detailed treatment see Hitzler et al. [148].
4.3.5.4 OWA revisited
An analogy can be established between databases and DL knowledge bases. The schema of a
database can be compared to the TBox, and the instance incorporating the actual data to the
ABox. However, the semantics of ABoxes differs from the usual semantics of database in-
stances. While a database instance represents exactly one interpretation, namely the one in
which classes and relations in the schema are interpreted by the objects and tuples in the in-
stance, an ABox represents many different interpretations, namely all its models. As a conse-
quence, absence of information in a database instance is interpreted as negative information,
while absence of information in an ABox only indicates lack of knowledge. That is, while the
information in a database is always deemed to be complete, the information in an ABox is in
general viewed as being incomplete. The semantics of ABoxes is therefore sometimes charac-
terised as ‘open-world’ semantics, while the traditional semantics of databases is characterised
as ‘closed-world’ semantics. For a detailed discussion of this issue see Baader [16].
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4.3.6 The W3CWeb Ontology Language (OWL)
4.3.6.1 OWL 1
The possibility of viewing the World-Wide Web as a semantic network has been considered
since the advent of the Web itself. The concept of an ontology was generally accepted as useful
for this purpose, and is loosely defined as a model which represents some subject matter.
W3C standardised a Web Ontology Language based on the () description logic
and called it OWL. This became aW3C recommendation in February 2004 [335]. This version
is also referred to as OWL 1.
It adds the notion of keys on top of(), which are a set of (object or data) properties
whose values uniquely identify an object. OWL uses the open world assumption (if a fact is
missing it may still be true, but simply missing), as opposed to the closed world assumption
(if fact is not present in the data it is assumed to be false). An OWL ontology maps to a DL
knowledge base, Tbox, RBox and Abox.
OWL is a family of three language variants (often called species) of decreasing expressive
power: OWL Full, OWL DL, and OWL Lite:
• OWL Full is the union of OWL syntax and RDF,
• OWL DL is restricted to a decidable FOL fragment,
• OWL Lite is an easier to implement subset of OWL DL.
Practical experience with OWL 1 has shown that OWL 1 DL lacks several constructs that
are often necessary for modelling complex domains. OWL 1’s lack of a suitable set of built-
in datatypes is a particular shortcoming. OWL 1 relies on XML Schema (xsd) for the list of
built-in datatypes.
4.3.6.2 OWL 2 Full and DL
The above issues were addressed in OWL 2, which improves the datatypes of OWL 1. Like
OWL 1, OWL 2 is a declarative language, i.e. it describes a state of affairs in a logical way.
For this it uses classes, properties, and individuals. Reasoners can then be used to infer further
information about that state of affairs. How these inferences are realised is not part of the OWL
specification, and the realisation depends on the specific implementation. Still, the correct
answer to any such question is predetermined by the formal semantics, which comes in two
versions: the Direct Semantics and the RDF-Based Semantics. Only implementations that
comply with these semantics can be regarded as OWL 2 conformant.
OWL 2 [342] was published by theW3C in 2012 as a series of documents. It is normatively
defined by five core specification documents:
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• Structural Specification and Functional-Style Syntax [352] defines the constructs of OWL
2 ontologies in terms of both their structure and a functional-style syntax, and defines
OWL 2 DL ontologies in terms of global restrictions on OWL 2 ontologies.
• Mapping to RDF Graphs [348] defines a mapping of the OWL 2 constructs into RDF
graphs, and thus defines the primary means of exchanging OWL 2 ontologies in the Se-
mantic Web.
• Direct Semantics [346] defines the meaning of OWL 2 ontologies in terms of a model-
theoretic semantics.
• RDF-Based Semantics [351] defines the meaning of OWL 2 ontologies via an extension
of the RDF Semantics.
• Conformance [343] provides requirements for OWL 2 tools and a set of test cases to help
determine conformance.
Four additional specifications complement the core specifications:
• Profiles [350] defines three sub-languages of OWL 2 that offer advantages in particular
applications scenarios.
• XML Serialisation [353] defines an XML syntax for exchanging OWL 2 ontologies, suit-
able for use with XML tools like schema-based editors and XQuery/XPath.
• Manchester syntax [347] defines an easy-to-read, but less formal, syntax for OWL 2 that
is used in some OWL 2 user interface tools
• Data Range Extension: Linear Equations [344] specifies an optional extension to OWL
2 which supports advanced constraints on the values of properties.
Besides the Functional-Style syntax, the Manchester syntax and the XML Serialisation, in
practice the Turtle syntax [345] is also used.
The OWL 2 Primer [349] defines two types of OWL 2, OWL 2 DL and OWL 2 Full, with
corresponding semantics.
• The Direct Semantics provide meaning for OWL 2 DL in a Description Logic style. In-
formally, the term OWL 2 DL is often used to refer to OWL 2 ontologies interpreted
using the Direct Semantics (but it is also possible to interpret OWL 2 DL ontologies
under RDF-Based Semantics). As demonstrated by Hitzler et al. [148], OWL 2 DL cor-
responds to. Horrocks et al. [153] have shown that is decidable. There
are several production quality reasoners for OWL 2 DL14.
14http://owl.cs.manchester.ac.uk/tools/list-of-reasoners/
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• The RDF-Based Semantics provide meaning for OWL 2 Full. These semantics are an
extension of the semantics for RDFS and is based on viewing OWL 2 ontologies as RDF
graphs. OWL 2 Full is undecidable. There are no production quality reasoners for OWL
2 Full.
4.3.6.3 OWL 2 profiles
In addition to OWL Full and OWL DL, OWL 2 specifies three OWL sublanguages, referred
to as profiles [350]. An OWL 2 profile (also called a fragment) is a trimmed down version of
OWL 2 that trades some expressive power for efficiency of reasoning. Each profile achieves
efficiency in a different way and is useful in different application scenarios. OWL 2 profiles
are defined by placing restrictions on the structure of OWL 2 ontologies. The profiles are as
follows.
• OWL2EL is useful in applications employing ontologies that contain very large numbers
of properties and/or classes. This profile captures the expressive power used by many
such ontologies and is a subset of OWL 2 for which the basic reasoning problems can
be performed in time that is polynomial with respect to the size of the ontology. The EL
acronym reflects the profile’s basis in the EL family of description logics, referred to as
EL++ [28], logics that provide only existential quantification.
• OWL 2 QL is aimed at applications that use very large volumes of instance data, and
where query answering is the most important reasoning task. In OWL 2 QL, conjunctive
query answering can be implemented using a conventional relational database system. As
in OWL 2 EL, polynomial time algorithms can be used to implement the ontology con-
sistency and class expression subsumption reasoning problems. The expressive power of
the profile is necessarily quite limited, although it does include most of the main features
of conceptual models such as UML class diagrams and ER diagrams. The QL acronym
reflects the fact that query answering in this profile can be implemented by rewriting
queries into a standard relational Query Language.
• OWL 2 RL is aimed at applications that require scalable reasoning without sacrificing
too much expressive power. It is designed to accommodate OWL 2 applications that can
trade the full expressivity of the language for efficiency, as well as RDF(S) applications
that need some added expressivity. OWL 2 RL reasoning systems can be implemented
using rule-based reasoning engines. The ontology consistency, class expression satisfia-
bility, class expression subsumption, instance checking, and conjunctive query answering
problems can be solved in time that is polynomial with respect to the size of the ontology.
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The RL acronym reflects the fact that reasoning in this profile can be implemented using
a standard Rule Language.
Another entailment regime was specified by ter Horst [309]. It is commonly referred to
as OWL Horst. It addresses the possibilities from combining the standard Semantic Web lan-
guages RDF and OWL with facilities for expressing and reasoning with rules. OWL Horst
extends the model theory of RDF with rules, while integrating OWL with a focus on the decid-
ability of entailment and on its computational complexity.
4.3.6.4 OWL DLP
Grosof et al. [137] introduce Description Logic Programs (DLP) which combine rules with
ontologies. DLP is defined by the intersection of RuleML Logic Programs and ontologies (in
OWL/DAML+OIL Description Logic), and Description Horn Logic (DHL).
4.3.6.5 OWL DL as an implementation of 
OWL DL is the syntactic fragment of OWL that abides by the restriction that OWL axioms
can be read as  axioms for which the structural restrictions are satisfied. This means
that once  constructors and axioms are identified, these are described in DL classes
(unary predicates, corresponding to  concepts), and DL properties (binary predicates,
corresponding to  roles). For a detailed treatment of the translation of a  KB
into OWL DL classes and properties, see Rudolph [282].
OWL is a practical way to create and populate an ontology. It can be used to specify what
kinds of things there are for the subject matter of interest, and how these are related to one
another. The kinds of things are called classes. The concept of class in OWL is well defined
and different from the concept of a class in object oriented programming. From a semantic
perspective, an OWL class corresponds to a set. OWL allows class hierarchy, disjointness, and
class equivalence to be defined. The term individual refers to an entity that is a member of a
specific set.
The following class definitions are commonly used as an example. Person is a class which
has two subclasses, Patient and Doctor. An individual can be a member of either of these
classes. The set membership can be asserted (i.e. provided as a fact), or can be inferred on the
basis of information that is already available. For example the class definition of Patient may
impose no restrictions on class membership, i.e. it can be freely asserted that any entity which
is a Person can be a Patient. However, the class of Doctor may define a Doctor as a Person
with the imposed restriction that a Doctor must have the property of holding a medical degree.
Relations between resources are expressed by properties in OWL. From a mathematical
perspective, a property is a set of ordered pairs. Semantics of a property can be defined us-
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ing property hierarchies, domains and ranges, property characteristics (such as functional and
transitive) and property inverses.
There are three types of properties: object properties, data properties and annotation prop-
erties. Object and data properties participate in inference, while annotation properties do not.
An object property relates an individual to another individual. A data property relates an indi-
vidual to a literal, so its range must be a datatype. Given a property has a value, the choice of
using an object or a data property depends on whether there is a need to say something about
that value. If there is such a need, the best choice is to use an object property, which allows the
value to be the subject of a triple. If no such need exists, it is common to use a data property.
To continue the example above, a degree could be a class, of which a specific medical
degree is an individual. The restriction that a Doctor must have a medical degree can then be
expressed via an object property restriction. However, under the OWA, this does not mean that
it is impossible to have an individual of the class Doctor that does not have a medical degree.
This would become visible by querying the knowledge base appropriately.
4.3.6.6 Controlled vocabularies
The concept of ‘controlled vocabulary’ was introduced to normalise the diversity of semantics
that can be expressed using RDF. However this does not allow the modelling of relationships
beyond broader, narrower and seeAlso relations. For this purpose, RDF Schema and OWL
provide mechanisms to formally represent a set of concepts and their relations, such as is-a
relationship, or specific relations through so-called object properties.
In particular, OWL supports the creation of semantics through class and property hier-
archies. Properties can have domains which say what class the subject of a triple using the
property must be a member of, and ranges which say the same for the object of a triple. Prop-
erties can have characteristics such as being functional or transitive. Class expressions can be
constructed using property restrictions and set operations. Property restrictions express what
properties individuals of a given class have. Class equivalence and inference can be used to
determine what classes an individual belongs to. An implementation of OWL includes an in-
ference engine, which can detect logical inconsistencies within an ontology.
4.4 Summary
We introduced the background necessary to understand the capabilities and limitations of the
model of claims and evaluations of trustworthiness which is introduced in the next chapter.
This model is specified in OWL, a DL, which is a type of first-order logic. We first introduced
notation for sets and logic, followed by that for first-order logic. The essential characteristics of
first-order logic were discussed. Compared to the simpler propositional logic, first-order logic
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adds ∃ and ∀ as quantifiers. This allows a broader set of situations to be captured. However it
comes at the expense of a more complex syntax and semantics. It was also explained that what
is understood by the term follows semantically needs to be defined. For propositional logic it
is simply an assignment of truth values to each of the atomic formulae present in the formula.
However, for first-order logic, this is insufficient because quantifiers need to be considered.
The specification and the implementation of the model described later in this thesis, have
been performed using semantic web software which relies on RDF. This is a framework for
creating a data model about resources, which can include documents, people, physical objects,
and abstract concepts. It is based upon the idea of making statements about resources (in par-
ticular web resources) in the form of subject-predicate-object expressions, known as triples.
The subject denotes the resource, and the predicate denotes traits or aspects of the resource and
expresses a relationship between the subject and the object. A set of triples can be represented
in the form of a directed graph, where the nodes represent subjects and objects, and a directed
edge from subject to object represents a predicate. Such graphs can be merged. SPARQL is a
semantic query language that can be used to retrieve and manipulate data stored in Resource
Description Framework format. SPARQL allows a query to consist of triple patterns, conjunc-
tions, disjunctions, and optional patterns.
The work described in this thesis employs OWL, which is based on the  DL, for
modelling, and SPARQL for querying. The capabilities of DLs in general and of  in
particular are a consequence of the types of constructors and axioms allowed. The character-
istics of the  DL were described, as this is the basis for OWL which was used in our
implementation. OWL allows the specification of what kind of things (‘classes’) there are for
the subject matter of interest, and how these are related to one another. OWL allows the defi-
nition of class hierarchy, disjointness, and class equivalence. An individual is an entity that is
a member of a class.
Relations between resources are expressed by properties in OWL. There are three types of
properties: object properties, data properties and annotation properties. Object and data prop-
erties participate in inference, while annotation properties do not. An object property relates an
individual to another individual. A data property relates an individual to a literal. The seman-
tics of a property can be defined by using property hierarchies, domains and ranges, property







The goal of the work described in this thesis is to enable automated reasoning
about the trustworthiness of entities; this requires an understanding of what must
hold for an entity to be deemed trustworthy, the topic which forms the main focus
of this chapter. We develop an integrated set of requirements for trust, i.e. things
which must hold for an entity, or the outcome of an interaction, to be regarded
as trustworthy. These trust requirements arise from two sources: the analysis in
the structured literature review in Chapter 3, and the findings of the FutureTrust
research project. We also compare these requirements with key elements of the
research questions given in Section 1.2.3.
5.1 Introduction
As observed in Part I, trust is a term commonly used in natural language, is rooted in the social
sciences and is open to many interpretations. There is no consensus to its meaning, either in
the social sciences or elsewhere. The same holds for the term trustworthiness. We thus need to
develop a definition of trustworthiness that is suitable for our purposes.
Identity is a fundamental pillar of trustworthiness. Given the size and complexity of this
topic, it is outside the scope of the thesis except for those elements that are fundamental to the
proposed framework. For this purpose, identity is addressed in Sections 5.4.2.1 and 7.5.3.
As described in Section 1.2.2, this thesis assumes that it is to the benefit of honest parties
that the evaluation of a transaction is based on a model with semantics, reasoning and evidence
understandable to all parties. Thus we take the approach of developing means to enable deci-
sions on the basis of evidence and reasoning, based on an evaluation of trustworthiness. As a
consequence, we focus on requirements for trustworthiness rather than for trust.
The requirements for assessing trustworthiness are based on the findings from the survey
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described in Chapter 3 as well as on an elaboration of the requirements developed by the author
in the FutureTrust project1.
This chapter consists of the following sections. Section 5.2 introduces the objectives ‘of
this chapter, together with key assumptions and definitions. Section 5.3 describes the require-
ments that were formulated on the basis of the literature survey, and Section 5.4 describes the
requirements derived from the FutureTrust project. Section 5.5 specifies an integrated set of
requirements, based on the requirements given in the previous two sections. Section 5.6 sum-
marises the chapter.
5.2 Definitions
5.2.1 Objective and assumptions
The objective of this chapter is to define requirements for a system to be defined and prototyped
that supports the hypothesis given in Section 1.2.2, namely:
Where machine processable information about actors is available, it is desirable
and possible to automate reasoning about the properties of these actors to support
trust-related decision making based on formal semantics.
In Section 1.2.3 a set of research questions was derived from these hypotheses, and the
system described in later chapters of this thesis should help in answering these questions.
To allow the definition of requirements, we make the following two assumptions, necessary
to allow the application of logical reasoning to trustworthiness.
• The trustworthiness of participants and interactions in an well-defined ecosystem can be
deduced in a logical and transparent way from a set of unambiguously defined data points.
• Such an ecosystem and data points can be defined and implemented.
5.2.2 Defining trustworthiness
The followingworking definition of trustworthiness is used in the remainder of the thesis. Trust-
worthiness is a characteristic of an entity, where entities include persons, ICT systems, organ-
isations and information artefacts, with the properties given below. An entity can be qualified
as being ex-ante or ex-post trustworthy, as follows.
1FutureTrust is a European Commission Horizon 2020 project (grant 700542-Future-Trust-H2020-DS-2015-1),
ref http://www.futuretrust.eu
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• When an entity is qualified as ex-ante trustworthy thismeans a trustor can have reasonable
expectations that future interactions and their outcomes will be consistent with what has
been communicated or committed by the trustee. This is also called forward-looking
trustworthiness.
• When an entity is qualified as ex-post trustworthy this means a trustor can have reasonable
expectations that the outcome of a transaction performed in the past can be relied upon.
This is also called backward-looking trustworthiness.
5.3 Requirements from the literature survey
The survey of Chapter 3 identified four questions as relevant for further research. As these ques-
tions indicate unmet needs, they were analysed to identify applicable elements for the creation
of the requirements for the   model introduced in the next chapter. The four questions are the
following.
• How can we semantically define trustworthiness?
• How can we reason about trustworthiness?
• On what can reasoning to qualify an entity as trustworthy be based?
• How can we obtain information for use in supporting such reasoning about ‘real world’
entities?
The description of each question is given in Section 3.5.3. We now describe how inputs to
the   model requirements were derived from the questions identified by the survey.
5.3.1 SR1 Semantic definition of trustworthiness
The need to develop a broadly applicable semantic definition of trustworthiness was discussed
in Section 3.5.3.1. This leads to Requirement SR1.
As a possible participant in an electronic interaction I can understand the meaning of trust-
worthiness of participants I plan to engage with, so that I can make an informed decision on
whom to interact with.
5.3.2 SR2 Reasoning about trustworthiness
The need for an unambiguous method for reasoning about trustworthiness was discussed in
Section 3.5.3.2. This leads to Requirement SR2.
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As a possible participant in an electronic interaction I can understand the reasoning per-
formed by a system that offers an evaluation of trustworthiness, so that I can verify this reason-
ing is compatible with the way I want to rely on its outcome.
5.3.3 SR3 Deciding whether an entity is trustworthy
The need to providing a means to decide whether an entity is trustworthy in a particular context
was discussed in Section 3.5.3.3. This leads to Requirement SR3.
As a possible participant in an electronic interaction I can understand the arguments used
in the reasoning that justify a participant is qualified as trustworthy, so that I can verify these
arguments are compatible with the way I want to rely on the reasoning’s outcome.
5.3.4 SR4 Information for reasoning about trustworthiness
The need for sources of information and appropriate types of information to input to a trustwor-
thiness reasoning process was discussed in Section 3.5.3.4. This leads to Requirement SR4.
As a possible participant in an electronic interaction I can understand the information used
in the reasoning that justify a participant is qualified as trustworthy, so that I can verify this
information is compatible with the way I want to rely on the reasoning’s outcome.
5.4 Requirements from FutureTrust
5.4.1 The FutureTrust project
5.4.1.1 Relationship between the thesis and the project
On the basis of the article A Comparison of Trust Models [295], I was invited to join the Fu-
tureTrust project, to work on a trust model. I participated in the project as lead author of two
deliverables2
• Deliverable 2.5 On Trust and Trust Models [229];
• Deliverable 2.6 Evaluation Scheme for Trustworthy Services [230].
5.4.1.2 Project objectives
The requirements for trust and trustworthiness modelling developed in the FutureTrust3 project
were analysed, and applicable elements were selected.
2Both deliverables are available at the project website https://www.futuretrust.eu/deliverables.
3https://www.futuretrust.eu/
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The FutureTrust project addressed the implementation of the eIDAS regulation [103]. The
project received funding from European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation pro-
gram under grant 700542. It was performed by eighteen participants and coordinated by Prof.
J. Schwenk from the Ruhr-Universität Bochum. The project kick-off meeting was held in June
2016, and the project concluded in December 2020.
The core objective of the FutureTrust project was to support the implementation of the
eIDAS regulation [103] on electronic identification (eID) and trusted services for electronic
transactions in the internal market, and facilitate the widespread use of trustworthy eID and
electronic signature technology in Europe and beyond to enable legally significant electronic
transactions. An introduction to the project and its architecture for trustworthy global transac-
tions is provided in Hühnlein [161].
5.4.1.3 Trustworthiness requirements defined in FutureTrust
Section 9 (pages 45 to 51) ofDeliverable 2.5 On Trust and Trust Models [229] defines two types
of requirements:
• requirements applicable to all participants, prior to an interaction;
• requirements applicable to participants interacting within the FutureTrust architecture in
a specific role.
.
We next analyse the relevance of these requirements to this thesis.
5.4.2 Requirements applicable to all participants
Subsection 9.1 ([229] page 45) of Deliverable 2.5 On Trust and Trust Models defines six re-
quirements that are applicable to all participants regardless of their role in the FutureTrust ar-
chitecture. These requirements are referred to as ‘contextual requirements’. They are
• CR1 Linkable identity,
• CR2 Competently acting in role,
• CR3 Fiduciary obligations/responsibilities,
• CR4 Governance and controls,
• CR5 Transparency, and
• CR6 Legal basis for legal effect.
We next briefly introduce each of these.
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5.4.2.1 CR1 Linkable identity
Identity should be uniquely established for participants. Identity is defined here as a set of
attributes that uniquely identify a participant. The actual set of attributes will depend on the
nature of the participant (e.g. natural person, legal person or automaton) and on the use case.
The established identity should be linkable to other instances (‘linkable identity’), because the
qualities that will have to be demonstrated need to be attributed to a specific participant for its
claims to be trustworthy. Additional possible requirements are the support of pseudonyms and
the ability to withstand Sybil attacks [75].
5.4.2.2 CR2 Competently acting in role
Participants need to demonstrate that they possess relevant competences when acting in a role.
Qualifications are a common way to demonstrate this. Which competences, and hence which
qualifications are required, depends on the use case and the level of calibration (introduced later
in the FutureTrust deliverable, in Section 10.7.1). Participants may provide evidence regarding
their possession of qualifications, or such evidence may be provided by a third party (attestor).
Whether self-declared or attestor-declared evidence is required, should be configurable in a
policy (specified in the rulebook, introduced later in the FutureTrust deliverable, in Section
10.4.1). It should also be possible to specify the independence of an attestor from the participant
about whom the evidence is provided.
5.4.2.3 CR3 Fiduciary obligations/responsibilities
Actors may be subject to fiduciary obligations and responsibilities from law and regulations.
They are also subject to less formal expectations of their responsibilities from consumers of their
information or services. Actors should maintain a track record of having been demonstrably
accountable, and having met their responsibilities and liabilities. This should include clear
references to the applicable obligations/responsibilities.
5.4.2.4 CR4 Governance and controls
This requirement relates to having in place appropriate governance, security safeguards, and
controls.
• Governance requires that accountability and responsibility is defined as well as commu-
nicated and accepted, and can be adjusted under a consensus model over time.
• Security safeguards require that appropriate technical security mechanisms are imple-
mented and operated. This need is a consequence of the defined accountability and re-
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sponsibility requirements, that necessitate principles such as integrity, access control,
segregation of duty, ‘four eyes’, and limitations in time, to be maintained.
• Controls require that an entity that enforces or helps to enforce accountability and respon-
sibility should be available to all participants. This includes the provision of assurance
and of monitoring.
5.4.2.5 CR5 Transparency
Actors, their attestations and all other artefacts should be accessible to demonstrate sufficient
transparency in order to allow verification of their claims by an interested party. Additionally,
transparency helps to demonstrate that respect of third party rights is guaranteed.
5.4.2.6 CR6 Legal basis for legal effect
In those cases where legal effect is desired, a legal basis should be in place. This needs to
be specified for each purpose. The purposes that need to be specified are varied and include
electronic authentication, electronic signature, electronic seal, electronic preservation and elec-
tronic verification.
5.4.3 Requirements applicable to participants in a FutureTrust role
Deliverable 2.5 On Trust and Trust Models Subsection 9.2 ([229] page 49) defines require-
ments applicable to participants in a specific role within the FutureTrust architecture. These
requirements are specified as ‘use cases’. A description of the roles is given, followed by 27
role-specific use cases. Each use case includes a brief description, an identification of its actors,
preconditions, main flow and postconditions. Required evidence is described for the precondi-
tions, main flow and postconditions.
5.4.4 Using the FutureTrust trustworthiness requirements
Not all the Future Trust requirements are relevant here.Of the six categories described in Section
5.4.2, four are generally applicable. These are:
• CR1 Linkable identity,
• CR2 Competently acting in role,
• CR4 Governance and controls, and
• CR5 Transparency.
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The other two categories focus on the legal value of services and their outputs. These are:
• CR3 Fiduciary obligations/responsibilities, and
• CR6 Legal basis for legal effect.
Taking the objectives of the thesis into account, the requirements in the four generally ap-
plicable categories (CR1, CR2, CR4, CR5) were used for the requirements of the   model.
The requirements in the two other categories (CR3, CR6) were not used as input because the
legal value of trust services and their outputs falls outside the scope of the thesis.
The use cases described in Section 5.4.3 are FutureTrust-specific, including a focus on the
legal value of evidence. Given the objectives of the thesis, the requirements in use cases were
not used as input for the requirements of the   model.
5.5 An integrated set of requirements
The SR-requirements derived from the literature survey and the four chosen CR-requirements
from FutureTrust were combined into a single integrated set of requirements (IR-requirements)
based on the analysis below. Figure 5.1 shows how the requirements were combined.
  
Creation of Integrated Requirements
Survey-based requirements
SR1 Semantic definition of trustworthiness
SR2 How to reason about trustworthiness
SR3 Basis to qualify as trustworthy 
SR4 How to obtain information
FutureTrust-based requirements
CR1 Linkable identity
CR2 Competently acting in role
CR3 Fiduciary obligations (not withheld)
CR4 Governance and controls
CR5 Transparency 
CR6 Legal basis for legal effect (not withheld)
Integrated requirements
SR1 → IR1 Semantic definition of trustworthiness
SR2+CR5 → IR2 Transparency
CR1 → IR3 Linked and unique identity 
SR3+CR2 → IR4 Competently acting in role
CR4 → IR5 Governance and controls
CR4 → IR6 Policy choices
SR4 → IR7 Obtaining credible data
Figure 5.1: Combining the literature survey and FutureTrust requirements
The integrated requirements are specified in the following way:
• the initial context, described by the part ‘As a participant’,
• the action, described by the part ‘I can’, and
• the expected outcome, described by the part ‘so that’.
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5.5.1 IR1 Semantic definition of trustworthiness
Survey requirement SR1 ‘Semantic definition of trustworthiness’, defined in Section 5.3.1, is
not related to any FutureTrust requirement. It is included without modification in the set of
integrated requirements as requirement IR1 Semantic definition of trustworthiness, which is
formulated as follows.
As a participant in an electronic ecosystem I can understand the meaning of trustworthiness
of participants I plan to engage with, so that I can make an informed decision on whom to
interact with.
5.5.2 IR2 Transparency
Survey requirement SR2 ‘How to reason about trustworthiness’ defined in Section 5.3.2 is re-
lated to CR5 ‘Transparency’ defined in Section 5.4.2.5. Since a possible participant in an elec-
tronic interaction must be able to understand the reasoning performed by a system that offers
an evaluation of trustworthiness, the components that make up the system must be available.
On this basis IR2 Transparency is as follows.
As a participant in an electronic ecosystem where I have access to a function that allows
me to evaluate trustworthiness of other participants, I can access all information (including
inputs used and operations performed) of this function in a transparent4 way, so that I can
understand the factors that contribute to trustworthiness and their mapping to evidence such
as qualifications of entities.
This implies:
• for ‘inputs used’:
– definition of the factors of trustworthiness, and
– mapping these inputs to understandable evidence such as qualifications of entities
in well-defined semantics;
• for ‘operations performed’: the use of a deterministic and logic-based procedure.
5.5.3 IR3 Linked and unique identity
Integrated requirement IR3 is based on CR1 ‘Linkable identity’ as defined in Section 5.4.2.1.
Some observations regarding linkability are as follows.
4The term ‘transparent’ is used as defined in the Oxford English Dictionary figurative meaning, as ‘frank, open,
candid, ingenuous’ and ‘Easily seen through, recognized, understood, or detected; manifest, evident, obvious, clear.’
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• Since information about participants is available from multiple sources, it must be pos-
sible to link all information pertaining to a particular participant to construct a set of
information that can be used as input for the reasoning, i.e. it must be ‘linkable’.
• It is not sufficient for the information to be linkable; to perform an evaluation of trust-
worthiness it must be correctly linked. Hence the requirement specifies ‘linked’ rather
than ‘linkable’ unique identity.
Furthermore the CR1 requirement contains the statement ‘Additional requirements are the
support of pseudonyms, and the ability to withstand Sybil attacks.’ Some further observations
are as follows.
• While support for pseudonyms is relevant from the point of view of systems based on
regulation, this requirement is not compatible with establishing a unique identity which
would allow reasoning on the basis of all available information. Hence it is not a require-
ment for the model introduced in the next chapter.
• The ability to withstand Sybil attacks, as introduced byDouceur [74], is a specific require-
ment related to the creation of multiple identities, most relevant in a reputation system.
However, reputation systems is not within the scope of the thesis, and hence this not a
requirement for the model we develop.
This leads to the formulation of IR3 Linked and unique identity as follows.
As a participant in an electronic ecosystem where I have access to a function that allows
me to evaluate the trustworthiness of other participants, I can rely on this function combining
all information about participants available within the ecosystem, so that I can claim the out-
come of the trustworthiness evaluation is based on all information known about the evaluated
participant.
This implies:
• identity is defined as a set of attributes that uniquely identify a participant;
• all instances of the same identity must be linked because the qualities that will have to be
demonstrated need to be attributed to a specific participant for the corresponding claims
to be trustworthy.
5.5.4 IR4 Competently acting in role
There is a relation between requirement SR3, defined in Section 5.3.3, and requirement CR2
defined in Section 5.4.2.2. Because qualifications are a generally accepted way to demonstrate
competence, integrated requirement IR4 Competently acting in role is as follows.
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As a participant in an electronic ecosystem I have access to and I can demonstrate that
I accept the definitions of roles, the qualifications that are required per role, and how these
qualifications are demonstrated by participants, so that I can verify these arguments are suitable
to support the reliance I want to take on the outcome of the reasoning.
5.5.5 IR5 Governance, security and controls
FutureTrust requirement CR4 ‘Governance and controls’ defined in Section 5.4.2.4 is not related
to any survey requirement. It is composed of three elements.
• Governance, which requires that accountability and responsibility is defined, communi-
cated and accepted, and can be adjusted under a consensus model over time.
• Security safeguards, which require that mechanisms such as identification, authentica-
tion, access control, segregation of duty, limitations in time etc. are in place.
• Controls, which require that an entity that supervises participants in their roles must be
in place and the results of its activities must be available to all participants. This includes
the provision of assurance and monitoring.
This leads to integrated requirement IR5 Governance and controls.
As a participant in an electronic ecosystem I can understand the governance, security safe-
guards and controls that are in place within the ecosystem, so that I can claim the outcome of
the trustworthiness evaluation took into consideration that the ecosystem follows good practices
regarding these topics.
5.5.6 IR6 Policy choices
We make a further observation regarding FutureTrust requirement CR4 ‘Governance and con-
trols’ defined in Section 5.4.2.4. There are many possible combinations of security safeguards
and controls. Some combinations are more suitable to meet certain expectations than others.
Seen from the point of view of a participant in an ecosystem it seems reasonable to require some
degree of freedom regarding the choice of the combination most appropriate for the trustwor-
thiness desired.
On this basis the integrated requirement IR6 Policy choices is as follows.
As a possible participant in an electronic interaction I can determine the information and
the reasoning justifying that a participant is qualified as trustworthy, so that I can verify that
information and reasoning are compatible with the way I want to rely on the outcome of the
reasoning.
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Research Question Addressed by
1 How can we semantically define trustworthiness? IR1 Semantic definition of trustworthiness
IR3 Linked and unique identity
IR4 Competently acting in role
IR5 Governance and controls
IR6 Policy choices
2 How can we reason about trustworthiness? IR2 Transparency
IR7 Obtaining credible data
3 On what can reasoning to qualify an entity as
trustworthy be based?
IR4 Competently acting in role
IR7 Obtaining credible data
4 How can we obtain information for use in sup-
porting such reasoning about ‘real world’ enti-
ties?
IR7 Obtaining credible data
Table 5.1: Research questions and integrated requirements
5.5.7 IR7 Obtaining credible data
Survey requirement SR4 ‘Information to reason about trustworthiness’ defined in Section 5.3.4
is not related to any FutureTrust requirement. It is included without modification in the set
of integrated requirements as requirement IR7 Obtaining credible data which is formulated as
follows.
As a participant in an electronic ecosystem I can understand the origin and the type of data
that is used in the evaluation of trustworthiness of participants, so that I can claim the outcome
of the trustworthiness evaluation is based on credible data.
5.5.8 Relation to research questions
Table 5.1 illustrates how the research questions from Section 1.2.3 are addressed by the inte-
grated requirements described in Section 5.5.
5.6 Summary
The objective of this chapter is to define requirements for a system to be defined and prototyped
that supports the hypothesis given in Section 1.2.2, namely:
Where machine processable information about actors is available, it is desirable
and possible to automate reasoning about the properties of these actors to support
trust-related decision making based on formal semantics.
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These requirements are based on the findings from the literature survey described in Chap-
ter 3 as well as on an elaboration of requirements developed by the author in the FutureTrust
project5. A single set of integrated requirements was derived by merging these two sets.
As described in Section 5.3, the literature survey described in Chapter 3 identified four top-
ics (SR1-SR4) relevant for further research. In Section 5.4, the requirements for trust and trust-
worthiness modelling developed in the FutureTrust project were analysed, and four of these
requirements (CR1, CR2, CR3 and CR5) are relevant to this thesis. In Section 5.5, the four
requirements derived from the literature survey and the four relevant requirements from Fu-
tureTrust were combined to give a single set of seven integrated requirements IR1-IR7. A





Overview of the trustworthy ecosystem
framework
This chapter presents an overview of the   framework that forms the core of the
work described in this thesis. It is intended to meet the requirements developed in
the previous chapter.
6.1 Introduction
This chapter presents an overview of the trustworthy ecosystem ( ) framework. Later chap-
ters provide more details.
Section 6.2 identifies and analyses possible root causes for the lack of adequate semantics
in trust-related decisions, and describes how the proposed   framework addresses them. Sec-
tion 6.3 provides the terminology used in the   framework. Section 6.4 describes how the
framework can be instantiated. Actors in the framework are situated in three planes, which are
described in Section 6.5. Rulebooks are described in Section 6.6, and Section 6.7 covers the
evaluation of trustworthiness. A summary is provided in Section 6.8.
6.2 Analysis of possible root causes
The digital society continues to increase its reliance on electronic representations of actors and
the interactions they perform. Such interactions are conducted between entities which act as
providers and consumers of services. Entities may be human users or digital agents. Relying
on the outcome of an interaction performed via an ICT system, or selecting which system to
use in the first place, forces an entity to take a trust-related decision.
We can identify two types of trust decision. Entities wishing to interact in the digital society
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have firstly to select one or more other entities with which to interact. Secondly, after the inter-
action has taken place, they often have to respond to challenges regarding the trustworthiness of
the interaction and its outcome. In both cases, there is a lack of a clear definition regarding the
meaning of the information used as the basis for the trust decision, and the logic applied. We
argue that the root causes for this lack include the points addressed in Section 6.2.1 immediately
below.
6.2.1 The absence of well-defined semantics
The absence of well-defined semantics regarding trust and trustworthiness in prior art was iden-
tified as the first root cause. This was discussed in Section 3.5.3.1, and can be summarised as
follows.
• There is a lack of consensus regarding whether trust is desirable in the first place.
• The trust frameworks and models that have been previously proposed are limited to a
specific context or problem, and there is no general model that is commonly accepted as
suitable.
• While PKI has been studied and deployed at large scale since the 1980s, and the term
‘trusted third party’ is commonly used, it is not clear what this term means. Huang
[156] states that the major PKI specification documents do not precisely define what
trust means in PKIs, and that there are implicit trust assumptions, some of which may
not always be true. These implicit assumptionsmay cause relying parties to have differing
understandings regarding the meaning of certificates and trust, which may possibly lead
to a misuse of trust. Henderson [146] also argues that the semantics of trust in a PKI are
not well defined.
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) provides an alternative model of trust based on asynchronous
distribution of public keys and certificates. In PGP, parties are represented by their public key;
for a description see Blaze et al. [34], and for a review of the overall system state see Barenghi
[22]. The PGP message format is described in RFC 4880 [42]. Certificates including public
keys can be downloaded from public key servers1. Abdul-Rahman [2] describes the PGP trust
model, where trustworthiness is explicitly defined in two ways.
• The trustworthiness of a public key certificate indicates whether one can be confident
regarding the binding between the ID and public key contained in the certificate. This
confidence is one of:
1From OpenPGP key servers such as hkps://hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net or http://pgp.mit.edu/
as well as from X.509 Directory Servers such as keys.gnupg.net
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– undefined,
– marginal (the key may be valid but one cannot be sure), or
– complete (one can be confident that this key is valid).
• The trustworthiness of an introducer indicates how much one can trust an entity repre-
sented by a public key to be a competent signer of another certificate. A user can assign
four levels of trustworthiness:
– full (this key is fully trusted to introduce another key),
– marginal (this key can be trusted to introduce another public key, but it is not clear
whether it is fully competent to do so),
– untrustworthy (this key should not be trusted to introduce another), or
– don’t know (there are no expressions of trust made about this key).
The precise meaning of these trust levels is not defined explicitly. How the user arrives at
an opinion about the introducer’s trustworthiness is left up to the user. To allow flexibility and
to cater for user-specific evaluation policies, PGP includes a tunable ‘scepticism’ level based on
two parameters2 that allows a user to define the minimum number of introducers required for
a certificate to be deemed valid. The single scepticism level affects all of the keys in the user’s
keyring, so it is implicitly assumed that every key with the same trust level has exactly the same
trustworthiness ‘value’. Abdul-Rahman [2] gives the following criticism of this mechanism.
The first problem is that these limited levels of trust are insufficient to reflect the highly varying
opinions about trustworthiness that a user must put in a public key or introducer. Secondly, in
real life each introducer will vary in their trustworthiness with respect to one another. How-
ever in PGP, given two marginally trusted introducers, one of them could be rated as twice as
trustworthy as the other.
It thus appears that the meanings of trust levels for PGP are also not precisely defined, and
the scepticism mechanism introduces implicit assumptions.
6.2.2 Reliance on simple hierarchical trust models
The reliance of trust-related reasoning in previous work on relatively simple hierarchical trust
models, that are ill-suited to address the needs of a network of interacting agents, was identified
as the second root cause. The following observations can be made.
• In Section 3.5.3.3 it was argued that, due to the continuous increasing diversification of
service provision, the need for assurance about the quality of service delivery ranges from
2COMPLETES_NEEDED and MARGINALS_NEEDED
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self-assurance to specialised third party assurance. Work by Mahmud [231] introduces
trust factors such as ‘security’ but only defines them broadly, and neither is it specified
precisely why and how such trust factors contribute to trust or trustworthiness.
• PKI is widely used as trust model for public key distribution. It is typically used in a
hierarchical way, and trust in a CA public keymeans that all certificates signed by that CA
are trusted. This provides a key management model for a range of applications including
domain authentication in Transport Layer Security (TLS), mail authentication and code
signing. This may be convenient for end users but does not allow users to gain a clear
understanding of the basis for trust.
• PGP creates a graph of interrelationships by letting users sign keys they consider trust-
worthy, referred to as a web of trust3. However PGP lacks a mechanism to extend this
graph with any other attributes. It also lacks a mechanism for propagating trust opinions
within the PGP web of trust and introducer chains, or any form of trust-related chains.
The graph of the web of trust is a fairly simple one, because is limited in depth and does
not allow propagation of trust opinions.
6.2.3 Addressing these root causes
The trustworthy ecosystem framework proposed in this thesis addresses the issues discussed
above in the following ways.
• Its datamodel is graph-based rather than hierarchical, allowing information frommultiple
sources to be combined in a corroborative way. A graph-based model enables effective
evaluations of relationships between nodes. In such a graph, each node is identified by
relating information (attributes) to it. In this way, information resides both in the edges
and in the nodes, supporting logical reasoning.
• The framework explicitly specifies:
– a data model that defines data points containing information about participants and
their interactions,
– a data import mechanism to create instance data according the data model,
– a rulebook that lays down trustworthiness constraints on participants and their in-
teractions, and
3The term ‘web of trust’ is also used for a reputation system created by the company WOT Services. The
reputation system relies on user ratings and on third-party malware, phishing, scam and spam blacklists. This
reputation system is unrelated to the PGP web of trust. There also exists a WOT ontology, available at http:
//xmlns.com/wot/0.1/. This ontology implements PKI concepts such as PubKey and EncryptedDocument.
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– trustworthiness evaluation algorithms which take as input:
∗ a set of instance data, and
∗ a rulebook.
The execution of a trustworthiness evaluation algorithm indicates whether constraints are
satisfied on the basis of the available inputs. Satisfaction of the constraints contained in the
rulebook is deemed to be a positive indication of trustworthiness.
The concept of a rulebook plays a central role in the proposed approach. Given the com-
plexity of today’s world, a single rulebook cannot be adequate for all types of electronic inter-
actions between participants. The thesis presents one example of such a rulebook, based on the
requirements from Section 5.2 and inspired by the eIDAS Regulation [103].
The data import mechanism imports real world data, referred to as instance data. How the
data import mechanism is constructed is an implementation issue. A partial implementation of
such a mechanism is described in Chapter 12.
The framework supports informed decisions on the basis of clear semantics, evidence and
reasoning, based on an evaluation of trustworthiness. The integrated requirements elaborated
in the previous chapter support such decision-taking. We recall these requirements are specified
in the following way:
• the initial context, described by the part ‘As a participant’,
• the action, described by the part ‘I can’, and
• the expected outcome, described by the part ‘so that’.
The expected outcomes of the integrated requirements IR2 to IR7 contain arguments that
support decision taking, since they are formulated as:
• IR2 ..., so that I can understand the factors that contribute to trustworthiness and their
mapping on evidence such as qualifications of entities.
• IR 3 ..., so that I can claim the outcome of the trustworthiness evaluation is based on all
information known about the evaluated participant.
• IR4 ..., so that I can verify these arguments are suitable to support the reliance I want to
take on the reasoning’s outcome.
• IR5..., so that I can claim the outcome of the trustworthiness evaluation took into consid-
eration the ecosystem meets good practices regarding these topics.
• IR6 ..., so that I can verify that information and reasoning are compatible with the way I
want to rely on the reasoning’s outcome.
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• IR7 ..., so that I can verify that information and reasoning are compatible with the way I
want to rely on the reasoning’s outcome.
The trustworthiness framework proposed in this thesis formalises a selected set of relation-
ships and attributes of an electronic ecosystem and its participants, to allow reasoning over
the trustworthiness of participants as well as their interactions. This enables automation of the
interpretations of trust claims and their resulting effects. The term interpretation refers to a
mathematically defined interpretation, corresponding to an assignment of meaning to the sym-
bols of a formal language. The interpretation used is truth functional.
6.3 Terminology
We next give definitions of some fundamental terms.
• The trustworthy ecosystem ( ) framework represents selective elements of the real
world. Its purpose is to allow automated reasoning about the trustworthiness of those
elements. The framework is composed of the following four building blocks.
– The data model defines predicates representing interacting entities and their at-
tributes, including roles the entities can assume, the interactions themselves, and
related attestations, evidence and claims. A data model is proposed in Chapter 7.
– Rulebooks contain formal rules specifying constraints that apply to the other ele-
ments of the ecosystem, satisfaction of which defines trustworthiness for a partic-
ular context. A rulebook functions as a norm that is well-defined and transparent.
There may be many rulebooks. An approach to the creation of rulebooks and a
specific rulebook example are proposed in Chapter 8. The example is based on the
requirements defined in Chapter 5.
– Trustworthiness evaluation functions verify whether constraints are satisfied using
a specific rulebook and a specific set of instance data. There are two types of trust-
worthiness evaluation functions, ex-ante and ex-post. This is further addressed in
Section 6.7. Only one rulebook and set of instance data can be taken into account
during an evaluation. Both an approach to create trustworthiness evaluation func-
tions and a specific example are proposed in Chapter 9.
– Instance data contains information about a specific set of entities. Instance data
can be retrieved from a variety of information sources. For the trustworthiness
evaluation to be relevant, instance data must be selected that applies to the entities
that are subject to evaluation. The framework is limited to working with instance
data that can be used as positive evidence, i.e. evidence which would allow a target
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role to be judged untrustworthy is not taken into account. The study of negative
evidence is a possible topic for future research.
An approach to the creation of instance data is proposed in Chapter 12.
• The ecosystem’s participants are an open group of distributed agents. Open here means
that the membership of the set can change dynamically, and can be large. The participants
can be heterogeneous.
• For trust the definition of Castelfranchi [46] is used, that ‘trust is in fact a deficiency of
control that expresses itself as a desire to progress despite the inability to control’.
• For trustworthiness the definition given in Section 5.2.2 is used, i.e. trustworthiness is a
characteristic of an entity, with the following properties.
– For participants, trustworthiness is based on evidence in the form of attestations.
Such attestations can be provided by the participants about themselves, or provided
by another participant.
– For interactions between participants and for the results of such interactions, trust-
worthiness is based on evidence in the form of evidence records. Such evidence
is created by trustworthiness service providers. They provide services that enrich
information with authenticity, commitments or electronic signatures.
• Base roles indicate the primary role a participant plays in the ecosystem. Demonstrating
the qualifications for a base role comes at a cost and may take some time. Therefore base
roles are likely to be relatively stable over time. Participants are free to claim one or more
base roles.
• Situational roles indicate a specific role a participant plays in a situation such as an inter-
active session, an information transfer or information storage. Therefore situational roles
are, as indicated by their name, bound to a specific situation. Participants are free to claim
any situational role. Base roles and situational roles can be combined. The framework as
defined here is limited to base roles. The study of situational roles is a possible topic for
future research.
• The participants in the ecosystem can be divided into three planes, described in detail in
Sections 6.5.1 – 6.5.3:
– the enabler plane,
– the trustworthiness provision plane, and
– the functional plane.
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This is illustrated in Figure 6.1. Participants may invoke services provided by partici-
pants from any plane. The rulebook and trustworthiness evaluation functions twsevalAP
and twsevalAE (see Section 6.7 and Chapter 9) are situated outside the planes, and are


















• Evidence Service Providers
• Claim Status Service Providers
Trustworthiness Monitors
Figure 6.1: Base roles in the three planes
6.4 Instantiation
6.4.1 Overview
The framework specifications must be instantiated before they can be of practical use. This can
be performed in the following way. The framework specifications consist of:
• the data model described in Chapter 7,
• a rulebook, such as the example described in Chapter 8,
• specifications for the evaluation of trustworthiness, such as those described in Chapter 9.
An instantiation of the framework is made by importing real world data, transformed ac-
cording to the data model, into a suitable repository, and by creating queries that allow the
satisfaction of the rules specified in the rulebook to be demonstrated. Technology has to be se-
lected for this purpose. The use of a graph database for the repository together with SPARQL
for formulating queries is proposed.
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A function that evaluates trustworthiness takes as input a target ecosystem or a target par-
ticipant, a set of rules from a rulebook and a set of instance data, and outputs either true or
false.
• A function returns true when all of the evaluated rules return true. True means that the
evaluated ecosystem or participant meets the constraints specified in the rules, which is
an indication of trustworthiness.
• A function returns falsewhen at least one of the evaluated rules return false. Falsemeans
that the evaluated ecosystem or participant does not meets the constraints specified in the
rules, which is an indication of a possible lack of trustworthiness.
6.4.2 Approach
One possible approach to developing a real-world instantiation of the framework is outlined
below.
• One or more actors establish the ecosystem’s rulebook and trustworthiness evaluation
functions. For this purpose the predicates specified in the data model are used.
• At least one actor endorses the rulebook and, in doing so, takes on the role of an endorser.
• Actors are classified according to the data model on the basis of their attributes regarding
identity and qualifications. Depending on the degree of desired trustworthiness:
– these attributes must either be self-attested or attested by third parties,
– these third parties must in turn be self-attested or attested by other third parties, and
– additional attestations such as legal qualifications may be required.
Actors may also create a ‘rulebook agreement’ attestation to express their agreement to
comply with the rules set-out in the rulebook and to respect the opinion of an enforcer.
The data import mechanismmust be used to ensure the information in the model adequately
reflects the situation of the real world.
6.5 Planes
As discussed above, the participants in the ecosystem are divided into three groups, referred to
as planes.
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6.5.1 The enabler plane
This plane forms the foundation of the ecosystem. The roles in this plane are as follows.
• Authentic Source (AS) role. An authentic source must hold a mandate to register and val-
idate information about entities. This information, or part thereof, is then made available
under its responsibility. The mandate can be a document that has legal validity because it
is published in an official journal or because it is accepted to be binding through a contract
or membership agreement. Competent authorities that allocate identifiers are examples
of authentic sources. The purposes for these identifiers include trading, Value Added Tax
collection and citizen identification (e.g. for the issue of passports, driving licences and
identity cards).
• Endorser (EnDo) role. An endorser provides the applicable rules, legislation, and regu-
lations and specifies who takes on responsibility, accountability, and authority to imple-
ment information security governance.
An endorser expresses its publicly visible approval for this rulebook through its en-
dorsement, and makes information on responsibility, accountability, and authority to im-
plement information security governance available either itself or endorses information
made available by another participant. Any participant can be an endorser.
• Enforcer (EnFo) role. An enforcer is an entity with power to enforce consequences among
participants. An enforcer acts as arbiter or judge and provides the possibility for redress.
Enforcement is outside the proposed system4, but information about whether enforcement
is available can be captured and reasoned about.
• The terminology of ISO/IEC 17000:2020 [173] is followed for the roles of Accreditation
Body and Conformity Assessment Body. The standard defines conformity assessment as
‘demonstration that specified requirements relating to a product, process, system, person,
or body are fulfilled’. It defines ‘specified requirement’ as ‘need or expectation that is
stated’. The standard includes a note that states ‘Specified requirements can be stated in
normative documents such as regulations, standards and technical specifications.’
– Accreditation Body (AB). An Accreditation Body is an entity that performs ac-
creditation, i.e. the independent evaluation of conformity assessment bodies against
4One may evaluate the trustworthiness of a credit card provider in a variety of ways, for example that once all
other possibilities are exhausted, potential disagreements will be settled before a court of law (an enforcer). Courts
of law and all things legal are outside the credit card scheme. Nevertheless I can reason about whether the presence
of such an enforcer improves the outcome of evaluation of trustworthiness. Marsh [234] Section 8.5 provides a
detailed discussion of the role of an enforcer.
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recognised criteria for their impartiality and competence. An AB accredits partici-
pants in the role of a Conformity Assessment Body. The United Kingdom Accred-
itation Service (UKAS) is an example of an entity in this role.
– Conformity Assessment Body (CAB) role. A CAB assesses the conformity of wit-
nesses and their services against relevant criteria, and provides assurances of con-
formity in the form of attestations. In the UK, Lloyd’s Register is an example of a
CAB.
6.5.2 The trustworthiness provision plane
This plane involves participants that provide trustworthiness services. The principal roles in
this plane are as follows.
• Witness roles. Witness roles provide attestations to facts, events or statements. We iden-
tify the following two special cases of witness roles.
– Evidence Service Provider (EvSP) role. An EvSP creates information that serves as
evidence. This name is proposed as a more generic alternative to the term Trust Ser-
vice Provider. It includes traditional Trust Service Providers such as Certification
Authorities, Identity Providers, Attribute Providers, (Remote) Signature Services,
Time Stamp Services, and providers of added value services such as registered elec-
tronic delivery or archiving. Examples of well-known organisations in this role
include Verisign5 and Identrust6.
– Claim Status Service Provider (CsSP) role. A CsSP provides status information
regarding claims, e.g. verifying a response to an authentication request, or verifying
an electronic commitment or signature. Examples include the following.
∗ In the public sector, the Belgian Federal Government offers a free eID Digital
Signature Server7. It offers signature and verification services.
∗ Private sector examples are the Belgian e-contract service8 and Trustweaver’s
verification service9 for electronic documents.
• Trustworthiness Monitor (TwsMo) role. A participant in this role monitors the provision
of services by EvSPs and CsSPs and attests to this. Examples include the UK’s tScheme
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6.5.3 The functional plane
This plane consists of participants that act in the role of consumers or providers of a functional
service. Prior to, during, and after service delivery these participants may invoke services
from the other planes to evaluate the trustworthiness of participants. The principal roles in the
functional plane are:
• Functional Service Providers (FuSPs), that offer business services, and
• Functional Service Consumers (FuSCs), that interact with FuSP services.
6.6 Rulebooks
A rulebook contains constraints in the form of rules which are used to determine whether an
entity can be regarded as trustworthy. It containsmandatory rules whose satisfactionwill always
be verified, and discretionary rules which can be selected by the invoker of the trustworthiness
evaluation function.
There may be many rulebooks. However, at the moment that a trustworthiness evaluation is
performed, the rulebook that is to be taken into account must be specified. Only one rulebook
can be taken into account during one evaluation. Rulebooks are described and an example is
given in Chapter 8. Censi [47] provides an introduction to the use of rulebooks.
6.7 Trustworthiness evaluation
6.7.1 Introduction
Trustworthiness evaluation is defined as the conduct of a set of logical steps in which evidence is
evaluated against a rulebook. Evidence in the form of a set of data points, represented according
to the data model, is defined in Chapter 7. Rulebooks are addressed in Chapter 8, and how to
perform the evaluation is described in Chapter 9. We now describe three fundamental aspects
of trustworthiness evaluation and an approach to perform it.
6.7.2 Moment in time and scope
Trustworthiness evaluation can take place at various points in time.
• Prior to an interaction, a participant can choose from two ex-ante trustworthiness evalu-
ation functions.
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– The ecosystem evaluation function (twsevalAE) can be invoked for assistance with
a decision regarding whether to interact within a particular ecosystem, under a spe-
cific rulebook. An ecosystem can be qualified as ex-ante trustworthy upon satis-
faction of the constraints of the trustworthiness evaluation policy specified by the
trustor. This means that if a trustor decides to interact within the evaluated ecosys-
tem, the trustor can have reasonable expectations that future interactions and their
outcomes will be consistent with what has been described in the rulebook and en-
dorsed by the endorser.
– The participant evaluation function (twsevalAP) can be invoked for assistance with
a decision regarding whether to interact with a particular participant. An entity can
be qualified as ex-ante trustworthy upon satisfaction of the constraints of the trust-
worthiness evaluation policy specified by the trustor. This means that if a trustor
decides to interact with the evaluated trustee, the trustor can have reasonable ex-
pectations that future interactions and their outcomes will be consistent with what
has been communicated or committed by the trustee.
The purpose of an ex-ante trustworthiness evaluation is to provide logical arguments to
support trustor decision-making and provide supporting arguments should a choice be
challenged. This type of evaluation forms the focus of much of the remainder of this
thesis.
• During an interaction, a participant may invoke the trustworthiness provision services
from a witness or a monitor. Functional interaction with invocation of trustworthiness
services will lead to the creation of evidence, on which claims can be based. This part
of the framework is not specified in detail in this thesis, and remains for future work (see
Chapter 16).
• After an interaction, a participant may invoke the ex-post trustworthiness evaluation func-
tion (twsevalP) for assistance in deciding whether the outcome of the interaction with
a particular participant can be deemed as trustworthy. The purpose of an ex-post trust-
worthiness evaluation is to support the trustor should the outcome of the transaction be
challenged or rejected by another participant. Again, this part of the framework is not
specified in detail in this thesis, and remains for future work (see Chapter 16).
6.7.3 Instance data
The   framework allows the selection of a range of different information sources from which
information can be used for trustworthiness evaluation. The sources must be identifiable and
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trustworthy in their own right. This is addressed by selecting sources that are authoritative for
the information they provide, as described in Chapter 10.
6.7.4 Execution capability
It is assumed that the party interested in the outcome of the trustworthiness evaluation function
has direct access to and control over a device capable of executing the function. There may
be cases where this is not possible due to a lack of resources or device constraints, or because
the required instance data is not available to the interested party. In such cases it would be
necessary to rely on another party to execute the function and return the results. However such
cases are outside of the scope of the thesis and are topics for future research (see Chapter 16).
6.7.5 The four steps
The approach consists of four steps.
• The first step involves choosing whether to evaluate the trustworthiness of an ecosystem
or a participant.
– In the ecosystem case, the particular ecosystem and a specific rulebook are evalu-
ated without specifying a particular participant.
– In the participant case, a particular participant is evaluated as a potential trustee in
the context of instance data and a rulebook.
• The second step involves selecting a rulebook and instance data. The rulebook 1 in-
troduced in Chapter 8 is used as a working example in the discussions in this chapter.
Selection of instance data is addressed in Chapter 10.
• The third step consists of selecting discretionary constraints from the rulebook that are
relevant to the trustor’s decision.
• The fourth step consists of executing the appropriate trustworthiness evaluation function
to validate whether the mandatory and the selected discretionary constraints are satisfied
by the selected instance data.
– twsevalAE is used when evaluating an ecosystem.
– twsevalAP is used when evaluating a specific participant as potential trustee.
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6.8 Summary
This chapter identified and analysed the possible root causes for the lack of adequate semantics
in trust-related decisions, and described how the   framework addresses them. The terminol-
ogy used in the framework was described. Ecosystem participants are divided into three planes,
as listed below, where each plane contains participants acting in specified roles.
• The enabler plane, where participants in the roles of authentic source, endorser, enforcer,
accreditation body and conformity assessment body are situated.
• The trustworthiness provision plane, where participants in the roles of evidence service
provider, claim status service provider and trustworthiness monitor are situated.
• The functional plane, where participants in the roles of functional service provider and
consumer are situated.
Rulebooks, which contain constraints in the form of rules, were described. They contain
mandatory rules whose satisfaction will always be verified, and discretionary rules which can
be selected by the invoker of the trustworthiness evaluation function for evaluation. Trustwor-
thiness evaluation was defined as the conduct of a set of logical steps in which evidence is




This chapter presents the data model part of the   framework. The data model
is based on predicates. It includes predicates that represent interacting entities
and their attributes, including roles they can assume. Predicates that represent
interaction, evidence and claims are also included. Subsequent chapters describe
how constraints are defined over the data, and how data and constraints are used
to calculate trustworthiness.
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter the data model of the   framework is defined. Data is represented by predicates
which are selected on the basis of the requirements defined in Chapter 5. Subsequent chapters
describe how constraints are defined over the data in the form of a set of rules (referred to as a
‘rulebook’), and how trustworthiness can be calculated using the data and the constraints. An
implementation of the data model is described in Chapter 11.
Section 7.2 describes the modelling of data points that contribute to meeting the require-
ments from Chapter 5, and how these data points are specified as predicates. The predicates
Actor, Attestations and Participants are specified in Sections 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5. The base roles
in which participants can act are specified in Section 7.6. Other attestations are specified in
Sections 7.7 – 7.10. This includes Agreement, Endorsement, Enforcement, Accreditation, At-
testation of Conformance to a standard, Attestation of being under Monitor’s supervision, At-
testation of being registered, legal attestation and disclosure attestation. Helper predicates
are specified in Sections 7.11 and 7.12, and predicates for data sources are specified in Section
7.13. A summary is provided in Section 7.14.
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7.2 Modelling the data
7.2.1 Meeting the requirements
7.2.1.1 Data points
Within the   framework, data is made up of individual data points which are represented
in the form of predicates. A data point is a unit of information which can be observed, anal-
ysed and processed. The purpose of data points in the   framework is to serve as input to
a trustworthiness evaluation function, which gives as output evidence to an ecosystem partici-
pant. This evidence is intended to give assurance to the participant that future interactions and
their outcomes will be consistent with what has been communicated by the trustee, or that the
outcome of a transaction performed in the past can be relied upon.
The data model has been designed to reflect the set of integrated requirements given in
Section 5.5. Five of the seven requirements translate directly into elements of the data model,
and these are listed immediately below.
• IR1 Semantic definition of trustworthiness. This is addressed by selecting data points
that have a truth-functional interpretation.
• IR3 Linked and unique identity. To meet this requirement, data points capture various
identity attributes. For this purpose the actor and participant predicates are created. This
allows identity attributes to be related to entities.
• IR4 Competently acting in role. To meet this requirement, data points capture the role
attributes specified per FLoC. For this purpose the role and attestation predicates are
created. This allows roles and other attributes to be related to entities.
• IR5 Governance and controls. To meet this requirement, data points capture controls for
integrity and authenticity. For this purpose the interaction, evidence and claim predicates
are created. This allows interactions to be related to participants, and evidence/claims to
be related to interactions, including the use of governance and control mechanisms.
• IR7 Obtaining credible data. To meet this requirement, selection criteria for data sources
can be specified as data points. This is addressed in Section 12.1.
The remaining two requirements are addressed in the following ways.
• IR2 Transparency: this can be addressed by making all selected data points and their
instantiation publicly available. However, this does not lead to the creation of a specific
data point.
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• IR6 Policy choices: this is addressed by selecting evaluation rules. This does not lead to
the creation of a specific data point.
7.2.1.2 Predicates
As described above, predicates are used to model the data points that address requirements IR1,
IR3, IR4, IR5 and IR7. The purpose of the predicates is to represent things from the real world
so that they can be reasoned with.
A predicate has the form Predicatename(term1, term2). When there is no need to specify
a term’s name it is represented by ‘_’, such as in Predicatename(term1,_)
To refer to terms within a predicate, a projection function is used. It can be distinguished
from the corresponding predicate by the use of a calligraphic letter in the first position. For
example Predicatename(term1, term2) is a predicate, and redicatename(term1, term2) is a
projection function. To improve readability the name of the projection function will include a
subscript that refers to the term such as redicatenameterm1(term1, term2).
The   framework predicates are listed in Table 7.1, along with the part of this chapter in
which they are described.
7.3 Actors
7.3.1 Purpose
The purpose of the actor predicate is to represent the class of things that are capable of acting
in the real world. This allows reasoning about them in a trustworthiness evaluation.
7.3.2 Definition
An actor predicate represents the class of things from the real world that are capable of acting
there. An actor is anything that can provide services to, or interact with, other actors, or is capa-
ble of reacting to stimuli from other actors within the   framework. There are no constraints
on who or what can be an actor. An actor predicate has the form Actor(X). The set of all actors
is denoted by SA.
7.4 Attestations
7.4.1 Purpose
The purpose of the attestation predicate is to record attributes of actors. This allows reasoning
about the presence, absence, or content of such qualities as part of trustworthiness reasoning
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aid = the identity of the issuer of the attestation
T ={Subject, Attribute, Value}
Section 7.4
Participant(X) Section 7.5
Base role specified as
Attestation(aid , (S, roleTypeBase, V)
Section 7.6
Agreement specified as
Agreement(aid ,(S, agreesTo, R)
Section 7.7
Endorsement specified as
Endorsement(aid , (S, doesEndorse, R)
Section 7.8
Enforcement specified as
Enforcement(aid , (S, doesEnforce, R)
Section 7.9
Accreditation specified as
Accreditation(aid , (S, accreditedFor, N)
Section 7.10.1
Conformance to standard specified as
Conformance(aid , (S, doesConformTo, V)
Section 7.10.2
Supervision specified as
Supervision(aid , (S, doesSupervise, V)
Section 7.10.3
Registration specified as
Registration(aid , (S, isRegisteredIn, R)
Section 7.10.4
Legal qualification specified as
LegalQualification(aid , (S, legalQual, V)
Section 7.10.5
Disclosure attestation specified as








Table 7.1: The   framework predicates
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about an actor.
7.4.2 Definition
An attestation predicate has the form Attestation(aid , T), where
• aid represents the actor that issued the attestation, and
• T represents the triple (subject, attribute, value) where
– subject identifies the actor that is the subject of the attestation,
– attribute specifies the attribute that is attested by the issuer aid about the subject,
where attributes are defined as Sag = {seq ℂ}, where ℂ is the allowed characterset,
and
– value contains the value of the attribute.
The triple T is used to define identity attributes, role attributes and other attributes such
as the agreement to respect the rules of the instantiation of the   framework within which a
participant is interacting. An actor can create attestations about itself or other participants.
An attestation predicate can be extended with time and commitment marks. For example
the attestation Attestation(pid , T) can be extended with time and commitment marks to Attes-
tation(pid , T, tm, cm). The set of all attestations is defined as Sattn.
7.4.3 Projection
The following projection functions are defined for the attestation predicate:
• ttestationaid (A) selects the issuer,
• other selections can be specified as follows.
– ttestationtsub(A) selects the subject1 of an attestation triple,
– ttestationtatt(A) selects the attribute type of an attestation triple, and
– ttestationtval (A) selects the attribute value of an attestation triple.
1participants are identified by their eIdentifier, as specified in Section 7.5.3
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7.4.4 Time, commitment and revocation
All attestations, as well as the predicates described in the subsequent sections, can be extended
with time and commitment marks. For example
Attestation(aid ,T)
can be extended to
Attestation(aid ,T, tm, cm)
An issued attestation can at any time be revoked (i.e. rendered invalid) by its issuer, using
time and commitment marks, as described below.
7.4.4.1 Time marks
A time mark tm is an optional set of attributes that express time of creation (cre), start of validity
(sov), and end of validity (eov). Its creation is handled by the commitment creation function
described below.
7.4.4.2 Commitment marks
A commitment mark cm is an optional attribute that expresses the commitment of its creator.
The commitment creation lifecycle is as follows.
• Prior to creating a commitment the committing actor has to invoke a commitment prepa-
ration function fcomprep(aid1). The function generates and returns two elements:
– commitment creation data which is to be kept internal and is required to create a
commitment,
– commitment validation data of the form
CVD(aid1, commitment-validation-data, data).
• To commit information, an actor invokes the commitment creation function
fcomcreate(aid , P)
which extends the predicatePwith a time and commitmentmark. The function has access
to the actor’s internal commitment creation data, and a timestamp function.
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• To verify a commitment, an actor invokes a commitment verification function
fcomverif (Predicate, CVD(aid1, (aid2, commitment-validation-data, data)))
which verifies the predicate’s time and commitment marks. It returns true if the ver-
ification was successful and false otherwise. The function has access to the creator’s
attestation that contains the commitment validation data.
Commitment can be based on an electronic signature or a commitment scheme. How it is
implemented is outside of the scope of this thesis.
7.4.4.3 Revocation
Revocation is performed by creating a attestation of the same type and with the same content
as the attestation to be revoked. This new attestation must have a more recent time of creation




The purpose of the participant predicate is to qualify actors that meet a minimum set of con-
straints. Actors that meet the minimum set of constraints are qualified as participants. The
presence or absence of this qualification is verified as part of an actor’s trustworthiness evalu-
ation.
7.5.2 Definition
A participant predicate has the form Participant(X). A participant is an actor that:
• is uniquely identified,
• is either a natural person or an organisation, and
• agrees to comply to the constraints formulated in one or more rulebooks.
These three required characteristics are expressed through attestation predicates. The set of
all participants is denoted by SPT .
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7.5.3 Participant identification
Identification is defined by requirement IR3 in Section 5.5.3.
As a participant in an electronic ecosystem where I have access to a function that allows me
to evaluate trustworthiness of other participants, I can rely on this function combining all infor-
mation about participants available within the ecosystem, so that I can claim the outcome of the
trustworthiness evaluation is based on all information known about the evaluated participant.
We recall this implies:
• Identity is defined as a set of attributes that uniquely identify a participant.
• All instances of the same identity must be linked because the qualities that will have to be
demonstrated need to be attributed to a specific participant for the corresponding claims
to be trustworthy.
For participants, the   data model is structured in two parts:
• the minimum   data model, and
• the extended   data model.
The minimum   data model is deliberately simple. Each participant X is identified by its
eIdentifier. This is a unique constant and ∀ X : fid(X) = c.
Attributes are related to participants by attestations. Possible attribute values for partici-
pants are as follows.
• The attributes for identification of natural persons are Saip = {eIdentifier, givenName,
middleName, firstName, dateOfBirth}. A natural person must at least have an eIdentifier
and a givenName.
• The attributes for identification of organisations are Saio = {eIdentifier, orgName, date-
OfEstablishment}. An organisation must at least have an eIdentifier and an orgName.
The responsibility for issuing eIdentifiers and names is outside the scope of this thesis.
Invoking the projection function for the identity attribute eIdentifier can be achieved
• by specifying the attributettestationtatt(A) as eIdentifier and retrieving its correspond-
ingttestationtval (A), or
• directly via ttestationteIdentif ier(A).
The extended   data model allows other attributes to be assigned to participants. For
example:
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• a social security number, or the name and date of birth of one or more parents could be
included in a natural person attestation;
• the legal form and Value Added Tax number (or similar) could be included in an organi-
sation attestation.
However, in this thesis we restrict our attention to the minimum data model.
7.6 Base roles
7.6.1 Purpose
The purpose of the base role predicate is to express that, according to its issuer, a participant
meets the requirements to act in the role indicated by the predicate. The role is one of the base
roles introduced in Section 6.5. As the rulebook contains constraints on participant attributes
which are role-dependent, checking these constraints is part of a participant’s trustworthiness
evaluation.
7.6.2 Definition
The following base roles were introduced in Section 6.5.




– Accreditation Body, and
– Conformity Assessment Body.
• Trustworthiness provision plane (defined in Section 6.5.2):
– Witness, including:
∗ Evidence service provider,
∗ Claim status service provider, and
– Trustworthiness Monitor.
• Functional plane (specified in Section 6.5.3):
– Functional service provider, and
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– Functional service consumer.
The base roles are depicted in three planes in Figure 6.1.
7.6.3 Base roletype attributes
A base role predicate consists of an attestation with attribute roleTypeBase, specified as Attes-
tation(aid , (S, roleTypeBase, V).
• S represents the subject of the attestation, i.e. the participant that is attested with the base
role specified by V.
• The attribute for the base roletype is defined as Sabr = {roleT ypeBase}.
• Values are defined as V = seq ℂ where
v ∈ Sarb ={RFuSP , RFuSC , REnDo, REnFo, RAB, RCAB, REvSP , RCsSP , RTwsMo}
The set of base role attestations is denoted by Sabr, where Sabr ⊂ Sattn.
7.7 Agreement
7.7.1 Purpose
The purpose of an agreement is to capture the fact that a participant has agreed to comply with
a specific rulebook. Such an agreement makes it clear that a participant accepts being evaluated
according to the rules specified by the rulebook, and will respect the opinion of an enforcer.
7.7.2 Definition
An agreement has the form Agreement(aid , T), where
• aid denotes the actor that issued the agreement, and
• T denotes the triple (subject, attribute, value) where
– subject denotes the actor that is the subject of the attestation,
– attribute specifies the attribute that is attested by the issuer aid about the subject,
where the attribute is defined as agreesTo, and
– value contains the value of the attribute, which is the rulebook identifier.
The set of agreements is denoted by Sagr.
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7.8 Endorsement
7.8.1 Purpose
The purpose of an endorsement is to describe that a participant endorses a specific rulebook. In
this way, the endorser expresses its approval for the rulebook in a way that is publicly visible.
7.8.2 Definition
An endorsement has the form Endorsement(aid , (S, doesEndorse, R)) where
• aid denotes the issuer,
• S denotes the subject (i.e. the participant that endorses), and
• R denotes the rulebook.
A trustworthy ecosystem must have exactly one endorsed2 rulebook, because the rulebook
contains the constraints that are the basis for trustworthiness evaluation. The set of endorse-
ments is denoted by Send .
7.9 Enforcement
7.9.1 Purpose
The purpose of an enforcement is to indicate that a participant is willing and able to enforce
a rulebook3. Recall that an enforcer is an entity with power to enforce consequences among
participants. While enforcement itself is external to the   framework, the presence of an
enforcer is part of trustworthiness evaluation.
7.9.2 Definition
An enforcement has the form Enforcement(aid , (S, doesEnforce, R)) where
• aid denotes the issuer,
• S denotes the subject (i.e. the participant that enforces), and
2It can be argued that it is sufficient to have agreement attestations from the individual participants, and that an
endorsement is not required. Illustrations of this approach can be seen in so-called self-sovereign models. However,
the framework is based on the integrated requirements given in Chapter 5, and IR5 ‘Governance, security and
controls’ leads to the need for endorsement.
3As for endorsement, the need for enforcement derives from requirement IR5 ‘Governance, security and con-
trols’.
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• R denotes the rulebook.




The purpose of an accreditation assertion is to indicate that a participant is accredited by an
accreditation body to assess the conformity of another participant according to a specific norm.
The need for accreditation derives from requirement IR5 ‘Governance, security and controls’.
Recall that an accreditor, formally an Accreditation Body (AB), is a participant that performs
accreditation, i.e. the independent evaluation of conformity assessment bodies against recog-
nised criteria for their impartiality and competence. An AB accredits participants in the role
of a Conformity Assessment Body. While accreditation itself is external to the   framework,
the presence of an accreditation body is part of trustworthiness evaluation.
7.10.1.2 Definition
An accreditation takes the form Accreditation(aid , (S, accreditedFor, N)) where
• aid denotes the issuer of the accreditation,
• S denotes the subject (i.e. the participant that has been accredited), and
• N denotes the norm.
The set of accreditations is denoted by SAcc .
7.10.2 Conformance to standard
7.10.2.1 Purpose
The purpose of a conformance to standard assertion is to indicate that, according to a conformity
assessment body, a participant complies with the standard specified in the attestation.
The need for conformance to standards derives from requirement IR5 ‘Governance, security
and controls’. Recall that a Conformity Assessment Body (CAB) is an entity that verifies the
conformity of witnesses and their services against relevant criteria, and provides assurances of
conformity in the form of attestations. A CAB is qualified as such by an AB.
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While conformity assessment itself is external to the   framework, the presence of an
attestation of conformance to standards is part of trustworthiness evaluation. This is based
on the assumption that compliance to a standard is a commonly accepted way to demonstrate
requirements are met. Obviously this does not stop a claimant from demonstrating requirements
are met in another way. However, such alternative ways are outside the scope of the thesis.
7.10.2.2 Definition
An attestation of conformance to a standard consists of an attestationwith attributetype doesCon-
formTo whose value refers to the standard. It is specified as Conformance(aid , (S, doesCon-
formTo, N) where
• aid denotes the issuer of the conformance assertion,
• S denotes the subject (i.e. the participant that has been conformity assessed), and
• N denotes the norm.
The set of conformity to standards attestations is denoted by Sctsa.
7.10.3 Supervision
7.10.3.1 Purpose
The purpose of a supervision assertion is to indicate that a trustworthiness monitor4 is super-
vising another participant. Recall that a trustworthiness monitor is an entity with the mandate
to supervise the activities of participants that deliver trustworthiness services, such as evidence
service providers and claim status service providers. While the supervision itself is external to
the   framework, the presence of a trustworthiness monitor that performs supervision is part
of trustworthiness evaluation.
7.10.3.2 Definition
An attestation of supervision consists of an attestation with attributetype doesSupervise. It is
specified as Supervision(aid , (S, doesSupervise, P)) where
• aid denotes the issuer of the supervision assertion,
• S denotes the subject (i.e. the participant that performs the supervision), and
• P denotes the participant that is being supervised.
The set of supervision attestations is denoted by Ssup.
4The need for supervision derives from requirement IR5 ‘Governance, security and controls’.
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7.10.4 Registration
7.10.4.1 Purpose
The purpose of a registration assertion is to indicate that, according to a registrar, a participant
is listed in the register referred to in the attestation.
The need for being registered derives from requirements IR4 ‘Competently acting in role’
and IR5 ‘Governance, security and controls’.
While such registration itself is external to the   framework, the presence of an attestation
of being registered is part of trustworthiness evaluation. This is based on the assumption that
such registration is a commonly accepted way to demonstrate requirements are met. Obviously
this does not stop a claimant from demonstrating requirements aremet in another way. However,
such alternative ways are outside the scope of this thesis.
7.10.4.2 Definition
It is specified as Registration(aid , (S, isRegisteredIn, R)).
• aid denotes the issuer of the registration assertion,
• S denotes the subject (i.e. the participant that is registered), and
• R denotes the register where the subject is registered.
The set of registration attestations is denoted by Srega.
7.10.5 Legal qualification
7.10.5.1 Purpose
The purpose of a legal qualification assertion is to indicate that a participant is qualified through
a legal document. The need for a qualification through a legal document derives from require-
ments IR4 ‘Competently acting in role’ and IR7 ‘Obtaining credible data’.
7.10.5.2 Definition
A legal qualification is specified as LegalQualification(aid , (S, legalQual, L)) where
• aid denotes the issuer of the legal qualification,
• S denotes the subject (i.e. the participant that is legally qualified), and
• L denotes the URI that resolves to the legal norm to which the subject is legally qualified.
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The set of legal document attestations is denoted by Slq. The detailed semantics of legal
documents are outside the scope of this thesis.
7.10.6 Disclosure
7.10.6.1 Purpose
The purpose of a disclosure assertion is to indicate that a participant has made a specific set of
information available5.
7.10.6.2 Definition
A disclosure consists of an attestation with attributetype doesDisclose, whose value takes a
universal resource identifier that refers to the disclosed information.
It is specified as Disclosure(aid , (S, doesDisclose, D)) where
• aid denotes the issuer of the disclosure,
• S denotes the subject (i.e. the participant that is performing the disclosure), and
• D denotes the URI that resolves to the disclosure document.
The set of disclosure assertions is denoted by Sdc . The detailed semantics of disclosure
documents are outside the scope of this thesis.
7.11 Eco helper predicate
7.11.1 Purpose
The predicate Eco() specifies that a combination of information establishes what is referred to
as an ecosystem. It refers to the set of information that represents an ecosystem as a whole.
The predicate represents an ecosystem by representing a set of actors and information about
them in the form of attestations, evidence and claims, as well as a rulebook containing sets of
constraints over the other elements and trustworthiness evaluation functions capable of verify-
ing that these constraints are satisfied.
7.11.2 Definition
An ecosystem predicate has the form Eco(E).
5The need for a disclosure attestation derives from requirement IR5 ‘Governance, safeguards and controls’.
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7.12 TwsEco helper predicate
7.12.1 Purpose
The predicate TwsEco() expresses the fact that, when specific constraints are satisfied, an ecosys-
tem is trustworthy. The predicate TwsEco(E) refers to the set of information that represents an
ecosystem that satisfies all mandatory rules and is referred to as a trustworthy ecosystem. The
purpose of this predicate is to represent an ecosystem that meets formally defined constraints.
7.12.2 Definition
A trustworthy ecosystem predicate has the form TwsEco(E). The variable E refers to a set which
may contain elements from
• S , the set of rulebooks,
• SA, the set of actors,
• Sattn, the set of attestations,
• SPT , the set of participants,
• Sagr, the set of agreements,
• Sds, the set of data sources,
• Send , the set of endorsements,
• Senf , the set of enforcements,
• Sint, the set of interactions,
• Scla, the set of claims,
• STwsEval, the set of trustworthiness evaluation functions.
7.13 Data sources
7.13.1 Purpose
The trustworthiness evaluations proposed here are based on inference and queries, using the
predicates defined in this chapter. The purpose of the data source predicate is to identify sources
of information that allow variable occurrences in other predicates to be bound6 to data that
represents a situation that is of interest.
6Bound means that substitution may no longer take place.
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7.13.2 Definition
A data source predicate has the form DataSource(aid , URI, howPublished) where
• aid denotes the responsible for the data source,
• URI denotes where the data source can be accessed, and
• howPublished denotes the activity performed by the responsible to make the data source
available.
The set of all data sources is denoted by Sds.
7.14 Summary
The objective of this chapter was to define the data model for the   framework. This data
model is based on predicates. Predicates that represent interacting entities and their attributes,
including roles they can assume, were defined, as well as predicates that represent attestations,
interaction, evidence and claims. A predicate to represent data sources was defined that allows
binding of variable occurrences to data that represents a situation that is of interest. The purpose
and definition of each predicate were given. Projection functions were defined that allow the




This chapter introduces the Rulebook, i.e. a set of constraints that reflect a partic-
ular context for reasoning about trustworthiness. Whilst the notion of a rulebook
is a general one, two particular instances of a rulebook are also described which
have been derived from the requirements developed in Chapter 5.
8.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces the concept of a Rulebook, a set of constraints that reflect a particular
context for reasoning about trustworthiness. The constraints are formalised as rules describ-
ing expected qualities of, and relationships between, participants in the ecosystem. Verifying
whether these rules are satisfied allows evaluation of the trustworthiness of an entire ecosystem
or of a participant in the ecosystem. Rule verification is evaluated by trustworthiness evalu-
ation functions, which are described in the next chapter. Whilst the notion of a rulebook is a
general one, two closely related specific rulebooks are also described which have been derived
from the requirements developed in Chapter 5. Both rulebooks include sets of mandatory and
discretionary rules
Section 8.2 provides an overview of the structure and use of rulebooks. Section 8.3 de-
scribes an approach for the creation of rulebooks. Sections 8.4 – 8.8 illustrate this approach
through the creation of a specific rulebook for the evaluation of an ecosystem. After a brief
introduction in Section 8.4, Sections 8.5 – 8.8 provide formally specified rules corresponding
to the the integrated requirements specified in Section 5.5. In a similar way, sections 8.9 –
8.13 illustrate this approach through the creation of a specific rulebook for the evaluation of a
participant in an ecosystem. A summary is provided in Section 8.14.
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8.2 Modelling constraints in rules
8.2.1 Purpose
The purpose of a rulebook is to formally capture an understanding of what trustworthiness
means in a particular context, in the form of constraints on data points. This, in turn, enables
reasoning about trustworthiness to be performed using the input instance data, using the for-
malisms introduced in Chapters 6 and 7.
8.2.2 Defining rulebooks
Rulebooks are the third of the four   framework building blocks specified in Section 6.3. The
other building blocks are the data model, the trustworthiness evaluation functions and instance
data.
There may be multiple rulebooks. The set of all rulebooks is denoted by S . Each rulebook
R is identified by its rulebook identifier (rIdentifier) r. This is a unique constant and ∀R : fid(R)
= r.
A rulebook consists of a set of rules that are expressed in FOL. As discussed in Section 8.3,
a rulebook contains both mandatory and discretionary rules.
8.2.3 Rulebook verification
While there may be multiple rulebooks, a trustworthiness evaluation must be performed using a
single rulebook and a specific set of instance data. In an evaluation, the mandatory rules of this
rulebook will be always be checked, along with those discretionary rules supporting the type
of trustworthiness required. Clearly, the set of discretionary rules to be used in an evaluation
must be specified in advance.
8.3 Approach for rulebook creation
In principle, many approaches could be used to create a rulebook. The approach adopted here
is described below. Key elements of the approach are described in greater detail in Sections
8.3.1 and 8.3.2.
• The rulebookmust be based on awell-defined set of requirements. The specific rulebooks
described later in this chapter build on the requirements defined in Chapter 5.
• The rulebook must be expressed in a well-defined terminology. The specific rulebooks
described later in this chapter use the terminology described in Chapters 6 and 7.
• Requirements must be specified using FOL.
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• Two types of rulebook are defined which differ in their objective:
– rulebooks that contain rules for the twsevalAE function, which evaluates the trust-
worthiness of an ecosystem, and
– rulebooks that contain rules for the twsevalAP function, which evaluates the trust-
worthiness of a participant.
• Two ruletypes are defined which differ in when and how they are evaluated.
– Mandatory rules are always evaluated. They define the minimum conditions that a
data instance must satisfy in order to be evaluated as trustworthy in the   frame-
work.
– Discretionary rules can be evaluated at the discretion of the invoker. They allow a
policy for trustworthiness evaluation to be expressed.
A trade-off is possible between specifying constraints as mandatory or discretionary for a
given rulebook. By including more constraints in the mandatory set, the bar is raised for an
ecosystem or a participant to be deemed as trustworthy. However, this comes at the cost of
reducing options to express policy, because a constraint cannot appear in both the mandatory
and in the discretionary set. The specific rulebooks used as illustration include only a small set
of mandatory constraints to allow flexibility in the creation of policy.
8.3.1 Rule formulation
We strove to formulate the rules in FOL in a consistent way. Where possible, patterns of the
following types were used.
• The implication connective→ is used to express constraints. A conditional statement of
the form p → q is used to express that p is a constraint that must be met for q to be true.
For example a rule expressing a participant is an actor that meets constraints c1 and c2 is
written as follows.
∀(X)(Actor(X) ∧ (c1(X) ∧ c2(X)) → Participant(X))
• Mandatory rules that apply to a set of data that represents an ecosystem can be constructed
as follows.
∀(E) (Eco(E) ∧ (constraints)→ TwsEco(E))
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The ‘∀(E)’ is referred to as the head of the pattern, while the remainder is referred as the
tail. The constraints in the tail refer to individual data points in instance data.
• Discretionary rules mostly follow one of the following two patterns.
∀ X ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2 ∈ Sabr (constraints)
∃ X ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2 ∈ Sattn (constraints)
However, in a few cases other patterns are used, e.g. to specify segregation of duty re-
quirements.
8.3.2 Mandatory and discretionary rules
A rulebook contains mandatory and discretionary rules. A trustworthiness evaluation combines
mandatory rules (which are by default executed) and discretionary rules (whose execution de-
pends on them being selected by the invoker).
The purpose of the mandatory rules is to ensure there is enough information in the instance
data to allow reasoning that can result in a decision. The set of discretionary rules allows the
invoker to select those rules that express policy requirements.
• The mandatory rules check instance data and express the requirements that must be met
for the available information to be deemed to represent a trustworthy ecosystem or par-
ticipant. At the moment of trustworthiness evaluation, all mandatory rules of the se-
lected rulebook are verified. Within the specific rulebooks described later in this chapter,
mandatory rules are identified as IRm-Mn where m refers to the requirement on which the
rule is based, M corresponds to ‘Mandatory’, and n is a sequence number.
• The discretionary rules affect theway the trustworthiness evaluation deductions are drawn
from the information inside the system. Information might be available that positively
contributes to trustworthiness, or required information might be missing. Within the spe-
cific rulebooks described later in this chapter, discretionary rules are identified as IRm-Dn
where m refers to the requirement on which the rule is based, D corresponds to ‘Discre-
tionary’ and n is a sequence number. The following sub-numbering is applied.
– Rules that formulate constraints that are ecosystem-wide are labelled as IRm-D0n.
– Rules that formulate constraints of information that is provided by a participant
about itself (self-attestations) are labelled as IRm-D1n.
– Rules that formulate constraints of information that is provided by another partici-
pant (other-attestations) are labelled as IRm-D2n.
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– Rules that formulate constraints of information that is provided by another partici-
pant that is legally qualified for this information (legally qualified-attestations) are
labelled IRm-D3n.
For example, rule IR3-D11 is the first discretionary rule of the ‘self’ category, and rule
IR3-D22 is the second discretionary rule of the ‘other’ category.
8.3.3 Two specific rulebooks
8.3.3.1 Description
As an illustration of the approach described above, in the remainder of this chapter two specific
examples of a rulebook, denoted by AE and AP, are presented. Both are based on the integrated
requirements defined in Section 5.5.
We describe how each requirement is addressed by the set of rules in the rulebook. For
requirements IR2 – IR5, explicit rules are specified in FOL, derived from the requirements. In
the remainder of this chapter we list the rules making up two specific rulebooks.
• The rules for the first rulebook are introduced in Sections 8.5 – 8.8, classified according
to which of the requirements in Section 5.5 were used to motivate their inclusion. The
names of the discretionary rules in this rulebook end in ‘-AE’.
• The rules for the second rulebook are introduced in Sections 8.10 – 8.13. They are clas-
sified in the same way as the rules of the first rulebook. The names of the discretionary
rules in this rulebook end in ‘-AP’.
8.3.3.2 Addressing IR1, IR6 and IR7
In the cases of requirements IR1, IR6 and IR7, where it is not possible to specify explicit rules,
the requirements have been addressed in each rulebook in the same way, as follows.
IR1 Semantic definition of trustworthiness Requirement IR1 is as follows.
As a participant in an electronic ecosystem I can understand the meaning of trust-
worthiness of participants I plan to engage with, so that I can make an informed
decision on whom to interact with.
No specific rules correspond to this requirement; it is instead addressed by specifying the
rules in FOL, using a formal taxonomy over data points that have a truth-functional interpreta-
tion1.
1While FOL adds value by its truth-functional interpretation, the implementation described in Chapter 10 refines
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IR6 Policy choices Requirement IR6 is as follows.
As a possible participant in an electronic interaction I can determine the informa-
tion and the reasoning justifying that a participant is qualified as trustworthy, so
that I can verify that information and reasoning are compatible with the way I want
to rely on the reasoning’s outcome.
This is addressed by making rules either mandatory or discretionary. The mandatory set is
kept minimal. Its purpose is to ensure there is enough information to allow reasoning that can
result in decision. The discretionary set allows the invoker to select those rules that correspond
best to its policy.
IR7 Obtaining credible data Requirement IR7 is as follows.
As a participant in an electronic ecosystem I can understand the origin and the
type of data that is used in the evaluation of trustworthiness of participants, so
that I can claim the outcome of the trustworthiness evaluation is based on credible
data.
This requirement applies to data points, and is addressed in Section 12.1.
8.4 A specific rulebook for ecosystem evaluation
The rulebook AE can serve as a basis for trustworthiness evaluation of an ecosystem in the set-
ting of a   framework instantiation, but obviously it can be extendedwith additional rules. For
example, rules on specific security safeguards, such as the use of hardware that is conformity-
assessed, as well as the demonstration of the well-functioning of governance or security man-
agement processes, could be envisaged.
8.5 IR2 Transparency
Requirement IR2 is as follows.
As a participant in an electronic ecosystem where I have access to a function that
allows me to evaluate trustworthiness of other participants, I can access all in-
formation (including inputs used and operations performed) of this function in a
this by using ontologies from the Worldwide Web Consortium. This improves interpretation because the ontologies
are written in OWL, which allows expression of fine-grained constraints and provides a simple interpretation in
natural language.
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transparent way, so that I can understand the factors that contribute to trustwor-
thiness and their mapping on evidence such as qualifications of entities.
This is addressed:
• by making the data model, the rules and the trustworthiness evaluation functions publicly
available,
• by using instance data from publicly available sources. As this is a matter of implemen-
tation it is addressed in Chapter 10.
Mandatory and discretionary rules were also derived from requirement IR2; details of the
rules themselves are given below.
8.5.1 Mandatory rules
8.5.1.1 Rulebook-related rules
As rulebooks contain the constraints whose satisfaction is evaluated during trustworthiness
evaluation:
• theremust be at least one rulebook, because otherwise there is no basis for trustworthiness
evaluation, and
• every rulebook must be uniquely identified, because otherwise participants cannot un-
ambiguously refer to it.
To meet these requirements, the rules specified in Figure 8.1 are included in the rulebook.
Figure 8.1: IR2 rulebook-related mandatory rules
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8.5.1.2 Participant-related rules
For participants to interact with each other in a transparent way it is required that a participant
is an identifiable and addressable entity. To meet this requirement, the rule specified in Figure
8.2 is included in the rulebook.
Figure 8.2: IR2 participant-related mandatory rule
8.5.2 Discretionary rules
8.5.2.1 Enabler plane rules
The enabler plane, introduced in Section 6.5.1, includes the roles of endorser, enforcer, authen-
tic source, accreditation body and conformity assessment body. To allow a potential trustor to
evaluate the trustworthiness of a potential trustee, we optionally require at least one participant
to be present in each role. This requirement is formalised by the rules in Table 8.1.
8.5.2.2 Trustworthiness provision plane
The trustworthiness provision plane, introduced in Section 6.5.2, includes the roles of evidence
service provider, claim status service provider and trustworthiness monitor. To allow a potential
trustor to evaluate the trustworthiness of a potential trustee in the setting of a   framework
instantiation, we optionally require at least one participant to be present in each role. This
requirement is formalised by the rules in Table 8.2.
8.5.2.3 Functional plane
The functional plane, introduced in Section 6.5.3, includes the roles of functional service provider
and functional service consumer. To allow a potential trustor to evaluate the trustworthiness of
a potential trustee in the setting of a   framework instantiation, we optionally require at least
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one participant to be present in each role. This requirement is formalised by the rules in Table
8.3.
8.6 IR3 Linked and unique identity
Requirement IR3 is as follows.
As a participant in an electronic ecosystem where I have access to a function that
allows me to evaluate trustworthiness of other participants, I can rely on this func-
tion combining all information about participants available within the ecosystem,
so that I can claim the outcome of the trustworthiness evaluation is based on all
information known about the evaluated participant.
The requirement for linked and unique identification of a participant can be informally de-
fined as follows.
• Identity is defined as a set of attributes that uniquely identify a participant.
• All instances of the same identity must be linked because the qualities that have to be
demonstrated need to be attributed to a specific participant for the corresponding claims
to be trustworthy.
• Every participant must have an identity attestation containing an eIdentifier.
• If identity attestations for actors A and B contain the same eIdentifier then actors A and
B are deemed to be the same participant.
These observations lead to the rules specified in Sections 8.6.1 and 8.6.2.
8.6.1 A mandatory rule
The single mandatory rule IR3-M01 for linked and unique identity is specified in Table 8.4. It
follows directly from requirement IR3 by stating that identity must be unique, i.e. it must be
resolvable to a unique identifier.
8.6.2 Discretionary rules
Discretionary rules related to identity are proposed below. First the basis for expressing such
rules is analysed, and subsequently the rules are given.
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8.6.2.1 Basis for expressing IR3 discretionary rules
A range of approaches to describing the quality of identity proofing have been proposed by
standardisation and regulatory bodies. Some of the most widely discussed are as follows.
• ISO/IEC TS 29003:2018 [180] defines three levels of identity proofing as follows.
– Level 1 corresponds to low confidence in the claimed or asserted identity. The
identity must be unique within the context, there is an assumption the identity exists,
and the subject is assumed to be bound to the identity. The identifying attributes
and the binding are accepted without any checks.
– Level 2 corresponds to moderate confidence in the claimed or asserted identity. As
for Level 1, identity must be unique within the context. Further it must be estab-
lished with reasonable confidence that the identity exists by checking that identify-
ing attributes exist in corroborative evidence, and that the subject has some binding
to the identity. The latter must be checked using one factor.
– Level 3 corresponds to high confidence in the claimed or asserted identity. As for
level 1, identity must be unique within the context. Further it must be strongly
established that the identity exists in authoritative evidence, and the subject has a
strong binding to the identity. The latter must be checked using two or more factors.
• European Implementing Act EU 2015/1502 [105] for the eIDASRegulation [103] defines
three eIDAS-specific levels of identity assurance for cross-border recognition of identity.
EU 2015/1502 [105] Recital (4) states that ISO/IEC 29115:2013 [181] has been taken into
account, but that the content of the eIDAS Regulation [103] differs in relation to identity
proofing and verification requirements. Also the Member State identity arrangements
and tools are implemented in diverging ways. The annex of EU 2015/1502 [105] contains
‘Technical specifications and procedures for assurance levels low, substantial and high for
electronic identification means issued under a notified electronic identification scheme.’
• ISO/IEC 29115:2013 [181] defines an entity authentication framework which specifies
four ‘levels of entity authentication’. Each level corresponds to a specified degree of
confidence in the processes leading up to and including the authentication process itself.
The levels of entity authentication are:
– 1 Low: Little or no confidence in the claimed or asserted identity;
– 2 Medium: Some confidence in the claimed or asserted identity;
– 3 High: High confidence in the claimed or asserted identity;
– 4 Very high: Very high confidence in the claimed or asserted identity.
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• The US NIST Special Publication ‘Digital Identity Guidelines’ [135] introduces three
separate assurance levels for identity.
– The Identity Assurance Level (IAL) addresses the robustness of the identity proof-
ing process. It is subdivided into three levels (IAL1, IAL2 and IAL3).
– The Authenticator Assurance Level (AAL) addresses the robustness of the authen-
tication process itself, and the binding between an authenticator and a specific in-
dividual’s identifier. It is subdivided into three levels.
– The Federation Assurance Level (FAL) addresses the robustness of the assertion
protocol when using a federated approach to communicate authentication and at-
tribute information (if applicable). It is subdivided into three levels.
ISO/IEC TS 29003:2018 appears to be the most suitable for use here, since it is directly
relevant and is of general applicability. EU 2015/1502 is specific to the eIDAS regulation and
the EU context. ISO/IEC 29115 is relevant, but focuses on authentication rather than identity
proofing. The Identity Assurance Level of NIST SP-800-63-3 is highly relevant, but is oriented
towards a US context.
The discretionary rules regarding attestation of the quality of identity proofing are therefore
based on the definitions in ISO/IECTS 29003:2018, andmore precisely on the Levels of Identity
Proofing. Additional rules based on the other approaches could be defined in an analogous way.
8.6.2.2 The rules
The following discretionary rules are derived from IR3.
• A single rule regarding self-attestation is specified in Table 8.5.
• Rules regarding other-attestations are specified in Table 8.6 and Table 8.7.
• Rules relating to identity attestation by legally qualified entities are given in Table 8.8
and Table 8.9.
• An extension to the second rule in Table 8.8 involving the additional requirement that the
ISO/IEC TS 29003:2018 Level of Identity Proofing 3 must be specified by the evidence
service provider is given in Table 8.10.
8.7 IR4 Competently acting in role
Requirement IR4 is as follows.
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As a participant in an electronic ecosystem I have access to and I can demonstrate
that I accept the definitions of roles, the qualifications that are required per role,
and how these qualifications are demonstrated by participants so that I can verify
these arguments are suitable to support the reliance I want to take on the outcome
of the reasoning.
8.7.1 A mandatory rule
The single mandatory rule that a participant’s base roles must be self-attested is specified in
Table 8.11. It follows from requirement IR4 because it excludes the inconsistency that a par-
ticipant denies having a particular role while other participants attest to it.
8.7.2 Discretionary rules
8.7.2.1 Role attestation
A rule specifying that for every role for which a participant has an attestation, at least one must
be a role attestation, is given in Table 8.12.
There is no discretionary self-attested rule for role attestation because this is already con-
tained in the mandatory rule IR4−M01.
8.7.2.2 Accreditation bodies
The single rule regarding accreditation bodies is specified in Table 8.13. Rule IR4-D022-AE is
based on the possibility of accreditation bodies being voluntarily assessed against ISO/IEC
17011 [174], which covers requirements for accreditation bodies. The rule specifies that if
one wants to rely on the services of an accreditation body that has an ISO/IEC 17011 [174]
attestation then there must be such an accreditation body and its attestation must be provided
by a member of the International Attestation Forum (IAF).
8.7.2.3 Conformity assessment bodies
Rules regarding conformity assessment bodies are specified in Table 8.14.
• Rule IR4-D023-AE is based on the operating practices of the ISO Committee for confor-
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• Rule IR4-D024-AE is based on the operating practices of the European Accreditation co-
operationmechanism3(EA)which prescribes a specific attestation for trust service provider
assessment based on the dedicated ETSI standard [88] for a conformity assessment body
that assesses such service providers.
Note that while the organisation and responsibilities of the EA are regulated by law, the
accreditation provided by EA does not have the power of law. Therefore such accreditations are
treated here as attestations by others but not as attested to by a legally qualified other.
Alternative rules can be envisaged that rely on other conformity assessment standards from
the ISO International Categorisation of Standards ICS 03.120.20, which covers product and
company certification4. However, as the ETSI standard [88] focuses specifically on require-
ments for conformity assessment bodies assessing trust service providers which is more specific
than the standards from ICS 03.120.202, such as ISO/IEC 27006 [178] which specifies ‘general
requirements for bodies providing audit and certification of information security management
systems’, the ETSI standard is preferred.
Alternative rules can be envisaged that rely on conformity assessment as prescribed by
the CA/Browser Forum. However, as the CA/Browser Forum focusses mainly on securing the
communication between a browser and a web server by putting trust in Certification Authorities
and browser manufacturers, this model is less suitable for the objectives of the thesis and is
therefore not further explored.
8.7.2.4 Evidence service providers
Rules regarding evidence service providers are specified in Table 8.15.
• Rule IR4-D025-AE is based on the possibility of service providers being voluntarily as-
sessed against ISO/IEC 27001 [177], which covers requirements for the existence and
operation of an Information Security Management System.
• Rule IR4-D026-AE is based on the possibility of oversight by a trustworthiness monitor
over an evidence service provider.
• Rule IR4-D027A-AE is based on the eIDAS definitions of and registration requirements for
trust service providers. For a discussion of this topic see Section 2.2.3.1. The definitions5
3The European co-operation for Accreditation is a dedicated not-for-profit appointed in Regulation (EC) No
765/2008 to develop and maintain a multilateral agreement of mutual recognition, the EAMLA, based on a harmo-
nized accreditation infrastructure; see https://european-accreditation.org/
4https://www.iso.org/ics/03.120.20/x/
5eIDAS [103] Art. 3 specifies that ‘trust service provider’ means a natural or a legal person that provides one
or more trust services either as a qualified or as a non-qualified trust service provider; ‘trust service’ means an
electronic service normally provided for remuneration which consists of: (a) the creation, verification, and vali-
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are taken from the eIDAS Regulation [103] and the applicable ETSI standard [89]. The
registration is taken from the eIDAS List of Trusted Lists which is available in human
readable format6 and in machine readable format7. The rule specifies that if one wants
to rely on the services of an evidence service provider that has an eIDAS TSP attestation
then there must be such an evidence service provider and it must be listed in a European
Trusted List by a trustworthiness monitor.
• Rule IR4-D027B-AE is based on the eIDAS conformity assessment of trust service providers.
For a discussion of this topic see Section 2.2.3.1. Demonstrating conformance to ETSI
EN 319 403 [88] is a possible way of demonstrating compliance with the eIDAS Regu-
lation [103] requirements regarding trust service providers.
8.7.2.5 Claim status service providers
Rules regarding claim status service provider are given in Table 8.16.
• Rule IR4-D028-AE is based on the possibility of service providers being voluntarily as-
sessed against ISO/IEC 27001 [177], which covers requirements for existence and oper-
ation of an Information Security Management System.
• Rule IR4-D029-AE is based on the possibility of oversight by a trustworthiness monitor
over claim status service provider.
• Rule IR4-D030-AE is based on the eIDAS definitions of and registration requirements for
trust service providers, and is defined analogously to Rule IR4-D027A.
8.7.2.6 Attestations by legally qualified others
Rules regarding attestations by legally qualified others are specified in Tables 8.17 and 8.18.
• Rules IR4-D301A-AE – IR4-D304B-AE specify that participants in the roles of endorser, en-
forcer, authentic source, accreditation body, trustworthiness monitor and evidence ser-
vice provider must be attested to by a legal act.
• Rule IR4-D305-AE is based on the eIDAS requirement (eIDAS [103] Art. 17) that a Mem-
ber State should designate an eIDAS Supervisory Body (trustworthiness monitor) and
the current practice that this body is registered in a European Trusted List.
dation of electronic signatures, electronic seals or electronic time stamps, electronic registered delivery services
and certificates related to those services, or (b) the creation, verification and validation of certificates for website
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8.8 IR5 Governance, safeguards and controls
Requirement IR5 is as follows.
As a participant in an electronic ecosystem I can understand the governance, se-
curity safeguards and controls that are in place within the ecosystem, so that I can
claim the outcome of the trustworthiness evaluation took into consideration that
the ecosystem meets good practices regarding these topics.
8.8.1 Foundation for IR5 rules
To meet requirement IR5, data points that capture governance principles, security safeguards
and controls need to be validated. For this purpose rules are formulated on the basis of good
practice for which the following sources have been considered:
• standards from by an official standards publishing organisation such as ISO and ETSI;
• legislation published by states;
• other published guidance and principles8.
We restrict our attention here to the first two categories since there is no simple way of
determining the extent to which other guidance and principles are accepted, and by whom.
The   framework allows other good practice principles to be included if desired, although
agreement would be needed on means to demonstrate compliance.
8.8.2 Discretionary governance rules
8.8.2.1 Foundation for governance rules
Governance of the entire ecosystem is relevant to all parties at all times, since being a participant
requires establishing one’s identity and have supporting identity attestations. It may also be
necessary to have an agreement attestation, capturing assent to interact under the ecosystem
rules. This requirement is captured in the rules discussed below.
Governance is also relevant when a user is deciding whether to use a service provider Since
this is service provider specific, it is addressed as part of the trustworthiness evaluation functions
described in Chapter 9. Other areas of governance exist but are outside the scope of the  
framework.
8Examples include documents such as Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request for Comments (RFCs),
standards from the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) and the OASIS consortium, the International Security
Forum’s (ISF) Standard of Good Practice for Information Security, publications from the Open Web Application
Security Project (OWASP) and publications from the Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA)
such as their Control Objectives for IT (COBIT) series.
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8.8.2.2 Governance information disclosure rules
As specified in Section 6.5.1, in the   framework the endorser is responsible for the avail-
ability of information regarding who takes on responsibility, accountability, and authority to
implement information security governance. The availability of this information9 is used to
formulate two discretionary rules in Table 8.19. Both rules are based on ISO/IEC 27014:2013
[179]. They differ in the qualification of the source of disclosure.
8.8.3 Discretionary security rules
8.8.3.1 Foundation for security safeguards rules
Security safeguards require that appropriate technical security mechanisms are implemented
and operated. They are consequences of the need for accountability and responsibility, and
require controls such as segregation of duty to be in place.
IR5 rules regarding security safeguards are based on the premise that, to avoid conflicts
of interest, the entities that define what needs to be complied with must be different from the
entities that verify and enforce this compliance. This concept was introduced in the eighteenth
century by Montesqieu [23] who argued that the executive, legislative, and judicial functions of
government should be assigned to different bodies, so that attempts by one branch of govern-
ment to infringe on political liberty might be restrained by the other branches. In an information
security policy setting this is supported by the concept of separation of duty, discussed by Clark
and Wilson [60]. Separation of duty has been studied extensively10 and continues to be em-
bedded in legislation. For example the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act [321] Title V Section 501 on
the treatment of securities analysts states ‘(3) to establish structural and institutional safeguards
within registered brokers or dealers to assure that securities analysts are separated by appro-
priate informational partitions within the firm from the review, pressure, or oversight of those
whose involvement in investment banking activities might potentially bias their judgement or
supervision;’.
Many other security safeguards can be envisaged such as the use of hardware that is con-
formity assessed or the proper functioning of security management processes.
8.8.3.2 Separation of duty rules
Rules regarding separation of duty are specified in the following tables.
9The operation of the governance processes is outside scope of the trustworthiness evaluation. Nevertheless
one can reason about whether the presence and the disclosure of information on this topic improves the outcome of
evaluation of trustworthiness. The inclusion of the operation of government processes as part of the trustworthiness
evaluation is a possible area for future research.
10See e.g. Gligor et al. [126], Jha et al. [187] and Basin et al. [25].
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• The rules in Table 8.20 specify that the function of endorser of the rules that make up an
ecosystem must be separated from the enforcer of these rules.
• The rules in Table 8.21 are stronger than the previous rules. They specify separation
between all the functions within the enabler plane (endorser, enforcer, accreditation body
and conformity assessment body).
• Table 8.22 specifies separation of the role of the trustworthiness monitor from the mon-
itored roles, namely the evidence service provider and claims status service provider.
8.8.4 Controls
Controls require that an entity that enforces or helps to enforce accountability and responsibility
should be available to all participants. This includes the provision of assurance and monitoring.
Enforcement, assurance and monitoring are already covered by existing rules in the following
ways.
• IR2-D01A-AE specifies that an endorser must exist within the ecosystem.
• IR2-D01B-AE specifies that an enforcer must exist within the ecosystem.
• IR2-D03-AE specifies that an accreditation body must exist within the ecosystem. The role
of such a body is to assess the conformance of conformity assessment bodies, and in this
way provide assurance.
• IR2-D04-AE specifies that a conformity assessment body must exist within the ecosystem.
The role of such a body is to assess conformance against norms, and in this way provide
assurance.
• IR2-D07-AE specifies that a trustworthiness monitor must exist within the ecosystem.
8.9 A specific rulebook for participant evaluation
The rulebook AP can serve as a basis for trustworthiness evaluation of an ecosystem in the set-
ting of a   framework instantiation, but obviously it can be extended with additional rules. As
is the case for AE, additional rules on specific security safeguards, such as the use of hardware
that is conformity-assessed, as well as the demonstration of the well-functioning of governance
or security management processes, could be envisaged.
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8.10 IR2 Transparency
Requirement IR2 is as follows.
As a participant in an electronic ecosystem where I have access to a function that
allows me to evaluate trustworthiness of other participants, I can access all in-
formation (including inputs used and operations performed) of this function in a
transparent way, so that I can understand the factors that contribute to trustwor-
thiness and their mapping on evidence such as qualifications of entities.
This is addressed:
• by making the data model, the rules and the trustworthiness evaluation functions publicly
available,
• by using instance data from publicly available sources. As this is a matter of implemen-
tation it is addressed in Chapter 10.
Mandatory and discretionary rules were derived from requirement IR2; details of the rules
themselves are given below.
8.10.1 Mandatory rules
8.10.1.1 Rulebook-related rules
To meet the rulebook-related requirements, the rules specified in Figure 8.1 are included in the
rulebook.
8.10.1.2 Participant-related rules
For participants to interact with each other in a transparent way it is required that a participant
is an identifiable and addressable entity. To meet this requirement, the rule specified in Table
8.2 is included in the rulebook.
8.10.2 Discretionary rules
For IR2 Transparency, there are no discretionary rules, because for the purpose of twsevalAP,
transparency is addressed by the mandatory rules.
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8.11 IR3 Linked and unique identity
Requirement IR3 is as follows.
As a participant in an electronic ecosystem where I have access to a function that
allows me to evaluate trustworthiness of other participants, I can rely on this func-
tion combining all information about participants available within the ecosystem,
so that I can claim the outcome of the trustworthiness evaluation is based on all
information known about the evaluated participant.
8.11.1 Mandatory rules
The single mandatory rule IR3-M01, specified in Table 8.4, is included.
8.11.2 Discretionary rules
These rules allow selection of a policy on what basis participant identity must be established.
For AP, the rules in Tables 8.5 – 8.10 can be applied with minor modifications, required
for the following reasons.
• The rules in rulebook AE include ∀ X ∈ SPT in the head of the rule, because the rules
apply to all participants within the ecosystem. However, the rules of rulebook AP only
cover a single participant.
• The rules in rulebook AE do not specify the identity of the potential trustee. However,
the rules of rulebook AP only apply to the participant that was identified by the potential
trustor as the potential trustee.
The modified rules are specified in Tables 8.23 – 8.28.
8.12 IR4 Competently acting in role
Requirement IR4 is as follows.
As a participant in an electronic ecosystem I have access to and I can demonstrate
that I accept the definitions of roles, the qualifications that are required per role,
and how these qualifications are demonstrated by participants so that I can verify
these arguments are suitable to support the reliance I want to take on the outcome
of the reasoning.
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8.12.1 A mandatory rule
The single mandatory rule that a participant’s base roles must be self-attested, specified in Table
8.11, is included.
8.12.2 Discretionary rules
These rules allow selection of a policy for evaluating competence of a participant.
• An appropriately modified version of the rule given in Table 8.12, requiring attestation
of roles by third parties, is given in Table 8.29.
• An analogous modification of the rule in Table 8.13 is given in Table 8.30.
• Similarly, participant-specific modifications of the rules in Tables 8.14 – 8.16 are given
in Tables 8.31 – 8.33.
• Finally, rules regarding attestations by legally qualified others are given in Tables 8.34 –
8.36.
8.13 IR5 Governance, safeguards and controls
Requirement IR5 is as follows.
As a participant in an electronic ecosystem I can understand the governance, se-
curity safeguards and controls that are in place within the ecosystem, so that I can
claim the outcome of the trustworthiness evaluation took into consideration that
the ecosystem meets good practices regarding these topics.
8.13.1 Mandatory rules
There are no mandatory rules for IR5 in the rulebook AP.
8.13.2 Discretionary rules
The rules regarding agreement, endorsement and enforcement are given in Table 8.37. The
rules regarding legal qualification of endorser and enforcer are specified in Table 8.38.Rules
regarding separation of duty are specified in Tables 8.39 – 8.41.
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8.14 Summary
This chapter described the role of the Rulebook, i.e. a set of constraints designed to enable
decisions to made about trustworthiness.
The constraints are formalised as rules that describe expected qualities of data representing
qualities and relationships between participants in the ecosystem. A distinction is made be-
tween mandatory and discretionary rules. Mandatory rules describe the constraints that must
be satisfied to have the minimal basis for trustworthiness. Discretionary rules allow the evalua-
tor to specify a trustworthiness evaluation policy by selecting discretionary constraints to match
the context of the evaluation.
Two closely related example rulebooks were proposed, whose rules were derived from the
integrated requirements described in Chapter 5. The proposed rulebooks are expressed in the
terminology described in Chapters 6 and 7, using first order logic.
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IR2-D01A-AE A trustworthy ecosystem




∧ (∃ A ∈ Sattn ∃ X ∈ SPT
(ttestationtsub(A) = fid(X)
∧ttestationtatt(A) = roleTypeBase
∧ttestationtval (A) = REnDo))
→ TwsEco(E))
IR2-D01B-AE A trustworthy ecosystem




∧ (∃ A ∈ Sattn ∃ X ∈ SPT
(ttestationtsub(A) = fid(X)
∧ttestationtatt(A) = roleTypeBase
∧ttestationtval (A) = REnFo))
→ TwsEco(X))
IR2-D02-AE A trustworthy ecosystem




∧ (∃ A ∈ Sattn ∃ X ∈ SPT
(ttestationtsub(A) = fid(X)
∧ttestationtatt(A) = roleTypeBase
∧ttestationtval (A) = RAS))
→ TwsEco(E))
IR2-D03-AE A trustworthy ecosystem




∧ (∃ A ∈ Sattn ∃ X ∈ SPT
(ttestationtsub(A) = fid(X)
∧ttestationtatt(A) = roleTypeBase
∧ttestationtval (A) = RAB))
→ TwsEco(E))
IR2-D04-AE A trustworthy ecosystem





∧ (∃ A ∈ Sattn ∃ X ∈ SPT
(ttestationtsub(A) = fid(X)
∧ttestationtatt(A) = roleTypeBase
∧ttestationtval (A) = RCAB))
→ TwsEco(E))
Table 8.1: IR2 enabler plane-related discretionary rules
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IR2-D05-AE A trustworthy ecosystem




∧ (∃ A ∈ Sattn ∃ X ∈ SPT
(ttestationtsub(A) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A) = REvSP ))
→ TwsEco(E))
IR2-D06-AE A trustworthy ecosystem
must contain at least




∧ (∃ A ∈ Sattn ∃ X ∈ SPT
(ttestationtsub(A) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A) = RCsSP ))
→ TwsEco(E))
IR2-D07-AE A trustworthy ecosystem




∧ (∃ A ∈ Sattn ∃ X ∈ SPT
(ttestationtsub(A) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A) = RTwsMo))
→ TwsEco(E))
Table 8.2: IR2 trustworthiness provision plane-related discretionary rules
IR2-D08-AE A trustworthy ecosystem





∧ (∃ A ∈ Sattn ∃ X ∈ SPT
(ttestationtsub(A) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A) = RFuSP ))
→ TwsEco(E))
IR2-D09-AE A trustworthy ecosystem





∧ (∃ A ∈ Sattn ∃ X ∈ SPT
(ttestationtsub(A) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A) = RFuSC ))
→ TwsEco(E))
Table 8.3: IR2 functional plane-related discretionary rules
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IR3-M01 A participant is an actor
that is uniquely identified
Remark: recall that as in-
troduced in Section 7.5.3,
fid(X) returns the unique
eIdentifier value for a par-




∧ (∀ A ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A) = X
∧ ttestationtatt(A) = eIdentifier
∧ ttestationtval (A) = c)





∧ (∃ A1, A2 ∈ Sattn
((A1 ≠ A2)
∧ (ttestationtsub(A1) = X
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = eIdentifier)
∧ (ttestationtsub(A2) = X
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = eIdentifier)
→ (ttestationtval (A1) =ttestationtval (A2))
→ Participant(X))
Table 8.4: IR3 linked and unique identity mandatory rule
IR3-D11-AE A participant’s identity
must be self-attested
∀ X ∈ SPT ∃ A ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A) = eIdentifier
∧ ttestationtval (A) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationaid (A) =ttestationtsub(A))
Table 8.5: IR3 linked and unique identity discretionary rule/self
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IR3-D21-AE For all participants there
must at least one identity
attestation that is not self-
attested
∀ X ∈ SPT ∃ A ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A) = eIdentifier
→ttestationaid (A) ≠ ttestationtval (A))
IR3-D22-AE The identity of every par-
ticipantmust be attested to
by at least one evidence
service provider
∀ X ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = eIdentifier
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationaid (A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = REvSP )
IR3-D23-AE The identity of every par-
ticipant must be attested
to by at least one ev-
idence service provider
whose role has been at-
tested to by a trustworthi-
ness monitor
∀ X ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2, A3, ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = eIdentifier
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationaid (A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = REvSP
∧ ttestationtsub(A3) =ttestationaid (A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A3) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A3) = RTwsMo
Table 8.6: IR3 linked and unique identity discretionary rules
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IR3-D24-AE The identity of every participant
must be attested to by at least one
evidence service provider
• whose role has been at-
tested to by a trustworthi-
ness monitor
• who confirms that the
identifying attributes exist
in corroborative evidence
and the binding between
an applicant and an iden-
tity was checked using
one factor prior enrolment
(ISO/IEC 29003:2018
Level 2)
∀ X ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2, A3, A4 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = eIdentifier
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationaid (A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = REvSP
∧ ttestationtsub(A3) =ttestationaid (A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A3) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A3) = RTwsMo
∧ ttestationtsub(A4) =ttestationaid (A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A5) = doesConformTo
∧ ttestationtval (A5) =
ISO-IEC-TS-29003:2018:Level2)
IR3-D25-AE The identity of every participant
must be attested to by at least one
evidence service provider
• whose role has been at-
tested to by a trustworthi-
ness monitor
• who confirms that the
identifying attributes exist
in corroborative evidence
and the binding between
an applicant and an iden-
tity was checked using
one factor prior enrolment
(ISO/IEC 29003:2018
Level 3)
∀ X ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2, A3, A4 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = eIdentifier
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationaid (A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = REvSP
∧ ttestationtsub(A3) =ttestationaid (A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A3) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A3) = RTwsMo
∧ ttestationtsub(A4) =ttestationaid (A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A5) = doesConformTo
∧ ttestationtval (A5) =
ISO-IEC-TS-29003:2018:Level3)
Table 8.7: IR3 linked and unique identity discretionary rules
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IR3-D31-AE The identity of every participant
must be attested to by at least one
evidence service provider who is
legally attested in that role
∀ X ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2, A3 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = eIdentifier
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationaid (A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = REvSP
∧ ttestationtsub (A3) =ttestationaid (A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A3) = legalQual
∧ ttestationtval (A3) = uri)
IR3-D32-AE The identity of every participant
• must be attested to by at
least one evidence service
provider whose role has
been attested to by a trust-
worthiness monitor, and
• the evidence service
provider and the trustwor-
thiness monitor are legally
attested in their respective
roles
∀ X ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2, A3, A4, A5 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = eIdentifier
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationaid (A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = REvSP
∧ ttestationtsub(A3) =ttestationaid (A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A3) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A3) = RTwsMo
∧ ttestationtsub (A4) =ttestationaid (A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A4) = legalQual
∧ ttestationtval (A4) = uri
∧ ttestationtsub (A5) =ttestationaid (A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A5) = legalQual
∧ ttestationtval (A5) = uri)
Table 8.8: IR3 linked and unique identity discretionary rules
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IR3-D33-AE The identity of every participant
must be attested to by at least one
evidence service provider
• whose role has been at-
tested to by a trustworthi-
ness monitor
• who confirms that the
identifying attributes exist
in corroborative evidence
and the binding between
an applicant and an iden-
tity was checked using
one factor prior enrolment
(ISO/IEC 29003:2018
Level 2),
and there must be legal at-
testation for the evidence ser-
vice provider and trustworthi-
ness monitor in their respective
roles.
∀ X ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = eIdentifier
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationaid (A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = REvSP
∧ ttestationtsub(A3) =ttestationaid (A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A3) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A3) = RTwsMo
∧ ttestationtsub(A4) =ttestationaid (A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A4) = doesConformTo
∧ ttestationtval (A4) =
ISO-IEC-TS-29003:2018:Level2
∧ ttestationtsub (A5) =ttestationaid (A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A5) = legalQual
∧ ttestationtval (A5) = uri
∧ ttestationtsub (A6) =ttestationaid (A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A6) = legalQual
∧ ttestationtval (A6) = uri)
Table 8.9: IR3 linked and unique identity discretionary rules
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IR3-D34-AE The identity of every participant
must be attested to by at least one
evidence service provider
• whose role has been at-
tested to by a trustworthi-
ness monitor
• who confirms that the
identifying attributes exist
in corroborative evidence
and the binding between
an applicant and an iden-
tity was checked using
one factor prior enrolment
(ISO/IEC 29003:2018
Level 3),
and there must be legal at-
testation for the evidence ser-
vice provider and trustworthi-
ness monitor in their respective
roles.
∀ X ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = eIdentifier
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationaid (A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = REvSP
∧ ttestationtsub(A3) =ttestationaid (A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A3) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A3) = RTwsMo
∧ ttestationtsub(A4) =ttestationaid (A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A4) = doesConformTo
∧ ttestationtval (A4) =
ISO-IEC-TS-29003:2018:Level3
∧ ttestationtsub (A5) =ttestationaid (A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A5) = legalQual
∧ ttestationtval (A5) = uri
∧ ttestationtsub (A6) =ttestationaid (A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A6) = legalQual
∧ ttestationtval (A6) = uri)
Table 8.10: IR3 linked and unique identity discretionary rules
IR4−M01 A participant’s base roles
must be self-attested
∀ X ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2 ∈ Sabr
(ttestationtsub(A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationaid (A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A2) =ttestationtval (A1))
Table 8.11: IR4 Mandatory rule
IR4-D021-AE For each role that partici-
pants have attestations for,
there must be at least one
role attestation that is not
self-attested
∀ X ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationtsub(A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A2) =ttestationtval (A1)
∧ ttestationaid (A2) ≠ ttestationaid (A1))
Table 8.12: IR4 Discretionary rules/others
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IR4-D022-AE Should one want to rely
on the services of an ac-
creditation body that has
an ISO/IEC 17011 [174]
attestation
then there must be such
an accreditation body and
its attestation must be pro-
vided by a member of
the International Attesta-
tion Forum (IAF)
∃ X ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub (A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = RAB
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationtsub(A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = doesConformTo
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = ISO-IEC-17011:2017
∧ ttestationaid (A2) ∈ {IAF-Memberlist})
Table 8.13: IR4 Discretionary rules/AB
IR4-D023-AE Should one want to rely
on a conformity assess-
ment body that has an
ISO/IEC 17065 [176] at-
testation for the assess-
ment of evidence or claim
status service providers
then there must be a con-
formity assessment body
that has such attestation
issued by a member of the
EA
∃ X ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub (A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = RCAB
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationtsub(A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = doesConformTo
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = ISO-IEC-17065:2012
∧ ttestationaid (A2) ∈ {EA-Memberlist})
IR4-D024-AE Should one want to rely on
a conformity assessment
body that has an ETSI EN
319 403 [88] attestation
for the assessment of evi-
dence or claim status ser-
vice providers
then there must be a con-
formity assessment body
that has such attestation
issued by a member of the
EA
∃ X ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub (A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = RCAB
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationtsub(A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = doesConformTo
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = EN319403
∧ ttestationaid (A2) ∈ {EA-Memberlist})
Table 8.14: IR4 Discretionary rules/others/CAB
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IR4-D025-AE Should one want to rely
on the services of an
evidence service provider
that has an ISO/IEC
27001 [177] attestation
then there must be such an
evidence service provider
and its attestation must be
provided by a member of
the EA
∃ X ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub (A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = REvSP
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationtsub(A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = doesConformTo
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = ISO-IEC-27001:2013
∧ ttestationaid (A2) ∈ {EA-Memberlist})
IR4−D026−AE Should one want to rely
on the services of an ev-
idence service provider
then there must be such an
evidence service provider
and it must be whose role
has been attested to by a
trustworthiness monitor
∃ X ∈ SPT ∃ A1 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = REvSP
→ ∃ A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationaid (A1) =ttestationtsub(A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = RTwsMo))
IR4-D027A-AE Should one want to rely
on the services of an ev-
idence service provider
that has an eIDAS TSP at-
testation
then there must be such an
evidence service provider
and it must be listed in a
European Trusted List by
a trustworthiness monitor
∃ X ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2, A3 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub (A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = REvSP
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationtsub(A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = isRegisteredIn
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = eIDASTrustList
∧ ttestationtsub(A3) =ttestationaid (A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A3) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A3) = RTwsMo)
IR4-D027B-AE Should one want to rely
on the services of an ev-
idence service provider
that has an eIDAS TSP at-
testation
then there must be such an
evidence service provider
and it must demonstrate
conformance to ETSI EN
319 403 [87]
∃ X ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2, A3 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub (A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = REvSP
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationtsub(A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = doesConformTo
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = ETSI-EN-319-403
Table 8.15: IR4 Discretionary rules/others/EvSP
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IR4-D028-AE Should one want to rely on
the services of a claim sta-
tus service provider that
has an ISO/IEC 27001
[177] attestation
then there must be such
a claim status service
provider and its attesta-
tion must be provided by
a member of the EA
∃ X ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub (A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = RCsSP
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationtsub(A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = doesConformTo
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = ISO-IEC-27001:2013
∧ ttestationaid (A2) in {EA-Memberlist})
IR4-D029-AE Should one want to
rely on the services of
a claim status service
provider then there must
be such a claim status
service provider and it
must be whose role has
been attested to by a
trustworthiness monitor
∃ X ∈ SPT ∃ A1 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = RCsSP
→ ∃ A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationaid (A1) =ttestationtsub(A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = RTwsMo))
IR4-D030-AE Should one want to rely
on the services of an claim
status service provider
that has an eIDAS TSP
attestation
then there must be such
an claim status service
provider and it must
be listed in a Euro-
pean Trusted List by a
trustworthiness monitor
∃ X ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2, A3 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub (A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = RCsSP
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationtsub(A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = isRegisteredIn
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = eIDASTrustList
∧ ttestationtsub(A3) =ttestationaid (A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A3) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A3) = RTwsMo)
Table 8.16: IR4 Discretionary rules/others/CsSP
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IR4-D301A-AE Participants in the role
of endorser must have a
legally qualified attesta-
tion
∀ X ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub (A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = REnDo
∧ ttestationtsub (A2) = fid(PT)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = legalQual
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = uri)
IR4-D301B-AE Participants in the role
of enforcer must have a
legally qualified attesta-
tion
∀ X ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub (A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = REnFo
∧ ttestationtsub (A2) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = legalQual
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = uri)
IR4-D302-AE Participants in the role
of authentic source must
have a legally qualified at-
testation
∀ X ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub (A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = RAS
∧ ttestationtsub (A2) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = legalQual
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = uri)
IR4-D303-AE Participants in the role of
accreditation body must
have a legally qualified at-
testation
∀ X ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub (A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = RAB
∧ ttestationtsub (A2) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = legalQual
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = uri)
Table 8.17: IR4 Discretionary rules/legal qualifications
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IR4-D304A-AE Participants in the role
of trustworthiness moni-
tor must have a legally
qualified attestation
∀ X ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub (A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = RTwsMo
∧ ttestationtsub (A2) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = legalQual
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = uri)
IR4-D304B-AE Participants in the role of
evidence service provider
must have a legally quali-
fied attestation
∀ X ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub (A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = REvSP
∧ ttestationtsub (A2) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = legalQual
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = uri)
IR4-D305-AE Participants in the role of
an eIDAS trustworthiness
monitor (Supervisory
Body) must be registered
in a European trusted list
∀ X ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub (A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = RTwsMo
∧ ttestationtsub (A2) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = eIDAS_Supervisory_Body
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = uri)
Table 8.18: IR4 Discretionary rules/legal qualifications
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IR5-D01-AE There exists an endorser
who discloses information
of who takes on respon-
sibility, accountability,
and authority for im-
plementing information
security governance in a
self-attested attestation
∃ X ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub (A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = REnDo
∧ ttestationtsub(A1) =ttestationtsub(A2)
∧ ttestationaid (A2) =ttestationtsub(A2))
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = doesDisclose
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = uri)
IR5-D02-AE There exists a legally
qualified endorser who
discloses information of





∃ X ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2, A3 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub (A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = REnDo
∧ ttestationtsub(A1) =ttestationtsub(A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = doesDisclose
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = uri
∧ ttestationtsub (A3) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A3) = legalQual
∧ ttestationtval (A3) = uri)
Table 8.19: IR5 governance disclosure discretionary rules
IR5-D11-AE An endorser cannot be an
enforcer
∀ A1 ∈ Sattn ∀ X ∈ SPT
(ttestationtsub(A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = REnDo
→ ∄ A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A2) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = REnFo))
IR5-D12-AE An enforcer cannot be an
endorser
∀ A1 ∈ Sattn ∀ X ∈ SPT
(ttestationtsub(A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = REnFo
→ ∄ A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A2) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = REnDo))
Table 8.20: IR5 discretionary rules regarding mutual exclusion of endorser and enforcer
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IR5-D21-AE Helper rule that defines
the separation of duties in
the enabler plane
SSOD1 = {REnDo, REnFo, RAB, RCAB}
IR5-D22-AE If participant is in SSOD1then only one role is al-
lowed
∀ A1 ∈ Sattn ∃ X ∈ SPT
(ttestationtsub(A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) ∈ SSOD1
→ ¬ ∃ A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A2) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A2) ∈ SSOD1 ))
Table 8.21: IR5 discretionary rules regarding separation of duty for the enabler plane
IR5−D23−AE Separation of duties for
the trustworthiness moni-
tor role
∀ A1 ∈ Sattn ∀ X ∈ SPT
(ttestationtsub(A1) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = RTwsMo
→ ∄ A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A2) = fid(X)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ (ttestationtval (A2) = REvSP
∨ ttestationtval (A2) = RCsSP )))
Table 8.22: IR5 discretionary rule regarding separation of duty for the trustworthiness monitor
role
IR3-D11-AP The selected partici-
pant’s identity must be
self-attested
∃ A ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A) = eIdentifier
∧ ttestationtval (A) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationaid (A) =ttestationtsub(A))
Table 8.23: IR3 linked and unique identity discretionary rule/self
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IR3-D21-AP For the selected partici-
pant there must at least
one identity attestation
that is not self-attested
∃ A ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A) = eIdentifier
→ttestationaid (A) ≠ ttestationtval (A))
IR3-D22-AP The identity of the se-
lected participant must be
attested to by at least one
evidence service provider
∃ A1, A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = eIdentifier
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationaid (A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = REvSP )
IR3-D23-AP The identity of the se-
lected participant must be
attested to by at least one
evidence service provider
whose role has been at-
tested to by a trustworthi-
ness monitor
∃ A1, A2, A3, ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = eIdentifier
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationaid (A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = REvSP
∧ ttestationtsub(A3) =ttestationaid (A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A3) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A3) = RTwsMo
Table 8.24: IR3 linked and unique identity discretionary rules
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IR3-D24-AP The identity of the selected par-
ticipant must be attested to by
at least one evidence service
provider
• whose role has been at-
tested to by a trustworthi-
ness monitor
• who confirms that the
identifying attributes exist
in corroborative evidence
and the binding between
an applicant and an iden-
tity was checked using
one factor prior enrolment
(ISO/IEC TS 29003:2018
Level 2)
∃ A1, A2, A3, A4, A5 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = eIdentifier
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationaid (A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = REvSP
∧ ttestationtsub(A3) =ttestationaid (A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A3) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A3) = RTwsMo
∧ ttestationtsub(A4) =ttestationaid (A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A5) = doesConformTo
∧ ttestationtval (A5) =
ISO-IEC-TS-29003:2018:Level2)
IR3-D25-AP The identity of the selected par-
ticipant must be attested to by
at least one evidence service
provider
• whose role has been at-
tested to by a trustworthi-
ness monitor
• who confirms that the
identifying attributes exist
in corroborative evidence
and the binding between
an applicant and an iden-
tity was checked using
one factor prior enrolment
(ISO/IEC TS 29003:2018
Level 3)
∃ A1, A2, A3, A4, A5 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = eIdentifier
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationaid (A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = REvSP
∧ ttestationtsub(A3) =ttestationaid (A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A3) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A3) = RTwsMo
∧ ttestationtsub(A4) =ttestationaid (A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A5) = doesConformTo
∧ ttestationtval (A5) =
ISO-IEC-TS-29003:2018:Level3)
Table 8.25: IR3 linked and unique identity discretionary rules
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IR3-D31-AP The identity of the selected par-
ticipant must be attested to by
at least one evidence service
provider who is legally attested
in that role
∃ A1, A2, A3 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = eIdentifier
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationaid (A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = REvSP
∧ ttestationtsub (A3) =ttestationaid (A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A3) = legalQual
∧ ttestationtval (A3) = uri)
IR3-D32-AP The identity of the selected par-
ticipant
• must be attested to by at
least one evidence service
provider whose role has
been attested to by a trust-
worthiness monitor, and
• the evidence service
provider and the trustwor-
thiness monitor are legally
attested in their respective
roles
∃ A1, A2, A3, A4, A5 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = eIdentifier
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationaid (A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = REvSP
∧ ttestationtsub(A3) =ttestationaid (A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A3) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A3) = RTwsMo
∧ ttestationtsub (A4) =ttestationaid (A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A4) = legalQual
∧ ttestationtval (A4) = uri
∧ ttestationtsub (A5) =ttestationaid (A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A5) = legalQual
∧ ttestationtval (A5) = uri)
Table 8.26: IR3 linked and unique identity discretionary rules
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IR3-D33-AP The identity of the selected par-
ticipant must be attested to by
at least one evidence service
provider
• whose role has been at-
tested to by a trustworthi-
ness monitor
• who confirms that the
identifying attributes exist
in corroborative evidence
and the binding between
an applicant and an iden-
tity was checked using
one factor prior enrolment
(ISO/IEC TS 29003:2018
Level 2),
and there must be legal at-
testation for the evidence ser-
vice provider and trustworthi-
ness monitor in their respective
roles.
∃ A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = eIdentifier
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationaid (A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = REvSP
∧ ttestationtsub(A3) =ttestationaid (A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A3) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A3) = RTwsMo
∧ ttestationtsub(A4) =ttestationaid (A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A4) = doesConformTo
∧ ttestationtval (A4) =
ISO-IEC-29003:2018:Level2
∧ ttestationtsub (A5) =ttestationaid (A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A5) = legalQual
∧ ttestationtval (A5) = uri
∧ ttestationtsub (A6) =ttestationaid (A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A6) = legalQual
∧ ttestationtval (A6) = uri)
Table 8.27: IR3 linked and unique identity discretionary rules
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IR3-D34-AP The identity of the selected par-
ticipant must be attested to by
at least one evidence service
provider
• whose role has been at-
tested to by a trustworthi-
ness monitor
• who confirms that the
identifying attributes exist
in corroborative evidence
and the binding between
an applicant and an iden-
tity was checked using
one factor prior enrolment
(ISO/IEC TS 29003:2018
Level 3),
and there must be legal at-
testation for the evidence ser-
vice provider and trustworthi-
ness monitor in their respective
roles.
∃ A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = eIdentifier
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationaid (A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = REvSP
∧ ttestationtsub(A3) =ttestationaid (A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A3) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A3) = RTwsMo
∧ ttestationtsub(A4) =ttestationaid (A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A4) = doesConformTo
∧ ttestationtval (A4) =
ISO-IEC-29003:2018:Level3
∧ ttestationtsub (A5) =ttestationaid (A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A5) = legalQual
∧ ttestationtval (A5) = uri
∧ ttestationtsub (A6) =ttestationaid (A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A6) = legalQual
∧ ttestationtval (A6) = uri)
Table 8.28: IR3 linked and unique identity discretionary rules
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IR4-D021-AP For each role that the se-
lected participant has at-
testations for, there must
be at least one role at-
testation that is not self-
attested
∃ A1, A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationtsub(A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A2) =ttestationtval (A1)
∧ ttestationaid (A2) ≠ ttestationaid (A1))
Table 8.29: IR4 Discretionary rules/others
IR4-D022-AP If the selected participant
acts in the role of an ac-
creditation body
then this role must be at-
tested to by a member
of the International At-
testation Forum (IAF) as
conforming to ISO/IEC
17011 [174]
∃ A1, A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub (A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = RAB
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationtsub(A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = doesConformTo
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = ISO-IEC-17011:2017
∧ ttestationaid (A2) ∈ {IAF-Memberlist})
Table 8.30: IR4 Discretionary rules/AB
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IR4-D023-AP If the selected participant
acts in the role of a con-
formity assessment body
then this role must be at-
tested to by a member of
the European Accredita-
tion co-operation mecha-
nism (EA) as conforming
to ISO/IEC 17065 [176]
∃ A1, A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub (A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = RCAB
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationtsub(A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = doesConformTo
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = ISO-IEC-17065:2012
∧ ttestationaid (A2) ∈ {EA-Memberlist})
IR4-D024-AP If the selected participant
acts in the role of a con-
formity assessment body
then this role must be at-
tested to by a member of
the European Accredita-
tion co-operation mecha-
nism (EA) as conforming
to ETSI EN 319 403 [88]
∃ A1, A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub (A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = RCAB
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationtsub(A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = doesConformTo
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = EN319403
∧ ttestationaid (A2) ∈ {EA-Memberlist})
Table 8.31: IR4 Discretionary rules/others/CAB
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IR4-D025-AP If the selected participant
acts in the role of an evi-
dence service provider
then this role must be at-
tested to by a member of
the European Accredita-
tion co-operation mecha-
nism (EA) as conforming
to ISO/IEC 27001 [177]
∃ A1, A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub (A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = REvSP
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationtsub(A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = doesConformTo
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = ISO-IEC-27001:2013
∧ ttestationaid (A2) ∈ {EA-Memberlist})
IR4-D026-AP If the selected participant
acts in the role of an evi-
dence service provider
then this role must be at-
tested to by a trustworthi-
ness monitor
∃ A1 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = REvSP
→ ∃ A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationaid (A1) =ttestationtsub(A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = RTwsMo))
IR4-D027A-AP If the selected participant
acts in the role of an evi-
dence service provider
then this role must be at-
tested to as conforming to
the requirements of an eI-
DASTSP by inclusion in a
European Trusted List by
a trustworthiness monitor
∃ A1, A2, A3 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub (A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = REvSP
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationtsub(A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = isRegisteredIn
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = eIDASTrustList
∧ ttestationtsub(A3) =ttestationaid (A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A3) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A3) = RTwsMo)
IR4-D027B-AP If the selected participant
acts in the role of an evi-
dence service provider
then this role must be at-
tested to as conforming to
the requirements of an eI-
DAS TSP by demonstrat-
ing conformance to ETSI
EN 319 403 [87]
∃ A1, A2, A3 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub (A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = REvSP
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationtsub(A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = doesConformTo
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = ETSI-EN-319-403
Table 8.32: IR4 Discretionary rules/others/EvSP
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IR4-D028-AP If the selected participant
acts in the role of claim
status service provider
then this role must be at-
tested to by a member of
the European Accredita-
tion co-operation mecha-
nism (EA) as conforming
to ISO/IEC 27001 [177]
∃ A1, A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub (A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = RCsSP
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationtsub(A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = doesConformTo
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = ISO-IEC-27001:2013
∧ ttestationaid (A2) in {EA-Memberlist})
IR4-D029-AP If the selected participant
acts in the role of a claim
status service provider
then this role must be at-
tested to by a trustworthi-
ness monitor
∃ A1 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = RCsSP
→ ∃ A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationaid (A1) =ttestationtsub(A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = RTwsMo))
IR4-D030-AP If the selected participant
acts in the role of claim
status service provider
then this role must be at-
tested to as conforming to
the requirements of an eI-
DASTSP by inclusion in a
European Trusted List by
a trustworthiness monitor
∃ A1, A2, A3 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub (A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = RCsSP
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) =ttestationtsub(A1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = isRegisteredIn
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = eIDASTrustList
∧ ttestationtsub(A3) =ttestationaid (A2)
∧ ttestationtatt(A3) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A3) = RTwsMo)
Table 8.33: IR4 Discretionary rules/others/CsSP
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IR4-D301-AP Participants in the role of
endorser that endorse the
rulebook selected by the
trustor must be attested by
a legal act
∀ PEndo ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2, A3 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub (A1) = fid(PEndo)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = REnDo
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) = fid(PEndo)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = doesEndorse)
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = fid(RBKid)
∧ ttestationtsub (A3) = fid(PEndo)
∧ ttestationtatt(A3) = legalQual
∧ ttestationtval (A3) = uri)
IR4-D302-AP Participants in the role of
enforcer that enforce the
rulebook selected by the
trustor must be attested by
a legal act
∀ PEnfo ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub (A1) = fid(PEnfo)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = REnFo
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) = fid(PEnfo)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = doesEnforce)
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = fid(RBKid)
∧ ttestationtsub (A3) = fid(PEnfo)
∧ ttestationtatt(A3) = legalQual
∧ ttestationtval (A3) = uri)
Table 8.34: IR4 Discretionary rules/legal qualifications
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IR4-D303-AP If the selected partici-
pant is an evidence ser-
vice provider or claim sta-
tus provider, it must be
conformity assessed by a
CAB that is accredited by
a legally qualified AB
∃ P1, PAB, PCAB ∈SPT ∃A1,A2,A3,A4,A5 ∈Sattn
(ttestationtsub (A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = (REvSP ∨ RCsSP )
∧ ttestationtsub (A2) = fid(PAB)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = RAB
∧ ttestationtsub (A3) = fid(PAB)
∧ ttestationtatt(A3) = legalQual
∧ ttestationtval (A3) = uri
∧ ttestationtsub (A4) = fid(PAB)
∧ ttestationtatt(A4) = doesAccredit
∧ ttestationtval (A4) = fid(PCAB)
∧ ttestationaid (A5) = fid(PCAB)
∧ ttestationtsub (A5) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A5) = doesConformTo
∧ ttestationtval (A5) = STANDARD11 ))
IR4-D304-AP If the selected partici-
pant is an evidence service
provider or claim status
provider, it must be moni-
tored by a trustworthiness
monitor attested by a legal
act
∃ P1, PTwsMo ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2, A3, A4 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub (A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = (REvSP ∨ RCsSP )
∧ ttestationtsub (A2) = fid(PTwsMo)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = RTwsMo
∧ ttestationaid (A3) = fid(PTwsMo)
∧ ttestationtsub (A3) = fid(PTwsMo)
∧ ttestationtatt(A3) = doesSupervise
∧ ttestationtval (A3) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtsub (A4) = fid(PTwsMo)
∧ ttestationtatt(A4) = legalQual
∧ ttestationtval (A4) = uri)
Table 8.35: IR4 Discretionary rules/legal qualifications
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IR4-D305-AP If the selected partici-
pant is an evidence ser-
vice provider or claim sta-
tus provider, it must be
monitored by a trustwor-
thiness monitor registered
in a European trusted list
∃ P1, PTwsMo ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2, A3, A4 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub (A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = (REvSP ∨ RCsSP )
∧ ttestationtsub (A2) = fid(PTwsMo)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = RTwsMo
∧ ttestationaid (A3) = fid(PTwsMo)
∧ ttestationtsub (A3) = fid(PTwsMo)
∧ ttestationtatt(A3) = doesSupervise
∧ ttestationtval (A3) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtsub (A4) = fid(PTwsMo)
∧ ttestationtatt(A4) = eIDAS_Supervisory_Body
∧ ttestationtval (A4) = uri)
Table 8.36: IR4 Discretionary rules/legal qualifications
IR5-D0A-AP The potential trustee is an
actor that agrees to the
rulebook specified in the




∧ (∃ A ∈ Sagr
∧ ttestationtsub(A) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A) = doesAgree
∧ ttestationtval (A) = RBKid))
IR5-D0B-AP The rulebook specified
in the invocation of the
trustworthiness evalu-
ation function must be
endorsed by at least one
endorser
∃ A1, A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub (A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = REnDo
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = doesEndorse)
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = RBKid)
IR5-D0C-AP The rulebook specified
in the invocation of the
trustworthiness evalu-
ation function must be
enforced by at least one
enforcer
∃ A1, A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub (A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = REnFo
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = doesEnforce)
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = RBKid)
Table 8.37: IR5 Discretionary rules/agreement, endorsement, enforcement
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IR5-D01-AP For the rulebook chosen
by the trustor, there
exists an endorser who
discloses information of




ernance in a self-attested
attestation
∃ PEndo ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2, A3 ∈ Sattn ∃ RBKid ∈ S
(ttestationtsub (A1) = fid(PEndo)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = REnDo
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) = fid(PEndo)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = doesEndorse)
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = fid(RBKid)
∧ ttestationtsub(A1) =ttestationtsub(A3)
∧ ttestationaid (A3) =ttestationtsub(A3)
∧ ttestationtatt(A3) = doesDisclose
∧ ttestationtval (A3) = uri)
IR5-D02-AP For the rulebook chosen
by the trustor, there







ernance in a self-attested
attestation
∃ PEndo ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2, A3, A4 ∈ Sattn ∃ RBKid
∈ S
(ttestationtsub (A1) = fid(PEndo)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = REnDo
∧ ttestationtsub(A2) = fid(PEndo)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = doesEndorse)
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = fid(RBKid)
∧ ttestationtsub(A1) =ttestationtsub(A3)
∧ ttestationaid (A3) =ttestationtsub(A3)
∧ ttestationtatt(A3) = doesDisclose
∧ ttestationtval (A3) = uri
∧ ttestationtsub (A4) = fid(PT)
∧ ttestationtatt(A4) = legalQual
∧ ttestationtval (A4) = uri)
Table 8.38: IR5 Discretionary rules/disclosure
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IR5-D11-AP If the selected participant
is an endorser, it cannot be
an enforcer
∀ A1 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = REnDo
→ ∄ A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A2) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = REnFo))
IR5-D12-AP If the selected participant
is an enforcer it cannot be
an endorser
∀ A1 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = REnFo
→ ∄ A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A2) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A2) = REnDo))
Table 8.39: IR5 discretionary rules regarding mutual exclusion of endorser and enforcer
IR5-D21-AP Helper rule that defines
the separation of duties in
the enabler plane
SSOD1 = {REnDo, REnFo, RAB, RCAB}
IR5-D22-AP If the selected participant
is in SSOD1 then only onerole is allowed
∀ A1 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) ∈ SSOD1
→ ¬ ∃ A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A2) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A2) ∈ SSOD1 ))
Table 8.40: IR5 discretionary rules regarding separation of duty for the enabler plane
IR5-D23-AP Separation of duties for
the trustworthiness moni-
tor role
∀ A1 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A1) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ ttestationtval (A1) = RTwsMo
→ ∄ A2 ∈ Sattn
(ttestationtsub(A2) = fid(P1)
∧ ttestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ (ttestationtval (A2) = REvSP
∨ ttestationtval (A2) = RCsSP )))





This chapter presents an approach to evaluating trustworthiness. It builds on the
preceding chapters in which data and constraints over the data have been defined.
A working definition of trustworthiness was proposed in Section 5.2.2, and an ap-
proach to evaluating trustworthiness was proposed in Section 6.7. This approach
is now specified in detail.
9.1 Introduction
This chapter is concerned with the functions used to evaluate trustworthiness. Three possible
such functions were introduced in Section 6.7, namely twsevalAE (for evaluating the trustwor-
thiness of an entire ecosystem), twsevalAP (for evaluating the trustworthiness of a participant),
twsevalP (for evaluating the trustworthiness of a transaction). Only the first two are described
in detail here – the third remains a possible topic for future research. This chapter provides de-
tailed specifications of the functions twsevalAE and twsevalAP, including details of their input
parameters and how they can be used.
Section Section 9.2 provides details of the ecosystem evaluation function twsevalAE, and
Section 9.3 addresses the participant evaluation function twsevalAP. A brief summary is pro-
vided in Section 9.4.
9.2 The ecosystem evaluation function twsevalAE
This function is invoked by a trustor to assist in deciding to what extent an ecosystem repre-
sented by instance data can be regarded as trustworthy. The remainder of this section describes
the function parameters and lists the tables from which discretionary rules can be selected.
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9.2.1 Function signature
The function signature is
twsevalAE(Rid , {DiscretionaryRules}, InstanceData)
where
• Rid identifies the applicable rulebook,
• {DiscretionaryRules} denotes the set of discretionary rules selected by the trustor, and
• InstanceData identifies the instance data that is to be used.
Execution of the function includes verification of the mandatory rules of the selected rule-
book.
The function returns true when all of the evaluated rules return true. True means that the
evaluated ecosystem meets the constraints specified in the rules, which is an indication of trust-
worthiness.
The function returns falsewhen at least one of the evaluated rules returns false. Falsemeans
that the evaluated ecosystem does not meet the constraints specified in the rules, which is an
indication of a lack of trustworthiness.
9.2.2 Selection of discretionary constraints
9.2.2.1 IR2 Transparency
Rules can be selected to express a policy regarding transparency from the following tables.
• Enabler plane rules can be selected from Table 8.1.
• Trustworthiness provision plane rules can be selected from Table 8.2.
• Functional plane rules can be selected from Table 8.3.
9.2.2.2 IR3 Linked and unique identity
Rules can be selected to express a policy regarding participant identity from the following tables.
• A single rule regarding self-attestation can be selected from Table 8.5,
• Rules regarding other-attestations can be selected from Tables 8.6 and 8.7.
• Rules regarding attestion by legally qualified others can be selected from Tables 8.8, 8.9
and 8.10.
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9.2.2.3 IR4 Competently acting in role
Rules can be selected to express a policy regarding participant competence from the following
tables.
• The single rule regarding having at least one role attestation that is not self-attested can
be selected from Table 8.12.
• The single rule regarding accreditation bodies can be selected from Table 8.13.
• Rules regarding conformity assessment bodies can be selected from Table 8.14.
• Rules regarding evidence service providers can be selected from Table 8.15.
• Rules regarding claim status service provider can be selected from Table 8.16.
• Rules regarding attestations by legally qualified others can be selected from Tables 8.17
and 8.18.
9.2.2.4 IR5 Governance, security and controls
Rules can be selected to express a policy regarding participant governance, security and controls
from the following tables.
• Rules regarding compliance with IT governance can be selected from Table 8.19.
• Rules regarding separation of duty can be selected from Table 8.20, Table 8.21 and Table
8.22.
9.3 The participant evaluation function twsevalAP
This function is invoked by a trustor to assist in deciding to what extent a participant P1 can be
regarded as trustworthy in a particular role. We next describe the following elements:
• the signature of the twsevalAP function;
• the tables from which discretionary rules can be selected without modification;
• possible refinements of discretionary rules where this is enabled by using the information
specified in the function invocation; including the potential trustee, the rulebook to be
used and standards to be complied with.
229
9.3. The participant evaluation function twsevalAP 9. Evaluating trustworthiness
9.3.1 Function signature
The function signature is
twsevalAP(RBKid , P1, target_base_role_P1, {DiscretionaryRules}, InstanceData, {Norms})
where
• RBKid identifies the applicable rulebook,
• P1 identifies the potential trustee,
• target_base_role_P1 denotes the target base role of P1, i.e. the role in which the trustee
is being evaluated,
• {DiscretionaryRules} stand for the set of discretionary rules selected by the trustor,
• InstanceData refers to the instance data that is to be used, and
• {Norms} denotes the set of discretionary norms against which the trustee is to be confor-
mity assessed.
Execution of the function includes verification of the mandatory rules of the selected rule-
book.
The function returns true when all of the evaluated rules return true. True means that the
evaluated participant meets the constraints specified in the rules, which is an indication of trust-
worthiness.
The function returns falsewhen at least one of the evaluated rules returns false. Falsemeans
that the evaluated participant does not meet the constraints specified in the rules, which is an
indication of a lack of trustworthiness.
9.3.2 Selection of discretionary constraints
9.3.2.1 IR2 Transparency
For IR2 Transparency, there are no discretionary rules, because transparency is already ad-
dressed for the purpose of twsevalAP by the mandatory rules.
9.3.2.2 IR3 Linked and unique identity
These rules can be selected from Tables 8.23 – 8.28.
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9.3.2.3 IR4 Competently acting in role
These rules allow selection of a policy determining how participant competence is evaluated.
They can be selected from Tables 8.29 – 8.33.
9.3.2.4 IR5 Governance, security and controls
These rules allow selection of a policy determining the basis for evaluating participant gover-
nance, security and controls. The rules regarding agreement, endorsement and enforcement can
be selected from Table 8.37. The two rules regarding legal qualification of endorser and en-
forcer can be selected from Table 8.38. Regarding separation of duty, the rules can be selected
from Tables 8.39 – Table 8.41.
9.4 Summary
Two trustworthiness evaluation functions were specified: twsevalAE, to be used for evaluating
the trustworthiness of an entire ecosystem, and twsevalAP to be used for evaluating the trust-




Using trust and trustworthiness
232
Chapter 10
Overview and implementation choices
To demonstrate the practical feasibility of the   framework, a partial imple-
mentation is presented in this and the next five chapters. Possible implementation
choices for the data model, rulebook, trustworthiness evaluation functions and in-
stance data are compared and chosen on the basis of defined selection criteria.
The implementation is then described.
10.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces the third part of the thesis, in which partial implementations of the
data model, rulebook and trustworthiness evaluation functions are presented. To help ensure
its practical relevance, the selection and storage of instance data is also addressed. The imple-
mentation was performed in two phases.
• In the first phase, selection criteria were formulated and used to determine the appropri-
ate technical components. An implementation architecture was defined to help ensure
effective interaction between the components. The first phase forms the focus of this
chapter.
• In the second phase, the data model, a specific rulebook, trustworthiness evaluation func-
tions and instance data were implemented and tested. These are described in Chapters
11 – 14.
Conclusions and ideas for future work are given in Chapter 16.
This chapter describes the first phase of the implementation. Possible approaches to im-
plementation are introduced and compared in Section 10.2. The data model, rulebook, trust-
worthiness evaluation functions and instance data are addressed. Implementation choices were
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selected on the basis of defined selection criteria. Section 10.3 describes the architecture and the
technical components that were selected for implementation. Section 10.4 provides a summary.
10.2 Evaluation of implementation choices
10.2.1 Data model
10.2.1.1 Selection criteria
The following criteria were used for the selection of the technology for the data model imple-
mentation.
• Well-defined syntax and semantics must be supported. This is required for transparency
and general understanding.
• A truth-functional interpretation must be supported. This is required because, as de-
scribed in Section 7.2, the data for the   framework is specified as predicates which
have a truth-functional interpretation.
10.2.1.2 Alternatives
Possible ways of modelling data include the following.
• In a relational model, information is modelled in tables consisting of rows and columns.
The tables are related by primary keys and foreign keys. A primary key is a specific
choice of a minimal set of columns that uniquely specify a row in a table. A foreign key
is a set of columns in a table that refers to the primary key of another table, linking these
two tables. Relational databases are a widely used implementation of such a data model,
with SQL1 as the most popular query language.
• In a key-value model, information is represented as a collection of key–value pairs, stored
in an associative array. Such an array is an abstract data type composed of a collection
of key-value pairs such that each possible key appears at most once in the collection.
This model is used to model data that can be represented in such pairs, which includes
wide column data and entire documents. The many existing NoSQL database systems2
provide implementations of such a model.
• Hierarchical trees, as used by the eXtensible Mark-up Language (XML) model, are an-
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database family, particularly in the document-related subfamily including databases ori-
ented towards XML and other document formats.
• Semantic models such as RDF, RDF Schema and OWL represent data as a graph. Triple-
stores and graph databases offer common implementations, and are available from many
suppliers including TopQuadrant3, Ontotext4, theApache Software Foundation5 andOpen-
Link Software6.
All four alternatives are based on a well-defined syntax. However, they differ in their sup-
port for semantics.
• The first three alternatives represent syntactical structures. Data typing can be used to
add meaning. Truth-functional interpretation is not present in these models; instead it
must be created on top of the syntax. Therefore they do not offer a suitable alternative
for the implementation of the data model for the trustworthiness evaluation system.
• The fourth alternative consists of a class of modelling alternatives specifically designed
to support semantic modelling. Within this class, OWL has good support for semantics.
RDF models data as a graph consisting of sets of (subject, predicate, object)-triples, with
semantics defined accordingly. New triples can be added to the graph, and may be linked
to any existing subject, predicate or object. OWL extends RDF’s possibilities to capture
semantics. A discussion of RDF and OWL is provided in Section 4.3.
10.2.1.3 Selection
On the basis of the assessment in the preceding section, a combination of RDF and OWL was
selected for data modelling because this best meets the defined requirements.
10.2.2 Implementation of rulebooks and evaluation
The representation of rulebooks and the evaluation of the rules they contain are both based on
logic, and are also tightly coupled. They are therefore treated together.
10.2.2.1 Selection criteria
The following selection criteria were used for the selection of components to implement rule-
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• As for the data model, well-defined syntax and semantics must be supported. This is
required for transparency and general understanding. The syntax and meaning of the
rules, and the outcome of their evaluation, must be available to everyone that uses them.
• The implementation must be based on a logic that is decidable7, because otherwise there
is no way to ascertain the correctness of the answer. Furthermore, the time required
to derive the answer must be acceptable for users. The precise timeliness requirement
depends on the use case. For example:
– in on-line electronic commerce, users may need an answer in less than a second (or
even less);
– in a non-commercial context, users may be willing to accept longer periods of time.
For the partial implementation that was created for the thesis it was assumed that the
answer must be available in less than fifteen minutes.
• For practical reasons, the implementation of the logic must offer good integration with
that of the data model.
• The implementationmust use existing vocabularies or ontologies fromwell-known sources.
This decreases the learning curve of users, and increases the chances of acceptance of the
framework.
10.2.2.2 Alternatives
Possible choices for the language used to implement the logic include the following:
• a general purpose computer language such as Java,
• a domain specific language such as Erlang, HTML or Unix Shell Script,
• a language oriented towards logic processing, such as Prolog,
• the combination of a semantic language such as the Web Ontology Language (OWL),
with a reasoning engine and a matching query language.
7In logic, a true/false decision problem is decidable if there exists an effective method for deriving the correct
answer. Logical systems such as propositional logic are decidable if membership in their set of logically valid
formulas (or theorems) can be effectively determined. A theory (set of sentences closed under logical consequence)
in a fixed logical system is decidable if there is an effective method for determining whether arbitrary formulas are
included in the theory. For a discussion see Section 2.3.1 or Mendelson [240].
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General purpose languages are inherently transparent. However to implement the logic of
the   framework would require significant additional programming to integrate with data in
the OWL semantics, and to guarantee decidability of the logic. The use of existing vocabularies
would be complicated if not impossible. For example, Java’s object-oriented data model does
not offermuch support for integrationwith semanticmodels, and neither does Java include a rule
engine. Should one want to use such a language for the implementation of the   framework,
then most functionality would have to be created from scratch. As a result, the use of a general-
purpose language was not pursued.
Domain-specific languages are created specifically to solve problems in a particular domain.
They are not intended to be able to solve problems outside of this domain, although that may
be technically possible. The survey given in Chapter 3 does not identify a domain-specific
language suitable for implementing the logic of the   framework. We therefore did not pursue
this option further.
Languages such as Prolog combine transparency with a sound logic foundation. Prolog is
an untyped declarative language where the program logic is expressed in terms of relations, rep-
resented as facts and rules. A computation is initiated by running a query over these relations.
Prolog is based on FOL Horn clauses and is Turing complete8. Prolog uses a non-deterministic
evaluation strategy to solve a query, so decidability is not guaranteed. For this reason the cut
operator9 and other language constructs have been introduced into the language. The cut op-
erator makes Prolog not purely declarative and a procedural reading of a program is needed to
understand it. Prolog has also been used for applications in the semantic web, as described by
Wielemaker et al. [384]. However, the following issues arise with such a choice.
• Only a limited number of implementations that combine Prolog or Datalog with semantic
web data could be identified.
• A short preliminary analysis suggested that such a combination is rather complex.
• Implementing rules on the basis of existing vocabularies and ontologies is not straight-
forward.
8A system of data-manipulation rules (such as a computer’s instruction set or a programming language) is said to
be Turing-complete if it can be used to simulate any Turing machine (a mathematical model of computation built on
an abstract machine that manipulates symbols on a strip of tape according to a table of rules). This means that this
system is able to recognize or decide other data-manipulation rule sets. Turing completeness is used to express the
power of such a data-manipulation rule set. A system that is Turing-complete is also referred to as computationally
universal. Most computer languages today are Turing-complete. Datalog is a subset of Prolog which is not Turing-
complete. For a detailed treatment of Turing-completeness see, for example, the article on Turing in the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy [149]
9The cut operator is a goal, written as !, which always succeeds, but cannot be backtracked. It is used to prevent
unwanted backtracking, including finding extra solutions and avoiding unnecessary computations
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In conclusion, while in principle such a language could be used, there appear to be consid-
erable practical difficulties with such an approach.
The combination of a semantic web language such as the Web Ontology Language (OWL)
with a reasoning engine and a matching query language (SPARQL) has the following advan-
tages.
• It provides the required degree of transparency, because OWL allows annotations to the
data model which can be used to explain the deductions made by the reasoning engine.
• The use of a reasoner, which is typically built-in in an OWL environment, allows the
maintenance of consistency and simplicity in data models and in the formulation of
queries.
• A type of OWL can be selected that is a decidable fragment of FOL.
• Existing vocabularies and ontologies can be imported and used as a basis to construct
new elements.
10.2.2.3 Selection
On the basis of the assessment in the preceding section, the combination of the logic supported
by RDF and OWL with a reasoning engine and a query language was selected to implement the
logic required for the   framework.
10.2.3 Instance data
10.2.3.1 Selection criteria
The selection criteria for instance data are based on requirement IR7, introduced in Section
5.5.7:
As a participant in an electronic ecosystem I can understand the origin and the type of data
that is used in the evaluation of trustworthiness of participants, so that I can claim the outcome
of the trustworthiness evaluation is based on credible data.
For the trustworthiness evaluation to be based on credible data, such data must come from
authoritative sources that allow access to data that corresponds to one or more predicates. This
leads to the following selection criteria.
• The data source must offer relevant data, i.e. data specified in the data model. This means
that the data must be mappable to one or more predicates specified in the   data model.
• The data source must be authoritative for this data.
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• The data must include a description of its meaning.
• The data must be available in a machine-readable format. If the data is also available in
a human readable format, this is additionally valuable.
10.2.3.2 Alternatives
There are many data sources capable of providing data corresponding to one or more predicates.
The implementation described below limits itself to data sources in the public domain. An
analysis of available data sources is described in Chapter 12.
10.2.3.3 Selection
The selection of data sources and instance data for each data element of the   data model is
addressed in Chapter 12.
10.3 Implementation architecture and tooling
10.3.1 Architecture
Combining the elements selected above leads to the architecture depicted in Figure 10.1.
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         Rulebook & twseval  
Interactive Query          Programmatic Query














Figure 10.1: Implementation architecture.
The following elements are included.
• A set of participants as potential trustees, and a potential trustor.
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• Data sources in the public domain, as discussed in Chapter 12.
• A front end layer, composed of the following elements.
– The   data model, created using Protégé [250], see Section 10.3.2.
– Extract and transform programs which download information from the data sources
and transform it into the form required by the implementation of the   data model.
These are written in a combination of the general purpose language Java and Ex-
tensible Stylesheet Language Transformations [377] (XSLTs). XSLT is a language
for transforming XML documents into other XML documents. To load the trans-
formed information into the back end, the standard load utility of the Graph DB
database was used.
– An implementation of the rulebook and trustworthiness evaluation functions.
∗ The interactive query interface is based on GraphDB’sWorkbench, which is an
interactive interface to the GraphDB database10. The rulebook is implemented
as a set of SPARQL queries that are stored and executed in the Workbench.
∗ The programmatic query interface consists of an Eclipse development envi-
ronment, in which SPARQL and Java are combined to form the rulebook and
the evaluation functions. The Java code is used to drive the execution of the
SPARQL queries and does not implement the evaluation logic.
• A back end layer, composed of:
– the instance data, stored in an Ontotext GraphDB database;
– the internal reasoning engine included in the database.
10.3.2 Data model
Protégé [250] was used as the data modelling tool. It is a free, open-source ontology editor, de-
veloped by the Stanford Center for BiomedicMedicine11. It supports the OWL 2WebOntology
Language and RDF specifications from the World Wide Web Consortium.
It includes a built-in HermiT reasoner [127], which was used for consistency checking of
the model. The built-in OntoGraf12 feature was used to visualise the ontology.
In initial implementation development work, Protégé also served as the SPARQL engine.
However, its SPARQL queries do not take into account inferred data and are hence limited.
Therefore the model and its data were moved into a back-end database whose SPARQL engine
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10.3.3 Data import and transformation
To load the selected instance data into the GraphDB database, XSL transformations were de-
veloped using an Eclipse development environment13. The Xalan Java libraries14 were used
for XSLT and XPath processing. The transformations were tailor-made to transform a specific
input (data source) to a specific output (a predicate in the form of an OWL assertion).
10.3.4 Database
10.3.4.1 GraphDB functionality
The free edition of Ontotext’s GraphDB15 version 8.8 was used as the back-end database.
GraphDB includes its own TRREE16 reasoner for consistency checking. It also includes a
SPARQL 1.1 query engine.
GraphDB supports four of the OWL species17 introduced in Section 4.3.6.1. Their se-
mantics and inference are defined in GraphDB internal rule-sets. Details can be found in the
GraphDB documentation18. Of these four species, the OWL Max ruleset was used. It covers
the full RDFS semantics without limitations, apart from the entailment related to typed literals
(known as D-entailment), most of OWL Lite and all of OWL DLP.
Regarding the type of inference, the OWL Max rule-set was selected because it covers the
semantics and inference required for the implementation of the   framework. The detailed
set-up of the database is specified in Section 12.3.2.
10.3.5 Rulebook and trustworthiness evaluation
10.3.5.1 Interactive query
The interactive query front end consists of the GraphDBWorkbench, a graphical user interface
to the GraphDB database. The rulebook is implemented as a set of SPARQL queries. These
are stored and can be executed in the GraphDB Workbench, along with the instance data. The
set-up is described in Section 13.3.2.
13The version ‘Eclipse IDE for Java Developers Version: Mars.1 Release (4.5.1)’ was used
14https://xalan.apache.org/
15https://graphdb.ontotext.com/
16Triple Reasoning and Rule Entailment Engine
17OWL Horst, OWL Max, OWL2 QL, and OWL2 RL.
18GraphDB Free Documentation Release 8.7 Ontotext, Oct 22, 2018
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10.3.5.2 Programmatic query
Programmatic queries were developed using an Eclipse19 development environment. The rule-
book and trustworthiness evaluation functions that were written for use in the interactive queries
were embedded in Java programs. These programs use a database driver to connect to the
GraphDB where the instance data resides. This set-up was used for prototyping but not for the
implementation.
10.4 Summary
This chapter described the first phase of the implementation. Possible approaches to the im-
plementation of the data model, rulebooks, trustworthiness evaluation functions and instance
data were introduced and compared. Selection criteria were specified and the choices for im-
plementation were made on this basis. The main choices were the use of a decidable version of
OWL for data modelling, the reuse of existing ontologies to improve interoperability, and the
integration with the real world through the selection of public data sources. The implementa-
tion architecture and the selected technical components were presented. The main components
are:
• Protégé, as the OWL data modelling tool,
• Java and XSLT, to extract data from the selected sources and transform it into the data
model,





Implementation of the data model
This chapter presents an implementation of the data model that was specified in
Chapter 7.
11.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the OWL DL implementation of the data model specified in Chapter 7.
The choice of OWL DL was discussed in 10.2.1. A fundamental part of the implementation
was the choice of OWL classes and properties to implement the predicates of the model. The
question of whether to create an ontology from scratch or to incorporate one or more existing
ontologies is addressed. After the identification of candidate ontologies, we describe how the
selected approach was chosen. Where possible, classes and properties from the incorporated
ontologies were reused.
The processes used to load the model implementation into a database and to import in-
stance data are described in Chapter 12. The implementations of a specific rulebook and of
trustworthiness evaluation functions are described in Chapters 13 and 14.
Section 11.2 describes the approach that was followed. Section 11.3 explains the set-up of
Protégé, the tool that was used for data modelling. Two further sections cover subjects that are
relevant to more than a single predicate:
• Section 11.4 specifies how time and commitments are modelled;
• Section 11.5 specifies how unique identity is modelled.
The approaches used to model the predicates of the data model as OWL classes and prop-
erties are described in Sections 11.6 – 11.11.
• Section 11.6 describes the implementation of the specific rulebook used in the thesis.
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• Section 11.7 specifies how participants are modelled.
• Section 11.8 specifies how agreements are modelled.
• Sections 11.9 and 11.10 specify how endorsement and enforcements are modelled.
• Section 11.11 specifies how attestations are modelled.
Section 11.12 describes how data sources are modelled, and afterwards Section 11.13 pro-
vides an overview of the classes and properties that were used. Section 11.14 provides a sum-
mary of the chapter.
11.2 Approach
11.2.1 To create from scratch or reuse?
To create the   data model, a dedicated   OWL ontology http://www.marcsel.eu/
onto/te/ was specified. The terminology defined in Hitzler et al. [148] was used. An in-
troduction to OWL is provided in Section 4.3.6 and its use for data modelling is described in
appendix D.
When creating an ontology it is necessary to decide whether to start from scratch and define
all the necessary concepts, or to include one or more already existing ontologies and reuse the
defined meanings. The two approaches have the following advantages and disadvantages.
• Creating an ontology from scratch.
– This has the advantage of giving its creator complete freedom over all aspects of
the ontology.
– It has the disadvantage of not capitalising on definitions of meaning that have been
vetted and documented, and in some cases well-accepted and in use.
• Reusing one or more existing ontologies.
– This has the advantage of capitalising on existing definitions of meaning, which
brings the following benefits.
∗ It has the potential to reduce errors, since ontologies that have been published
by organisations such as the Worldwide Web Consortium have been created
through a controlled process and are less likely to contain serious errors.
∗ It improves interoperability with existing Semantic Web applications based on
existing ontologies.
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∗ It decreases the amount of new terminology users have to learn. This improves
the chances of the new ontology being accepted in a wider user community.
– It has the disadvantage of leaving less freedom to its creator.
Given the above-listed advantages of ontology re-use, the decision was made to re-use ex-
isting ontologies in implementing the   data model.
11.2.2 Existing ontologies
Given the decision to re-use existing ontologies, it was necessary to first understand available
alternatives. The following sources of information on ontologies were used:
• the DARPA Agent Markup Language (DAML) list of ontologies1,
• the W3C’s list of ontologies2,
• the Protégé list of ontologies3,
• the Object Management Group (OMG) ontologies4, and
• the Global Legal Entity Identifier Foundation (GLEIF) ontologies6.
Also, ISO/IEC is soon expected to publish two documents on ontologies:
• ISO/IEC PRF 21838-1 [183] Information technology — Top-level ontologies (TLO) —
Part 1: Requirements, and
• ISO/IEC PRF 21838-2 [184] Information technology — Top-level ontologies (TLO) —
Part 2: Basic Formal Ontology (BFO).
However at the time the implementation was developed these were not available, and were
thus not considered.
11.2.3 Selected ontologies
Of the ontologies listed above, an analysis revealed that the following were relevant to the
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• Two ontologies from the W3C:
– the Organization7 (ORG) ontology [376], which enables the publication of infor-
mation on organisations and organisational structures;
– the Provenance (PROV-O) ontology [357] which enables tracing the provenance
of an object or entity, and provides contextual and circumstantial evidence for its
original production.
• Two ontologies from the EDM Council, which enable the description of financial infor-
mation:
– the FIBO Foundations [77] ontology, and
– the FIBO Business Entities [78] ontology.
• Two ontologies from the Global Legal Electronic Identifier Foundation (GLEIF), which
enable the description of legal entities:
– the GLEIF level 1 ontology [123] , and
– the Entity Legal Form (ELF) ontology [122].




Protégé, as described in 10.3.2, was used as the data modelling tool. The chosen syntax is
RDF/XML. Details of naming conventions, character encoding and namespaces are discussed
in Appendix D.1.2.
11.3.2 Mapping predicates onto OWL DL
A dedicated   ontology was specified. The prefix te was defined as http://www.marcsel.
eu/onto/te/. Predicates are modelled as OWL classes and properties of this ontology. For
example the predicate Participant is implemented as the te:Participant class, and properties
include te:pAgreement and te:pEndorsement. An actual Participant, represented by instance
data, is implemented as an individual of the te:Participant class. Time and commitment marks
are not implemented.
7The W3C uses the American spelling
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11.3.3 Location
The ontology that represents the data model is available at http://www.marcsel.eu/onto/
te/te-data-model.owl.
11.3.4 Importing existing ontologies
The TE ontology imports two existing ontologies:
• the ORG ontology, from http://www.w3.org/ns/org\#, and
• the PROV ontology, from http://www.w3.org/ns/prov-o-20130430.
Depending on the tool used, these might be loaded automatically or an import8 action might
be needed.
11.4 Time and commitment
11.4.1 Time
It must be possible to relate the notions of points in time, including start and end points of an
interval, and of interval duration to individuals of the classes of the   data model. For this
purpose two classes are defined.
• The class te:TimeInstant represents points in time such as start and end points.
• The class te:TimeInterval represents intervals which have a start and end point. It has
two subclasses.
– te:Event represents time intervals during which something eventful takes place.
– te:TemporalRelation represents relations that connect at least two entities and last
for an interval of time.
11.4.2 Commitment
There are many ways of expressing the commitment of an entity to information. This includes
hashes, commitment schemes, message authentication codes, and electronic signatures. As the
thesis is limited to the semantic aspects of evaluating trustworthiness, it is assumed that such a
scheme may be in place. However, how such an commitment is instantiated is outside the scope
of this thesis.
8E.g. in Protégé one may have to select the ‘Active ontology/Ontology imports’ tab, and perform a ‘direct import’
before the ontology that is referred to in an OWL import statement is actually loaded into the workspace.
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11.5 Establishing unique identity
According to requirement IR3, specified in Section 5.5.3, all individuals in the   framework
need to be uniquely identified. Otherwise it would not be possible to implement trustworthiness
evaluation functions that effectively verify segregation of duty rules.
For this purpose the class te:ID and corresponding properties were created9.
• The class te:ID is defined as equivalent to te:uniqueText with the existential qualifier
(‘some’).
• The data property te:uniqueText is defined as a functional property (meaning it can only
have a single value), without domain, and with xsd:string as range. Its value corresponds
to the eIdentifier. Who issues eIdentifiers is outside the scope of this thesis.
• The object property doesIdentify identifies things. It is defined as functional because an
identifier should only identify a single thing in the   data model.
• The inverse object property identifiedBy is defined for convenience. It is not functional
since a thing can be identified by many identifiers, e.g. a citizen temporarily having resi-
dence abroad.
Uniqueness is enforced for the functional properties by the consistency checks that are per-
formed by the reasoner. These checks are automatically performed at the initial loading of data
into the OWL environment (modeller or database), and at run time when an insert operation is
performed. This guarantees that all participants are uniquely identified.
This uniqueness is enforced during inference and for inference purposes, under the OWA10.
OWL does not force the actual presence of a functional property. Such presence must be
checked via SPARQL or any other means. Individuals of the class te:ID have a name that
starts with ID-.
11.6 Rulebook
The concept of a rulebook is introduced in Chapter 8. For implementation purposes, a distinc-
tion is made between two ways of using a rulebook.
9OWL 2 supports the HasKey axiom, which states that each named instance of a class is uniquely identified by
a (data or object) property or a set of properties. Hence if two named instances of the class coincide on values for
each of key properties, then these two individuals are the same. However, this is not stringent enough for the  
data model because the model relies on an eIdentifier whose uniqueness must be enforced.
10All individuals that are different must also be specified as different in OWL.
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• For the purpose of data modelling, it is necessary to represent rulebooks because they
are terms of predicates such as agreements, endorsements and enforcements. This is
addressed in the current chapter.
• For the purpose of trustworthiness evaluation, it is necessary to implement the rulebook
rules. This is addressed in Chapter 13.
11.6.1 The te:RuleBook class
The class te:RuleBook is specified as a subclass of owl:Thing. There may be multiple rulebook
individuals. Each individual is uniquely identified using an identifier of the class te:ID and the
object property te:doesIdentify.
Individuals of the te:RuleBook class allow participants to express their compliance with the
specified rulebook through an agreement, and let endorsers and enforcers express their endorse-
ment and enforcement thereof.
11.6.2 The rulebook digests
An individual of the class te:RuleBook is linked with its rules through the data properties
te:ruleBook-digest-RIPEMD-160 and te:ruleBook-digest-SHA-256. These data properties con-
tain the RIPEMD-160 [168] and SHA-256 [163] hash of the file that contains the rules. An
alternative approach to implementing the rules would be to store them within the te:RuleBook
individual.
11.7 Participant
The predicate Participant was specified in Section 7.5. It is modelled as an OWL class. Section
11.7.1 gives the requirements for the Participant class, which is defined in Section 11.7.2.
11.7.1 Prerequisites
11.7.1.1 Name and unique identification
It must be possible to name things, including participants. For this purpose a data property
te:name is created. However, it is assumed names might not be unique, and all individuals in
the   data model need to be uniquely identified. Identifier uniqueness is achieved by using a
specific attribute, linked via the property identifiedBy. An alternative would be to use a combi-
nation of attributes; indeed using more attributes may provide more flexibility. However, such
flexibility would not add value to the current implementation, and so a single attribute is used.
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To guarantee uniqueness, the identity of a participant is expressed via an individual identi-
fier of class of te:ID and related to the participant via identifiedBy. This identifier is uniquely
attributed because it is based on the functional property identifiedBy. For functional proper-
ties, the reasoner’s consistency checks ensure that it has only been allocated once (and tools
such as data modellers and database systems refuse to allocate more than one value). The te:ID
individual has a functional data property, te:uniqueText, where a unique value is registered.
The issuer of this identifier is registered through the object property prov:wasAttributedTo.
11.7.1.2 Natural Person or Organisation
A participant11 can be a natural person or an organisation. The latter may or may not be a legal
person.
• For natural persons, the class te:LivingThing is created as the basis for all living things.
The class te:NaturalPerson is defined as equivalent to a te1:LivingThing that has a name.
• For organisations, the W3C Organization ontology12 is used.
• For legal persons, the class te:LegalPerson is created.
The definition of participant should indicatewhether it is a te:NaturalPerson or an org:Organization.
11.7.1.3 Rulebook and agreement
The class te:RuleBook allows individual rulebooks to be created. The object property te:doesAgreesTo
allows a participant to express its agreement to interact according to a rulebook.
11.7.2 Participant class
The class te:Participant is defined as equivalent to the union of te:NaturalPerson and org:Organization,
and identification is available from te:ID. Identity uniqueness is achieved by relating the partic-
ipant to an individual of the class te:ID. Individuals that meet the criteria will automatically be
classified by the reasoner as Participant. In Protégé, the Hermit reasoner will ensure this, and
when the data is loaded into the back-end database the GraphDB reasoner takes care of this.
The object property prov:wasAttributedTo is used to record the source of the identity at-
tribution. For a self-attested identity, the te:ID individual is linked to the source participant,
which is the same as the subject of the identified participant. For object properties, both
11The data model defined in Chapter 7 includes the actor predicate. Evaluation of trustworthiness requires that
actors qualify as participants. As a consequence there is no need to implement the actor class, since the evaluation
is only concerned with participants.
12W3C makes use of the American spelling
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prov:wasAttributedTo and doesIdentify link the te:ID individual to the same participant. Figure
11.1 shows a partial   graph, focused on the Participant class.
Figure 11.1: The te:Participant class in its context
11.8 Agreement
The predicate Agreement was specified in Section 7.7. The class and its properties are as fol-
lows.
• The class te:Agreement is defined to be a subclass of te:TemporalRelation. A specific
agreement is expressed as an individual of the te:Agreement class.
• The object property te:pAgreement links13 a participant to an agreement (te:Participant
→ te:pAgreement → te:Agreement).
• The object property agreementR links an agreement to a rulebook (Agreement → agree-
mentR→ Rulebook).
11.9 Endorsement
The predicate Endorsement was specified in Section 7.8. The class and its properties are as
follows.
13The symbol→ is used here to indicate a link, not an implication.
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• The class te:Endorsement is defined to be a subclass of te:TemporalRelation. A specific
endorsement is expressed as an individual of the te:Endorsement class.
• The object property te:pEndorsement links a participant to an endorsement individual
(Participant → te:pEndorsement → te:Endorsement).
• The endorsement individual is linked to a rulebook by the object property te:endorsementR
(te:Endorsement → te:endorsementR → Rulebook).
• The object property te:pEndorsedBy is the inverse of te:pEndorsement.
11.10 Enforcement
The predicate Enforcement was specified in Section 7.9. The class and its properties are as
follows.
• The te:Enforcement class is defined to be a subclass of te:TemporalRelation.
• The object property te:pEnforcement relates a participant to an enforcement individual
(te:Participant → te:pEnforcement → te:Enforcement).
• The enforcement individual is related to a rulebook by the object property te:enforcementR
(Enforcement → te:enforcementR→ te:Rulebook).
• The object property te:pEnforcedBy is the inverse of te:pEnforcement.
11.11 Attestations
11.11.1 Attestation
The predicate Attestation was defined in Section 7.4. It has the form Attestation(aid , T), where
• aid represents the actor that issued the attestation, and
• T is a triple (subject, attribute, value) where
– subject identifies the actor that is the subject of the attestation,
– attribute specifies the attribute that is attested by the issuer aid about the subject,
and
– value contains the value of the attribute.
The class te:Attestation is defined as a subclass of te:TemporalRelation. Each component
of the triple T is implemented as a class and its properties. The issuer aid is implemented as
provenance. Time and commitment marks are not implemented.
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11.11.2 Identity attestation
Participant identification was specified in Section 7.5.3. It is implemented as the combination
of the following:
• the unique identifier, specified in Section 11.5, and
• the class te:IdentityAttestation, which allows identity attestations from different issuers
to be linked to an identifier.
The class te:IdentityAttestation is defined as a subclass of te:Attestation. Participants are
linked to individuals of this subclass by the object property pIdentityAttestation with domain
Participant and range IdentityAttestation. Each individual of the class te:IdentityAttestation is
• uniquely identified through an individual of te:ID and related to it via identifiedBy, and
• linked to the identity (te:ID) it attests via the property identityAttestationId
The issuer of an identity attestation is registered through the object property prov:wasAttributedTo.
An identity does not need to be attested to be loaded into the OWL environment.
11.11.3 Role attestation
Roles were specified in Section 7.6. Two possible approaches to role modelling are as follows.
• A role can be to modelled directly as a class, allowing participants to be members. How-
ever, a role is a participant attribute that may vary over time. Creating a role class and
making participants a member would not model the temporal aspect. A participant would
either be in a role or not.
• A role can be modelled as a subclass of te:Attestation, allowing the relation between
participants and roles to be limited in time.
The second approach was adopted for the implementation because this corresponds best to the
dynamics of the real-world, which will be reflected in instance data.
The class te:RoleAttestation expresses that a participant is attested by the issuer of the at-
testation in the role referred to by the attestation. It is defined as a subclass of te:Attestation,
which is a subclass of te:TemporalRelation.
The object properties pRoleAttestation and roleAttestationR have a similar role to those
created for identity attestation.
The roles are specified as a set of possible roles. The role class is defined by listing its
instances (AB, AS, CAB, CsSP, EnDo, EnFo, EvSP, FuSC, FuSP and TwsMo).
The issuer of a role attestation is registered through the object property prov:wasAttributedTo.
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11.11.4 Norm
As specified in Section 6.5.1, the terminology defined in ISO/IEC 17000:2020 [173] is used
for accreditation and conformity assessment. According to this standard, ‘Specified require-
ments can be stated in normative documents such as regulations, standards and technical spec-
ifications.’ To allow accreditation and conformity assessment to express such a reference to
a normative document, the class te:Norm is defined. An individual of this class represents a
norm.
• The class te:Norm is defined as a subclass of owl:Thing.
• The author of a norm is registered through the object property prov:wasAttributedTo.
• The class te:Norm has two subclasses:
– te:Standard, which specifies a standard from a recognised standards organisation.
An entity is linked to a standard through a conformance attestation. This is de-
scribed in Section 11.11.6.
– te:LegalNorm, which specifies a document from a recognised legal source. An
entity is linked to a legal norm through a legal qualification attestation. This is
described in Section 11.11.9.
• The data property te:NormURI links a norm to the URI where the norm is published.
11.11.5 Accreditation
The class te:Accreditation expresses that a participant is accredited, to the specified norm, by
the issuer14. The class and its related properties are as follows.
• The class te:Accreditation is defined to be a subclass of te:Attestation.
• The issuer of an accreditation assertion is registered through the object property prov:wasAttributedTo.
• The object property te:pAccreditation links a participant to an accreditation individual
(Participant → te:pAccreditation→ te:Accreditation).
• The accreditation individual is linked to a norm by the object property te:accreditationN
(te:Accreditation → te:accreditationN → te:Norm).
14A rulebook may specify restrictions on the issuer, e.g. it may be required that the issuer is an accreditation body.
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11.11.6 Conformance
The class te:Conformance expresses that a participant is conformity assessed, to the specified
norm, by the issuer15. The class and its related properties are as follows.
• The class te:Conformance is defined to be a subclass of te:Attestation.
• The issuer of a conformance assertion is registered through the object property prov:wasAttributedTo.
• The object property te:pConformance links a participant to a conformance individual
(Participant → te:pConformance→ te:Conformance).
• The object property te:aConformance links an attestation to a conformance individual
(Attestation→ te:aConformance → te:Conformance).
• The conformance individual is linked to a standard by the object property te:conformanceN
(te:Conformance→ te:conformanceN → te:Norm).
11.11.7 Supervision
The class te:Supervision expresses that a participant is supervised by another participant. The
class and its related properties are as follows.
• The class te:Supervision is defined to be a subclass of te:Attestation.
• The issuer of a supervision assertion is registered through the object property prov:wasAttributedTo.
• The object property te:pSupervision links a participant to a supervision individual (Par-
ticipant → te:pSupervision→ te:Supervision).
• The supervision individual is linked to a another participant by the object property te:supervisionP
(te:Supervision→ te:supervisionP→ te:Participant).
11.11.8 Registration
The class te:Registration expresses that a participant is registered in a registry. The class and
its related properties are as follows.
• The class te:Registration is defined to be a subclass of te:Attestation.
• The issuer of a registration assertion is registered through the object property prov:wasAttributedTo.
15A rulebook may specify restrictions on the issuer, e.g. the issuer may be required to be a conformity assessment
body.
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• The object property te:pRegistration links the participant that is the subject of the regis-
tration to a registration individual (Participant → te:pRegistration→ te:Registration).
• The data property te:RegisterURI links the registration to the URI where the registered
subject’s registration is published.
11.11.9 Legal qualification
The class te:LegalQualification expresses that a participant is legally qualified according to the
issuer. The class and its related properties are as follows.
• The class te:LegalQualification is defined to be a subclass of te:Attestation.
• The issuer of a legal qualification assertion is registered through the object property
prov:wasAttributedTo.
• The object property te:pLegalQualification links the participant that is the subject of
the qualification to a qualification individual (Participant → te:pLegalQualification →
te:LegalQualification).
• The qualification individual is linked to a norm by the object property te:legalQualificationN
(te:LegalQualification → te:legalQualificationN → te:Norm).
• The object property te:raLegalQualification links the role attestation that is the subject of
the qualification to a qualification individual (RoleAttestation→ te:raLegalQualification
→ te:LegalQualification).
11.11.10 Disclosure
The class te:Disclosure expresses that a participant discloses information at a location that is
specified as a URI. The class and its related properties are as follows.
• The class te:Disclosure is defined to be a subclass of te:Attestation.
• The issuer of a disclosure assertion is registered through the object property prov:wasAttributedTo.
• The object property te:pDisclosure links the participant that discloses the information to
a disclosure individual (Participant → te:pDisclosure→ te:Disclosure).
• The data property te:DisclosureURI links the disclosure to the URI where the disclosure
is published.
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11.12 Data sources
The class te:DataSource represents a source of information that can be used to bind variable
occurrences in predicates. The class and its related properties are as follows.
• The class te:DataSource is defined to be a subclass of owl:Thing.
• Properties from the provenance ontology are used to describe the class as follows.
– The entity responsible for a data source (aid) is registered through the object prop-
erty prov:wasAttributedTo.
– The location (URI) where the data source can be accessed is registered through the
object property prov:atLocation, and
– The activity performed by the responsible to make the data source available (how-
Published) is registered through the object property prov:wasGeneratedBy.
11.13 Overview
11.13.1 Classes
Figure 11.2 shows the graph of   top-level classes as represented in Protégé’s OntoGraph
explorer.
Figure 11.2: Overview of the   top-level classes.
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11.13.2 Object properties
Figure 11.3 shows the   object properties in Protégé ’s property explorer.
Figure 11.3: Overview of the   object properties.
11.13.3 Data properties
Figure 11.4 shows the   data properties in Protégé ’s property explorer.
Figure 11.4: Overview of the   data properties
11.14 Summary
This chapter described how the data model that was specified in Chapter 7 has been imple-
mented in OWL DL. The resulting ontology is available at http://www.marcsel.eu/onto/
te/te-data-model.owl. The approach to developing the implementation was described and
can be summarised as follows. The ontology was created by specifying the classes and prop-
erties that implement the predicates that were specified in Chapter 7. Where relevant, classes
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and properties from existing ontologies were reused; otherwise, new ones were defined. The
set-up of Protégé, the tool that was used as data modeller, was described, as well as how each
of the predicates were modelled. An overview of the classes and properties used was provided
as shown in the Protégé tool.
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Chapter 12
Implementation of data import and
transformation
This chapter presents an implementation of mechanisms for the transformation of
instance data, and its import into the data repository described in the previous
chapter. This includes the selection of data sources, the download of data, its
transformation into the format required by the   data model, and the addition
of provenance information. A description is also provided of how the transformed
data was integrated and loaded into a graph database.
12.1 Introduction
The first step in demonstrating the practical feasibility of the proposed solution involved the
implementation of the data model (see Chapter 11). To be of practical use, the evaluation
functions must have access to relevant data, the issue addressed in this chapter.
Authoritative data sources were selected that provide instance data corresponding to the
predicates specified in Chapter 11. Data was downloaded from those sources, transformed,
tagged with provenance information, integrated and loaded in a local repository.
An implementation of this process is described in this chapter. The implementation includes
all the steps from selection to downloading, but is partial because it is limited in terms of the
data sources that were used and the amount of data that was downloaded. The remainder of the
chapter is structured as follows
• Section 12.2 presents the approach that was used for selection, download, transformation
and integration of data, and Section 12.3 describes the technical set-up.
• Section 12.4 covers the creation of data sources for organisations.
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• Section 12.5 covers the creation of trustworthinessmonitors and evidence service providers
on the basis of public trusted lists.
• Section 12.6 covers the creation of an additional trustworthiness monitor and of identity
and role attestations on the basis of the public European List of Trusted Lists.
• Section 12.7 covers the creation of accreditation bodies and conformity assessment bod-
ies.
• Section 12.8 covers the creation and attestation of participants based on norms. This
covers the use of legislation and standards.
• Section 12.9 covers the creation and attestation of organisations based on public company
data.
• Sections 12.10 and 12.11 cover endorser and enforcer.
• Sections 12.12, 12.13 and 12.14 cover the creation of natural persons.
• Section 12.15 describes additional self-attestations.
• Section 12.16 covers data integration. It describes how the files created in the preceding
sections were combined to form a single file, suitable for loading into a semantic web
tool.
A summary is provided in Section 12.17.
12.2 Approach
To create the partial implementation, the following steps were performed for the data elements
that represent predicates stored in the repository, each of which is examined in greater detail
immediately below:
• selection of authoritative data sources that provide instance data corresponding to the
predicates specified in the data model;
• data download from those sources;
• data transformation and tagging with provenance information;
• data loading into a local GraphDB repository.
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12.2.1 Selection of data sources
12.2.1.1 Data source selection criteria
There are many data sources that contain data related to one or more predicates. Requirement
IR7 ‘Obtaining credible data’ is relevant to the selection of sources. It is specified in Section
5.5.7 in the following way.
As a participant in an electronic ecosystem I can understand the origin and the type of data
that is used in the evaluation of trustworthiness of participants, so that I can claim the outcome
of the trustworthiness evaluation is based on credible data.
To meet this requirement, Section 10.2.3.1 gives the following criteria for a data source and
its data.
• The data source must make relevant data available, i.e. data specified in the data model.
This means that the data from the data source must be mappable to one or more predicates
specified in the   data model.
• The data source must be authoritative for this data. Where possible data sources that are
legally qualified as authoritative for the provided information must be used.
• The data must include a description of its meaning.
• The data must be available in a machine readable format. If the data is also available in
a human readable format, this is additionally valuable.
12.2.2 Data download
There are at least two ways to make data available to the evaluation algorithms:
• via downloading, and
• via on-line access.
The implementation we describe here uses downloading. The data downloading step is
represented as the building block ‘Extract and transform’ in Figure 10.1. The data must be
extracted from the data sources without modification. The downloaded data is transformed
according the   data model and provenance information is added. Possible implementations
using on-line access are left for further research.
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12.2.3 Data transformation and tagging
The information in the sources we used is not structured according to the data model described
in Chapter 11. It was therefore necessary to transform the data into the format of the   data
model. Themapping from data source information to the   data model and the transformation
is described below. Provenance information about data source and transformation logic was
added as described in Section D.2.2.2. All the programs used to perform data transformation
are available online1.
12.2.4 Data loading
After transformation, the data was loaded without modification into a repository, making it
available to the evaluation functions.
12.3 Set-up
There was no specific set-up required for data source selection as it involved manual inspection
of the candidate data sources and application of the selection criteria. For the selected data
sources, the download was performed in the simplest way possible. This is described individu-




An Eclipse development environment was used, as described in Section 10.3.3. Background to
the implementation of the transformations is provided in Appendix F.6.
12.3.1.2 Location
The implementation source and data files were stored locally on a Personal Computer in an
Eclipse project under the name TI (TE Integration). The following subdirectories were used.
• /xml contains the downloaded XML input files.
• /pdf contains the downloaded PDF input files.
• /xsl contains the XSL transformation programs.
1They can be accessed at http://www.marcsel.eu/ti/xsl/NAME.xsl where NAME should be replaced
with the name of the desired transformation
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• /src contains the source code of the Java programs that execute the transformations.
• /log contains the log files of the executions.
• /rdf contains the resulting RDF files.
12.3.2 Loading
12.3.2.1 Components
The transformed data was loaded into a GraphDB database following the relevant documen-
tation [266]. A repository was created with OWL Max2 as its rule-set. The base url http:
//www.marcsel.eu/onto/te/ was specified. Data was loaded into the repository using the
import RDF function. Loaded data can be used in two ways.
• It can be interacted with via the GraphDB Workbench. This allows interactive creation
and execution of queries, as well as storage and retrieval of queries and their results.
• It can be interacted with programmatically, using a program that implements a RDF4J3
client. RDF4J is an open source Java framework for working with RDF data. It allows
parsing, storing, inferencing and querying of such data through an API that connects with
a SPARQL endpoint.
The GraphDBWorkbench was used to develop and execute all queries. Whilst not the approach
adopted, RDF4J appears to offer helpful features for accessing and integrating data sources
online; its use remains an area for possible future research.
12.3.2.2 Naming conflicts
The data that resulted from the transformations was analysed both in Protégé and in GraphDB.
There were some minor differences as to how IRIs were interpreted by the tools’ parsers, occa-
sionally resulting in errors.
The cause of these errors was usually the use of blanks or underscores in IRIs. This was
because many IRIs were generated from public data sources. In those cases, blanks and under-
scores were replaced by dashes (‘-’).
12.4 Data sources for organisations
A range of public data sources were considered for use, and those adopted are listed below.
We restrict our attention here to data sources for organisations (data sources for natural person
2Introduced in Section 10.3.4.1
3See https://rdf4j.org/
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were addressed in Section 12.12). Data sources should preferably be authentic sources for
the information they provide. The role of an authentic source is described in Section 6.5.1
as a participant that holds a mandate to register and validate information about entities. This
information, or part thereof, is then made available under its responsibility. Authentic sources
have been established in a variety of ways.
Two obvious possibilities for sourcing organisation data, namely the Domain Name System
(DNS) and TLS certificates were considered but rejected, as in neither case do they relate di-
rectly to organisations (the DNS provides unique names for websites on the Internet, and TLS
certificates relate to specific domains which, although they may belong to an organisation, do
not correspond to the organisation as a whole).
An initial review of further potential data sources led to the following candidates:
• the Trusted Lists that were implemented as part of the eIDAS Regulation [103] imple-
mentation;
• the List of Trusted Lists that was implemented for the same purpose;
• membership lists of the EuropeanAccreditation association and the national accreditation
organisations;
• company data published by the Global Legal Entity Identifier Foundation (GLEIF) and
other officially mandated organisations such as Central Banks;
• self-published information.
For each candidate data source, the possible data items that could bemapped onto predicates
were identified, and the selection criteria specified in Section 12.2.1 were applied. Where this
application led to the conclusion that the use of the data source was justified, a download and
transformation mechanism was established. This process is next described for each individual
data source.
12.5 Organisations based on TL data
The European trusted lists were established as part of the implementation of the eIDAS Regu-
lation [103], which included the organisation of a European scheme of trusted lists4 published
by national Trusted List Scheme Operators (TLSOs). Background information on, and a de-
scription of, the technical aspects of trusted lists are provided in appendix F.
4Following common practice, we use the terms trusted list and trust list interchangeably. The defining specifi-
cation, ETSI TS 119 612 [89] uses the term ‘Trusted Lists’, and this is also used here.
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12.5.1 Mapping
Since the TL information is not available in the   data model format, a transformation is
required. Therefore a mapping is necessary between the   data model and the description of
the trusted list.
• For the   data model, the description from Chapter 7 was used.
• For the trusted list information, the description from ETSI TS 119 612 [89] was used.
A comparison of these descriptions led to the conclusion that the following mapping can
be used.
• The TLSO which issued the trusted list, identified by <tsl:SchemeOperatorName>), cor-
responds to a trustworthiness monitor in the   data model. The ‘Quality and Safety’
department of the Belgian Federal Public Service (FPS) Economy, SMEs, Self-employed
and Energy is an example of a Belgian TLSO.
• The TSP that delivers trust services, identified by <tsl:TrustServiceProvider>), corre-
sponds to an evidence service provider in the   data model.
12.5.2 Trusted lists as data sources
12.5.2.1 Application of selection criteria
As shown in Table 12.1, trusted lists meet the selection criteria defined in Section 12.2.1. They
are relevant data sources for trustworthiness monitor and evidence service provider predicates.
To adhere to the requirements IR2 (transparency) and IR7 (data source credibility) the prove-
nance of the information used to bind variable occurrencesmust be included. As a consequence,
all usage of a TL as data source needs to refer to the original source.   data sources that in-
clude a link to the original TL source were created for this purpose. For the implementation,
trusted lists issued by Belgium, Spain and the UK were used as data sources.
12.5.2.2 Transformation approach
Trusted lists are published in two formats, PDF and XML. Neither format can be loaded into the
GraphDB repository because it requires use of a semantic web format such as OWL, in a syntax
such as XML/RDF. Of the two formats, the XML version appears to be simplest to transform.
Three common transformation approaches are compared in Appendix F.5:
• XSLT and XPath,
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Selection criteria Description
Authoritative source TLs are provided by a Competent Authority of a Mem-
ber State of the EU
Transparency TLs are published by the European Commission in
their List of Trusted Lists, available at https://ec.
europa.eu/tools/lotl/eu-lotl.xml
Description of meaning avail-
able
The TLs themselves and all data elements within them
are described in ETSI TS 119 612 [89]
Machine readable/human read-
able
TLs are published in machine readable XML Schema
Description (XSD) format and in PDF format
Mapping possibility Data elements can be mapped via XSLT
Respect for GDPR [101] There is no personal information in TLs
Table 12.1: Selection criteria for data sources applied to Trusted Lists
• Jena, and
• SPIN.
On the basis of this comparison, the combination of XSLT and XPath was selected.
12.5.2.3 Trusted list download and transformation
For each of the selected trusted lists, a copy of the machine-readable version was downloaded
from the location where it is published by the issuing TLSO. The locations were verified against
the locations included in the LOTL and found to match.
For each downloaded trusted list, a TL2RDF_XX_DataSource_TL_v301.xsl program5 was
developed to create a   framework data source on the basis of a trusted list file. The program
combines   data model predicates and provenance assertions. The   data model predicates
describe the data source. The following assertions describe its provenance:
• the activity (prov:Activity) that created the data source, including the time when the ac-
tivity was performed (prov:startedAtTime and prov:endedAtTime),
• the original source (prov:wasDerivedFrom) of the data, i.e. the URI of the trusted list,
• the agent to which the creation of the data source can be attributed, for which a refer-
ence to http://www.marcsel.eu/onto/ti was used, referring to the   framework’s
software6
5‘XX’ is a placeholder for the country identifier
6The ‘ti’ refers to the ‘  framework integration’ software.
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The XSL program performs the following two steps.
• The first step is the creation of the Activity individual that generates the data source. This
involves the following sub-steps:
– the creation of a resource (‘rdf:about’) with hardcoded name based on the xsl pro-
gram and its execution date, i.e.
http://www.marcsel.eu/ti/xsl/TL2RDF_BE_DataSource_TL_v301.xsl.2021-01-06,




• The second step is the creation of the DataSource individual, involving:
– the creation of a resource with a hardcoded name based on the URI from where the
trusted list file was originally obtained,
– casting into the type of te:DataSource,
– addition of prov:wasDerivedFrom the trusted list URI, where the TLSO published
the TL,
– addition of prov:wasAttributedTo http://www.marcsel.eu/onto/ti,
– addition of prov:wasGeneratedBy using the activity which was created in the first
step.
Each program was executed to create a corresponding DataSource individual. As an exam-
ple, the source code of the TL2RDF_BE_DataSource_TL transformation and the corresponding
Java driver program can be found in Listings K.1 and K.2. The output of the transformations
was integrated into the database load file, as described in Section 12.16.
12.5.3 Creation of trustworthiness monitor
12.5.3.1 Input
The individual TLs were downloaded in XML format from the location where they are pub-
lished by the issuing TLSO. The locations were verified against the locations included in the
LOTL7 and found to match.
7At the following locations:
• Belgium: https://tsl.belgium.be/tsl-be.xml,
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12.5.3.2 Transformation and output
The transformation TL2RDF_XX_TwsMo creates a trustworthiness monitor individual in RD-
F/XMLon the basis of a trusted list, issued by a TLSO, identified by the<tsl:SchemeOperatorName>
element. As described in Section 10.3.3, an Eclipse development environment was used; tech-
nical background is provided in Appendix F.6. Provenance was added to each element in the
following way.
• The property prov:wasDerivedFrom was added, with value the URI where the TLSO
published the TL.
• The property prov:wasAttributedTo was added, with value the name of the TLSO that
issued the TL.
• The property prov:wasGeneratedBywas added, with value the name of the XSL program
that created the RDF/XML data source individual.
A transformation involves the following steps.
• Creation of identity individuals for the TwsMo, the TwoMo attestations, and the prove-
nance of the TwsMo, its identity attestation, and its attestation as a TwsMo.
• Creation of attestation individuals with provenance for identity and role attestations.
• Creation of the TwsMo individual with provenance on the basis of the TL TLSO and with
the allocation of the individual’s identity and role attestations.
As an example, the source code of the TL2RDF_BE_TwsMo_TL_v301.xsl transformation
can be found in Listing K.3.
The output of the transformations was saved in individual RDF files. These files were
integrated into the database load file as described in Section 12.16.
12.5.4 Creation of evidence service providers
12.5.4.1 Input
The input files that were used for the creation of trustworthiness monitors, as described in
Section 12.5.3, were also used to create evidence service providers.
• Spain: https://sede.minetur.gob.es/Prestadores/TSL/TSL.xml,
• United Kingdom: https://www.tscheme.org/sites/default/files/tsl-uk0022signed.xml
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12.5.4.2 Transformation functionality
The transformation TL2RDF_XX_EvSP creates evidence service provider individuals in RD-
F/XMLon the basis of a trusted list, issued by a TLSO, identified by the<tsl:SchemeOperatorName>
element. Provenance was added to each element in the following way.
• The property prov:wasDerivedFrom was added, with value the URI where the TLSO
published the TL.
• The property prov:wasAttributedTo was added, with value the name of the TLSO that
issued the TL. The assertions added to the database are about EvSPs and issued by the
TLSO (i.e. other-attested, not self-attested).
• The property prov:wasGeneratedBywas added, with value the name of the XSL program
that created the RDF/XML data source individual.
The transformation involves the following steps:
• creation of identity individuals for the EvSP individuals and their identity and role attes-
tations, with provenance;
• creation of identity and role attestations individuals, with provenance;
• creation of the EvSP individuals, with provenance.
The outputs of the transformations were saved in the corresponding RDF files. These files
were integrated into the database load file as described in Section 12.16.
12.6 Organisations based on LOTL Data
An introduction to the LOTL is provided in Appendix G.
12.6.1 Mapping
As the LOTL is defined as a trusted list, the mapping described in Section 12.5.1 applies. Thus
the following mapping can be used.
• The LOTL identifies the European Commission as its issuing TLSO, which corresponds
to a trustworthiness monitor. This can be used to create a self-attested identity and role
attestation about the European Commission as trustworthiness monitor.
• The LOTL includes descriptions of national Trusted List SchemeOperators, which corre-
spond to trustworthinessmonitors. This can be used to create identity and role attestations
about these trustworthiness monitors, issued by the European Commission.
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Selection criteria Description
Authoritative source The LOTL is provided by the European Com-
mission and a description of the information
for which it is authoritative is published in the
Official Journal8
Transparency Further to the publication of its description
in the Official Journal, the LOTL itself is
publicly available at https://ec.europa.
eu/information_society/policy/
esignature/trusted-list/tl-mp.xml
Description of meaning available LOTL has the format and meaning of TL as
described in ETSI specification, both in natu-
ral language and in XML Schema Description
(XSD)
Machine readable/human readable The LOTL is published in XML and PDF for-
mats
Mapping possibility Can be mapped via XSLT
Respect for GDPR [101] There is no personal information in TLs
Table 12.2: Selection criteria for data sources applied to List of Trusted Lists
12.6.2 List of trusted lists as data source
12.6.2.1 Application of selection criteria
The list of trusted lists (LOTL) is a relevant data source for attestation predicates about trust-
worthiness monitors. As shown in Table 12.2, the LOTL meets the selection criteria defined in
Section 12.2.1.
To adhere to requirements IR2 (transparency) and IR7 (data source credibility), the prove-
nance of the information used to bind variable occurrencesmust be included. As a consequence,
all usage of the LOTL as a data source needs to refer to the original source. A   data source
that include a link to the original LOTL source was created for this purpose.
12.6.2.2 Transformation approach
The approach described in Section 12.5.2.2 is also used for the list of trusted lists.
12.6.2.3 LOTL download and transformation
A copy of the LOTL was downloaded in the same way as a trusted list, as described in Sec-
tion 12.5.2.3. The location is published by the European Commission9. A program (called
9https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/eu-trusted-lists
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TL2RDF_DataSource_LOTL_v301.xsl) was developed that contains the same steps as those
described for the trusted list program, described in Section 12.5.2.3. The main differences to
the trusted list program involved changes to names of data sources, resources, and attribute
types and properties.
12.6.3 Creation of EC trustworthiness monitor
12.6.3.1 Input
The LOTL was downloaded in XML format from the location10 where it is published by the
European Commission, its issuing TLSO.
12.6.3.2 Transformation and output
The transformation TL2RDF_LOTL_1_v301.xsl creates a trustworthiness monitor individual
on the basis of the LOTL. The issuing TLSO is identified by the <tsl:SchemeOperatorName>
element. This TLSO, i.e. the European Commission, signs the LOTL. Provenance was added
as described in Section 12.5.3.2. The transformation involves the following steps:
• creation of identities:
– creation of an identity for the European Commission (EC) individual;
– creation of an identity for the EC identity self-attestation;
– creation of an identity for the EC role self-attestation.
• Attestations:
– creation of an EC identity self-attestation;
– creation of an EC role self-attestation,
• Creation of the EC individual.
The XSL transformation program is available online11. The output of the transformation
was saved to the corresponding RDF file. This file was integrated into the database load file as
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12.6.4 Creation of identity and role attestations
12.6.4.1 Input
The input file described in Section 12.6.3 was used for the creation of role and identity attesta-
tions.
Note that creating the identity attestations does not create the actual individual, nor does it
allocate the properties to these individuals. That is done in the respective XSLs that create the
evidence service provider individuals.
12.6.4.2 Transformation and output
The transformation TL2RDF_LOTL_2_v301.xsl creates identity and role attestations on the ba-
sis of the LOTL. Provenance was added as described in Section 12.5.3.2. The transformation
involves the following steps:
• creation of identifiers for identity and role attestations,
• creation of identity and role attestation with EC as issuer,
• relating the attestations to their own identities,
• relating the attestations to the identities they attest.
The output of the transformation was saved in the corresponding RDF file. This file was
integrated into the database load file as described in Section 12.16.
12.7 Attestations based on accreditation
12.7.1 Mapping
12.7.1.1 Available data
There are at least two types of organisations that provide accreditation:
• National Accreditation Bodies (NABs), mutually recognising one-another through bodies
such as the European co-operation for Accreditation (EA), and
• Membership-based organisations such as the Kantara Initiative.
National Accreditation Bodies (NABs) and the European co-operation for Accreditation
(EA) publish information about officially-recognised accreditation bodies. Those organisations
publish information about their credentials for operating as accreditation bodies, as well as
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which conformity assessment bodies (CABs) they recognise. In the case of NABs, there is a
national law in each country that specifies the NAB’s role.
Organisations such as the Kantara Initiative12 are recognised by their members for their
organisation of an accreditation scheme. They operation is characterised by policies, proce-
dures and ByLaws. Members confirm their acceptance thereof when signing the membership
agreement.
A selective overview of the organisation of accreditation is provided in Appendix H.
12.7.1.2 Used mapping
The role of accreditation body and conformity assessment body in the   framework was de-
scribed in Section 6.5.1. An analysis of the available data led to the following mapping:
• NABs correspond to   data model accreditation bodies;
• NABs publish data about organisations that correspond to   data model conformity
assessment bodies.
The EA facilitates mutual recognition between the NABs, and is an additional source of
data about them.
12.7.2 Accreditation data as data source
12.7.2.1 Application of selection criteria
As described in Table 12.3, the accreditation data meet the selection criteria defined in Section
12.2.1. The main points can be summarised in the following way.
• Accreditation data are relevant data sources for accreditation body and conformity as-
sessment body predicates.
• NABs are legally appointed in their role. Furthermore the EA publishes an authoritative
list of NABs.
• NABs publish authoritative lists of conformity assessment bodies.
• As the landscape of NABs is already broad, it was decided to limit the scope for the
implementation to officially appointed NABs. Accreditation organised by membership
organisations is left for further research.
12The Kantara Initiative Inc is a US registered 501(c) (6) tax exempt non-profit Industry Association with the
goal of promoting interoperable trust.
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Selection criteria Description
Authoritative source The NABs are authoritative because they are the
competent and legally recognised authorities for
accreditation within their jurisdiction.
The EA is authoritative on the basis of mutual
recognition by the NABs.
Transparency The NABs and the EA publish data about their
competence, their operating procedures and the
standards they apply.
Description of meaning available The terminology used in the publications is plain
and understandable.
The terminology used by NABs and the EA is
based on the ISO/IEC 17011:2017 [174].
Machine readable/human readable The information is published on web pages in
HTML and in publicly available documents in
PDF format
Mapping possibility Data elements can be mapped manually
Respect for GDPR [101] No personal information is published
Table 12.3: Selection criteria for data sources applied to accreditation body data
To adhere to requirements IR2 (transparency) and IR7 (data source credibility), the prove-
nance of the information used to bind variable occurrences was included. As a consequence,
all usage of accreditation data as data source can refer to the original source.   data sources
that include a link to the original source were created for this purpose. For the implementation,
the NABs of Belgium, Spain and the UK were used, as well as the EA.
12.7.2.2 Creation of the data sources
As data is published in web pages and in PDF documents, either dedicated transformations must
be developed or the OWL statements must be created manually. As the layouts of the web pages
and the documents are not standardised, it was decided to manually create OWL statements on
the basis of the publicly available information.
It was decided not to download the public information but to refer to the on-line information,
and to manually create   data sources and AB and NAB statements with references to this on-
line information. The following data sourceswere created, containing the information described
in Section 12.5.2.3.
• To use the Belgian NAB as a data source, the OWL file PDF2RDF-DataSource-BELAC-
v301.rdf was created. It uses the on-line Royal Decree13 that established BELAC as name
13https://economie.fgov.be/sites/default/files/Files/Publications/files/Belac-NL/
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for the data source.
• To use theUnitedKingdom’sNAB as a data source, theOWLfilePDF2RDF-DataSource-
UKAS-v301.rdf was created. It uses the on-line Accreditation Regulations 200914 that
established the UKAS organisation as name for the data source.
• To use the Spanish NAB as a data source, the OWL file PDF2RDF-DataSource-ENAC-
v301.rdf was created. It uses the on-line Royal Decree15 that established the ENAC
organisation as name for the data source.
• To use the EA as a data source, the OWL file PDF2RDF-DataSource-EA-v301.rdf was
created. It uses the on-line Regulation16 that appointed the EA in its role as name for the
data source.
As these data source individuals were created manually as part of the implementation, they
were attributed to http://www.marcsel.eu/onto/ti.
12.7.3 Creation of accreditation bodies
12.7.3.1 Using NAB data
As an example, we next describe how BELAC is created as a   data model AB. A query on
the BELAC website identified the legal act17 which established the organisation. The imple-
mentation of the te:Norm that models this act was described in Section 12.8.4. To create the
Belgian NAB as a   data model AB, the file PDF2RDF-AB-BE-BELAC-v301.rdf was cre-
ated. This was done in a similar way to that described in Section 12.5.3, and can be summarised
as follows.
• The URI of the on-line Royal Decree18 that established BELAC was used to refer to the
data source on which the AB individual and its attestations are based.
• Identifiers for the BE-BELAC individual and its identity, role and legal attestations were
created.









19At https://economie.fgov.be/nl/themas/kwaliteit-veiligheid/accreditatie BELAC is de-
clared as part of the Federal Public Service Economy.
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– The AB role was justified on the basis of the information published by the data
source20.
• The BE-BELAC individual was created and cast into the types org:Organization and
prov:Organization, and linked to its identity, role and legal qualification attestations. It
was created manually as part of the implementation. As a consequence it was attributed
to http://www.marcsel.eu/onto/ti.
In a similar way, individuals that implement the French and UK accreditation bodies were
created. The files PDF2RDF-AB-BE-BELAC-v301.rdf, PDF2RDF-AB-FR-COFRAC-v301.rdf,
PDF2RDF-AB-UK-UKAS-v301.rdf andDBLN.owlwere integrated into the database load file as
described in Section 12.16. Figure 12.1 shows the BELAC accreditation body and its properties
as displayed by the explorer utility of GraphDB.
Figure 12.1: BELAC accreditation body and its properties
12.7.3.2 Using EA data
Identity and role attestations can be created on the basis of the data provided by the EA21.
EA-based attestations can be created following a similar approach to that used for NAB-based
20At https://economie.fgov.be/sites/default/files/Files/Publications/files/Belac-NL/
1-01-NL.pdf BELAC is declared as accreditation body.
21https://european-accreditation.org/ea-members/directory-of-ea-members-and-mla-signatories/
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attestations.
12.7.4 Creation of conformity assessment bodies
Accreditation data from three NABs was used to create CABs:
• BELAC, the Belgian Accreditation Body,
• COFRAC, the French Accreditation Body, and
• UKAS, the United Kingdom Accreditation Body,
12.7.4.1 BELAC derived CABs
The accreditation data used to create CAB individuals needs to describe the CABs and for which
standards they are accredited, i.e. standards to which they are allowed to assess the conformance
of their clients.
To obtain this information, the BELAC website was queried22 by specifying ‘Information
Technology’ as product or service; it responded that two entities were accredited as CAB for
‘ISO/IEC 2700123’:
• VINCOTTE SA/NV, and
• KPMG CERTIFICATION bv.
For both entities the provided list included the same standards:
• ISO/IEC 27001:2013 [177],
• ISO/IEC 27006:2015 [178], and
• ISO/IEC 17021-1:2015 [175].
For each standard an OWL individual of type te:Standard was created in the fileDBLN.owl.
For VINCOTTE SA/NV and KPMG CERTIFICATION bv, individuals of the type CAB were
created in the file PDF2RDF-BELAC-CABs-v301.rdf. This includes the statements described in
Section 12.5.3 for the inclusion of provenance and the creation of the CAB individuals, which
can be summarised in the following way.
22https://economie.fgov.be/nl/themas/kwaliteit-veiligheid/accreditatie-belac/
geaccrediteerde-instellingen/certificatie-instellingen-van-2
23The version of the standardwas notmentioned, but it wasmentioned on the electronic document that is displayed
on the website. This document was downloaded to local storage as evidence.
278
12.7. Attestations based on accreditation 12. Implementation of data import and transformation
• The URI of the on-line Royal Decree24 that established BELAC was used to refer to the
data source on which the CAB individuals and their attestations are based.
• Identifiers for the CAB individuals accredited by BELAC, and their identity, role and
accreditation attestations were created.
• The CAB individuals accredited by BELAC, and their identity, role and accreditation
attestations were created and linked to their identifiers.
– The CAB identity attestation was justified on the basis of the information published
by BELAC25, to whom it was attributed.
– The CAB role attestation was justified on the basis of the information published by
BELAC, to whom it was attributed.
• TheCAB individuals were defined and cast into the types org:Organization and prov:Organization.
They were linked to their identity, role and accreditation attestations. The CAB individ-
uals was attributed to BELAC.
The filesPDF2RDF-BELAC-CABs-v301.rdf andDBLN.owlwere integrated into the database
load file as described in Section 12.16.
12.7.4.2 COFRAC derived CABs
The approach described in the preceding section was again followed to create CABs that are
accredited by COFRAC.
The COFRACwebsite was queried26 by specifying ‘Information Technology’ as product or
service; it responded that 24 entities were accredited in this domain. A query for ‘Information
Security’ returned 26 entities. For the implementation of the thesis, one entity was used: ‘LA
SECURITE DES TECHNOLOGIES DE L’INFORMATION LSTI SAS’. Its accreditation27
statement lists a series of norms including:
• ETSI standards including ETSI EN 319 401 [90], ETSI EN 319 403 [88], ETSI EN 319
411-1 [92] and -2 [94], ETSI EN 319 421 [96],
• the standard ILNAS/PSCQ/Pr001 ’Supervision of Qualified Trust Service Providers (QT-
SPs)’ [162] from Luxembourg, and
24https://economie.fgov.be/sites/default/files/Files/Publications/files/Belac-NL/
0-05-NL.pdf
25At https://economie.fgov.be/nl/themas/kwaliteit-veiligheid/accreditatie BELAC is de-
clared as part of the Federal Public Service Economy.
26https://tools.cofrac.fr/fr/easysearch/index.php, queried on 7 February 2021
27https://tools.cofrac.fr/annexes/sect5/5-0546.pdf, queried on 7 February 2021
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• specific eIDAS Regulation [103] articles including Art. 5(1), Art. 13(2), Art. 15, Art.
19(1), Art. 19(2), Art. 24(2) etc.
For the ETSI standards mentioned above, an OWL individual of the type te:Standard was
created in the fileDBLN.owl. For ‘LASECURITEDESTECHNOLOGIESDEL’INFORMATION
LSTI SAS’ an individual of the type CAB was created in the file PDF2RDF-COFRAC-CABs-
v301.rdf. This includes the statements described in Section 12.5.3 for the inclusion of prove-
nance.
The filesPDF2RDF-COFRAC-CABs-v301.rdf andDBLN.owlwere integrated into the database
load file as described in Section 12.16.
12.7.4.3 UKAS derived CABs
The approach described in the preceding sectionwas followed to create CABs that are accredited
by UKAS. The UKAS website was queried28 for the accreditation of the companies identified
by tScheme as assessors. For the implementation of the thesis, three entities were used.
• Lloyd’s Register,
• KPMG LLP, and
• KPMG Audit Plc.
For each assessor, an individual of the type CAB was created in the file PDF2RDF-UKAS-
CABs-v301.rdf. This includes the statements described in Section 12.5.3 for the inclusion of
provenance. KPMG Audit Plc as identified by UKAS29 could not be found in the UK com-
pany register 30. As a consequence, the provenance attribute prov:wasDerivedFrom was not
allocated.
The filesPDF2RDF-UKAS-CABs-v301.rdf andDBLN.owlwere integrated into the database
load file as described in Section 12.16.
12.7.5 Creation of evidence service providers
As a consequence of the Brexit, see Section 2.2.3.2, the United Kingdom’s approach for estab-
lishing evidence service providers is independent of eIDAS. To demonstrate how this approach
fits in the proposed framework, an evidence service provider from the United Kingdom has
been implemented.
28https://www.ukas.com/find-an-organisation/, queried on 22 February 2021
29KPMG Audit Plc, One Snowhill Snowhill Queensway Birmingham B4 6GH United Kingdom
30https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/
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The company Secure Meters Limited operates a PKI service for smart meters. On the basis
of the tScheme service description thereof, an evidence service provider was created using the
name ‘SMETS1 PKI Service from SML’ in the file PDF2RDF-UK-EvSP-tScheme-v301.rdf.
This file was integrated into the database load file as described in Section 12.16.
12.8 Attestations based on norms
Norms were introduced in Section 11.11.4, which specified the class te:Norm, with the sub-
classes te:LegalNorm and te:Standard.
12.8.1 Mapping
12.8.1.1 Available data
Various sources provide information regarding legal norms. This includes state gazettes, official
journals and ad-hoc publications by legal entities. Other sources provide information regarding
standards. These include the ISO and the ETSI.
12.8.1.2 Used mapping
The role of authentic source in the   framework was described in Section 6.5.1. An analysis
of the available data led to the conclusion that the mapping had to be done on a case-by-case
basis.
12.8.2 Norms as data source
12.8.2.1 Application of selection criteria
As described in Table 12.4, norms have the potential to meet the selection criteria defined in
Section 12.2.1. Selective norms that meet the selection criteria have been used for this imple-
mentation.
12.8.3 Approach for creation of norms
As norm data is published on web pages and in PDF documents, either dedicated transforma-
tions must be developed, or the OWL statements must be created manually. As the layouts of
the web pages and the documents are not standardised, it was decided:
• to manually create OWL statements on the basis of the publicly available information,
and
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Selection criteria Description
Authoritative source The state gazettes, official journals and
selected ad-hoc publications are authorita-
tive because they are the legally recognised
sources for legal qualifications within their
jurisdiction. A legal norm is authoritative
within its jurisdiction. A standard is author-
itative for those that accept to comply with it.
Transparency Such data is published on the website of its
publisher.
Description of meaning available The terminology does contain law jargon
and/or technical jargon.
Machine readable/human readable Norm information is published on web pages
in HTML and in publicly available documents
in PDF format.
Mapping possibility Data elements can be mapped manually.
Respect for GDPR [101] No personal information is published.
Table 12.4: Selection criteria for data sources applied to accreditation body data
• not to download the public information but to refer to the on-line information.
A URI was used to refer to the original source. For legislation, the European Legislation
Identifier (ELI31) was used to refer to the legal source where possible. For standards, the URI
that refers to the standard was used. All norms were attributed to the entity that published it.
12.8.4 Creation of legal norms
The following documents were used to create norms of the type te:LegalNorm:
• the French Royal Decree that established the COFRAC organisation as an accreditation
body,
• the Belgian Royal Decree that established the BELAC organisation as an accreditation
body,
• the Belgian Law that established the National Register of Natural persons (NRN) organ-
isation as an authentic source,
31The ELI is a system to make legislation available on-line in a standardised format, https://eur-lex.
europa.eu/eli-register/about.html
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• the Certipost CitizenCA Certification Practice Statement that allocates the responsibil-
ity for operating the Certification Authority which issues authentication and signature
certificates on behalf of the Belgian Federal Government, and
• the Belgian Law that established the Federal Public Service ‘Economy, SMEs, Self-
employed and Energy’ as a trustworthiness monitor (in eIDAS terminology: ‘Supervi-
sory Body’).
12.8.4.1 French Royal Decree COFRAC
A te:LegalNorm was created on the basis of the French Decree that established the COFRAC
organisation in the following way.
• A query to the COFRAC website32 identified the organisation, its founding act and its
role as accreditation body.
• The description of its role was corroborated against the Decree published in the French
State Gazette33, which confirmed the name and role of COFRAC34.
• A te:LegalNorm individual was defined, using the URI of this Decree as its te:NormURI.
12.8.4.2 Belgian Royal Decree BELAC
A te:LegalNorm was created on the basis of the Belgian Royal Decree that established the
BELAC organisation in the following way.
• Aquery on the BELACwebsite identified the legal act35 that established the organisation.
• This act was corroborated against the Belgian State Gazette36, which confirmed the name
and contents of the act37 as well as the role of BELAC as accreditation body.
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12.8.4.3 Belgian Law NRN
A te:LegalNorm was created on the basis of the Belgian Law that established the NRN organi-
sation in the following way.
• A query to the NRN website39 identified the legal act40 that established the organisation.
• This act was corroborated against the Belgian State Gazette41, which confirmed the name
and contents of the act, as well as the role of the NRN.
• A te:LegalNorm individual was defined, using theURI42 of the legal act as its te:NormURI.
12.8.4.4 Certipost CPS
A te:LegalNorm was created on the basis of the Certipost CitizenCA Certification Practice
Statement in the following way.
• A query to the Belgian eID PKI repository website43 identified the Certipost CPS44,
which allocates the responsibility for operating the Certification Authority that issues
authentication and signature certificates on behalf of the Belgian Federal Government to
Certipost, Muntcentrum, Brussels.
• This company information was corroborated against the Belgian trust list45, which con-
firmed the name and address as Certipost, Muntcentrum, Brussels, as well as the com-
pany’s role as certificate service provider.
• A te:LegalNorm individual was defined, using the URI46 of the CPS as its te:NormURI.
12.8.4.5 FPS Economy
A te:LegalNorm was created on the basis of the Belgian law that established the Federal Public
Service ‘Economy, SMEs, Self-employed and Energy’ as a trustworthiness monitor (in eIDAS
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• A query to the website47 of the Federal Public Service ‘Economy, SMEs, Self-employed
and Energy’ identified the law48 which allocates the responsibility for supervision of
eIDAS trust services to itself.
• This information was corroborated against two sources:
– the European list of trust lists49, which confirmed the name and address of the Bel-
gian supervisory body to be ‘FPS Economy, SMEs, Self-employed and Energy -
Quality and Safety’;
– the law50, that allocates the responsibility for supervision to ‘FPS Economy, SMEs,
Self-employed and Energy’ in Chapter 2, Art. 2 (Section 16).
• A te:LegalNorm individual was defined, using the URI51 of the law as its te:NormURI.
Each legal norm was implemented as an OWL individual in the DBLN.owl file which was
integrated into the database load file as described in Section 12.16.
12.8.5 Creation of legal attestations
For each of the legal norms defined in the preceding section, a te:LegalQualification individual
was created and linked to the corresponding norm. The attested participants were linked to their
legal qualifications via the property te:pLegalQualification in the file DBLN.owl. This file was
integrated into the database load file as described in Section 12.16. .
12.8.6 Creation of standards
The following standards were used to create norms of the type te:Standard:
• ISO/IEC 27001:2013 [177],
• ISO/IEC 27006:2015 [178],
• ISO/IEC 17021-1:2015 [175],
• ETSI TS 119 403-2 [97],
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• ETSI EN 319 403 [88],
• ETSI EN 319 403-1 [98],
• ETSI EN 319 411-1 [92],
• ETSI EN 319 411-2 [94],
• ETSI EN 319 421 [96],
• CA Browser Forum’s ‘EV SSL Certificate Guidelines version 1.7.1’ [41].
Each standard was implemented as an OWL individual in the DBLN.owl file which was
integrated into the database load file, as described in Section 12.16.
12.8.7 Creation of conformity attestations
The CABs that were described in Sections 12.7.4.1 and 12.7.4.2 publish conformity attes-
tations as specified in Section 7.10.2. For the implementation, examples of conformity at-
testations based on publications of the CAB ‘LA SECURITE DES TECHNOLOGIES DE
L’INFORMATION LSTI SAS’ were created. The CAB lists its attestations online52, in PDF






For each EvSP, attestations and individuals were specified in PDF2RDF_FR_LSTI_EvSPs_v301.rdf.
This led to the following observations.
• Regarding British Telecom:
– British Telecom was identified by the CAB (LSTI, in their attestation letter) as
‘BRITISH TELECOMMUNICATIONS PLC BT Centre, 81 Newgate Street Lon-
don EC1A 7AJ United Kingdom’, registered under no 01800000.
52https://www.lsti-certification.fr/fr/telechargements/
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– British Telecom was identified by the TLSO (tScheme, in the UK Trusted List) as
‘BT Trust Services Helpdesk, PO Box 641 Cardiff, South Glamorgan, CF1 1YL,
UK ’, with NTRUK-1800000 as tradename.
– Hence, British Telecom was identified differently by the CAB and the TLSO, but it
was assumed the use of the registration number 1800000 refers to the same en-
tity. The conformance attestation were therefore linked to the British Telecom
TE individual that resulted from the processing of the UK TL by the program
TL2RDF_UK_EvSPs_v301.xsl.
• Regarding CertSIGN:
– CertSIGN was identified by the CAB (LSTI, in their attestation letter) as ‘Cert-
Sign, AFI Tech Park 1, Bulevardul Tudor Vladimirescu 29, Bucharest, registered
in Romania under number J40/484/2006.
– As the Romanian TLwas not processed, it did not receive a TE identifier or an EvSP
attestation.
– The conformity attestationwere therefore linked to the entity http://www.marcsel.
eu/onto/te/CertSIGN-SA, established on the basis of the CAB’s attestation let-
ter.
• Regarding Dhimyotis:
– Dhimyotis was identified by the CAB (LSTI, in their attestation letter) as ‘DHIMY-
OTIS, 20, allée de la Râperie 59650 Villeneuve d’Ascq FRANCE, 20, allée de la
Râperie 59650 Villeneuve d’Ascq -FRANCE, without registration information.
– As the French TL was not processed, it did not receive a TE identifier or an EvSP
attestation.
– The conformity attestationwere therefore linked to the entity http://www.marcsel.
eu/onto/te/Dhimyotis, established on the basis of the CAB’s attestation letter.
• Regarding E-Tugra:
– E-Tugra was identified by the CAB (LSTI, in their attestation letter) as ‘E-Tugra
Headquarter: 3 CeyhunAtufKansuCad. Gözde Plaza 130/5806520, Ankara, TURKEY’,
registered under number 53151.
– As Turkey is not a member of the European Union, there was no Turkish TL in the
European LOTL that could be processed. As a consequence, it did not receive a TE
identifier or an EvSP attestation.
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– The conformity attestationwere therefore linked to the entity http://www.marcsel.
eu/onto/te/E-Tugra, established on the basis of the CAB’s attestation letter.
• Regarding Zetes:
– Zetes was identified by the CAB (LSTI, in their attestation letter) as ‘ZETES Head-
quarter: 3 rue de Strasbourg Haren 1130 Bruxelles Belgium’ with company regis-
tration BE0408425626.
– Zetes was identified by Belgian TLSO (in https://tsl.belgium.be/tsl-be.xml) by its
address and its VAT number VATBE-0408425626. This information was used to al-
locate the TE identity attestation (te:identifiedBy http://www.marcsel.eu/onto/te/ID-
Zetes-SA-NV) to the individual http://www.marcsel.eu/onto/te/Zetes-SA-NV.
– The conformity attestationwere therefore linked to the entity http://www.marcsel.
eu/onto/te/Zetes-SA-NV that resulted from the processing of the Belgian TL by
the program TL2RDF_BE_EvSPs_v301.xsl.
The file PDF2RDF_FR_LSTI_EvSPs_v301.rdf was integrated into the database load file
as described in Section 12.16.
12.9 Attestations based on company data
12.9.1 Mapping
12.9.1.1 Available data
A range of data sources for company information were considered for use. An analysis of these
sources is provided in Appendix I. It was concluded that the company data from the Global
Legal Entities Identification Foundation (GLEIF53) that is included in FactForge54 offers the
most suitable choice for the implementation.
12.9.1.2 Used mapping
Since the GLEIF data that is accessible through FactForge is not available in the format of the
  data model, a transformation is required to map the   data model onto the ontologies used
in the FactForge GLEIF data. This was done in the following way.
• For the   data model, the description from Chapter 7 was used.
53An introduction to the GLEIF and its ontologies is provided in Appendix D.2.4
54An introduction to FactForge is provided in Appendix I.4
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• For the FactForge GLEIF data, the entities referred to by LEIs, and LEIs themselves, are
described in the FIBO ontology (see Appendix I.4.2.1) both in natural language and in
OWL.
An analysis of the use of the FIBO ontologies in FactForge’s GLEIF data is given in Ap-
pendix I.4.2. On this basis it was concluded that the following mapping can be made.
• Functional Service Providers/Consumer individuals that are legal persons can be created
on the basis of the entities included as legal persons in the GLEIF data.
• The value obtained from the LegalEntityIdentifier in the GLEIF data can be used to iden-
tify these individuals.
The implementation currently limits its use of FactForge GLEIF data to these two data
elements. How to make further use of data published according to the FIBO ontologies is left
for future research.
12.9.2 FactForge as data source
12.9.2.1 Application of selection criteria
The company data from the Global Legal Entities Identification Foundation (GLEIF) that is
included in FactForge meet the selection criteria, as shown in Table 12.5. Appendix I.3.1 pro-
vides additional information on the rationale for selection of the GLEIF data in FactForge for
this implementation.
12.9.2.2 Creation of the data source
An individual of the class te:DataSource was created for company data based on the FactForge
GLEIF data. Information can be retrieved from FactForge using its own upper-level ontology
PROTON, or using the ontologies of the included data sets. The latter approach was chosen
because it avoids an intermediary mapping (  data model ⟷ PROTON ⟷ FIBO).
FactForge makes the LEI data available in RDF format, structured according to the Finan-
cial Industry Business Ontology (FIBO56). According to the FactForge website57, the FIBO
Foundations58 and the FIBO Business Entities59 ontologies are included in FactForge. The
data source was created in two steps.
• In the first step a selection of the FactForge data was downloaded.
56described in appendix D.2.3
57http://factforge.net/, last accessed 25/1/2021
58version 14-11-30, November 2014
59version 15-02-23, February 2015
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Selection criteria Description Comment
Authoritative source LEI data is provided by LEI is-
suers (Local Operating Units, re-
fer to Appendix D.2.4.3) gov-
erned by the GLEIF (refer to Ap-
pendix D.2.4.1)
This includes the ‘Challenge LEI
data’ mechanism55 to correct er-
rors in LEI data
Transparency Available at FactForge’s pub-
lic SPARQL endpoint: http://
factforge.net/sparql
Data is available as an RDF
graph
Description of meaning avail-
able
Entities referred to by LEIs, and
LEIs themselves are described in
the GLEIF (refer to Appendix
D.2.4.3) and FIBO (refer to Ap-
pendix I.4.2.1) ontologies both
in natural language and in OWL
Machine readable LEI data is published in RD-
F/XML format
Mapping possibility Mapping is possible via XSLT
Respect for GDPR [101] There is no personal informa-
tion in LEI and related FactForge
data
Table 12.5: Selection criteria for data sources applied to LEI data
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– The SPARQL query described in Listing 12.1 selects the following data.
∗ The variable ?name selects the legal entity’s name.
∗ The variable ?identifier selects its LEI.
– The query response was saved in the local file FFLEI_20210102.xml.
• In the second step the file FF-DataSource-v301.rdf was created containing an OWL in-
dividual of the class te:DataSource. This refers to the downloaded data and indicates the
FactForge GLEIF data as its original source. This file combines   data model predi-
cates and provenance assertions.
The RDF file was integrated into the database load file as described in Section 12.16.
Listing 12.1: FactForge query to select company names and LEIs
1 # h t t p : / / f a c t f o r g e . n e t / s p a r q l
2 PREFIX r d f : <h t t p : / / www. w3 . org /1999 /02 /22 − rd f −s yn t ax −ns#>
3 PREFIX f i bo −be−l e− l p : <h t t p : / / www. omg . org / spec /EDMC−FIBO /BE / L e g a l E n t i t i e s / Lega lPe r son s />
4 PREFIX f i bo −fnd : <h t t p : / / www. omg . org / spec /EDMC−FIBO /
5 FND/ Founda t i o n s />
6 PREFIX f i bo −fnd−aap−a g t : <h t t p : / / www. omg . org / spec /
7 EDMC−FIBO /FND/ AgentsAndPeople / Agents />
8
9 SELECT ?name ? i d e n t i f i e r
10 WHERE {? i n d i v r d f : t y p e f i bo −be−l e− l p : L e g a l E n t i t y ;
11 f i bo −fnd−aap−a g t : i s I d e n t i f i e d B y ? i d e n t i f i e r ;
12 f i bo −fnd−aap−a g t : hasName ?name . } l i m i t 100000
12.9.3 Creation of Functional Service Providers/Consumers
The program FFLEI2RDF_v301.xsl was run on the downloaded file. The transformation in-
volves the following steps:
• creation of identifiers for individuals, identity attestation, and for FuSP and FuSC role
attestation (because it is assumed a legal person can at least act in both roles),
• creation of attestations,
• creation of legal person individuals, including the allocation of identity and role attesta-
tions, and enriched with provenance.
The resulting file FFLEI2RDF_v301.extract.rdf was integrated into the database load file
as described in Section 12.16.
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12.10 Endorser
12.10.1 Selection of alternatives
The role of endorser is described in Section 6.5.1 as a participant that publicly expresses ap-
proval of a specific rulebook. The endorsement attestation is specified in Section 7.8. The
role of endorser can be fulfilled by a government body, or another entity such as an industry or
end-user association. Prior to the publication of such an endorsement, the legal consequences
thereof would need to be analysed. Such details are outside of the scope of this thesis.
12.11 Enforcer
12.11.1 Selection of alternatives
The role of enforcer is described in Section 6.5.1 and the enforcement attestation is specified in
Section 7.9. Competence and authority in matters of law enforcement are complex. The eIDAS
Regulation [103] was identified as relevant legislation for trust and trustworthiness. Similar
legislation exists for non-EU countries. A description of the legal perspective is provided in
Section 2.2.3.
As the eIDAS regulation is a European legal instrument, one could argue that the European
Court of Justice takes the role of enforcer on the basis of the self-provided role description on
the Court’s website60. Furthermore data is available from open data sources, e.g. the European
Data Portal publishes information on the judicial systems in EUMember States61. However, for
participants that originate outside the EU, this would most likely not be suitable. Determining a
more appropriate authority (or authorities) to fulfil the role of enforcer for the rulebook proposed
here is a legal matter more than an information security matter.
We suppose here that it is possible to identify the legally competent authority (or authorities)
regarding the participants and their attributes. As this is a legal matter, it is outside the scope
of this thesis.
12.12 Data sources for natural persons
A range of public data sources were considered for use, and those adopted are listed below. An
analysis of these sources is provided in Appendix J. Authentic sources (such as national identity
registers) are highly relevant, but use of such data is restricted under legislation such as GDPR
[101]. It was concluded that the following were relevant candidates for this implementation.
60https://curia.europa.eu/
61https://www.europeandataportal.eu/data/datasets/, see information on judicial systems inMember
States ordinary courts
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• An aggregated FOAF file from Elsevier’s Mendeley Data Search62.
• A sample certificate of a natural person (the author of the thesis), produced on behalf of
a national identity register.
For each candidate data source, the possible data items that could be mapped onto predi-
cates were identified, and the selection criteria specified in Section 12.2.1 were applied. Where
this application led to the conclusion that the use of the data source was justified, a download
and transformation mechanism was established. This is described for FOAF data and national
identity data below.
12.13 Natural Persons based on FOAF data
12.13.1 Mapping
Natural persons can act in the   framework as Functional Service Consumers or Providers
(through the use of software agents). These roles were described in Section 6.5.3. An analysis of
the available data from FOAF information providers led to the conclusion that a FOAF natural
person corresponds sufficiently to a   framework natural person for this implementation. The
rationale for this conclusion is as follows.
The FOAF specification is defined as a dictionary of named properties and classes using
W3C’s RDF semantics and syntax. Since the FOAF data model is different from the   data
model, a transformation is required. Therefore a mapping must be defined.
• For the   data model, the description from Chapter 7 was used.
• For the information published in FOAF files, the human-readable FOAF Vocabulary
Specification [37] and the machine-readable RDF version63 were used.
– The FOAF specification describes a broad set of person-related attributes including
name, homepage, work location, email address, and a hash of an email address.
– The FOAF specification can also contain relationship information. This means that
a person’s FOAF file can contain records with the foaf:knows attribute, which refers
to other persons. By mentioning other people (via foaf:knows or other relation-
ships) and by providing an rdfs:seeAlso link to their FOAF file, FOAF indexing
tools can build FOAF aggregators without the need for a centrally managed direc-
tory of FOAF files.
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A comparison of the FOAF and   data model descriptions led to the conclusion that the
following mapping can be used.
• The foaf:Person class64 represents people and corresponds to the te:NaturalPerson class.
Such people can be attested in roles, e.g. as Functional Service Consumer or Provider.
• There are two properties related to an email mailbox.
– The foaf:mbox property is a relationship between the owner of a mailbox and a
mailbox. A mailbox is an Internet mailbox associated with exactly one owner. This
is a ‘static inverse functional property’, in that there is (at any point in time) at most
one individual that has a particular value for foaf:mbox. Mailboxes are typically
identified using the mailto: URI scheme [150]. FOAF sees mbox as an indirect
way of identifying its owner, which works even if the mailbox is out of service.
Furthermore, a person can have multiple mbox properties.
The foaf:mbox property can be used to create a unique   identifier of a person.
– The foaf:mbox_sha1sum property is a textual representation of the result of applying
the SHA-1 [257] hash function to a ‘mailto:’ identifier for an Internet mailbox with
which a person has an mbox relationship.
The foaf:mbox_sha1sum property can also be used to create a unique   identifier
of a person, and is more privacy-friendly.
• The foaf:familyName, foaf:givenName, foaf:lastName and foaf:firstName properties de-
scribe names of a person.
These can be used as identity attributes.
• The following list is a selection of properties which could be used as additional identity
attributes.
– The foaf:img property refers to an image.
– The foaf:birthday property describes a birthday.
– The foaf:nick property describes a nickname.
– The foaf:openid property describes an OpenID identifier.
– The foaf:phone property describes a telephone number.
– The foaf:publications property describes publications associated with the person.
– The foaf:skypeID property describes a Skype identifier.
64The foaf:Person class is a sub-class of foaf:Agent, which further includes foaf:Organization and foaf:Group.
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Selection criteria Description
Authoritative source FOAF data is self-provided.
Transparency FOAF data is published in readable format by
its owner, aggregated in Academic databases
such as Mendeley
Description of meaning available The FOAF terminology is described in the
FOAF specification [37]
Machine readable/human readable FOAF data is published in machine readable
XML Schema Description (XSD) format
Mapping possibility Data elements can be mapped via XSLT
Respect for GDPR [101] There is personal information in FOAF data
but it is self-disclosed by its owner so it seems
reasonable to assume consent is present.
FOAF data may contain information about
other persons known to the publisher, but such
information is not used in the thesis.
Table 12.6: Selection criteria for data sources applied to FOAF data
12.13.2 FOAF data as data source
12.13.2.1 Application of selection criteria
FOAF data sources and their data meet the selection criteria defined in Section 12.2.1, as de-
scribed in Table 12.6. They provide relevant data sources for natural person predicates.
To adhere to requirements IR2 (transparency) and IR7 (data source credibility), the prove-
nance of the information used to bind variable occurrences must be included. As a consequence
all use of FOAF data as data source needs to refer to the original source.   data sources that
include a link to the original FOAF source were created for this purpose. For the implementa-
tion, two data sources were established on the basis of theMendeley database. Each data source
corresponds to one FOAF file.
12.13.2.2 Use and transformation
The approach described in Section 12.5.2.2 was applied to the FOAF data. The FOAF data
set65 [272] that was used as a data source was obtained from Elsevier’s Mendeley Data ser-
vice. It is described by Petrovic and Fujita [273]. The dataset contains FOAF descriptions
of 84802 people, and 107485 known relationships. These were extracted from the Advogato
social networking site66.
65https://data.mendeley.com/datasets/zp23s23xpb/1
66http://www.advogato.org/, with http://www.advogato.org/person/connolly/foaf.rdf\#me as
the initial URL
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The Mendeley dataset consists of a compressed file. Its decompression results in a series of
individual FOAF files. Two XSL programs67 were developed to create   model data sources
on the basis of such FOAF files. The programs combines   data model predicates and prove-
nance assertions. The provenance assertions describe the following:
• the activity (prov:Activity) that created the data source, including the time when the ac-
tivity was performed (prov:startedAtTime and prov:endedAtTime);
• the original source from where the data source was derived (prov:wasDerivedFrom), i.e.
the URI of the Mendeley data set;
• the agent to which the creation of the data source can be attributed, for which a reference
to http://www.marcsel.eu/ti is used, referring to the   framework’s data integration soft-
ware.
The XSL program involves the following two steps.
• The first step is the creation of the Activity individual that generates the data source. This
involves the creation of a resource with a hardcoded name based on the XSL program and
its execution date (http://www.marcsel.eu/onto/te/xsl/FOAF_01_DataSource_v301.xsl.2021-
01-07), its casting into the type of prov:Activity and the addition of prov:startedAtTime
and prov:endedAtTime.
• The second step is the creation of the DataSource individual. This involves the creation of
a resource with a hardcoded name based on the URI from where the FOAF file was origi-
nally obtained by the aggregator that published it on theMendeley data service, its casting
into type te:DataSource, the addition of the Mendeley URI (as prov:wasDerivedFrom)
and the addition of further provenance data.
The output of the transformations was integrated into the database load file as described in
Section 12.16.
12.13.3 NPs based on FOAF data
Two XSL programs68 were used to create natural persons. The programs combine   data
model predicates and provenance assertions in a similar way to the corresponding data source
program. Each program used a different FOAF file as its input. The transformation involves
the following steps:
67FOAF_01_DataSource_v301.xsl and FOAF_02_DataSource_v301.xsl
68called FOAF_01_NP_v301.xsl and FOAF_02_NP_v301.xsl
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• creation of identifiers for identity and role attestations and for the natural person, includ-
ing provenance data,
• creation of identity and role attestations,
• creation of the NaturalPerson individuals, as a resource with its name based on foaf-
name, the casting into type of te:NaturalPerson, and the inclusion of identity and role
attestations and provenance data.
For privacy reasons, only those persons whose FOAF file included the foaf:mbox_sha1sum
attribute were selected from the outputfile for inclusion in the database load file. These records
were integrated into the database load file as described in Section 12.16. Figure 12.2 shows a
FOAF-based Natural Person and its properties in GraphDB’s explorer.
Figure 12.2: FOAF-based Natural Person and its properties
12.14 NPs based on national identity data
12.14.1 Mapping
Natural persons can act in the   framework as Functional Service Consumers or Providers.
These roles were described in Section 6.5.3. The analysis of the available data from national
identity data sources described in Appendix J led to the conclusion that a natural person as
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Selection criteria Description
Authoritative source National identity data is provided by a national
competent authority
Transparency National identity data is distributed in certifi-
cate files, which are used to verify e.g. the au-
thenticity of an email or an electronic docu-
ment, or an on-line authentication ticket
Description of meaning available The format used by these certificates is de-
scribed in the X.509 version 3 specification
[63]
Machine readable/human readable National identity data is published in PEM or
DER encoding which is easily decoded
Mapping possibility Data elements can be mapped manually
Respect for GDPR [101] There is personal information in national iden-
tity data, hence respect for GDPR [101] has to
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis
Table 12.7: Selection criteria for data sources applied to national identity data
described in such a source corresponds sufficiently to a   framework natural person for our
purposes. However, as all national identity data sources are different, the mapping must be
tailor-made. For the implementation, this was done for Belgium only.
12.14.2 NID as data source
12.14.2.1 Application of selection criteria
National identity data is not generally available. However, in a number of countries the gov-
ernment distributes X.509 certificates for authentication and signature. In countries such as
Belgium and Spain, these certificates contain citizen identity data which is based on the au-
thentic source, the national identity register. There is no general access to the national identity
register; however, the certificates are used in the public domain because they are included in
the electronic identity cards, and are required when validating an on-line authentication request
or a signature.
National identity data provides relevant data sources for natural person predicates. Such
data partially meets the selection criteria defined in Section 12.2.1 as described in Table 12.7.
It was decided to include data for a single natural person (the author of the thesis) to demonstrate
the possibilities of this data.
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12.14.2.2 Use and transformation
For the implementation of a natural person based on national identity data, the following com-
ponents were created.
• An individual that represents the Belgian National Register of Natural persons (NRN) as
authentic source of identity information.
• A data source that represents an X.509 certificate based on this authentic source.
The individual that represents the NRN as authentic source of identity information was
created manually in the file BE-AS-NRN-v301.rdf. The NRN is part of the Belgian Federal
Public Service Home Affairs.
The NRN individual asserts:
• that it was derived from the law69 that established the organisation,
• links to identity and role attestations, based on the electronic publication, by the Belgian
Ministry of Justice in the official State Gazette, of the law that established the organisa-
tion, and
• that it was attributed to this same electronic publication.
The data source file Certipost-CitizenCA-cert-01-DataSource-v301.rdf was created manu-
ally. The data source asserts:
• that it was derived from the certificate downloaded from an eID card,
• that the certificate was made available70, and
• that it was attributed to Certipost.
Both files were integrated into the database load file as described in Section 12.16.
12.14.3 NPs based on national identity data
The authentication certificate file of a Belgian citizen was extracted from an identity card and
saved71. This certificate file contains the following information:
69http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/eli/wet/1983/08/08/1984021127/justel
70at http://www.marcsel.eu/onto/te/crt/Certipost-CitizenCA-01-NP-v301.crt
71The encoded certificate is available at http://www.marcsel.eu/onto/te/crt/
Certipost-CitizenCA-01-NP-v301.crt. The certificate can be decoded into human readable for-
mat using the OpenSSL tool from https://www.openssl.org/ or an on-line decoder such as e.g.
https://redkestrel.co.uk/products/decoder/.
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• Regarding the certificate’s subject: ‘C=BE, CN=Marc Sel (Authentication), SN=Sel,
GN=Marc Louis, serialNumber=***********’ (the serial number is equal to the na-
tional identity register number of the citizen and has been removed for privacy reasons),
• Regarding the certificate’s issuer: ‘C=BE, CN=Citizen CA, serialNumber=201403’,
• Information on
– validity period and cryptographic algorithms and key-lengths used,
– ‘Authority Information Access’ information about the issuer,
– Certificate Policy: OID and url of the CPS,
– CRL distribution point.
The information in the certificate was used to manually create two pieces of information.
• The Certipost-CitizenCA-01-NP-v301.rdf file, containing:
– the resource BE-Marc-Louis-Sel72 as a te:NaturalPerson,
– with an identity attestation issued by Certipost73,
– derived from the corresponding data source74.
• A conformance attestation was added to file DBLN.owl. The attestation was given the
name Demo-Conformance-00175 because it demonstrates how conformity to a level of
identity proofing can be incorporated in the   framework on the basis of existing infor-
mation.
This file was integrated into the database load file as described in Section 12.16.
12.15 Self-attestations
It can reasonably be expected that self-attestations are available when entities provide infor-
mation about themselves in a publicly available electronic way. In the context of the thesis it
was decided to use existing data rather than to request self-attestations. For natural persons,
the FOAF data that was discussed in Section 12.13 provided a relevant example. For organisa-
tions, their websites were a relevant source of information. File DBLS.owl provides examples
72in full http://www.marcsel.eu/onto/te/BE-Marc-Louis-Sel-21267647932558983308196457700015365695,
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of self-attestations of organisations (Certipost, Zetes and SMETS1 PKI-Service from Secure
Meters Limited) based on their website. This file was integrated into the database load file as
described in Section 12.16.
12.16 Data integration
12.16.1 Overview
The outputs of all transformations were included in a single XML/RDF file called DBL.owl.
This integrated file is referred to as the database load file. The construction of the database
load file is described in Appendix L.
12.16.2 Loading
The database load file can be loaded into any tool supporting the RDF/XML format. The file
was loaded into an instance of the Ontotext GraphDB database. The following figures illustrate
some selected features of the loaded file.
• Figure 12.3 shows the   data model class hierarchy in the explorer of GraphDB.
• Figure 12.4 shows an overview of the   data model class relationships in the explorer
of GraphDB.
• Figure 12.5 shows a sample participant, the British Telecom evidence service provider
as represented in the   data model graph.
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Figure 12.3: The   data model class hierarchy
Figure 12.4: Overview of the   data model class relationships
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Figure 12.5: The British Telecom evidence service provider and related classes as represented
in the   data model graph
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12.17 Summary
This chapter presented the implementation of a mechanism for the import and transformation
of instance data for the data model implementation described in Chapter 11. This included the
selection of data sources, the download of data and its transformation into the   data model
format, and the addition of provenance information.
The approaches that were used for selection, download, transformation and integration of
data were presented. The technical set-up of the technology used was discussed. This in-
cluded the creation of an Eclipse project that allows the execution of XSL transformations on
the selected data, and the creation of a GraphDB repository. Candidate data sources were iden-
tified and described. The creation of individuals, through the use of XSL transformations, was
demonstrated. This was done for the following predicates:
• trustworthiness monitors and evidence service providers (on the basis of public trusted
lists).
• accreditation bodies and conformity assessment bodies (on the basis of public accredita-
tion data);
• authentic sources and norms (based on public company data);
• legal persons (based on public company data);
• natural persons (based on public data).
The creation of endorser and enforcer individuals was discussed but no such individuals
were created. How the transformed data was integrated and loaded into a graph database was
described.
This implementation contributes to the validation of the proposed framework by creating a
database that contains information corresponding to the ‘real world’ of the selected data sources
and participants. This information is used in Chapters 13 and 14.
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Chapter 13
Implementation of a rulebook
An implementation of a specific rulebook, i.e. a set of constraints that reflect a par-
ticular context for reasoning about trustworthiness, is presented. The implemented
rulebook is AP, described in Chapter 8, the content of which was inspired by the
European legislation for trust services.
13.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a partial implementation of a specific rulebook. The concept of a rulebook
was introduced in Chapter 8 as a set of constraints that reflect a particular context for reasoning
about trustworthiness. The example rulebook AP was specified in Sections 8.9 – 8.13; it was
inspired by the European legislation on trust services itself described in Section 2.2.3.
In this chapter we describe a partial implementation of this example rulebook. The imple-
mentation of the data model described in Chapter 11, and of the data import and transformation
mechanism described in Chapter 12, are based on a graph database. As a consequence, the
rulebook implementation makes use of the features of a graph database and consists of:
• constraints imposed by properties of the data model, and
• SPARQL queries.
The implementation of the data model and of the data import and transformation mecha-
nism is complemented by an implementation of a subset of the rules defined in Chapter 8. The
rules derived from requirements IR2 (transparency) and IR3 (linked and unique identity) were
implemented and a subset of the rules derived from requirement IR4 (competently acting in
role) were implemented. Whilst the remaining rules (namely the other rules derived from re-
quirement IR4 and those derived from IR5) have not been implemented, it should be a relatively
straightforward task to implement them following the same approach.
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The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows.
• Section 13.2 describes the general approach to implementing the rulebook.
• Section 13.3 describes the technical set-up.
• Section 13.4 addresses the implementation of rules derived from requirement IR2 Trans-
parency.
• Section 13.5 addresses the rules derived from requirement IR3 Linked and unique iden-
tity.
• Section 13.6 addresses a selection of the rules derived from requirement IR4Competently
acting in role.
• Section 13.7 provides a summary.
13.2 Approach
The rulebook specified in Chapter 8 is structured according to the integrated set of requirements,
given in Section 5.5, as follows.
• Requirement IR1 (semantic definition of trustworthiness, described in Section 5.5.1 ) was
addressed by formulating the rules in FOL using a formal taxonomy over data points that
have a truth-functional interpretation.
• Requirement IR6 (policy choices, described in Section 5.5.6) was addressed by structur-
ing rules into two sets, containing mandatory and discretionary rules.
• Requirement IR7 (credible data, described in Section 5.5.7) was addressed by using data
sources as specified in Section 12.2.
The rules derived from requirements IR2, IR3 and partially from IR4, were implemented
in the following way.
• As described below, each rule was implemented either in the form of:
– constraints, imposed by properties of the   data model, or
– a SPARQL query together with an expected response to this query.
• A rulebook data file was created which includes all the queries corresponding to rules of
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• A rulebook individual including provenance information was manually created and inte-
grated into the database load file, as described in Section 12.16.
13.3 Set-up
13.3.1 Inferencing
The implementation makes use of Protégé as a data modeller and GraphDB as a database. Both
were introduced in Section 10.3. Because their inferencing capabilities influence the imple-
mentation it is important to understand these capabilities.
• The SPARQL support in Protégé 5.5 has the limitation that it does not allow information
created through inference to be queried. It is possible to partially overcome this limitation
by using the plug-in Snap SPARQL. Its support for inferences to be queried is described by
Horridge and Musen [152]. However, while this plug-in allows inferences to be queried,
it does not support the SPARQL ASK statement that provides a means of obtaining a
yes/no answer to a query, and is helpful in the implementation.
• Fortunately, Ontotext’s GraphDB does support SPARQL queries on information created
through inference.
As a consequence, prototyping of queries was done in Protégé, but the development was
done in Ontotext’s GraphDB.
13.3.2 Using interactive queries
To develop and execute the SPARQL queries that implement the rules, the GraphDB Work-
bench was used. Once a GraphDB database is started, the GraphDB Workbench is accessible
through a browser (at http://localhost:7200/) and the database load file can be imported
(from http://www.marcsel.eu/onto/te/DBL.owl). To have inferred data accessible in
queries, the button ‘Include Inferred data’ needs to be in the position ‘on’.
13.3.3 Rulebook
A copy of the rulebook is available at http://www.marcsel.eu/onto/te/RuleBook-001.
txt.
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Listing 13.1: IR2-M01
1 # IR2−M01
2 PREFIX r d f : <h t t p : / / www. w3 . org /1999 /02 /22 − rd f −s yn t ax −ns#>
3 PREFIX t e : <h t t p : / / www. marc se l . eu / on to / t e />
4 ASK {? a r d f : t y p e t e : RuleBook . }
Listing 13.2: Listing all rulebooks
1 # L i s t i n g a l l r u l e b ook s
2 PREFIX r d f : <h t t p : / / www. w3 . org /1999 /02 /22 − rd f −s yn t ax −ns#>
3 PREFIX t e : <h t t p : / / www. marc se l . eu / on to / t e />
4 # L i s t i n g a l l r u l e b ook s
5 s e l e c t ∗ where {? Ru l e b o ok I n d i v i d u a l r d f : t yp e t e : RuleBook . }
13.4 IR2 Transparency
13.4.1 Mandatory rules
The mandatory rules are specified in Tables 8.1 and 8.2. The rules contained in Table 8.1 (the
rulebook-related rules) were implemented in the following way.
• Rule IR2-M01 (a trustworthy ecosystemmust have at least one rulebook) was implemented
by the ASK query described in Listing 13.1, the expected response to which is ‘YES’.
Existing rulebooks can be listed as described in Listing 13.2, the expected response to
which is a list of candidate rulebooks.
• Rule IR2-M02 (every rulebook must be uniquely identified) was implemented by using the
object property te:doesIdentify as described in Section 11.5. Whether there is an identifier
linked through the property te1:doesIdentify can be queried as described in Listing 13.3.
The expected response is a list of rulebook-identifiers pairs, indicating valid rulebooks.
Inspection of the identifier reveals the unique identifier and the provenance data of the
rulebook.
Table 8.2 contains IR2-M10 the participant-related rule. This rule (a participant is an actor
that has a given name (for a natural person) or an organisation name (for an organisation))
is implemented in the data model implementation, as described in Section 11.7.2. It can be
queried as described in Listing 13.4. The expected response is a list of candidate participants.
Such participants have a name but not necessary one or more identity attestations. This latter
property is verified in IR3-M01.
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Listing 13.3: IR2-M02
1 # IR2−M02
2 PREFIX r d f : <h t t p : / / www. w3 . org /1999 /02 /22 − rd f −s yn t ax −ns#>
3 PREFIX t e : <h t t p : / / www. marc se l . eu / on to / t e />
4 s e l e c t ∗ where {
5 ? r u l e book r d f : t y p e t e : RuleBook .




2 PREFIX r d f : <h t t p : / / www. w3 . org /1999 /02 /22 − rd f −s yn t ax −ns#>
3 PREFIX t e : <h t t p : / / www. marc se l . eu / on to / t e />
4 PREFIX te rms : <h t t p : / / p u r l . org / dc / t e rms />
5 s e l e c t ∗ where {
6 ? P a r t i c i p a n t r d f : t y p e t e : P a r t i c i p a n t .
7 }
13.4.2 Discretionary rules
As rulebook AP does not contain discretionary rules for IR2, there is nothing to implement.
To demonstrate how rules of this type could be implemented, Appendix N describes an imple-
mentation of the discretionary rules for IR 2 for the rulebook AE.
13.5 IR3 Linked and unique identity
13.5.1 Mandatory rules
The single mandatory rule IR3-M01 (a participant is an actor that is uniquely identified) is spec-
ified in Table 8.4. The rule was implemented in the same way as IR2-M02, i.e. by using the
object property te:doesIdentify described in Section 13.4.1. The existence of a identifier can
be verified as described in Listing 13.5. The expected response is a list of participant-identifier
pairs, indicating valid participants. Inspection of the identifier (e.g. through theGraphDBWork-
bench) reveals the unique identifier and the provenance data of the participant.
13.5.2 Discretionary rules
The discretionary rules regarding linked and unique identity are specified in Tables 8.23 to 8.28
Listing 13.5: IR3-M01
1 # IR3−M01
2 s e l e c t ∗ where {
3 ? p a r t i c i p a n t r d f : t y p e t e : P a r t i c i p a n t .
4 ? i d t e : d o e s I d e n t i f y ? p a r t i c i p a n t .
5 }
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Listing 13.6: IR3-D11-AP
1 # IR3−D11−AP
2 s e l e c t ∗ where {
3 ? P a r t i c i p a n t r d f : t y p e t e : P a r t i c i p a n t .
4 ? P a r t i c i p a n t t e : p I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n ? i d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n .
5 ? i d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n prov : wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo ? i s s u e r O f I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n .




2 ask { t e : Ze tes−SA−NV t e : p I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n ? i d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n .
3 ? i d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n prov : wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo ? i s s u e r O f I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n .
4 }
Table 8.23 specifies the single rule regarding self-attestation, IR3-D11-AP (a participant’s
identity must be self-attested). This was implemented as described in Listing 13.6. The ex-
pected response is the list of participants that have at least one identity attestation that is self-
attested.
The related query that asks whether a particular participant is linked to a self-attested iden-
tity attestation was implemented as described in Listing 13.7. The company Zetes was used
as an example. The expected response is yes. In the case of Zetes a yes answer is obtained
because Zetes is a participant for which a self-attestation is present in the database load file, as
described in Section 12.15.
The related query that identifies participants that lack self-attested identity attestation was
implemented as described in Listing 13.8. The expected response is the list of participants that
lack self-attested identity attestations.
Listing 13.8: IR3-D11c-AP
1 # IR3−D11c−AP
2 s e l e c t ∗ where {
3 ? P a r t i c i p a n t r d f : t y p e t e : P a r t i c i p a n t .
4 MINUS {? P a r t i c i p a n t t e : p I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n ? i d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n .
5 ? i d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n prov : wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo ? i s s u e r O f I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n
6 FILTER ( ? P a r t i c i p a n t = ? i s s u e r O f I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n ) } .
7 }
Rules regarding attestations other than self-attestations are specified in Tables 8.24 through
8.28. The rules contained in Table 8.24 were implemented in the following way.
Rule IR3-D21-AP (for the selected participant there must at least one identity attestation that
is not self-attested) was implemented as described in Listing 13.9. The expected response is
a table that contains a list of participants that have at least one identity attestation that is not
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Listing 13.9: IR3-D21-AP
1 # IR3−D21−AP
2 s e l e c t ∗ where {
3 ? P a r t i c i p a n t r d f : t y p e t e : P a r t i c i p a n t .
4 ? P a r t i c i p a n t t e : p I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n ? i d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n .
5 ? i d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n prov : wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo ? i s s u e r O f I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n .




2 s e l e c t ∗ where {
3 ? P a r t i c i p a n t r d f : t y p e t e : P a r t i c i p a n t .
4 ? P a r t i c i p a n t t e : p I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n ? i d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n .
5 ? i d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n prov : wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo ? i s s u e r O f I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n .
6 ? i s s u e r O f I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n t e : p R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n ? R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n .
7 ? R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R t e : EvSP .
8 }
self-attested, and the trustor must verify whether the selected participant is included in the list2.
Rule IR3-D22-AP (the identity of the selected participant must be attested to by at least one
evidence service provider) was implemented as described in Listing 13.10. The expected re-
sponse is a table that contains a list of participants that have at least one identity attestation
that is attested to by an evidence service provider. The trustor must verify whether the selected
participant is included in the list. An alternative implementation is possible by using the name
of the selected participant.
Rule IR3-D23-AP (the identity of the selected participant must be attested to by at least one
evidence service provider attested in its role by a trustworthiness monitor) was implemented
as described in Listing 13.11. The expected response is a table that contains a list of partic-
ipants that meet the constraint, and the trustor must verify whether the selected participant is
included in the list. An alternative implementation is possible by using the name of the selected
participant. In addition to the name, the resulting table contains the following attributes:
• the participant’s identity attestation (variable ?P1IdentityAttestation),
• the issuer of the identity attestation (variable ?P2issuerOfP1IdentityAttestation),
• the role of this issuer (participant P2 must be an EvSP),
• the identity of issuer of this role attestation (variable ?P3issuerOfEvSProle) and its role
(participant P3 must be a TwsMo),
2An alternative implementation is possible by using the name of the selected participant. How to use the name
of the selected participant is demonstrated in Listing 13.7.
311
13.5. IR3 Linked and unique identity 13. Implementation of a rulebook
Listing 13.11: IR3-D23-AP
1 # IR3−D23−AP
2 PREFIX r d f : <h t t p : / / www. w3 . org /1999 /02 /22 − rd f −s yn t ax −ns#>
3 PREFIX t e : <h t t p : / / www. marc se l . eu / on to / t e />
4 PREFIX prov : <h t t p : / / www. w3 . org / ns / prov#>
5 s e l e c t ∗ where {
6 # a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s ’ ␣ i d e n t i t y ␣must ␣be␣ a t t e s t e d ␣by␣an␣ ev i d en c e ␣ s e r v i c e ␣ p r o v i d e r ␣ a t t e s t e d ␣ i n ␣ i t s ␣ r o l e ␣by␣a␣
t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s ␣mon i t o r
7 ? P a r t i c i p a n t 1 ␣ r d f : t y p e ␣ t e : P a r t i c i p a n t ␣ .
8 ? P a r t i c i p a n t 1 ␣ t e : p I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n ␣? P 1 i d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n ␣ .
9 ? P 1 i d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n ␣ prov : wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo ␣? P 2 i s s u e r O f P 1 I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n .
10 ? P 2 i s s u e r O f P 1 I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n ␣ t e : p R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n ␣? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP2 ␣ .
11 ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP2 ␣ t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R ␣ t e : EvSP␣ .
12 #␣ t h a t ␣EvSP␣ co r r e s p o nd s ␣ t o ␣? P 2 i s s u e r O f P 1 I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n
13 #␣␣which␣must ␣be␣ a t t e s t e d ␣ i n ␣ i t s ␣ r o l e ␣by␣a␣ t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s ␣mon i t o r
14 ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP2 ␣ prov : wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo ␣? P3 i s s u e rO fEvSP ro l e ␣ .
15 ? P3 i s s u e rO fEvSP ro l e ␣ t e : p R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n ␣? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP3 ␣ .
16 ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP3 ␣ t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R ␣ t e :TwsMo␣ .
17 #␣ d i s p l a y ␣ t h e ␣ r o l e ␣ t h a t ␣ i s ␣ a t t e s t e d ␣ e x p l i c i t l y
18 ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP3 ␣ t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R ␣? Role ␣ .
19 }
• the role of P3 (variable ?Role).
The rules contained in Table 8.25 address requirements regarding the verification of the
binding between an applicant and its identity prior enrolment, using ISO/IEC TS 29003:2018
Level 2 and Level 3, respectively.
These rules were implemented in the following way. Rule IR3-D24-AP was implemented
as described in Listing 13.12. The expected response is a list of participants that meet rule
IR3-D24-AP. Rule IR3-D25-AP is implemented by replacing te:ISO-IEC-TS-29003:2018:LOIP2
by te:ISO-IEC-TS-29003:2018:LOIP3 in Listing 13.12. The expected response is a list of par-
ticipants that meet rule IR3-D25-AP.
Rules relating to identity attestation by legally qualified entities are given in Table 8.26.
These rules were implemented in the following way.
Rule IR3-D31-AP (the identity of the selected participant must be attested to by at least one
evidence service provider who is legally attested in that role) was implemented as described in
Listing 13.13. The expected response is a table that contains a list of participants that meet the
constraint, and the trustor must verify whether the selected participant is included in the list.
An alternative implementation is possible by using the name of the selected participant. The
list contains the following elements.
• The participant’s name (?Participant1).
• The identity attestation (?P1IdentityAttestation) and the issuer thereof
(?P2IssuerOfP1IdentityAttestation).
• The role attestation of this issuer (?RoleAttestationOfP2).
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Listing 13.12: IR3-D24-AP
1 # IR3−D24−AP
2 PREFIX r d f : <h t t p : / / www. w3 . org /1999 /02 /22 − rd f −s yn t ax −ns#>
3 PREFIX t e : <h t t p : / / www. marc se l . eu / on to / t e />
4 PREFIX prov : <h t t p : / / www. w3 . org / ns / prov#>
5 s e l e c t ∗ where {
6 # S tep 1 s e l e c t EvSPs t h a t a t t e s t t o i d e n t i t y
7 # ? P a r t i c i p a n t 1 = s e l e c t e d p a r t i c i p a n t
8 ? P a r t i c i p a n t 1 r d f : t y p e t e : P a r t i c i p a n t .
9 ? P a r t i c i p a n t 1 t e : p I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n ? P 1 i d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n .
10 ? P 1 i d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n prov : wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo ? P 2 i s s u e r O f P 1 I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n .
11 ? P 2 i s s u e r O f P 1 I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n t e : p R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP2 .
12 ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP2 t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R t e : EvSP .
13 # EvSP = ? P 2 i s s u e r O f P 1 I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n
14 # which must be a t t e s t e d i n i t s r o l e by a t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s mon i t o r
15 # TwsMo = ? P3 i s s u e rO fEvSP ro l e
16 ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP2 prov : wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo ? P3 i s s u e rO fEvSP ro l e .
17 ? P3 i s s u e rO fEvSP ro l e t e : p R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP3 .
18 ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP3 t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R t e :TwsMo .
19 # d i s p l a y t h e r o l e t h a t i s a t t e s t e d e x p l i c i t l y
20 ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP3 t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R ? Role .
21
22 # S tep 2 s e l e c t EvSP t h a t conforms t o ISO−IEC−TS−29003 a c c o r d i n g t o TwsMo
23 # S e l e c t conformance a t t e s t a t i o n s o f P1
24 ? P 2 i s s u e r O f P 1 I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n t e : pConformance ? I d e n t i t yA t t e s t a t i o nC o n f o rm a n c e .
25 # S e l e c t on ly t h o s e conformance a t t e s t a t i o n s from t h e s e l e c t e d TwsMo
26 ? I d e n t i t yA t t e s t a t i o nC o n f o rm a n c e prov : wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo ? P3 i s s u e rO fEvSP ro l e .
27 # S e l e c t on ly t h o s e c on f o rm i t y a t t e s t a t i o n s t h a t match LOIP2
28 ? I d e n t i t yA t t e s t a t i o nC o n f o rm a n c e t e : conformanceN t e : ISO−IEC−TS−29003:2018: LOIP2 .
29 # D i sp l a y t h e norm f o r i n f o rm a t i o n pu rpose
30 ? I d e n t i t yA t t e s t a t i o nC o n f o rm a n c e t e : conformanceN ? Iden t i t yNo rm .
31 }
• The legal qualification (?LegalRoleQualification) and the legal document (?LegalNorm)
on which the role attestation is based.
Rule IR3-D32-AP which states:
• that the identity of the selected participant must be attested to by at least one evidence
service provider attested to its role by a trustworthiness monitor; and
• that the evidence service provider and the trustworthinessmonitormust be legally attested
in their respective roles,
Listing 13.13: IR3-D31-AP
1 # IR3−D31−AP
2 PREFIX r d f : <h t t p : / / www. w3 . org /1999 /02 /22 − rd f −s yn t ax −ns#>
3 PREFIX t e : <h t t p : / / www. marc se l . eu / on to / t e />
4 PREFIX prov : <h t t p : / / www. w3 . org / ns / prov#>
5 s e l e c t ∗ where {
6 # The p a r t i c i p a n t i d e n t i t y must be a t t e s t e d by an EvSP
7 ? P a r t i c i p a n t 1 r d f : t y p e t e : P a r t i c i p a n t .
8 ? P a r t i c i p a n t 1 t e : p I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n ? P 1 i d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n .
9 ? P 1 i d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n prov : wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo ? P 2 i s s u e r O f P 1 I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n .
10 ? P 2 i s s u e r O f P 1 I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n t e : p R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP2 .
11 ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP2 t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R t e : EvSP .
12 # A l t e r n a t i v e form t o ca tch a l l r o l e s : ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP2 t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R ?RoleOfP2 .
13
14 # The EvSP co r r e s p o nd s t o ? P 2 i s s u e r O f P 1 I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n
15 # which must be l e g a l l y a t t e s t e d i n i t s r o l e
16 ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP2 t e : r a L e g a l Q u a l i f i c a t i o n ? L e g a l R o l eQ u a l i f i c a t i o n .
17 # D i sp l a y t h e l e g a l norm f o r i n f o rm a t i o n pu rpose
18 ? L e g a l R o l eQ u a l i f i c a t i o n t e : l e g a l Q u a l i f i c a t i o nN ?LegalNorm .
19 }
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Listing 13.14: IR3-D32-AP
1 # IR3−D32−AP
2 PREFIX r d f : <h t t p : / / www. w3 . org /1999 /02 /22 − rd f −s yn t ax −ns#>
3 PREFIX t e : <h t t p : / / www. marc se l . eu / on to / t e />
4 PREFIX prov : <h t t p : / / www. w3 . org / ns / prov#>
5 s e l e c t ∗ where {
6 ? P a r t i c i p a n t 1 r d f : t y p e t e : P a r t i c i p a n t .
7 ? P a r t i c i p a n t 1 t e : p I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n ? P 1 i d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n .
8 ? P 1 i d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n prov : wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo ? P 2 i s s u e r O f P 1 I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n .
9 ? P 2 i s s u e r O f P 1 I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n t e : p R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP2 .
10 ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP2 t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R t e : EvSP .
11 # To d i s p l a y t h e EvSP ’ s ␣ r o l e ␣ a t t e s t a t i o n
12 ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP2 ␣ t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R ␣?RoleOfP2␣ .
13
14 #␣EvSP␣must ␣be␣ a t t e s t e d ␣by␣TwsMo
15 #␣␣EvSP␣ co r r e s p o nd s ␣ t o ␣? P 2 i s s u e r O f P 1 I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n
16 #␣␣TwsMo␣ co r r e s p o nd s ␣ t o ␣? P3 i s s u e rO fEvSP ro l e
17 ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP2 ␣ prov : wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo ␣? P3 i s s u e rO fEvSP ro l e ␣ .
18 ? P3 i s s u e rO fEvSP ro l e ␣ t e : p R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n ␣? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP3 ␣ .
19 #? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP3 ␣ t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R ␣?RoleOfP3␣ .
20 ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP3 ␣ t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R ␣ t e :TwsMo␣ .
21 #␣To␣ d i s p l a y ␣ t h e ␣TwsMO’ s r o l e a t t e s t a t i o n
22 ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP3 t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R ?RoleOfP3 .
23
24 # EvSP must be l e g a l l y a t t e s t e d i n i t s r o l e
25 ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP2 t e : r a L e g a l Q u a l i f i c a t i o n ? L e g a lR o l eQu a l i f i c a t i o n P 2 .
26 # D i sp l a y t h e l e g a l norm i t s e l f f o r i n f o rm a t i o n pu rpose
27 ? L e g a lR o l eQu a l i f i c a t i o n P 2 t e : l e g a l Q u a l i f i c a t i o nN ?LegalNormP2 .
28
29 # TwsMo must be l e g a l l y a t t e s t e d i n i t s r o l e
30 # TwsMo co r r e s p o nd s t o ? P3 i s sue rOfEvSPro l e , who has a r o l e a t t e s t a t i o n ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP3
31 ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP3 t e : r a L e g a l Q u a l i f i c a t i o n ? L e g a lR o l eQu a l i f i c a t i o n P 3 .
32 # D i sp l a y t h e l e g a l norm f o r i n f o rm a t i o n pu rpose
33 ? L e g a lR o l eQu a l i f i c a t i o n P 3 t e : l e g a l Q u a l i f i c a t i o nN ?LegalNormP3 .
34 }
was implemented as described in Listing 13.14. The expected response is a list of all par-
ticipants that are legally attested in their roles, with their legal qualification and the legal norm
on which the legal qualification is based.
Rule IR3-D33-AP (contained in Table 8.27) can be implemented by adding an additional con-
dition to rule IR3-D32-AP. This condition requires that the evidence service provider’s attestation
of ISO/IEC TS 29003:2018 Level of Identity Proofing 2 is attested by the trustworthiness mon-
itor. Rule IR3-D33-AP was implemented as described in Listing 13.15. The expected response
is the list of participants that have a matching Level of Identity Proofing attestation. The trustor
must verify whether the selected participant is included in the list.
Rule IR3-D34-AP (contained in Table 8.28) can be implemented by changing the Level of
Identity Proofing condition into te:ISO-IEC-TS-29003:2018:LOIP3 in rule IR3-D33-AP.
13.6 IR4 Competently acting in role
13.6.1 Mandatory rules
The singlemandatory rule IR4-M01 (the roles of a participantmust be self-attested) is specified in
Table 8.11. The rule was implemented as described in Listing 13.16. The expected response is
314
13.6. IR4 Competently acting in role 13. Implementation of a rulebook
Listing 13.15: IR3-D33-AP
1 # IR3−D33−AP
2 PREFIX r d f : <h t t p : / / www. w3 . org /1999 /02 /22 − rd f −s yn t ax −ns#>
3 PREFIX t e : <h t t p : / / www. marc se l . eu / on to / t e />
4 PREFIX prov : <h t t p : / / www. w3 . org / ns / prov#>
5 s e l e c t ∗ where {
6 # EvSP = ? P 2 i s s u e r O f P 1 I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n
7 # TwsMo = ? P3 i s s u e rO fEvSP ro l e
8 ? P a r t i c i p a n t 1 r d f : t y p e t e : P a r t i c i p a n t .
9 ? P a r t i c i p a n t 1 r d f : t y p e t e : N a t u r a l P e r s o n .
10 ? P a r t i c i p a n t 1 t e : p I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n ? P 1 i d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n .
11 ? P 1 i d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n prov : wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo ? P 2 i s s u e r O f P 1 I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n .
12 ? P 2 i s s u e r O f P 1 I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n t e : p R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP2 .
13 ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP2 t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R t e : EvSP .
14 # To d i s p l a y t h e EvSP ’ s ␣ r o l e ␣ a t t e s t a t i o n
15 ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP2 ␣ t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R ␣?RoleOfP2␣ .
16
17 #␣EvSP␣must ␣be␣ a t t e s t e d ␣by␣TwsMo
18 ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP2 ␣ prov : wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo ␣? P3 i s s u e rO fEvSP ro l e ␣ .
19 ? P3 i s s u e rO fEvSP ro l e ␣ t e : p R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n ␣? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP3 ␣ .
20 ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP3 ␣ t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R ␣ t e :TwsMo␣ .
21 #␣To␣ d i s p l a y ␣ t h e ␣TwsMO’ s r o l e a t t e s t a t i o n
22 ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP3 t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R ?RoleOfP3 .
23
24 # EvSP must be l e g a l l y a t t e s t e d i n i t s r o l e
25 ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP2 t e : r a L e g a l Q u a l i f i c a t i o n ? L e g a lR o l eQu a l i f i c a t i o n P 2 .
26 # D i sp l a y t h e l e g a l norm f o r i n f o rm a t i o n pu rpose
27 ? L e g a lR o l eQu a l i f i c a t i o n P 2 t e : l e g a l Q u a l i f i c a t i o nN ?LegalNormP2 .
28
29 # TwsMo must be l e g a l l y a t t e s t e d i n i t s r o l e
30 # TwsMo co r r e s p o nd s t o ? P3 i s sue rOfEvSPro l e , who has a r o l e a t t e s t a t i o n ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP3
31 ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP3 t e : r a L e g a l Q u a l i f i c a t i o n ? L e g a lR o l eQu a l i f i c a t i o n P 3 .
32 # D i sp l a y t h e l e g a l norm f o r i n f o rm a t i o n pu rpose
33 ? L e g a lR o l eQu a l i f i c a t i o n P 3 t e : l e g a l Q u a l i f i c a t i o nN ?LegalNormP3 .
34
35 # S e l e c t conformance a t t e s t a t i o n s o f P1
36 ? P 2 i s s u e r O f P 1 I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n t e : pConformance ? I d e n t i t yA t t e s t a t i o nC o n f o rm a n c e .
37 # S e l e c t on ly t h o s e conformance a t t e s t a t t i o n s t h a t come from t h e s e l e c t e d TwsMo
38 ? I d e n t i t yA t t e s t a t i o nC o n f o rm a n c e prov : wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo ? P3 i s s u e rO fEvSP ro l e .
39 # S e l e c t on ly t h o s e c on f o rm i t y a t t e s t a t i o n s t o match LOIP2
40 ? I d e n t i t yA t t e s t a t i o nC o n f o rm a n c e t e : conformanceN t e : ISO−IEC−TS−29003:2018: LOIP2 .
41 # D i sp l a y t h e norm f o r i n f o rm a t i o n pu rpose
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Listing 13.16: IR4-M01
1 # IR4−M01
2 # Roles must be s e l f − a t t e s t e d
3 PREFIX t e : <h t t p : / / www. marc se l . eu / on to / t e />
4 PREFIX : <h t t p : / / www. marc se l . eu / on to / t e #>
5 PREFIX prov : <h t t p : / / www. w3 . org / ns / prov#>
6 s e l e c t ∗ where {
7 ? P a r t i c i p a n t t e : p R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n ? R o l e A t t e s t a t i o n O f P a r t i c i p a n t .
8 ? R o l e A t t e s t a t i o n O f P a r t i c i p a n t prov : wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo ? R o l eA t t e s t a t i o nA t t r i b u t e d T o .




2 PREFIX r d f : <h t t p : / / www. w3 . org /1999 /02 /22 − rd f −s yn t ax −ns#>
3 PREFIX t e : <h t t p : / / www. marc se l . eu / on to / t e />
4 PREFIX prov : <h t t p : / / www. w3 . org / ns / prov#>
5 s e l e c t ∗ where {
6 ? P 2 i s s u e r O f P 1 I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n t e : p R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP2 .
7 ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP2 t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R t e : EvSP .
8 # t h a t EvSP co r r e s p o nd s t o ? P 2 i s s u e r O f P 1 I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n
9 # which must be a t t e s t e d i n i t s r o l e by a t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s mon i t o r
10 ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP2 prov : wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo ? P3 i s s u e rO fEvSP ro l e .
11 ? P3 i s s u e rO fEvSP ro l e t e : p R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP3 .
12 ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP3 t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R t e :TwsMo .
13 # d i s p l a y t h e r o l e t h a t i s a t t e s t e d e x p l i c i t l y
14 ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP3 t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R ? Role .
15 }
the list of participants that have self-attestations for their roles. The trustor must verify whether
the selected participant is included in the list. An alternative implementation is possible by
using the name of the selected participant.
13.6.2 Discretionary rules
A selection of IR4 discretionary rules was implemented. Rule IR4-D26-AP, described in Table
8.32, lists all evidence service providers attested in their role by a trustworthiness monitor. It
was implemented as described in Listing 13.17. The expected response consists of a table of
evidence service providers attested in their role by a trustworthiness monitor. The trustor must
verify whether the selected participant is included in the list. An alternative implementation is
possible by using the name of the selected participant.
Rule IR4-D027A-AP, also described in Table 8.32, lists all evidence service providers that are
attested to their role by a trustworthiness monitor and that are listed in a European trust list.
It was implemented as described in Listing 13.18. The expected response consists of a table
of evidence service providers attested in their role by a trustworthiness monitor and listed in a
European trust list3. The trustor must verify whether the selected participant is included in the
3As the only entities that are allowed to create entries in a European trust list are the registered trustworthiness
monitors it is sufficient to verify the presence of evidence service providers in the European trust lists.
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Listing 13.18: IR4-D027A-AP
1 # IR4−D027A−AP
2 # L i s t s e v i d en c e s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r s i n c l u d e d i n a European t r u s t l i s t
3 # ( l i m i t e d t o Un i t ed Kingdom , Spa in and Belgium )
4 PREFIX r d f : <h t t p : / / www. w3 . org /1999 /02 /22 − rd f −s yn t ax −ns#>
5 PREFIX t e : <h t t p : / / www. marc se l . eu / on to / t e />
6 PREFIX prov : <h t t p : / / www. w3 . org / ns / prov#>
7 s e l e c t ∗ where {
8 ? P 2 i s s u e r O f P 1 I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n t e : p R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP2 .
9 ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP2 t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R t e : EvSP .
10 # t h a t EvSP co r r e s p o nd s t o ? P 2 i s s u e r O f P 1 I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n
11 # which must be i n c l u d e d i n a European t r u s t l i s t
12 ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP2 prov : wasDerivedFrom ? Source .
13 FILTER (
14 ? Source = <h t t p s : / / www. t s cheme . org / s i t e s / d e f a u l t / f i l e s / t s l −uk0022s igned . xml> | |
15 ? Source = <h t t p s : / / s ede . m i n e t u r . gob . e s / P r e s t a d o r e s / TSL / TSL . xml> | |




2 # L i s t s EvSPs t h a t d emon s t r a t e comp l i ance wi th ETSI EN 319 403
3 PREFIX r d f : <h t t p : / / www. w3 . org /1999 /02 /22 − rd f −s yn t ax −ns#>
4 PREFIX t e : <h t t p : / / www. marc se l . eu / on to / t e />
5 PREFIX prov : <h t t p : / / www. w3 . org / ns / prov#>
6 s e l e c t ∗ where {
7 ? P a r t i c i p a n t 1 t e : p R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP1 .
8 ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP1 t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R t e : EvSP .
9 ? P a r t i c i p a n t 1 t e : pConformance ? Con f o rman c eA t t e s t a t i o n .
10 ? Con f o rman c eA t t e s t a t i o n t e : conformanceN ? S t anda r d .
11 FILTER ( ? S t a nd a r d = <h t t p : / / www. marc se l . eu / on to / t e / ETSI−EN−319−403> )
12 }
list. An alternative implementation is possible by using the name of the selected participant.
Rule IR4-D027B-AP, also described in Table 8.32, lists all evidence service providers that
demonstrate conformance to ETSI EN 319 403 [88]. It was implemented as described in List-
ing 13.19. The expected response consists of a table of evidence service providers that demon-
strate conformance to the standard. The trustor must verify whether the selected participant is
included in the list. An alternative implementation is possible by using the name of the selected
participant.
Rule IR4-D304-AP, described in Table 8.35, lists all evidence service providers that are mon-
itored by a trustworthiness monitor that is legally attested to in this role. It was implemented
as described in Listing 13.20. A similar rule for claim status service providers can be imple-
mented by changing the role from evidence service provider to claim status service provider.
The expected response consists of a list of evidence service providers that satisfy the condition.
The trustor must verify whether the selected participant is included in the list. An alternative
implementation is possible by using the name of the selected participant.
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Listing 13.20: IR4-D304-AP
1 # IR4−D304−AP
2 PREFIX r d f : <h t t p : / / www. w3 . org /1999 /02 /22 − rd f −s yn t ax −ns#>
3 PREFIX t e : <h t t p : / / www. marc se l . eu / on to / t e />
4 PREFIX prov : <h t t p : / / www. w3 . org / ns / prov#>
5 s e l e c t ∗ where {
6 # s e l e c t e v i d en c e s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r s t h a t have evsp r o l e a t t e s t a t i o n
7 ? P1evsp t e : p R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP1 e v s p .
8 ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP1 e v s p t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R t e : EvSP .
9 # EvSP must be s u p e r v i s e d by TwsMo
10 ? Su p e r v i s i o n t e : s u p e r v i s i o n P ? P1evsp .
11 ?P2twsmo t e : p Sup e r v i s i o n ? S u p e r v i s i o n .
12 # TwsMo must be a t t e s t e d i n i t s r o l e
13 ?P2twsmo t e : p R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n ? Ro l e a t t e s t a t i o nO fP2 tw smo .
14 ? Ro l e a t t e s t a t i o nO fP2 tw smo t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R t e :TwsMo .
15 # TwsMo ’ s ␣ r o l e ␣ a t t e s t a t i o n ␣must ␣be␣ l e g a l l y ␣ q u a l i f i e d
16 ? Ro l e a t t e s t a t i o nO fP2 tw smo ␣ t e : r a L e g a l Q u a l i f i c a t i o n ␣? L e g a l R o l eQ u a l i f i c a t i o n ␣ .
17 #␣ D i sp l a y ␣ t h e ␣ l e g a l ␣norm␣ f o r ␣ i n f o rm a t i o n ␣ pu rpose
18 ? L e g a l R o l eQ u a l i f i c a t i o n ␣ t e : l e g a l Q u a l i f i c a t i o nN ␣?LegalNorm .
19 }
13.7 Summary
This chapter presented a partial implementation of a specific rulebook, inspired by the European
legislation for trust services. It complements the implementation of the data model and of the
data import and transformation mechanism that were described in Chapters 11 and 12. The
rules derived from requirements IR2 Transparency and IR3 Linked and unique identity together
with a subset of those derived from IR4 Competently acting in role were implemented. The
implementation also serves as a demonstration of how the rules for the other requirements can
be implemented.
The approach, technical set-up and implementation of the rules was described. A similar
approach can be applied to implement the remaining rules.
This implementation contributes to the validation of the proposed framework by showing




Building on the implementations of the data model, the data import and trans-
formation functions, and the rulebook, the use of the trustworthiness evaluation
function to improve the interpretation of trustworthiness is described.
14.1 Introduction
This chapter shows how the data that was collected and the rules that were specified in the
previous chapters support the hypothesis of the thesis presented in Section 1.2.2. This hypoth-
esis states that a reduction of possible interpretations of trust claims is desirable, and that such
a reduction can be based on a systematic approach that combines collecting and aggregating
trust artefacts that include contextual information, followed by reasoning according to clearly
specified, documented and explainable logic. To support this hypothesis, the chapter presents:
• how rules can be selected from the rulebook specified in Chapter 13 to construct a trust-
worthiness evaluation function,
• how such a trustworthiness evaluation function can be executed using the database that
was constructed in Chapter 12, and
• how the result obtained from performing this evaluation can be used to improve the in-
terpretation of trustworthiness.
The remainder of this chapter is as follows.
• Section 14.2 describes the approach followed for performing trustworthiness evaluation.
• Section 14.3 describes the preparatory steps.
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• Section 14.4 describes the evaluation of the mandatory rules. These rules are relevant
regardless of the type of participant that is being evaluated.
• Section 14.5 describes the evaluation of an evidence service provider and how the results
improve the interpretation of trustworthiness.
• Section 14.6 provides a summary of the chapter.
14.2 Approach
14.2.1 Overview
The proposed approach was introduced in Section 6.7.5 and consists of four steps.
• A choice must be made whether to evaluate the trustworthiness of an ecosystem or a
participant.
– In the ecosystem case, an ecosystem and a rulebook are evaluated without specify-
ing a particular participant.
– In the participant case, the participant that performs the evaluation is referred to as
the potential trustor, and the participant whose data is evaluated is referred to as the
potential trustee. The evaluation is performed in the context of a specific rulebook
and database.
Only the second case was implemented, since this allows a demonstration of the frame-
work and the first case can be implemented in a similar way.
• A rulebook and a database containing instance data must be selected.
• Discretionary constraints must be selected from the chosen rulebook that correspond
to the trustor’s expectations regarding trustworthiness. These must be relevant to the
trustor’s decision to interact with the potential trustee. An example for an evidence ser-
vice provider is described in Section 14.5.
• The ecosystem or participant trustworthiness evaluation function must be executed to de-
termine whether the mandatory and the selected discretionary constraints can be satisfied
by the selected instance data.
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14.2.2 Performance
The evidence service provider was chosen as the class of participant for the demonstration
of execution of trustworthiness evaluation. The reason for this choice is that participants in
this class are instrumental in the provision of trust-related services. Furthermore, the imple-
mentation of trustworthiness evaluation for this class serves as a good example of how other
participant classes can be evaluated. The company Zetes (te:Zetes-SA-NV) was selected as the
evidence service provider to be evaluated.
To execute the twsevalAP function, the potential trustor must execute the mandatory and
selected discretionary queries. For the example policies that are described in this chapter, the
results from the queries are described in Sections 14.4 and 14.5. Since this information con-
sists of screenshots, the information cannot easily be presented here, so a summary is provided
together with links to where full information can be obtained1.
The results of the queries indicate whether the constraints are satisfied by the selected in-
stance data. To interpret the results of the queries, the potential trustor can make use of the
expected answers that are provided for each query in Chapter 13.
14.3 Preparatory steps
The potential trustor must access the file that contains the rulebook and the database that were
developed. The potential trustor should perform the following steps.
• Calculate the RIPEMD-160 and/or SHA-256 digest(s) of the file that contains the rule-
book, e.g. using CrypTool2. The file is available on-line3.
• Retrieve the digest of the rulebook individual te:RuleBook-001 specified by the property
te:ruleBook-digest-RIPEMD-160 and/or te:ruleBook-digest-SHA-256 in the database4.
• Verify that the respective digest values are identical; if so, the rulebook and the database
are consistent and the potential trustor can proceed.
1To conduct a further test, a graph database can be installed and the DBL.owl file imported. The queries can
be downloaded from the rulebook file (http://www.marcsel.eu/onto/te/RuleBook-001.txt) and can be
executed over the data. The results of the queries can be consulted. Since all data is available in the database, the
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14.4 Evaluation of the AP mandatory rules
A series of eight figures, described below, show the results obtained from executing a num-
ber of queries on the target database. These queries demonstrate the verification of the set of
constraints specified in the mandatory rules of the input rulebook.
• Figure 14.1 shows the result of querying IR2-M01. This confirms that at least one rule-
book is present in the database.
• Figure 14.2 shows the result of querying IR2-M02, the rulebook individual and its iden-
tifier.
• Additional to the information that results from the execution of the mandatory rules,
rulebook information can be listed as follows.
– Figure 14.3 shows the results from selecting the rulebook and shows the rulebook’s
properties.
– Figure 14.4 shows the results from selecting the rulebook’s identifier and shows its
properties.
• Figure 14.5 shows a part of the result of querying IR2-M10 and lists a selection of the
candidate participants. Zetes (te:Zetes-SA-NV) is included on line seven.
• Figure 14.6 shows a part of the result of querying IR3-M01 and lists a selection of the
participants. Zetes is included on line six.
Figure 14.7 shows the result of querying IR3-M01-EvSP. This refinement of IR3-M01 is
described in Listing M.1. It adds the condition that the participant must be an EvSP to
IR3-M01. Zetes is included on line two.
• Figure 14.8 shows the result of querying IR4-M01 and lists the participants that have
self-attested role attestations. Zetes is included on line three.
Figure 14.1: The result of querying IR2-M01
Figure 14.2: The result of querying IR2-M02
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Figure 14.4: Rulebook identifier properties
Figure 14.5: The result of querying IR2-M10, a list of candidate participants (selection)
14.5 Evidence service provider
Three EvSP trustworthiness policies were created to serve as examples of the policy types that
can be specified. Their evaluations provide results that allow the potential trustor to evaluate a
potential trustee (Zetes) in the role of an evidence service provider. The example policies are
described as well as the expected and actual query results.
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14.5.1 First EvSP trustworthiness policy
The first policy requires that the potential trustee:
• has a self-attested EvSP role attestation (IR3-D11-AP), and
• has an EvSP role attestation issued by a trustworthiness monitor (IR4-D26-AP).
14.5.2 Evaluation results
The results of the execution of the corresponding rules on the DBL.owl database are shown in
the following figures.
• Figure 14.9 shows the result of querying IR3-D11-AP . The expected result is that the
potential trustee is included in the list5.
• Figure 14.10 shows the result of querying IR4-D26-AP. The expected result is that the
potential trustee is included in the list. Zetes is included on line three.
14.5.3 Second EvSP trustworthiness policy
The second policy requires that the potential trustee:
• has a legal attestation of its role (IR4-D304B-AP), and
• has a role attestation based on a European trust list (IR4-D027A-AP).
14.5.4 Evaluation results
The results of the execution of the corresponding rules on the DBL.owl database are shown in
the following figures.
• Figure 14.11 shows the result of querying the query IR4-D304B-AP and lists all evidence
service providers that are legally attested in their role. The expected result is that the
potential trustee is included in the list. Zetes is included on line two.
This list might omit some evidence service providers that are legally attested in their role.
The database contains 70 evidence service providers, generated by the XSL programs
on the basis of the public trusted lists. The database contains two legal attestations for
evidence service providers only. The reason is that there is no obligation or common
5Natural persons with FOAF data do not appear in the list. This is because their attestations are based on the
Mendeley dataset, rather than on the participants themselves.
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way for evidence service providers to operate under a legal mandate that could be used
as a basis for te:Legal Qualification. As a consequence, legal attestations have to be
investigated on an individual basis.
Additional information can be obtained as follows.
– Figure 14.12 shows all participants for which a legal attestation was created on the
basis of a legal document. This was implemented as described in ListingM.2. Zetes
is included on line six.
– Figure 14.13 shows a selection of the sources from where role attestations were
derived. This was implemented as described in Listing M.3. Zetes is included on
line four.
• Figure 14.14 shows the result of querying the query IR4-D027A-AP and lists all evidence
service providers included in a European trust list (limited to the United Kingdom, Spain
and Belgium). The expected result is that the potential trustee is included in the list. The
list has 69 entries. Zetes is included on line 60.
14.5.5 Third EvSP trustworthiness policy
The third policy requires that the evidence service provider has a conformity attestation for
ETSI EN 319 403 [87] (IR4-D027B), and illustrates the possibility of additional conformity
attestation regarding further ETSI standards related to electronic trust services. There are more
than 100 such ETSI standards that can be consulted on the ETSI portal6.
14.5.6 Evaluation results
Figure 14.15 shows the result of querying the query IR4-D027B and lists all evidence service
providers that demonstrate compliance with ETSI EN 319 403 [87]. The expected result is that
the potential trustee is included in the list. Zetes is not included in the list.
Figure 14.16 shows all participants for which a conformance attestation was created on the
basis of the information published by a conformity assessment body. This was implemented as
described in Listing M.4. Standards that are commonly in use include:
• ETSI EN 319 401 [91],
• ETSI EN 319 411-1 [93], and
• ETSI EN 319 411-2 [95].
6https://portal.etsi.org/home.aspx
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The expected result is that the evidence service provider that was selected as potential trustee
demonstrates a conformity attestation of the standards that the potential trustor identified as
relevant. Zetes is included in the list on lines one, two and three.
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Figure 14.15: The result of querying IR4-D027B, the list of EvSPs that demonstrate compliance
with ETSI EN 319 403 [87]
Figure 14.16: The result of querying IRX-Participants-conformance, the list of participants
with an attestation of conformance to a standard
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14.6 Summary
This chapter presented results from performing the prototype implementation of the trustwor-
thiness evaluation function on selected test data. The approach, consisting of four steps, was
described. The implementation of the function twsevalAP for the participant class of evidence
service provider was provided. This allows the evaluation of a specific participant of the class
evidence service provider as potential trustee. Three EvSP trustworthiness policies were cre-
ated to serve as examples of the policy types that can be specified. Their evaluations provide
results that allow a potential trustor to evaluate a potential trustee in the role of an evidence
service provider. The example policies were described as well as the expected and actual query
results. This contributes to the validation of the proposed framework by showing
• how a potential trustor can select discretionary rules from a rulebook to specify a policy
for trustworthiness evaluation,
• how the corresponding queries can be performed, and
• how the results demonstrate satisfaction (or the lack thereof) of the selected rules, which
assists in the evaluation of a potential trustee.
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Chapter 15
Results and comparison with prior art
This chapter presents experimental results obtained from the partial implementa-
tion and a comparison with the prior art.
15.1 Introduction
This chapter presents experimental results obtained from the partial implementation described
in Chapters 10 – 13. A comparison with the prior art is also provided. The remainder of this
chapter is structured as follows.
• Section 15.2 provides experimental results from the partial implementation of the  
framework on a laptop computer.
• Section 15.3 provides a comparison with the prior art.
• Section 15.4 provides a summary of the chapter.
15.2 Experimental results
A laptop computer was used for the implementation of the   framework. This laptop was
running the Windows 10 64-bit Operating System and equipped with an Intel(R) Core(TM)
i7-4700 MQ CPU, running at 2.4 GHz, and with 12 GB ram.
Downloading the data sources employed a home-office Internet connection using the Digital
Subscriber Line (DSL) protocol. The network speed was measured using the ISP’s speedtest
and indicated a download speed of 20.9 Mbps (and an upload speed of 5.5 Mbps).
The Trusted Lists that were selected vary in size between 338Kilobytes and 2162Kilobytes.
Each individual download took less than one second. Extracting the selected data for 100.000
organisations from the FactForge SPARQL endpoint took 0.2 seconds, and the download took
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less than one second. The Mendeley Data’s FOAF dataset has a size of 3 Megabytes and was
downloaded in less than one second.
The execution of the XSL transformation on the laptop was performed while no other ap-
plications were active. Their execution always took less than one second. The following values
are listed as examples.
• TL2RDF_DataSource_LOTL_v301 took 385 milliseconds.
• TL2RDF_UK_EvSPs_v301 took 495 milliseconds.
• TL2RDF_BE_TwsMo_v301 took 426 milliseconds.
• FOAF_01_NP_v301 took 431 milliseconds.
• FOAF_02_NP_v301 took 524 milliseconds.
The creation of the database load file DBL.owl is described in Appendix L. Its loading
in the GraphDB database took approximately one second. A data import results in a total of
10787 statements in the database, of which 6250 are explicit assertions and 4537 are inferred.
The execution of the SPARQL queries took between 20 and 100 milliseconds.
Comparable performance figures for the prior art approaches described in Section 15.3
could not be identified.
15.3 Comparison with prior art
A comparison with the prior art was performed by analysing how the proposed   framework
approach relates to commonly accepted trust concepts, including those defined by Marsh and
by Bacharach and Gambetta, and by comparing it to the approaches of PKI, the Web of Trust
and selected other trust-related ontologies.
15.3.1 Preliminary observations
The proposed   framework is aligned with the following well-established principles related
to trust.
• It aligns with Luhmann’s thesis, as expressed in his work Trust and Power [226], that
‘trust allows to reduce the complexity of society’ by introducing a set of specialised roles,
and then introducing a formalisation for the qualification of these roles.
• It aligns with the concept of segregation of duty, specified by Clark and Wilson [60], by
introducing roles and constraints related to which roles can be combined.
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15.3.2 Relationship to Marsh’s concepts
As discussed in Section 2.3.2, Marsh [234] proposed formalising trust as a computational con-
cept. His proposals are relevant to evaluating trustworthiness in an electronic society, and are
hence relevant to the problems addressed in the thesis. The concepts of Marsh are related to
the   framework in the following ways.
• In Marsh’s approach, the trustor and trustee are referred to as ‘agents’ and it is implicitly
assumed they exist and are uniquely defined. It is also assumed agents have access to
information about other agents and the situations. However, how such information should
be specified and used is not formally defined.
To refer more concretely to these agents and to specify constraints on them, the  
framework contains rules ensuring the existence and uniqueness of participants.
• Marsh identifies situational trust, which corresponds to trust of x in y for z. He gives the
example of trusting his brother for driving him to the airport but not for flying the plane.
In the   framework, this is captured in the data model, more particularly in the set of
roles.
15.3.3 Relationship to Bacharach and Gambetta
15.3.3.1 The underlying problems of trust
As discussed in Section 2.2.1, Bacharach and Gambetta [18] describe what they refer to as ‘the
underlying problems of trust’ and introduce a distinction between the primary and secondary
problems of trust. These notions relate to the   framework in the following ways.
• The primary problem addressed by Bacharach and Gambetta is whether one can trust a
person to do X. This can be evaluated in two ways.
– Directly, in which case the person simply ‘does X’. This case is disregarded by
Bacharach and Gambetta since it ignores the trust-related decision altogether, and
completely exposes the trustor to the trustee. This case is also disregarded in the
  framework.
– Indirectly, based on information gathered from the context. In the   framework
this is addressed by attestations, either self-provided or provided by another partic-
ipant.
• The secondary problem is how to construct sufficiently clear identities for the person
and X. This is addressed by the data model described in Chapter 7 and the constraints
described in Chapter 8.
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Building on the work of Bacharach and Gambetta, we formulate a third underlying problem
of trust as whether to rely on a trust evaluation performed by oneself or by another party.
15.3.3.2 Addressing the underlying problems of trust
The three problems discussed above are addressed in the   framework in the following ways.
• The primary problem of trust, whether one can trust a person to do X, is addressed by the
use of attestations.
• The second problem, how to construct sufficiently clear identies of the person and X,
is addressed by the data model described in Chapter 7 and the constraints described in
Chapter 8.
• The third problem, whether to rely on a trust evaluation performed by oneself or by an-
other party, currently remains unaddressed. However, it could be addressed by explicitly
describing and evaluating the evaluator (as ‘evaluated by’). This is not covered in the
framework as currently defined, and addressing this is a possible area for future research.
An outline of how it could be addressed is provided in Section 16.4.5.
15.3.4 PKI
PKI, whose trust model was introduced in Section 2.3.2, was chosen as a basis for validation
because it is a trust model that is in use today on a global scale. This focus is supported by the
recent ETSI report TR 103 684 [99] on global trust which states that it concentrates on existing
PKI-based trust services as these are themost prevalent across theworld. PKI and its trust model
were described in Section 2.3. We argue the proposed   framework is more precise than PKI
in terms of semantics regarding the meaning of trustworthiness for the following reasons.
• PKI policies suffer from a lack of clear semantics. This was observed in the survey as
described in Section 3.5.2.5 and analysed in Section 3.5.3.1.
• The ETSI report TR 103 684 [99] analyses 37 PKI standard, global, sector and national
PKI schemes. Part of the study addresses trust representation. The study states that the
following four main models for representation of trust are widely used:
– national root-signing by a national root CA with the ability to cross-certify other
CAs for recognition;
– trust stores listing the approved issuing CAs or root-CAs operated by an application
or software platform provider;
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– trusted lists as specified in ETSI TS 119 612 [89]; and
– cross certification between CAs, or between a CA and a root-CA, through a bridge
CA.
However these four models are not models for representation of trust but rather models
to specify anchor points for the trust required in a PKI root.
We argue that the semantic approach proposed in the   framework is more complete
and semantically more precise in representing and reasoning about trust, because it allows a
potential trustor to select data points that represent information on a potential trustee from a
qualified and distributed set of data sources. Furthermore the PKI model does not allow the role
and potential trustworthiness of the service provider that verifies the status of an authenticated
or signed object to be clearly described. The traditional PKI role distribution is as follows:
• an entity registers with a Certification Authority, which accepts the entity according its
policy;
• as a result of acceptance the entity receives one or more certificates;
• the entity can then use these certificates to engage in an interaction with a relying party;
• the replying party can then validate aspects of the interaction (e.g. verifying a public key
or an attribute) using the certificates.
What is rarely if ever addressed in PKI policies is the fact that, if the verification policy is
complex in nature, verification may involve another service provider. Such a service provider
is explicitly introduced in the   data model as the claim status service provider.
15.3.5 Web of Trust
As described in Section 6.2.1, the PGPWeb of Trust is an alternative to a conventional PKI and
is used extensively, but it lacks precise semantics. We argue that the   framework is more
precise regarding the meaning of trustworthiness for the following reasons.
• PGP creates a graph of interrelationships by letting users sign keys they consider trust-
worthy. However PGP lacks a mechanism to extend this graph with any other attributes.
The   framework allows a more granular specification of the interrelationships through
its use of attestations.
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• PGP lacks a mechanism for propagating trust opinions within the web of trust.
Following Marsh (see Section 3.5.3.2) the   framework does not assume that trust is
transitive. However, the   framework offers an alternative in the form of chaining of
relationships, such as in the rule IR4−D026. It is possible to evaluate chains of edges such
as those created by the relationships between accreditation bodies, conformity assessment
bodies and evidence service providers.
15.3.6 Trust-related ontologies
The survey in Chapter 3 classified trust-related approaches into five clusters. Of these ap-
proaches, those that appear in the cluster ‘trust-related ontologies specified in OWL’ are com-
pared below to the   framework because their objectives, representation formalisms and rea-
soning mechanism are the closest to it. This cluster is described in Section 3.5.2.1, and Table
3.1 provides an overview.
15.3.6.1 Bernabé et al. – SOFIC/Trust-DSS
Bernabé et al. [26] proposed a Security Ontology For the InterCloud (SOFIC). The   frame-
work relates to the SOFIC/Trust-DSS system in the following ways.
• Similarities include the following.
– Both use the formalisms of an ontology and rules with the aim to support trust-
related decisions.
– Both import other ontologies to improve interoperability.
• The following are the main differences.
– SOFIC/Trust-DSS approach focuses on decisions related to cloud service providers
while the   framework addresses the broader setting of a potential trustor and a
potential trustee.
– The SOFIC/Trust-DSS approach bases its trust-related decision support on an on-
tology which is security based. The   data model integrates security data points
but is not limited to them.
– The SOFIC/Trust-DSS approach involves significant manual effort for translation
of observations about service providers into instances of a SOFIC class, and for the
customisation of rules to express what needs to be assessed. The   framework
has automated this translation by the use of XSL, and includes the concept of a
rulebook which consists of pre-specified rules.
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– The SOFIC/Trust-DSS approach is open to a variety of data sources and rules may
be created for specific cases. The operation of the   framework has been demon-
strated using real-world data imported through the data import and transformation
mechanism, which outputs the data expressed using description logic.
– The SOFIC/Trust-DSS approach uses data aggregation and quantification. The  
framework does not, because we argued in Section 3.5.3.2 that it is not useful for
trust.
15.3.6.2 Karthik and Ananthanarayana – the TRUST framework
Karthik and Ananthanarayana [197] proposed a trust framework for sensor-driven pervasive
environments that is based on an OWL ontology and security rules in SWRL. The ontology
is referred to as the TRUST ontology. The   framework relates to Karthik and Anantha-
narayana’s TRUST framework in the following ways.
• Similarities include the following.
– Both use the formalisms of an ontology and rules with the aim of supporting trust-
related decisions.
– Both use the notion of the subject as trustor and the object as potential trustee.
– Both use provenance of information in the evaluation of trustworthiness.
• The following are the main differences.
– While the   framework imports other ontologies to improve interoperability, the
Karthik and Ananthanarayana TRUST framework does not.
– While the   framework gives a truth-functional interpretation to the outcome of a
trustworthiness evaluation, the TRUST framework gives a trust score (a numerical
value such as 0.3). The   framework does not use numerical values, because we
argued in Section 3.5.3.2 that it is not useful for trust.
– While the   framework makes its evaluation rules publicly available through the
publication of a rulebook and the corresponding queries, the rules used by the
TRUST framework are not available.
– The TRUST framework focuses on decisions related to a pervasive sensor-driven
network, while the   framework addresses the broader setting of a potential trustor
and a potential trustee.
– The   framework includes an automated mechanism to create instance data. How
to generate instance data for the TRUST framework is not addressed.
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15.3.6.3 Karuna et al. – the UTPO ontology
Karuna et al. [198] describe a trust model for on-line health information systems. The model
consists of a taxonomy of trust factors which is implemented as the User’s Trust Profile Ontol-
ogy (UTPO) in OWL. The taxonomy of trust factors and validate it through a user survey based
on nine responses. The   framework relates to the UTPO ontology in the following ways.
• Similarities include the following.
– Both use the formalisms of an ontology with the aim of supporting trust-related
decisions.
– Both implementations make use of OWL DL.
• The following are the main differences.
– The focus of the UTPO ontology is on-line healthcare systems, while the   frame-
work addresses the broader setting of a potential trustor and a potential trustee.
– While the   framework imports other ontologies to improve interoperability, the
UTPO ontology does not.
– The UTPO ontology is, as its name implies, limited to an ontology. There is no
discussion of how to instantiate the ontology for practical use cases, or how to use
the trust factors it proposes.
– The UTPO ontology is intended to be used as the basis for a recommender system
with numerical values, while the   framework gives a truth-functional interpre-
tation to the outcome of a trustworthiness evaluation.
– The   framework includes an automated mechanism to create instance data. How
to generate instance data for an instantiation of the UTPO ontology is not addressed.
15.3.6.4 Kravari and Bassiliades – the ORDAIN ontology
Kravari and Bassiliades [205] propose ORDAIN as a general-purpose ontology for trust man-
agement in the Internet of Things. The   framework relates to ORDAIN in the following
ways.
• Similarities include the following.
– Both use the formalisms of an ontology with the aim of supporting trust-related
decisions.
– Both use OWL DL for their implementation.
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• The following are the main differences.
– While the   framework imports other ontologies to improve interoperability, the
ORDAIN ontology does not.
– TheORDAIN ontology focuses on reputation, which is assumed to be the prime fac-
tor in the establishment and maintenance of trust between parties. The   frame-
work focuses on evaluation of trustworthiness.
– While the   framework gives a truth-functional interpretation to the outcome of a
trustworthiness evaluation, ORDAIN is based on data aggregation and confidence
level calculations. The   framework does not use numerical values, because we
argued in Section 3.5.3.2 that it is not useful for trust.
– While the   framework makes its evaluation rules publicly available through the
publication of a rulebook and the corresponding queries. The calculation of the
reputation score is not addressed in ORDAIN.
– The   framework includes an automated mechanism to create instance data. How
to generate instance data according to the ORDAIN ontology is not addressed.
15.3.6.5 Oltramari and Cho – the ComTrustO framework
Oltramari and Cho [261] propose ComTrustO, a composite trust-based ontology framework
fusion, modelled in OWL. The   framework relates to ComTrustO in the following ways.
• Similarities include the following.
– Both use the formalisms of an ontology with the aim of supporting trust-related
decisions.
– Both import other ontologies to improve interoperability.
– Both address the setting of a potential trustor and a potential trustee.
– Both address trust as multidimensional. ComTrustO is a composite ontology of four
layers (communication trust, information trust, social trust and cognitive trust). In
the   framework this is addressed by the integrated requirements and the selection
of data points in multiple dimensions.
• The following are the main differences.
– ComTrustO is, as implied by its name, an ontology. How to use the ontology (which
typically involves an instantiation of individuals of the classes defined by the on-
tology), or how to support decision-making (e.g. by rules), is envisaged as future
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research. Oltramari and Cho [261] state that they plan to investigate the applicabil-
ity of real data sets. The   framework includes an ontology and a set of reasoning
rules. Furthermore, the data import and transformation mechanism has been in-
stantiated to create instance data on the basis of real data sets.
15.3.6.6 Sel – the Trust Claim Interpretation model
Sel [296] proposed the Trust Claim Interpretation (TCI) model. It is based on a combination of
newly defined classes and existing vocabularies from W3C. The   framework relates to the
TCI model in the following ways.
• Similarities include the following.
– Both address the setting of a potential trustor and a potential trustee.
– Both use the formalisms of an ontology and rules with the aim of supporting trust-
related decisions.
– Both import other ontologies to improve interoperability.
• The following are the main differences.
– In the TCI model, unlike the   framework, the creation of classes is not based on
an analysis of requirements.
– The TCI model involves significant manual effort for the manual translation of ob-
servations about entities into instances of a TCI class. The   framework has au-
tomated this translation using XSL. Also, the operation of the   framework has
been demonstrated using real-world data converted into FOL via data import and
transformation mechanisms.
– The TCI model includes only a limited set of example rules. The   framework
includes the concept of a rulebook consisting of pre-specified rules. Furthermore
the   framework allows the specification of a trustworthiness evaluation policy,
based on the distinction between mandatory and discretionary rules.
15.3.6.7 Sullivan et al. – the Trust-term ontology
As described in Section 3.5.2.1, Sullivan et al. [307] define security requirements, metrics and
trust terms in the form of a Trust-term ontology. The   framework relates to the Trust-term
ontology in the following way.
• Similarities include the following.
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– Both use the formalisms of an ontology.
– Both attribute importance to transparency and identification.
– Both address the setting of a potential trustor and a potential trustee.
• The following are the main differences.
– The Trust-term ontology does not make use of other existing ontologies to improve
interoperability. Rather it aims to refine the terminology related to security and
trust. The ontology of the   framework builds on multiple existing ontologies, as
described in Section 11.2.3.
– The Trust-term ontology uses the property ‘fosters’ to link anonymity to trust. The
ontology of the   framework does not cover anonymity, because anonymity was
not identified as a necessary characteristic for the context of interest.
– The Trust-term ontology explicitly defines accountability, which the property ‘fa-
cilitates’ links to responsibility. The ontology of the   framework addresses this
implicitly, through legal attestations.
– The Trust-term ontology does not address instance data, as it limits its scope to
terminology. The   framework encompasses instance data to demonstrate how to
reason with the concepts defined in the ontology.
15.3.7 Summary of the comparison
The   framework has the following characteristics that go beyond the prior art.
When compared to the use of trust in trusted third parties, the   framework is more pre-
cise in terms of semantics regarding the meaning of trustworthiness because it allows a potential
trustor to select data points that represent information with a specific meaning regarding a po-
tential trustee, from a qualified and distributed set of data sources.
When compared to the use of trust in the Web of Trust, the   framework allows:
• a more granular specification of the interrelationships between participants through its
use of attestations, and
• the chaining of relationships, which makes it possible to evaluate chains of edges such as
those created by the relationships between accreditation bodies, conformity assessment
bodies and evidence service providers.
When compared with trust-related ontologies, the   framework has the following addi-
tional characteristics.
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• It includes evaluation criteria for data sources, as well as methods to automatically create
instance data about the potential trustees and their context from selected data sources.
• It builds on existing W3C ontologies to enable interoperability.
• It has a formal data model that addresses the context (accreditation, conformity, legal
qualification) of the relationship between a potential trustor and a potential trustee.
• It includes a basic rulebook in FOL, and allows implementation of specific rulebooks on
the basis of the data model and this basic rulebook.
15.4 Summary
This chapter presented experimental results of the partial implementation of the   frame-
work. Using a home-office Internet connection and a regular laptop, all individual operations
(downloads, transformations, data base load, queries) could be performed in less than or ap-
proximately one second.
A comparison against existing frameworks was also given, covering the well-known trust
concepts such as those from Marsh and from Bacharach and Gambetta, the PKI and WOT




This chapter concludes the thesis by providing a summary and a review of the work
performed. This leads naturally to a detailed assessment of the validation of the
trustworthiness evaluation framework proposed in the thesis. Areas for further
research are also described.
16.1 Introduction
The thesis proposed a novel approach to improving interpretations of claims of trustworthiness.
It was argued that one should not ‘trust’ but rather take an informed decision on the basis of
evidence and reasoning. Data points that represent evidence from multiple data sources can be
combined and logically reasoned about.
This chapter presents the conclusions of the thesis and describes areas for further research.
It is structured as follows.
• Section 16.2 provides a summary of the   framework and the partial implementation
developed to validate it.
• Section 16.3 presents a review of the main hypothesis of the thesis, and gives answers to
the research questions on the basis of the work performed.
• Section 16.4 proposes areas for future work.
• Section 16.5 provides a summary of the chapter.
16.2 The   framework
The objective of the   framework is to allow a potential trustor to evaluate the trustworthiness
of a potential trustee. This evaluation is based on verifying whether a set of rules is satisfied
351
16.2. The   framework 16. Summary and conclusions
by particular instance data. The framework contains four classes of components: a data model,
rulebooks, trustworthiness evaluation functions and methods to create instance data about the
potential trustees and their context. To demonstrate the practical feasibility of the proposed
solution, a partial implementation was developed.
16.2.1 Requirements
The requirements for the framework were given in Chapter 5, and were developed on the basis
of a literature review and the requirements developed in the Horizon2020 FutureTrust project1
work packages [229], [230]. Requirements from these sources were combined into the follow-
ing set of integrated requirements.
• IR1 Semantic definition of trustworthiness: As a participant in an electronic ecosystem I
can understand the meaning of trustworthiness of participants I plan to engage with, so
that I can make an informed decision on whom to interact with.
• IR2 Transparency: As a participant in an electronic ecosystem where I have access to
a function that allows me to evaluate trustworthiness of other participants, I can access
all information (including inputs used and operations performed) of this function in a
transparent way, so that I can understand the factors that contribute to trustworthiness
and their mapping on evidence such as qualifications of entities.
• IR3 Linked and unique identity: As a participant in an electronic ecosystem where I have
access to a function that allows me to evaluate the trustworthiness of other participants,
I can rely on this function combining all information about participants available within
the ecosystem, so that I can claim the outcome of the trustworthiness evaluation is based
on all information known about the evaluated participant.
• IR4 Competently acting in role As a participant in an electronic ecosystem I have access
to and I can demonstrate that I accept the definitions of roles, the qualifications that are
required per role, and how these qualifications are demonstrated by participants, so that
I can verify these arguments are suitable to support the reliance I want to take on the
outcome of the reasoning.
• IR5 Governance, security and controls: As a participant in an electronic ecosystem I can
understand the governance, security safeguards and controls that are in place within the
ecosystem, so that I can claim the outcome of the trustworthiness evaluation took into
consideration that the ecosystem meets good practices regarding these topics.
1http://www.futuretrust.eu
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• IR6 Policy choices: As a possible participant in an electronic interaction I can determine
the information and the reasoning justifying that a participant is qualified as trustworthy,
so that I can verify that information and reasoning are compatible with the way I want to
rely on the reasoning’s outcome.
• IR7 Obtaining credible data: As a participant in an electronic ecosystem I can under-
stand the origin and the type of data that is used in the evaluation of trustworthiness of
participants, so that I can claim the outcome of the trustworthiness evaluation is based
on credible data.
16.2.2 Framework participants
The framework positions participants within an ecosystem, divided into three planes, described
in Chapter 6. Participants may invoke services provided by participants from any plane. The
enabler plane consists of the participants whose role is to enable trustworthiness, and also con-
tains the rulebooks and the trustworthiness evaluation functions which are available to all par-
ticipants. The roles in this plane are as follows.
• An authentic source holds a mandate to register and validate information about entities
and makes this information available. The mandate can be a document that has legal
validity because it is published in an official journal or because it is accepted to be binding
through a contract or membership agreement.
• An endorser expresses its publicly visible approval for a rulebook through its endorse-
ment, and makes information on responsibility, accountability, and authority to imple-
ment security governance available either itself or endorses information made available
by others.
• An enforcer is an entity with power to enforce consequences among participants. An
enforcer acts as arbiter or judge and provides the possibility for redress. Enforcement is
outside the proposed system, but information about whether enforcement is available can
be captured and reasoned about.
• An accreditation body is an entity that performs accreditation, i.e. the independent eval-
uation of conformity assessment bodies against recognised criteria for their impartiality
and competence. An accreditation body accredits participants in the role of a conformity
assessment body.
• A conformity assessment body assesses the conformity of participants and their services
against relevant criteria, and provides assurances of conformity in the form of attestations.
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The trustworthiness provision plane involves participants that provide trustworthiness ser-
vices. The principal roles in this plane are as follows.
• An evidence service provider creates information that serves as evidence. It includes
traditional Trust Service Providers such as Certification Authorities, Identity Providers,
Attribute Providers, (Remote) Signature Services, Time Stamp Services, etc.
• A claim status service provider provides status information regarding claims, e.g. veri-
fying a response to an authentication request, or verifying an electronic commitment or
signature.
• A trustworthiness monitor is a participant that monitors and attests the services from
evidence service providers and claim status service providers.
The functional plane consists of participants that act in the role functional service providers,
that offer business services, and functional service consumers, that interact with the former.
16.2.3 Data model
Predicates are used to model the data points that are used for trustworthiness evaluation. The
purpose of the predicates is to represent things from the real world, so that they can be reasoned
with. 15 predicates were specified in Chapter 7, of which a selection is listed below. S always
refers to the Subject.
• Actor(X), an entity without any attestation
• Attestation(aid , T), where aid = the identity of the issuer of the attestation and triple T
={S, A, V} where A refers to Attribute and V to Value
• Participant(X)
• Base role specified as Attestation(aid , (S, roleTypeBase, V)) where V refers to an instance
of a role type
• Accreditation(aid , (S, accreditedFor, N) where N refers to Norm
• Conformance(aid , (S, doesConformTo, N) where N refers to Norm
• LegalQualification(aid , (S, legalQual, L) where L refers to a legal qualification such as a
law, regulation, act, or decree
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16.2.4 Rulebooks
The concept of a rulebook was specified in Chapter 8. The purpose of a rulebook is to formally
capture an understanding of what trustworthiness means in a particular context, where this
understanding is captured in the form of constraints. The rules were specified in FOL, using
the predicates defined in the data model.
A rulebook contains a mandatory and a discretionary part. The mandatory constraints ver-
ify the basis for relevant execution of the discretionary rules. The latter can be selected by a
potential trustor to configure a policy for trustworthiness evaluation.
16.2.5 Trustworthiness evaluation
16.2.5.1 The function twsevalAE
The trustworthiness evaluation function twsevalAE is used to verify that an ecosystem is trust-
worthy. The function takes the form
twsevalAE(Rid , {DiscretionaryRules}, InstanceData)
where
• Rid identifies the applicable rulebook,
• {DiscretionaryRules} denotes the set of discretionary rules selected by the trustor, and
• InstanceData identifies the instance data that is to be used.
Execution of the function includes verification of the mandatory rules of the selected rule-
book. The function returns true when all of the evaluated rules return true. True means that
the evaluated ecosystem meets the constraints specified in the rules, which is an indication of
trustworthiness. The function returns falsewhen at least one of the evaluated rules returns false.
False means that the evaluated ecosystem does not meet the constraints specified in the rules,
which is an indication of a possible lack of trustworthiness.
16.2.5.2 The function twsevalAP
The trustworthiness evaluation function twsevalAP is used to verify that a participant is trust-
worthy. The function takes the form
twsevalAP(RBKid , P1, target_base_role_X, {DiscretionaryRules}, InstanceData, {Norms})
where
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• RBKid denotes the identification of the applicable rulebook,
• X denotes the identification of the potential trustee,
• target_base_role_X denotes the target base role of X, i.e. the role the trustor would expect
the trustee X to act in,
• {DiscretionaryRules} stand for the set of discretionary rules selected by the trustor, which
allows to configure a trustworthiness evaluation policy, and
• InstanceData denotes the reference to the instance data that is to be used,
• {Norms} denotes the set of discretionary norms (i.e. legal acts and technical standards)
the trustee is expected to provide attestations of conformity assessment to.
Execution of the function includes verification of the mandatory rules of the selected rule-
book. The function returns true when all of the evaluated rules return true. True means that
the evaluated participant meets the constraints specified in the rules, which is an indication of
trustworthiness. The function returns falsewhen at least one of the evaluated rules returns false.
False means that the evaluated participant does not meet the constraints specified in the rules,
which is an indication of a possible lack of trustworthiness.
16.2.6 Implementation
16.2.6.1 Technical set-up
The framework was implemented in an architecture that is composed of a front-end and back-
end layer. The front-end layer contains the   data model2 created using Protégé [250], trans-
formation programs3 that download information from the data sources and transform it accord-
ing to the   data model, and SPARQL queries whose answers allow to verify the satisfaction
of the rules. The back-end layer stores the downloaded information as instance data in an On-
totext GraphDB database4.
16.2.6.2 Instance data
The creation of instance data was addressed in Chapter 12. For the trustworthiness evaluation
to be based on credible data, such data must come from authoritative sources that allow access
to data that corresponds to one or more predicates. This lead to the following selection criteria.
The data source must offer data that is specified in the data model, it must be authoritative
2http://www.marcsel.eu/onto/te/te-data-model.owl
3Developed in a combination of Java and Extensible Stylesheet Language Transformations [377] (XSLTs).
4https://graphdb.ontotext.com/
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for this data, it must include a description of its meaning, and the data must be available in a
machine readable format.
There are a number of data sources capable of providing data corresponding to one or more
predicates. The current implementation limits itself to data sources in the public domain. On
the basis of the selection criteria, the European Trusted Lists5 and the Linked Open Data source
FactForge6 were selected as data sources for information about companies. Data sources were
also selected for information about accreditation, conformity assessment and legal attestation.
Using the same selection criteria, a FOAF file from Elsevier’sMendeley Data Search (described
by Petrovic and Fujita [273]) and one of the author’s X.509 certificates, produced by the Belgian
national identity register, were used as data sources about natural persons. The selected data was
downloaded and transformed into triples that could be loaded in the graph database. Provenance
information was added to indicate the original data source of the information in the database.
16.2.6.3 Rulebook implementation
A specific rulebook, inspired by the eIDAS Regulation [103] and meeting the requirements de-
fined in Chapter 5, was described in Chapter 13. Requirement IR1 is addressed by formulating
the rules in FOL using a taxonomy of data points that have a truth-functional interpretation.
While FOL adds value through its truth-functional interpretation, the implementation refines
this by using the Organization (ORG) ontology [376] and the Provenance (PROV-O) ontology
[357]. This improves interpretation because the ontologies are written in OWL, which allows
expression of fine-grained constraints and provides an interpretation in natural language. Rules
were defined to address requirements IR2, IR3, IR4 and IR5 in the following ways.
• IR2 is addressed by making the data model, the rules and the trustworthiness evaluation
functions publicly available, by using instance data from publicly available sources, and
by the specification of rules. Mandatory rules specify requirements on existence and
identification of the rulebook and naming of participants. Ten discretionary rules specify
requirements on the existence of participants in specific roles.
• IR3 is addressed by defining a mandatory rule regarding the uniqueness of identity. Dis-
cretionary rules specify requirements on identity attestation regarding self-attestation,
increasingly stringent third-party attestation and legal attestation of identity.
• IR4 is addressed by defining amandatory rule on role attestation regarding self-attestation,
and discretionary rules specify increasingly stringent attestation requirements for the dif-
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• IR5 is addressed by defining discretionary rules that cover disclosure and segregation of
duty.
IR6 is addressed by keeping the number of mandatory rules minimal, and allowing the
potential trustor to select discretionary rules that correspond best to its policy. IR7 is addressed
by defining selection criteria for data sources from where the instance data will be generated.
16.2.6.4 Evaluation of trustworthiness
An evaluation of an entity as a potential trustee involves the following steps. The trustor must
connect to the database that holds the instance data, select the discretionary rules of its choice
and execute the queries that correspond to the mandatory and selected rules. The query results
allow satisfaction of the rules to be verified.
16.3 Review
16.3.1 Review of hypothesis
Section 1.2.2 contains the following hypothesis: ‘Wheremachine processable information about
actors is available, it is desirable and possible to automate reasoning about the properties of
these actors to support trust-related decision making based on formal semantics.’
Evidence was identified that supports this hypothesis. As shown in Part II, logical speci-
fications can be formalised that describe properties of actors relevant to trust-related decision
making, and the evaluation of trustworthiness can be modelled as constraint satisfaction. Part
III demonstrated:
• that authentic data sources containing the required information in machine readable for-
mat are available;
• how the logical specifications, elaborated in Part II, can be implemented with formal
semantics in OWL and in a graph database, and how this allows automated reasoning
about the properties of actors to support trust-related decision making.
16.3.2 Review of research questions
The following answers to the research questions that were posed in Section 1.2.3 derive from
the work described.
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16.3.2.1 How can we semantically define trustworthiness?
As trust is a social concept, we did not attempt to describe it in the context of the electronic
society. However, we demonstrated in Part II that a meaningful description of trustworthiness
can be given using a data model, rulebooks and a specification of trustworthiness evaluation.
These were developed on the basis of a set of requirements that were established in Chapter
5. Requirements IR1 Semantic definition of trustworthiness and IR2 Transparency contributed
specifically to the elaboration of a meaningful description.
16.3.2.2 How can we reason about trustworthiness?
It was demonstrated that formal logic, aided by transparency and credible input data can assist in
automating claims of trustworthiness. Claims of trustworthiness can be evaluated on the basis
of a policy. Compliance to the policy can be demonstrated by the execution of queries over
the graph database. Chapter 8, and particularly Section 8.2, describe how constraints on data
points that represent relationships or attributes can be formalised as rules in FOL. Chapter 13
demonstrates how these rules can be implemented in OWL. Chapter 14 provides a description
of how the results of the execution of these rules can be interpreted.
16.3.2.3 On what can reasoning to qualify an entity as trustworthy be based?
A trustworthy ecosystem was proposed in Chapter 6, and on the basis of the roles given there,
the required information was identified and a corresponding data model was defined in Chapter
7. Requirements IR4 Competently acting in role and IR5 Governance and controls contributed
to the identification of the required information to support the proposed reasoning.
16.3.2.4 Obtaining information for use in reasoning
The fourth research question was formulated as How can we obtain information for use in
supporting such reasoning about ‘real world’ entities?
Selection criteria for the required information artefacts were specified in Chapter 12, and
data sources were identified. For relevant data sources, transformation programs were devel-
oped that converted information in XML format to OWL XML/RDF format. Where the infor-
mation was not available in machine-readable format, manual conversion was done on the basis
of publishes PDF documents. Such manual conversions obviously do not scale. Requirement
IR7 Obtaining credible data contributed to the development of the data import and transforma-
tion method.
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16.4 Areas for future research
16.4.1 Identity issues
As described in Section 7.5, the   framework is built on the assumption that a unique linkable
identity can be implemented. Whether this is both feasible and desirable is an open question.
Recent work in this area includes the following.
• The Solid7 initiative, described by Werbrouck et al. [383], has developed a set of con-
ventions and tools for building decentralized social applications based on Linked Data
principles. Solid relies on existing W3C standards and protocols. These include RDF
for resource description, Web Identity and Discovery (WebID) to provide universal user-
names/IDs for Solid apps, and to refer to agents (people, organizations, devices), and
the FOAF vocabulary. The objective is to give users direct control over their identity
attributes. For this purpose, such attributes are stored in a so-called Solid pod. Before
an application has access to an attribute, the user needs to grant permission for this. As
opposed to the current model used by big tech companies, this gives the control over
identity and other attributes back to the user.
• Project SEAL8, described by Aragó-Monzonís et al. [7], has identity reconciliation as its
prime focus. The envisaged functionality of SEAL is to act as a trusted authority to issue
information about the relationship between different identities and data sets.
• Verheul et al. [329] proposed polymorphic encryption and pseudonymisation as a novel
approach for the management of personal data and of pseudonymous authentication. The
proposed scheme is based on the homomorphic properties of the ElGamal algorithm [84].
For an overview refer to Appendix J.2.1. The key idea of polymorphic encryption is that
directly after generation, data can be encrypted in a ‘polymorphic’ manner and stored as
such. There is no need to decide a priori whowill be allowed to see the data. This decision
will be made on the basis of a policy, in which the data subject should play a key role. The
encrypted data can be tweaked to make it decryptable by a specific party. This tweaking
can be done in a blind manner, by a trusted party who knows how and for whom to tweak
the ciphertext. The proposed polymorphic pseudonymisation infrastructure guarantees
that each individual will automatically have different pseudonyms for different parties
and can only be de-pseudonymised by participants who know the original identity.
Future work on the   framework could investigate whether a subset of identity attributes
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enhancing techniques could aid in reducing the need for a single unique linked identity, or could
replace it by another approach, are interesting possible directions for further work.
16.4.2 Further semantic refinement
As described in Chapter 11 and in Appendix D, the framework implementation makes use of a
selection of existing ontologies.
• Additional ontologies could be analysed for identification of additional data points that
further improve trustworthiness evaluation. Candidate ontologies include the following.
– TheW3C Registered Organization Vocabulary9 (RegORG) is a profile of the Orga-
nization Ontology intended for describing organisations that have gained legal en-
tity status through a formal registration process, typically in a national or regional
register. A Registered Organization is a sub class of the Organization Ontology’s
Formal Organization. RegORG includes three sub properties of ORG’s classifica-
tion property covering status, activity and type. It uses the identifier issued by the
relevant registration authority that confers legal status.
– MetaLex and Legal Knowledge Interchange Format (LKIF), as described by Boer
et al. [35], are relevant ontologies. MetaLex is an interchange format intended to
impose a standardised view on legal documents for the purposes of information
exchange and interoperability in the context of software development. LKIF was
designed with the goal of becoming a standard for representing and interchanging
policy, legislation and cases, including their justificatory arguments, in the legal
domain.
• The use of ontologies that cover the legal domain, and additional data points that address
legal information could allow expression of legal effects such as presumption of validity,
exemption from the burden of proof and assumption of legal compliance as components
of the evaluation of trustworthiness.
• Selective classes of the FIBO ontologies, described in Section D.2.3, are currently used
in the implementation. As these ontologies contain a rich set of data points, their further
potential could be studied.
Future research could investigate whether the use of these ontologies can contribute to more
refined semantics of trustworthiness.
9https://www.w3.org/TR/vocab-regorg/
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16.4.3 Data model extensions
The proposed data model provides a foundation for trustworthiness evaluation. Section 6.3
specified two types of roles: base roles and situational roles. The current data model and the
corresponding trustworthiness evaluation are limited to base roles. A situational role indicates a
specific participant role in a situation. Examples of situations include an interactive session, an
information transfer, and the storage/retrieval of information. Situational roles are, as indicated
by their name, bound to a specific situation. The use of situational roles is a topic for future
research.
16.4.4 Rulebook extensions
The proposed rulebook can serve as a basis for trustworthiness evaluation, but it can be ex-
tended. Future research topics in this area include the following.
• Governance aspects could be further incorporated. The current specification is limited to
governance of information security. There are several other areas of governance within
an organisation, such as governance of information technology, and organisational gov-
ernance. How governance of such areas could contribute to trustworthiness is a possible
future research topic, potentially covering both the operation of the governance processes
and the outcome of these processes.
• Security safeguards could be further incorporated. For example rules on the use of trust-
worthy hardware and/or software could be envisaged. Such rules could be based on con-
formity assessment.
• The dependency of a participant on another participant, such as created through owner-
ship, may influence trustworthiness in specific situations. How independence (or the lack
thereof) of participants could contribute to trustworthiness is a possible topic for future
research.
• How to create rulebooks for a consensus-governed society rather than for a law-governed
society could usefully be investigated. This could include the role of membership or-
ganisations such as the Kantara Initiative10 as accreditation body and as publisher of a
trust list. In such a consensus-governed society the participants must be attested by other
participants using a consensus scheme. Many consensus-based schemes that are based
on blockchain technology are emerging.
10https://kantarainitiative.org/
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16.4.5 Evaluation-related
16.4.5.1 Use of logic
Regarding the use of logic in the evaluation function, the following topics are candidates for
further research.
• The evaluation functions makes use of instance data which contains information about
a specific set of entities. The current system is limited to instance data that can be used
as positive evidence, i.e. evidence which would allow a target role to be judged untrust-
worthy is not taken into account. The study of negative evidence is a possible topic for
future research.
• The thesis makes use of FOL to describe the proposed rulebook. Rules related to sep-
aration of duty could benefit from being specified algebraically, e.g. as proposed by Li
[218]. Such an algebra supports the combination of quantitative requirements (such as
that k different users must be involved in a sensitive task), with minimal qualification
requirements for these users. How such an algebra could contribute to trustworthiness is
an interesting topic for further research.
• The partial implementation relies on SPARQL queries to evaluate trustworthiness. This
evaluation (or parts thereof) could alternatively be based on additional classes and in-
ference, as calculated by the inference engine. The potential benefits of using a more
inference-based approach could be further investigated.
16.4.5.2 Evaluation policies
The proposed evaluation policy mechanism, where a potential trustor selects the rules most
relevant to its situation, is described in Chapter 14.1. This could helpfully be extended to ad-
dress to address the third underlying problem of trust, as described in Section 15.3.3.2. A brief
description how this might be done is provided below.
A matrix representation with the dimensions Source (‘attested by’) and Evaluator (‘evalu-
ated by’) could be used to model the relations between self and others. Such a trustworthiness
evaluation matrix is illustrated in Figure 16.1. The trustworthiness matrix represents two prin-
ciples that are relevant to trustworthiness evaluation.
• The first principle is the selection by the potential trustor of the source of information used
during trustworthiness evaluation. This source must be known. To make this assumption
reasonable, it is required that there is a reliable way to determine the information sources
used and to identify the derived information as such. The x-axis indicates the source of
the data points. This is addressed by participants and attestations as follows.
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– ‘Trustee self’ (or ‘self-claimed’) corresponds to a participant that attests (claims)
its own trustworthiness (‘trust me’). In the non-electronic world this corresponds
to what is commonly known as ‘unsworn declarations’ where a signer of a docu-
ment declares that the signature is executed under penalty of perjury and no other
individual is involved11.
– ‘Unqualified other’, which corresponds to a participant who claims trustworthiness
about another participant (‘trust them because I tell you’) without having a legal
qualification to do so. While the claimant may have a (hopefully positive) repu-
tation that is publicly known, or other qualifications that are not based on a legal
foundation, the claimant does not have one or more relevant legal qualifications.
– ‘Qualified other’, which corresponds to a participant that claims trustworthiness
about another participant (‘trust them because I tell you and I am legally qualified in
this’). The claimant does have particular legal qualifications such as accreditations
to make the claim trustworthy.
• The second principle is the choice by the potential trustor of the executor of the trust-
worthiness evaluation function. To make this assumption reasonable, it is required that
there is a reliable way to determine the executor and to identify the derived outcome. The
y-axis indicates the performer of the evaluation, which is one of the following.
– ‘Trustor self’, which corresponds to a participant that executes its own trustwor-
thiness evaluation (‘rely on self’). Given the complexity of today’s interactions in
electronic ecosystems and given that the knowledge and capabilities of a participant
are always limited, higher trustworthiness can be obtained from combining one’s
own knowledge and capabilities with those from others.
– ‘Unqualified other’, which corresponds to a participant who relies on a trustworthi-
ness evaluation performed by another participant (‘trust them because I tell you’)
without that participant having a legal qualification to do so. While the claimant
may have a (hopefully positive) reputation that is publicly known, or other qualifica-
tions that are not based on a legal foundation, it does not have one or more relevant
legal qualifications.
– ‘Qualified other’, which corresponds to a participant that relies on a trustworthiness
evaluation performed by another participant (‘trust them because I tell you and I am
legally qualified in this’). The claimant has particular legal qualifications such as
accreditations to make the claim trustworthy.
11In an unsworn declaration, the contents and signer can vary widely. The contents can be about oneself or
another, and the signer can be anyone, with or without qualifications of any type. The ‘trustee self’ case can only
be compared to an unsworn declaration whose content provides information about the signer.
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Figure 16.1: Trustworthiness evaluation matrix
It is assumed that the distinction between self and other can easily be made. However,
the distinction between unqualified and qualified other needs to be specified. It is assumed
here that the   framework is used in a law-governed society and this distinction is based on
whether or not the qualification has a legal basis. Other approaches are possible. The emerging
self-sovereign models for deciding what information to accept as truth are based on consensus
protocols. Rulebooks could be created for such a consensus-governed society where the partic-
ipants must be attested by other participants using a consensus scheme. This is a possible topic
for further research.
The matrix supports multiple trustworthiness evaluation policies. Such a policy can be
described by specifying the included matrix quadrants. This would allow the following policy
examples.
• A trustor may decide to only rely on itself for evaluation, and to make use of data sources
provided by qualified others.
• A trustor may decide to only rely on itself for evaluation, but to make use of all of the
categories of data sources (trustee self, unqualified other, qualified other).
• A trustor may decide to rely only on a qualified other to perform the evaluation, and to
use data that is provided by qualified others.
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16.4.5.3 Attestation of trustworthy execution
A situation can be envisaged where the potential trustor does not have access to a trustworthi-
ness evaluation function under its control. This might be due to a lack of resources or device
constraints, or because the required instance data is not available. In such a situation it would
be necessary to rely on another party to execute the function and return the results. The choice
by the potential trustor of the executor of the trustworthiness evaluation function could be sup-
ported by the qualifications of the execution environment. Huh and Martin [160] proposed the
idea of a ‘configuration resolver’ for trustworthy distributed systems. A configuration resolver
maintains an up-to-date whitelist and performs attestation on the user’s behalf, ensuring that
the tasks to be executed are dispatched to only those considered trustworthy. This aims to pro-
vide a more usable attestation service for large-scale distributed systems. How this could be
formulated as   framework attestations and integrated in a rulebook is a possible topic for
future research.
16.4.6 Data import and transformation
16.4.6.1 On-line access to data
The implementation presented above involves the use of a data import function. An alternative
implementation using an on-line access function could be investigated. Such an approach could
be beneficial for the freshness of the information that is obtained.
16.4.6.2 Use of more trusted list data
For the specific rulebook that was proposed in Chapter 13, the participant assertions in the
graph database include information derived from European trusted lists. However, the imple-
mentation does not use the service status indication12. This information distinguishes between
the statuses of granted, undersupervision and withdrawn, and could be imported, transformed
into assertions and evaluated.
16.4.6.3 Additional data sources
The use of additional data sources, which continue to emerge, could usefully be investigated,
e.g. as follows.
• The Governments of British Columbia, Ontario and Canada recently initiated an on-line
registry13 of what they refer to as ‘verifiable organisations’. It offers its blockchain-based
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information through a public API14. Since the information is created by officially recog-
nised authentic sources, this offers a newmechanism for on-line verification of participant
information.
• In Europe, the following data sources are candidates for further analysis and potential
implementation in the trustworthiness evaluation function.
– As a result of the amended Transparency Directive in 2013, companies listed on
EU regulated markets are required to prepare their annual financial reports in a Eu-
ropean Single Electronic Format (ESEF). All annual financial reports must be pre-
pared in XHTML format, and where the reports contain IFRS consolidated financial
statements they must be labelled with XBRL (eXtensible Business Reporting Lan-
guage).
– The list of national accreditation bodies and the CABs was recently consolidated
and made publicly available15.
– As described in Section 4.3.1.3, the National Archives publish all UK legislation on
behalf of HM Government, and ‘The Gazette’ is an official journal of record which
consists largely of statutory notices. Both are available in machine-readable RDF
format.
– EU legislation is published by the Publication Office16. The information is made
available in various ways, including an API, a SPARQL endpoint and an RSS feed.
16.4.6.4 Data transformation
The possible further automation of XSL-based transformations using technology specifically
developed for the creation of graphs on the basis of existing data could be investigated. Exam-




As described in Section 6.7, a potential trustor can use the trustworthiness provision and eval-
uation services before an interaction (ex-ante), during an interaction or after an interaction (ex-







for future work. For example, the ex-post use of trustworthiness evaluation may be particu-
larly relevant because it can provide information that is complementary to the verification of an
electronic signature.
16.5 Summary
This chapter presented the main conclusions of the thesis and described areas for further re-
search. A review of the hypothesis of the thesis was presented, and answers to the research
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A search in Google Scholar for trust or trustworthiness returns millions of results. The search
engine’s user interface allows querying through search terms and natural language. It uses
underlying structures which are not made public. Hence it is treated here as using a natural
language vocabulary.
The selection that Google Scholar makes is not transparent. It ranks the search results and
shows only the first 1,000 results of any search, based on algorithms that Google changes at
their discretion. The ranking depends on settings such as language settings or location.
Google Scholar does not offer guidance on search terminology to use except for a basic
description of search tips. These address how to limit the search period, how to obtain the full
text, and how to use references found inside articles as pointers. Nevertheless as the tool covers
a wide range of academic sources, a search was conducted. The following results were obtained
on 29 May 2019.
• The results shown in Table A.1 were obtained by using the query terms that are shown
in the first column, which always include the term ‘trust’.
• The results shown in Table A.2 were obtained by using the query terms that are shown
in the first column, which always include the term ‘trustworthiness’.
Candidate terms returned from the query semantic models of trust in the period 2009-2019
were evaluation of trust, social trust ensemble, trust and distrust, and computational trust mod-
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Google Scholar - query terms including trust Period Number of results
trust Not specified about 3,700,000 results
trust 2009-2019 about 1,690,000 results
meaning of trust Not specified about 3,120,000 results
meaning of trust 2009-2019 about 1,450,000 results
trust electronic society Not specified about 2,000,000 results
trust electronic society 2009-2019 about 430,000 results
meaning of trust in electronic society Not specified about 1,010,000 results
meaning of trust in electronic society 2009-2019 about 152,000 results
semantics of trust Not specified about 255,000 results
semantics of trust 2009-2019 about 50,600 results
semantic models of trust Not specified about 367,000 results
semantic models of trust 2009-2019 about 97,900 results
semantic models of trust since 2018 about 17,400 results
Table A.1: Google Scholar table (trust)
els. Limiting the terms to results since 2018 yielded semantic trust model, framework to support
trust, flow of trust with semantic web technologies, trust attributes, trust and liking rate, and
methods for identifying fake news.
Candidate terms from the query semantic models of trustworthiness in the period 2009-2019
were provably trustworthy hardware, fuzzy reputation logic, trustworthiness at runtime, ontolo-
gies for trustworthy solutions, and trustworthy components. Limiting the terms to results since
2018 yielded trustworthy systems development, API trustworthiness, ontology based reason-
ing about trustworthiness, trustworthy, responsible, interpretable system and trustworthiness
measurement from knowledge graph.
A.1.2 Microsoft Academic
A search on Microsoft Academic returned thousands of results. Searching can be done by
author, author’s institution, paper’s publication title, journal, topic and conference. The search
engine is not transparent about the classification algorithms. Nevertheless as the tool covers
a wide range of academic sources, searches including trustworthiness were conducted. The
results that are shown in Table A.3 were obtained on 3 June 2019.
Microsoft Academic did not allow to select beyond 2018. The results were broad and in-
cluded many references to social sciences and chemistry. Candidate search terms identified
from ‘semantics of trustworthiness’ were attestation, evidence, trustworthy fulfilment of com-
mitments, subjective logic, uncertainty, provenance and sentiment.
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Google Scholar - query term including trustworthiness Period Number of
results






meaning of trustworthiness Not specified about
193,000
results
meaning of trustworthiness 2009-2019 about
53,200
results
trustworthiness electronic society Not specified about
88,200
results
trustworthiness electronic society 2009-2019 about
22,300
results
meaning of trustworthiness in electronic society Not specified about
91,600
results
meaning of trustworthiness in electronic society 2009-2019 about
17,800
results
semantics of trustworthiness Not specified about
30,000
results
semantics of trustworthiness 2009-2019 about
16,100
results
semantic models of trustworthiness Not specified about
61,800
results
semantic models of trustworthiness 2009-2019 about
17,600
results
semantic models of trustworthiness since 2018 about
13,300
results
Table A.2: Google Scholar table (trustworthiness)
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Microsoft Academic - query term including trust-
worthiness
Period Number of results
trustworthiness 2008-2018 5000+ results
meaning of trustworthiness 2008-2018 42 results
trustworthiness electronic society 2008-2018 407 results
meaning of trustworthiness in electronic society 2008-2018 447 results
semantics of trustworthiness 2008-2018 56 results
Table A.3: Microsoft Academic table (trustworthiness)
A.1.3 Possible terms
Taking into consideration the envisaged scope for the review, the following terms were identi-
fied from the above unstructured sources (in alphabetical order): attestation, API trustworthi-
ness, computational trust models, evaluation of trust, evidence, flow of trust with semantic web
technologies, interpretable system, ontology based reasoning about trustworthiness, ontologies
for trustworthy solutions, provenance, semantic trust model, trust attributes, trustworthy fulfil-
ment of commitments and trustworthiness measurement from knowledge graph.
A.1.4 Structured terms
Information providers using structured terms include the Web of Science (WOS), the 2012
ACM CCS Classification, the IEEE taxonomy, and the Computer Science Ontology.
The WOS covers journals, books and conference proceedings in its Core Collection. These
are produced by commercial or open access publishers, and categorised and indexed by Clar-
ivate Analytics. They make use of keywords, 252 subject categories mapped to 151 broadly
defined research areas, including Engineering, Chemistry, Computer Science, Physics, and
Mathematics. No keywords, categories or research areas are directly related to trust or trust-
worthiness.
The 2012 ACMComputing Classification System has been developed as a poly-hierarchical
ontology, integrated into the search capabilities and topic displays of the ACM Digital Library.
A search at the top level for the term trustworthiness did yield no results (29/5/2019). A search
in the on-line ACM CCS at the top level for the term trust yielded four results (29/5/2019):
• information systems/world wide wide/web applications/crowdsourcing/trust
• security and privacy/formal methods and theory of security/ trust frameworks
• security and privacy/systems security/operating systems security/mobile platform secu-
rity/trusted computing
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• social and professional topics/computing technology policy/commerce policy/antitrust
and competition
A search at the top level for the term semantics yielded the following results (29/5/2019):
• Software notations and tools/General programming languages/Formal language defini-
tions/Semantics







• ComputingMethodologies/Symbolic and algebraic manipulation/Artificial intelligence/-
Natural language processing/Lexical semantics
• ComputingMethodologies/Symbolic and algebraic manipulation/Artificial intelligence/-
Knowledge representation and reasoning/Semantic networks
• Information Systems/Information Systems Applications/World Wide Web/Web data de-
scription languages/Semantic web description languages
The IEEE publishes the IEEE Taxonomy, which comprises the first three hierarchical lev-
els under each term-family (or branch) that is formed from the top-most terms of the IEEE
Thesaurus. The latter is a controlled vocabulary of about 10,100 descriptive engineering, tech-
nical, and scientific terms as well as IEEE-specific society terms. The taxonomy did not yield
any useful search terms. No matches were found for trustworthiness. The results are given in
Table A.4.
TheComputer ScienceOntology (CSO) [285] is a large-scale ontology of research areas that
was automatically generated using the Klink-2 algorithm [268] on the Rexplore dataset [269],
which consists of about 16 million publications, mainly in the field of Computer Science. The
Klink-2 algorithm combines semantic technologies, machine learning, and knowledge from ex-
ternal sources to automatically generate an ontology of research areas. Some relationships were
also revised manually by experts during the preparation of two ontology-assisted surveys in the
field of Semantic Web and Software Architecture. The main root of CSO is Computer Science,
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Table A.4: IEEE thesaurus terms
however, the ontology includes also a few secondary roots, such as Linguistics, Geometry, and
Semantics. A search on 13 June 2019 for ‘semantics’ returned 13 results, described in Ta-
ble A.5. Regarding ‘semantics of trust’ and ‘semantics of trustworthiness’ no matching CSO
concept were identified.
A.1.4.1 Summary of identified candidate search terms from structured sources
The following candidate terms were identified from the above structured sources: trust frame-
works, trusted computing, denotational semantics, semantic web description languages, argu-
mentation semantics.
A.1.4.2 Selected terminology and search terms
The following selection criteria were applied to select the initial search terms. The search
terms must have the potential to lead to search results that are related to semantics, meaning,
automation or logic. Those terms that lead to reputation systems, belief, subjective opinions,
statistics and probability are not included. On this basis, subjective logic is not withheld as a
search term, because it a type of probabilistic logic. Following terms were identified from the
above sources:
• from the unstructured sources:
• semantic trust model,
• evaluation of trust,




operational semantics Operational semantics are a category of formal program-
ming language semantics in which certain desired proper-
ties of a program, such as correctness, safety or security,
are verified.
denotational semantics In computer science, denotational semantics (initially
known as mathematical semantics or Scott–Strachey se-
mantics) is an approach of formalizing themeanings of pro-
gramming languages.
lexical semantics Lexical semantics (also known as lexicosemantics), is a
subfield of linguistic semantics. The units of analysis in
lexical semantics are lexical units which include not only
words but also sub-words.
image semantics -
argumentation semantics Argumentation theory, or argumentation, is the interdisci-
plinary study of how conclusions can be reached through
logical reasoning; that is, claims based, soundly or not, on
premises.
well founded semantics -
answer set semantics -
structural operational semantics Operational semantics are a category of formal program-
ming language semantics in which certain desired proper-
ties of a program, such as correctness, safety or security,
are verified.
formal semantics In logic, the semantics of logic is the study of the semantics,
or interpretations, of formal and (idealizations of) natural
languages usually trying to capture the pre-theoretic notion
of entailment.
Kripke semantics Kripke semantics (also known as relational semantics or
frame semantics, and often confused with possible world
semantics) is a formal semantics for non-classical logic sys-
tems created in the late 1950s.
stable model semantics The concept of a stable model, or answer set, is used to de-
fine a declarative semantics for logic programs with nega-
tion as failure.
Table A.5: CSO terms
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• ontology based reasoning about trustworthiness,
• ontologies for trustworthy solutions,
• trustworthy fulfilment of commitments,
• trustworthiness measurement from knowledge graph,





The identification of candidate sources was based on interaction with my supervisor, a study of
the Royal Holloway University of London’s Information Security Group training material on
the topic, a review of trust related and semantic web related conference proceedings (IFIP TM,
DEXA/TrustBus, ISWC) and on-line research. Candidate sources were identified in two tiers.
The first tier consisted of providers that make citation indexing and ranking a core part of their
offering.
• WOS (Clarivate Analytics, citation index),
• CiteseerX (Pennsylvania State University, automated citation indexing and digital li-
brary),
• Scopus (Elsevier, citation index),
• ScienceDirect (Elsevier, citation index),
• Google Scholar.
The second tier consisted of providers that focus on offering access to information reposi-
tories. This includes libraries, search engines and publishers.
• ZETOC (British Library’s Electronic Table of Contents),
• Archives such as arXiv (Cornell University) and IACR (Cryptology ePrint archive),
• DBLP (database and logic programming bibliography site, University of Trier),
• Semantic Scholar (AI-backed search engine for scientific journal articles, the Allen In-
stitute),
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• Professional bodies such as ACM (Association for Computing Machinery) and IEEE
(Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) ,
• Commercial publishers such as Elsevier, Taylor and Francis, IOS Press, Springer,
• Oxford Journals (related to Computer Science),
• IOS Press(independent publishing house established in 1987 in Amsterdam),
• Open Access such as Zenodo from CERN,




This appendix contains the longlist of articles considered for the literature review
described in Chapter 3. The articles are listed per source.
B.1 WOS
AWOS basic search for ‘semantic model of trustworthiness’ was performed, using WOS Core
Collection, searching in SCIE, from 2014 to present. This search returned 25 results.
1. Identifying peer experts in online health forums, Vydiswaran, V. G. Vinod and Reddy,
Manoj, BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making, 2019, [332],
2. Modelling the Provenance of Linked Data Interlinks for the Library Domain, McKenna,
L. et al. , Companion of the World Wide Web Conference (WWW 2019), [238]
3. Modeling and simulation of complex manufacturing phenomena using sensor signals
from the perspective of Industry 4.0, Ullah, A. M. M. Sharif, Advanced Engineering
Informatics (journal), 2019, [317],
4. A generalized stereotype learning approach and its instantiation in trust modeling, Fang,
Hui et al. , Electronic Commerce Research and Applications (journal), 2018, [113],
5. COVERS-UP: Collaborative Verification of Smart User Profiles for social sustainability
of smart cities, Lorimer, Philip A. K. et al. , Sustainable Cities and Society (journal),
2018, [222],
6. TextTruth: AnUnsupervisedApproach toDiscover Trustworthy Information fromMulti-
Sourced Text Data, Zhang, Hengtong et al. , KDD’18: Proceedings of the 24TH ACM
SIGKDD International Conference onKnowledgeDiscovery&DataMining, 2018, [386],
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7. Data trustworthiness and user reputation as indicators of VGI quality, Fogliaroni, Paolo
et al. , Geo-spatial Information Science (journal), 2018, [117],
8. On semantic map as a key component in socially-emotional BICA, Samsonvich, Alexei
V., Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architectures (journal), 2018, [287],
9. Levels of Ethical Quality of Metaphor in Stock Market Reporting, O’Mara-Shimek, M.,
Business and Society Review (journal), 2018, [264],
10. Linked Data Processing Provenance Towards Transparent and Reusable Linked Data In-
tegration, Trinh, Tuan-Dat et al. , IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web
Intelligence, Leipzig, Germany, 2017, [314],
11. An IntelligentModel for Trustworthiness Evaluation in SemanticWeb Applications, Mo-
hammad, Rami M. and AbuMansour, Hussein Y., 8th International Conference on Infor-
mation and Communication Systems, 2017, [244],
12. AnOntologyBased Trust Framework for Sensor-Driven Pervasive Environment, Karthik,
N. and Ananthanarayana, V. S. , Asia Modelling Symposium AMS, 2017, [197],
13. Reliable Medical Diagnosis from Crowdsourcing: Discover Trustworthy Answers from
Non-Experts, Li, Yaliang et al. , 10th ACM International Conference on Web Search and
Data Mining (WSDM), Cambridge, England, 2017, [219],
14. DISARM: A social distributed agent reputation model based on defeasible logic, Kravari,
K. and Bassiliades, N., Journal of Systems and Software, 2016, [204],
15. Construction andDevelopment of Quantitative Scale toMeasure Source Credibility in the
Maternal Mortality Context, Mustaffa, Che Su and Baqi, Salah Saudat Abdul, Pertanika
Journal of Social Science and Humanities, 2016, [251],
16. Stage: Stereotypical Trust Assessment Through Graph Extraction, Sensoy, Murat et al. ,
Journal of Computational Intelligence, 2016, [300],
17. LogProv: Logging Events as Provenance of Big Data Analytics Pipelines with Trustwor-
thiness, Wang, Ruoyu et al. , 2016 IEEE International Conference on Big Data, [380],
18. European InteroperabilityAssets Register andQuality Framework Implementation,Moreno-
Conde, Alberto et al. , Studies in Health Technology and Informatics, 2016, [246],
19. Formal Methods for a System of Systems Analysis Framework Applied to Traffic Man-
agement, Dickerson, Charles E. et al. , 11th IEEE System of Systems Engineering Con-
ference (SoSE), Kongsberg, Norway, 2016, [71],
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20. Preserving digital heritage: At the crossroads of Trust and LinkedOpenData, Solodovnik,
Iryna et al. , IFLA Journal International Federation of Library Association, 2015, [305],
21. Intercloud Trust and Security Decision Support System: an Ontology-based Approach,
Bernal Bernabe et al. , Journal of Grid Computing, 2015, [27],
22. Trustworthy advice, Osman, Nardine et al. , Journal of Knowledge Based Systems, 2015,
[270],
23. Trustworthy Service Discovery for Dynamic Web Service Composition, Kim, Yukyong
et al. , KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems, 2015, [200],
24. Semantics-Empowered Big Data Processing with Applications, Thirunarayan, Krish-
naprasad et al. , AI Magazine, 2015, [310],
25. Energy Consumption Analysis Method of CPS Software Based on Architecture Model-
ing, Hou Gang et al. , 9th International Conference on Frontier of Computer Science and
Technology, Dalian, Peoples Republic of China, 2015, [120].
B.2 IEEE
A query for articles (2/8/2019) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
(TDSC) on ’semantic model of trustworthiness’ in the period 2014-2019 yielded 110 results.
Based on relevance the following 5 articles were selected.
1. A Computational Dynamic Trust Model for User Authorization, Yuhui Zhong et al. ,
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 2015, [389],
2. PROVEST: Provenance-Based Trust Model for Delay Tolerant Networks, Cho and Chen,
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 2018, [58],
3. GeTrust: A Guarantee-Based Trust Model in Chord-Based P2P Networks, Xianfu Meng
et al. , IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 2018, [242],
4. Trust-Based Service Management for Social Internet of Things, Chen et al. , IEEE Trans-
actions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 2016, [55],
5. Trustworthy Parking Communities: Helping Your Neighbor to Find a Space, Timpner J.
et al. , IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 2016, [311],
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B.3 TrustBus and IFIP TM conference proceedings
A dedicated search of conference proceedings from TrustBus and IFIP TM conferences (in-
cluding their references) was performed. 49 articles were identified.
1. A Calculus for Trust and Reputation Systems, Aldini A., Trust Management VIII - 8th
IFIP WG 11.11 International Conference, IFIPTM 2014, Singapore, July 7-10, 2014,
Proceedings, [4],
2. Basic concepts and taxonomy of dependable and secure computing, Avizienis et al. ,
Journal IEEE Trans. Dependable Sec. Comput., 2004, [13],
3. M-STAR: AModular, Evidence-based Software Trustworthiness Framework, Alexopou-
los et al. , CoRR, 2018, [5],
4. How Human Trusters Assess Trustworthiness in Quasi-virtual Contexts, Bacharach M.,
Trust, Reputation, and Security: Theories and Practice, AAMAS 2002 International
Workshop, Bologna, Italy, 2002, Selected and Invited Papers, [17],
5. Challenges for Trusted Computing, S. Balfe et al. , IEEE Security and Privacy Magazine
2008, [20],
6. Authentication: A Practical Study in Belief and Action, Burrows M. et al. , Proceedings
of the 2nd Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge, Pacific
Grove, CA, USA, March 1988, [38],
7. Named graphs, provenance and trust, Jeremy J. Carroll, Proceedings of the 14th interna-
tional conference on World Wide Web, 2005, Chiba, Japan, [45],
8. A trust model for data sharing in smart cities, Cao QH, et al. , IEEE International Con-
ference on Communications 2016, [43],
9. Building general purpose security services on trusted computing, Chunhua Chen et al.
, Trusted Systems: Third International Conference, INTRUST 2011, Beijing, China,
November 27-29, 2011, Revised Selected Papers, [54],
10. Towards the Definition of an Ontology for Trust in (Web) Data, Ceolin D. et al. , Pro-
ceedings of the 10th International Workshop on Uncertainty Reasoning for the Semantic
Web (URSW 2014), [51],
11. Bridging Gaps Between Subjective Logic and Semantic Web, Ceolin D. et al. , Uncer-
tainty Reasoning for the Semantic Web III - ISWC International Workshops, URSW
2011-2013, Revised Selected Papers, [49],
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12. Calculating the Trust of Event Descriptions using Provenance, Ceolin D., Proceedings
of the Second International Workshop on the role of Semantic Web in Provenance Man-
agement, ISWC 2010, Shanghai, China, [48],
13. Trustworthy Systems Design using Semantic Risk Modelling, Ajay Chakravarthy et al. ,
Proceedings of the TrustBus 2012 Conference, [53],
14. A novel trust management framework formulti-cloud environments based on trust service
providers, Wenjuan Fan and Harry G. Perros, Journal Knowl.-Based Syst., 2014, [112],
15. Mathematical Modelling of Trust Issues in Federated Identity Management, Md. Sadek
Ferdous et al. 9th IFIP WG 11.11 International Conference, IFIPTM 2015, Hamburg,
Germany, [116],
16. A formal notion of trust –enabling reasoning about security properties, Fuchs, Gürgens
and Rudolph, IFIP TM 2010 conference proceedings, [118],
17. Towards content trust of web resources, Gil Y. and Artz D., Journal of Web Semantics,
2007, [121],
18. Trust Networks on the Semantic Web, Golbeck J. et al. Cooperative Information Agents
VII, 7th International Workshop, CIA 2003, Helsinki, Finland, [128],
19. Computational trust methods for security quantification in the cloud ecosystem, Habib et
al. The Cloud Security Ecosystem - Technical, Legal, Business and Management Issues,
2015, [140],
20. Trust4App: Automating Trustworthiness Assessment of Mobile Applications, Habib et
al. 17th IEEE International Conference On Trust, Security And Privacy In Computing
And Communications / 12th IEEE International Conference On Big Data Science And
Engineering, TrustCom/BigDataSE 2018, NY, USA, 2018, [138],
21. Data-Purpose Algebra: Modeling Data Usage Policies, Hanson C. et al. proceedings of
the 8th IEEE International Workshop on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks
(POLICY 2007), [142],
22. Querying Trust in RDF data with tSPARQL, Hartig O., ESWC 2009 conference proceed-
ing, [143],
23. The hoonoh ontology for describing trust relationships in information seeking, Heath,
T. and Motta, E., Personal Identification and Collaborations: Knowledge Mediation and
Extraction (PICKME2008), [145],
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24. Modelling Trust Structures for Public Key Infrastructures, Henderson M. et al. Infor-
mation Security and Privacy, 7th Australian Conference, ACISP Melbourne, Australia,
2002, [146],
25. A calculus of Trust and its application to PKI and identity management, Huang andNicol,
ACM IDTrust 2009 conference proceeding, [157],
26. An ontology of trust: formal semantics and transitivity, Jingwei Huang and Mark S.
Fox, The new e-commerce - Innovations for Conquering Current Barriers, Obstacles and
Limitations to Conducting Successful Business on the Internet, 2006, Fredericton, New
Brunswick, Canada, [155],
27. A calculus of Trust and its application to PKI and identity management, Huang andNicol,
ACM IDTrust 2009 conference proceeding, [157],
28. An anatomy of trust in public key infrastructure, Huang, Jingwei and M. Nicol, David,
International Journal of Critical Infrastructures, 2017, [156],
29. The Beta Reputation System, Roslan Ismail and Audun Jøsang, 15th Bled eConference:
eReality: Constructing the eEconomy, Slovenia, 2002, [164],
30. Rule-Based Trust Assessment on the Semantic Web, Jacobi I. et al. Rule-based Rea-
soning, Programming, and Applications - 5th International Symposium, RuleML 2011,
[185],
31. Trust network analysis with subjective logic, Jøsang A., ACSC 2006 conference proceed-
ing, [190],
32. A Policy Language for a Pervasive Computing Environment, Kagal L. et al. 4th IEEE In-
ternationalWorkshop on Policies for Distributed Systems andNetworks (POLICY 2003),
Italy, [193],
33. Accountability: definition and relationship to verifiability, Küsters R. et al. Proceedings
of the 17th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2010,
[211],
34. A State-Based Model for Certificate Management Systems, Chuchang Liu et al. Third
International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography, PKC, Aus-
tralia, 2000, [220],
35. The Eigentrust algorithm for reputationmanagement in P2P networks, Sepandar D. Kam-
var et al. Proceedings of the Twelfth International World Wide Web Conference,WWW
2003, Budapest, Hungary, 2003, [195],
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36. ORDAIN: An Ontology for Trust Management in the Internet of Things, Kravari K. and
Bassiliades N., On the Move to Meaningful Internet Systems. OTM 2017 Conferences -
Confederated International Conferences: CoopIS, C&TC, and ODBASE 2017, [205],
37. A Language for Trust Modelling, Muller T. et al. Proceedings of the 18th International
Workshop on Trust in Agent Societies co-located with the 15th International Conference
on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS, Singapore, 2016, [249],
38. PrivOnto: A semantic framework for the analysis of privacy policies, Oltramari A. et al.
Semantic Web Journal 2018, [263],
39. ComTrustO: Composite trust-based ontology framework for information and decision
fusion, Oltramari A. and Jin-Hee Cho, 18th International Conference on Information
Fusion, FUSION 2015, Washington, DC, USA, 2015, [261],
40. CertainLogic: A Logic for Modeling Trust and Uncertainty - (Short Paper), Ries S. et
al. Trust and Trustworthy Computing - 4th International Conference, TRUST Pittsburgh,
PA, USA, 2011, [276],
41. Implementing Trustworthy Services Using Replicated StateMachines, Fred B. Schneider
and Lidong Zhou, IEEE Security & Privacy, 2005, [290],
42. Modeling and evaluation of trust with an extension in semantic web, Shekarpour and
Katebi, Journal (Elsevier) Web Semantics: Science, Services and Agents on the World
Wide Web, Volume 8 Issue 1, March, 2010, [302],
43. Semantic Association Identification and Knowledge Discovery for National Security Ap-
plications, Amit P. Sheth et al. J. Database Manag. 2005, [304],
44. Improving Interpretations of Trust Claims, Sel M., Trust Management X - 10th IFIP WG
11.11 International Conference, IFIPTM 2016, Germany, [296],
45. Towards an Ontology of Trust, Viljanen L., Trust, Privacy and Security in Digital Busi-
ness: Second International Conference, TrustBus 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark, [330],
46. Information accountability, Daniel J. Weitzner et al. Journal Commun. ACM, 2008,
[382].
47. Model of trust management based on Finite State Machine, Caiyi Zhu and Xiangkun
Dai, International Conference on Cyber Security, Cyber Warfare and Digital Forensic,
CyberSec 2012, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 2012, [391],
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48. Observations on Non-repudiation, Jianying Zhou and Dieter Gollmann, Advances in
Cryptology - ASIACRYPT ’96, International Conference on the Theory and Applica-
tions of Cryptology and Information Security, Korea, 1996, [390],
49. Trust Analysis of Web Services Based on a Trust Ontology, Manling Zhu et al. Knowl-
edge Science, Engineering and Management, Second International Conference, KSEM
2007, Melbourne, Australia, [392].
B.4 Elsevier
From Elsevier’s Journal of Web Semantics the following articles were included.
1. Semantic Web in data mining and knowledge discovery: A comprehensive survey, Ris-
toski P. and Paulheim H., Journal of Web Semantics, 2016, [278],
2. Triple Pattern Fragments: A low-cost knowledge graph interface for the Web, Verborgh
R. et al. Journal of Web Semantics, 2016, [327],
3. Faceted search over RDF-based knowledge graphs, Marcelo Arenas et al. Journal of Web
Semantics, 2016, [8],
4. Building event-centric knowledge graphs from news, Marco Rospocher et al. Journal of
Web Semantics, 2016, [279],
5. Learning the semantics of structured data sources, Mohsen Taheriyan et al. Journal of
Web Semantics, 2016, [308].
From Elsevier’s journal Computers & Security the following 5 articles were included:
1. Secure attribute-based data sharing for resource-limited users in cloud computing, Jin Li
et al. Computers & Security, 2018, [217],
2. A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems, Cherdantseva
Y. et al. Computers & Security, 2016, [56],
3. Privacy attitudes and privacy behaviour: A review of current research on the privacy
paradox phenomenon, Kokolakis S. et al. Computers & Security, 2017, [203],
4. Information security policy compliance model in organizations, Nader Sohrabi Safa et
al. Computers & Security, 2016, [284],
5. Cyber physical systems security: Analysis, challenges and solutions, Ashibani Y. et al.
Computers & Security, 2017, [12].
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B.5 Journal of Trust Management
A query for semantic trust and semantic trustworthiness (6/9/2019) on the website of this Ope-
nAccess journal returned 10 articles, of which 2 were included on the basis of their relevance.
1. Efficient semi-automated assessment of annotations trustworthiness, Ceolin D. et al. Jour-
nal of Trust Management, 2014, [50],
2. Two sides of the coin: measuring and communicating the trustworthiness of online in-
formation, Nurse et al. Journal of Trust Management, 2014, [258].
B.6 DBLP
A query for articles (30/8/2019) on DBLP with trust ontology as search term in the period 2009
to 2019 returned 16 relevant articles.
1. Ontology-Based Reasoning about the Trustworthiness of Cyber-Physical Systems, Bal-
duccini M. et al. CoRR Journal, 2018, [19],
2. Intercloud Trust and Security Decision Support System: an Ontology-based Approach,
Bernabé J. B. et al. Journal of Grid Computing, 2015, [26],
3. A JADE-Based ART-Inspired Ontology and Protocols for Handling Trust and Reputa-
tion, Javier Ignacio Carbó Rubiera and José M. Molina López, Ninth International Con-
ference on Intelligent Systems Design and Applications, ISDA, Italy, 2009, [280],
4. Towards an Ontology of Trust for Situational Understanding, Carpanini O. and Cerutti F.,
Advances in Computational Intelligence Systems - 17th UKWorkshop on Computational
Intelligence, 2017, UK, [44],
5. A Trust Ontology for Business Collaborations, Fatemi H. et al. Short Paper Proceedings
of the 5th IFIP WG 8.1 Working Conference on the Practice of Enterprise Modeling,
Germany, 2012, [114],
6. UTPO:User’s Trust ProfileOntology -Modeling trust towardsOnlineHealth Information
Sources, Karuna P. et al, CoRR journal 2019, [198],
7. An Ontology-Based Framework Model for Trustworthy Software Evolution, Ji Li et al.
Advanced Data Mining and Applications - 6th International Conference, ADMA, China,
2010, [216],
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8. An Enhanced Method for Computation of Similarity between the Contexts in Trust Eval-
uation UsingWeighted Ontology, MohammadAminMorid et al. IEEE 10th International
Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications, Trust-
Com 2011, China, 2011, [247],
9. On the Trusted Ontology model for evaluating the Semantic Web Services, Ming Qu
et al. Proceedings of the 2010 14th International Conference on Computer Supported
Cooperative Work in Design, CSCWD China, 2010, [275],
10. A Trust Ontology for Semantic Services, Sherchan W. et al. 2010 IEEE International
Conference on Services Computing, SCC, USA, 2010, [303],
11. Flexible Wireless Trust Through Ontology-Based Mapping and Its Attendant Semantic
Limitations, Steele R. et al. Third International Conference on Network and System Se-
curity, NSS, Australia, 2009, [306],
12. Trust-terms ontology for defining security requirements and metrics, Sullivan K. et al.
Software Architecture, 4th European Conference, ECSA, Denmark, 2010, [307],
13. Ontology, Epistemology, and Teleology for Modeling and Simulation - Philosophical
Foundations for Intelligent M&S Applications, Tolk A., Intelligent Systems Reference
Library, 2013, [312],
14. Trust OntologyBased onAccess Control Parameters inMulti-organization Environments,
Toumi K. et al. Ninth International Conference on Signal-Image Technology & Internet-
Based Systems, SITIS 2013, Japan, [313],
15. Ontology and trust based data warehouse in new generation of business intelligence:
State-of-the-art, challenges, and opportunities, Wongthongtham P. and Abu-Salih B.,
13th IEEE International Conference on Industrial Informatics, INDIN, United Kingdom,
2015, [385],
16. Preference ontology-oriented metric model for trustworthy Web services, Yang Zhang et
al. Int. J. Intell. Syst., 2011, [388].
B.7 Google Scholar
A query for articles (2/8/2019) published on semantic model of trustworthiness in the period
2014-2019 yielded ’about 17.500 results.’ The five most relevant articles selected from the first
100 articles were the following.
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1. A tool for monitoring andmaintaining system trustworthiness at runtime, Goldsteen et al.
Workshops at 21st International Conference on Requirements Engineering: Foundation
for Software Quality, Germany, 2015-03, [129], cited by 45,
2. FRTRUST: a fuzzy reputation based model for trust management in semantic P2P grids,
Javanmardi et al. Computing Research Repository (CoRR), [186], cited by 91,
3. VGI edit history reveals data trustworthiness and user reputation, F D’Antonio et al. Pro-
ceedings of the AGILE’2014 International Conference on Geographic Information Sci-
ence, Castellón, 2014, [159], cited by 27,
4. A decentralized trustworthy context and QoS-aware service discovery framework for the
internet of things, J Li et al. IEEE Access, [215], cited by 13,
5. Towards trustworthy smart cyber-physical-social systems in the era of internet of things,
J Huang et al. 11th System of Systems Engineering Conference, SoSE 2016, Norway,
[158], cited by 12.
A query for articles (2/8/2019) published on semantic model of trust in the period 2014-
2019 yielded ’about 30.600 results.’ The three most relevant articles selected from the first 100
articles were:
1. FRTRUST: a fuzzy reputation based model for trust management in semantic P2P grids,
Javanmardi et al. Computing Research Repository (CoRR), [186], cited by 91,
2. A trust-based probabilistic recommendation model for social networks, Wang Y. et al.
Journal of Network and Computer Applications, [381], cited by 58,
3. A trust model for data sharing in smart cities, QH Cao et al. IEEE International Confer-
ence on Communications 2016, [43], cited by 25.
As [186] already appeared in the previous search, it was selected only once.
B.8 Dedicated search for surveys and reviews
An additional search using Google Scholar andMicrosoft Academic was carried out for surveys
and literature reviews relevant to the research questions. This search identified 11 articles.
1. A survey of trust in computer science and the Semantic Web, Artz D. and Gil Y., Journal
of Web Semantics 2007, [11],
2. A Survey on Trust Modeling, Jin-Hee Cho et al. ACM Journal Comput. Surv. 2015, [57],
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3. A Review on Various Trust Models in Cloud Environment, Priya Govindaraj, Journal of
Engineering Science and Technology Review 2017, [134],
4. Trust as a facilitator in cloud computing: a survey, Habib et al. J. Cloud Computing,
2012, [139],
5. Access control and the Resource Description Framework: A survey, Kirrane S. et al.
Semantic Web Journal, 2016, [201],
6. Privacy, security and policies: A review of problems and solutions with semantic web
technologies, Kirrane S. et al. Semantic Web Journal, 2018, [202],
7. A review on computational trust models for multi-agent systems, Lu, G. et al. ICOMP
2007 conference proceedings, [223],
8. Trust Establishment and Estimation in Cloud Services: A Systematic Literature Review,
Mahmud et al. Journal of Network and Systems Management, 2019, [231],
9. Multiparty nonrepudiation: A survey, Jose Antonio Onieva et al. Journal ACM Comput.
Surv., 2008, [265],
10. An Overview of PKI Trust Models, Perlman R., IEEE Network - November/December
1999, [271],





This appendix contains the shortlist of articles covered in the literature review
described in Chapter 3.
C.1 Articles excluding reviews and surveys
1. A Calculus for Trust and Reputation Systems, A. Aldini, Trust Management VIII - 8th
IFIP WG 11.11 International Conference, IFIPTM 2014, Singapore, July 7-10, 2014,
Proceedings, [4],
2. M-STAR: A Modular, Evidence-based Software Trustworthiness Framework, N. Alex-
opoulos et al., CoRR, 2018, [5],
3. Ontology-Based Reasoning about the Trustworthiness of Cyber-Physical Systems, M.
Balduccini et al., CoRR Journal, 2018, [19],
4. Intercloud Trust and Security Decision Support System: an Ontology-based Approach,
B.J. Bernabé et al., J. Grid Comput. 2015, [26],
5. Towards an Ontology of Trust for Situational Understanding, O. Carpanini and F. Cerutti,
Advances in Computational Intelligence Systems - 17th UKWorkshop on Computational
Intelligence, 2017, UK, [44],
6. Towards the Definition of an Ontology for Trust in (Web) Data, D. Ceolin et al., Pro-
ceedings of the 10th International Workshop on Uncertainty Reasoning for the Semantic
Web (URSW 2014), [51],
7. PROVEST: Provenance-Based Trust Model for Delay Tolerant Networks, J. Cho and I.
Chen, IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 2018, [58]
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8. A novel trust management framework formulti-cloud environments based on trust service
providers, W. Fan and H. G. Perros, Journal Knowl.-Based Syst., 2014, [112],
9. Mathematical Modelling of Trust Issues in Federated Identity Management, M. S. Fer-
dous et al., 9th IFIP WG 11.11 International Conference, IFIPTM 2015, Hamburg, Ger-
many, [116],
10. Computational trust methods for security quantification in the cloud ecosystem, S. M.
Habib et al., The Cloud Security Ecosystem - Technical, Legal, Business and Manage-
ment Issues, 2015, [140],
11. Modelling Trust Structures for Public Key Infrastructures, M. Henderson et al., Infor-
mation Security and Privacy, 7th Australian Conference, ACISP 2002, Melbourne, Aus-
tralia, [146]
12. An ontology of trust: formal semantics and transitivity, J. Huang and M. Fox, Proceed-
ings of the 8th International Conference on Electronic Commerce: The new e-commerce
- Innovations for Conquering Current Barriers, Obstacles and Limitations to Conducting
Successful Business on the Internet, 2006, Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada, August
13-16, 2006, [155]
13. A calculus of Trust and its application to PKI and identity management, D. Huang and J.
Nicol, ACM IDTrust 2009 conference proceeding, [157],
14. An anatomy of trust in public key infrastructure, D. Huang and J. Nicol, International
Journal of Critical Infrastructures, 2017, [156],
15. Rule-Based Trust Assessment on the Semantic Web, I. Jacobi et al., Rule-based Rea-
soning, Programming, and Applications - 5th International Symposium, RuleML 2011,
[185],
16. ORDAIN: An Ontology for Trust Management in the Internet of Things, K. Kravari and
N. Bassiliades, On the Move to Meaningful Internet Systems. OTM 2017 Conferences -
Confederated International Conferences: CoopIS, C&TC, and ODBASE 2017, [205],
17. AnOntologyBased Trust Framework for Sensor-Driven Pervasive Environment, N. Karthik
and V. S. Ananthanarayana, Asia Modelling Symposium AMS, 2017, [197],
18. UTPO:User’s Trust ProfileOntology -Modeling trust towardsOnlineHealth Information
Sources, P. Karuna et al., CoRR journal 2019, [198],
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19. A State-Based Model for Certificate Management Systems, C. Liu et al., Public Key
Cryptography, Third InternationalWorkshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryp-
tography, PKC 2000, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia, [220],
20. An intelligent model for trustworthiness evaluation in semantic web applications, R. Mo-
hammad and H. AbuMansour, 8th International Conference on Information and Commu-
nication Systems (ICICS), 2017, Jordan, [244],
21. A Language for Trust Modelling, T. Muller et al., Proceedings of the 18th International
Workshop on Trust in Agent Societies co-located with the 15th International Conference
on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS, Singapore, 2016, [249],
22. ComTrustO: Composite trust-based ontology framework for information and decision
fusion, A. Oltramari and J-H. Cho, 18th International Conference on Information Fusion,
FUSION 2015, Washington, DC, USA, 2015, [261],
23. On the Trusted Ontology model for evaluating the Semantic Web Services, M. Qu et al.,
Proceedings of the 2010 14th International Conference on Computer Supported Cooper-
ative Work in Design, CSCWD China, 2010, [275],
24. Implementing Trustworthy Services Using Replicated State Machines, F. B. Schneider
and L. Zhou, IEEE Security & Privacy, 2005, [290],
25. Modeling and evaluation of trust with an extension in semantic web, S. Shekarpour and
S. D. Katebi, Journal (Elsevier) Web Semantics: Science, Services and Agents on the
World Wide Web, Volume 8 Issue 1, March, 2010, [302],
26. A Trust Ontology for Semantic Services, W. Sherchan et al., 2010 IEEE International
Conference on Services Computing, SCC, USA, 2010, [303],
27. LogProv: Logging Events as Provenance of Big Data Analytics Pipelines with Trustwor-
thiness, R. Wang et al., 2016 IEEE International Conference on Big Data, [380],
28. Trust Analysis of Web Services Based on a Trust Ontology, M. Zhu et al., Knowledge
Science, Engineering and Management, Second International Conference, KSEM 2007,
Melbourne, Australia, [392].
C.2 Reviews and surveys
1. A Survey on Trust Modeling, J-H. Cho et al., ACM Journal Comput. Surv. 2015, [57],
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2. A Review on Various Trust Models in Cloud Environment, P. Govindaraj, Journal of
Engineering Science and Technology Review 2017, [134],
3. Trust as a Facilitator in Cloud Computing: a Survey, S. M. Habib et al., J. Cloud Com-
puting, 2012, [139],
4. Privacy, Security and Policies: A Review of Problems and Solutions with Semantic Web
Technologies, S. Kirrane et al., Semantic Web Journal, 2018, [202],
5. Trust Establishment and Estimation in Cloud Services: A Systematic Literature Review,




This appendix contains a short introduction to data modelling in the OWL 2 Web
Ontology Language and an overview of existing ontologies that were identified
as relevant to the model described in the main body of the thesis. Where existing
ontologies were used in the   data model and data import functions is described.
D.1 OWL modelling in a nutshell
D.1.1 Using classes and properties
An ontology specified in the OWL 2Web Ontology Language was created to implement the  
data model. The terminology defined in [148] was used. An introduction to OWL is provided
in Section 4.3.6.
D.1.1.1 Classes
An ontology is a model which represents some subject matter, in the present case the   model.
It specifies what kind of things there are for the subject matter of interest, and how these are
related to one another.
These kinds of things are called classes. The concept of class in OWL is different from
e.g. the concept of a class in object oriented programming. From a semantic perspective, an
OWL class corresponds to a set. OWL allows to define class hierarchy, disjointness, and class
equivalence. The term ‘individual’ refers to the entity that is a member of a specific set. The
term ‘instance’ is often used as a synonym.
The following class definitions are commonly used as illustration: Person is a class which
has two subclasses, Patient and Doctor. An individual can be a member of either of these
classes. The set membership can be asserted (i.e. provided as a fact), or can be inferred on the
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basis of information that is already available. For example the class definition of Patient may
impose no restrictions on class membership, it can be freely asserted that any entity which is a
Person can be a Patient. However, the class of Doctor may define a Doctor as a Person with
the imposed restriction that a Doctor must have the property of holding a medical degree.
Implementing a concept as a class allows the usage of a class hierarchy, disjointness, and
class equivalence. It allows to create individuals as instances of the class, and to link such
individuals via object properties.
D.1.1.2 Properties
Relations and predicates are expressed by properties in OWL. There are two types of properties.
• An object property relates an individual to another individual.
• A data property relates an individual to a literal.
To continue the example above, a degree could be a class, of which a specific medical
degree is an individual. The restriction that a Doctor must have a medical degree can then be
expressed via an object property restriction. However, when modelling under the Open World
Assumption, attribute existence must be verified through queries.
D.1.2 Naming conventions
For naming classes and properties, the naming convention proposed in Uschold [323] is used,
i.e. classes in upper camel case (e.g. LegalEntity), properties in lower camel case (e.g. isSub-
sidiaryOf ).
D.1.3 Use of URIs and URI character encoding in RDF
The TE data model is implemented in OWL, using RDF/XML syntax. RDF uses URIs to
represent resources. Encoding in the TE data model implementation is described as follows.
D.1.3.1 URI encoding
Encoding follows RFC 3986 [29], which specifies a URI as follows.
URI = scℎeme ∶ [∕∕autℎority]patℎ[?query][#fragment]
The RFC also defines reserved and unreserved characters for use in URIs. Reserved char-
acters are those characters that have special meaning. For example, forward slash characters
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are used to separate different parts of a URL (or more generally, a URI). Unreserved characters
have no such meanings. Reserved characters need encoding.
The implementation of the TE data model uses percent-encoding, where reserved characters
are represented using character sequences that start with the escape character %. For example
the blank character is encoded as %20. Depending on the rendering, the blank might be rep-
resented as a blank (‘space’) character, or as %20. Other popular percent-encoded characters
include ! (encoded as%21), # (encoded as%23), < (encoded as%3C) and > (encoded as%3E).
D.1.3.2 Carriage return encoding in XSLT
XSLT [377] is used in the data import and transformation to generate RDF. Regarding encoding,
it can be observed that theXSLTway to represent a carriage return is <xsl:text>&#10;</xsl:text>.
This may introduce undesired side-effects such as carriage returns in URIs which cause render-
ing problems in Protégé and import problems inGraphDB.Where required such carriage returns
were removed.
D.1.3.3 Encoding of special characters in XML
Regarding encoding, it can be observed that XML has a specific way to represent characters,
such as&amp; for & (ampersand), &lt; for < (less-than), &gt; for > (greater-than), &quot; for
" (quotation mark) and &apos; for ’(apostrophe). Where required these encodings were used.
D.1.4 Use of namespaces
There are some notably differences between the use of namespaces for XML and URIs. An
XML namespace name does not necessarily imply any of the semantics of URI schemes. For
example, a XML namespace name beginning with http: may have no connotation to the use
of the HTTP. In XML, a namespace is an abstract domain to which a collection of element
and attribute names can be assigned. The namespace name is a character string which must
adhere to the generic URI syntax. However, the name is generally not considered to be a URI,
because the URI specification bases the decision not only on lexical components, but also on
their intended use.
The   model defines its own namespace http://www.marcsel.eu/onto/te. The pre-
fix te: is defined as a reference to the namespace. The namespaces of the imported ontologies
are also used. Two further attention points were noted.
• Comments can be added directly to the ontology file with a text editor. However, when
saving Protégé uses theOWLAPI1 to rewrite the file, and those comments will be deleted.
1https://github.com/owlcs/owlapi
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Hence comments have been stored in annotations.
• It was found more efficient to use Protégé to create the all-different general axiom than
doing this manually.
D.2 Reusing existing ontologies
D.2.1 W3C ORG
D.2.1.1 Description
The W3C Organization ontology was designed by a W3C Working Group to enable publica-
tion of information on organisations and organisational structures. It is described in the W3C
Organization Ontology Recommendation [376]. ORG extends and uses terms from other vo-
cabularies, including Dublin Core [66], Friend of a Friend[37], Good Relations [228], and
Provenance[357]. It defines terms to support the representation of:
• organisational structure, including notion of an organisation, decomposition into sub-
organisations and units, and purpose and classification of organisations,
• reporting structure, includingmembership and reporting structure within an organisation,
as well as roles, posts, and the relationship between people and organisations,
• location and historical information.
This coverage corresponds to the type of information typically found in organisational
charts, and it does not offer a complete representation for all the nuances of organisational
control structures and flows of accountability and empowerment. The ontology does not pro-
vide category structures for organisation type, purpose or roles. This ontology provides the core
base concepts to allow extensions to add specific sub-class structures or classification schemes.
An illustration of the main classes and relationships in ORG is provided in Figure2 D.1.
Figure D.2 illustrates the ORG classes as loaded in Protégé.
D.2.1.2 Use in   data model
The   data model uses the org:Organization class in its specification of te:Participant.
2This figure is Copyright © [2014] World Wide Web Consortium, (MIT, ERCIM, Keio, Beihang) under licence
http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Legal/2015/doc-license
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Figure D.1: W3C ORG ontology
Figure D.2: W3C ORG classes loaded in Protégé
D.2.2 W3C PROV-O
D.2.2.1 Description
The Provenance ontology was defined by Moreau [245]. It consists of four recommendations:
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• the PROV Data Model [355] – which describes the concepts, types and relations of the
provenance data model ,
• the PROV Ontology [357], – which expresses the PROV Data model in OWL 2, also
informally referred to as PROV-O,
• PROV-N [356] – a notation for provenance aimed at human consumption,
• Provenance Constraints [354] – non-mandatory validity constraints.
The three core classes of the ontology are entities, activities and agents.
• Physical, digital, conceptual, or other kinds of thing are called entities. Provenance
records can describe the provenance of entities, and an entity’s provenance may refer
to other entities.
• Activities are how entities come into existence and how their attributes change to become
new entities. They are dynamic aspects of the world, such as activities, processes, etc.
For example, if the second version of a document was generated by a translation from the
first version in another language, then this translation is an activity.
• An agent takes a role in an activity such that the agent can be assigned some degree of
responsibility for the activity taking place. An agent can be a person, a piece of software,
an inanimate object, an organization, or other entities that may be ascribed responsibility.
When an agent has some responsibility for an activity, PROV says the agent was associated
with the activity. Several agents may be associated with an activity and vice-versa. An agent
may be acting on behalf of others, e.g. an employee on behalf of their organization, and we can
express such chains of responsibility in the provenance. It can also be described that an entity
is attributed to an agent to express the agent’s responsibility for that entity, possibly along with
other agents. This description can be understood as a shorthand for saying that the agent was
responsible for the activity which generated the entity.
The provenance of an agent can be described. For example, an organization responsible for
the creation of a report may evolve over time as the report is written as some members leave
and others join. To make provenance assertions about an agent in PROV, the agent must be
declared explicitly both as an agent and as an entity. A role is a description of the function or
the part that an entity played in an activity. Roles specify:
• the relationship between an entity and an activity, i.e. how the activity used or generated
the entity,
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• how agents are involved in an activity, qualifying their participation in the activity or
specifying for what aspect of it each agent was responsible.
Roles are application specific, so PROV does not define any particular roles. An illustration
of the main classes and relationships in PROV is provided in Figure3 D.3. Figure D.4 illustrates
the PROV classes as loaded in Protégé.
Figure D.3: W3C PROV ontology
Figure D.4: W3C PROV classes loaded in Protégé
3This figure is Copyright © [2014] World Wide Web Consortium, (MIT, ERCIM, Keio, Beihang) under licence
http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Legal/2015/doc-license
437
D.2.2.2 Use in   data model
The   data model uses the following provenance concepts.
• The prov:Entity class is used to record the source of the data used.
• The prov:Agent class is used to record the software agent such as the XSL program.
• The prov:Activity class is used to record the execution of XSL transformations and the
insertion of OWL individuals in the database load file.
• The prov:wasAttributedTo object property records the issuer of an attestation.
– In those cases where the issuer was a real-world entity such as a TLSO, the TLSO
was referred to.
– in those cases where the issuer was the   framework software, a reference to
http://www.marcsel.eu/onto/ti/ was used4.
• The prov:wasGeneratedBy object property records the activity that generated an entity
such as an attestation.
• The prov:startedAtTime and prov:endedAtTimeobject properties record the start and end
time of an activity.
D.2.3 FIBO
D.2.3.1 Introduction
The Financial Industry Business Ontology (FIBO) models business entities terms, definitions,
and relationships for the purpose of the finance industry. The scope of this industry encom-
passes a range of organisations that manage money, including credit unions, banks, credit card
companies, insurance companies, consumer finance companies, stock brokerages, investment
funds and government sponsored enterprises. FIBO provides the legal and business entities
concepts to support the definition of financial services entities and the relationships between
them, as well as other business entities that may require financial services. The FIBO specifi-
cations consist of:
• FIBO Foundations [77],
• FIBO Business Entities [78],
• FIBO Indices and Indicators [79].
4The ‘ti’ refers to the ‘  framework integration’ software
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D.2.3.2 FIBO Foundations
The FIBO Foundations specification defines a foundational set of business concepts which sup-
port the financial industry terms semantics presented in other FIBO specifications. Foundations
is itself segmented into a number of ontologies and includes a number of basic legal, contrac-
tual and organizational concepts, among others. Concepts which are available in other industry
standards are not included, but in some cases a ‘proxy’ concept is included for reference, for
example for address and country concepts. The rationale for including these is the following.
• Concepts in the financial industry are generally specialisations of more general concepts
such as contracts, commitments, transactions, organisations and so on. These are in-
cluded in FIBO Foundations so that specialisations of themmay be defined in other FIBO
specifications.
• Properties of financial industry concepts frequently need to be framed in terms of rela-
tionships to non-financial concepts such as countries, jurisdictions, addresses and the like.
These are included in FIBO Foundations so that properties in other FIBO specifications
may make reference to them.
The FIBO model content is developed and maintained using the Unified Modeling Lan-
guage as a modelling tool framework, but with all model content built using OWL constructs5.
The FIBO Foundations ontology is published:
• as a single normative specification document [77] in pdf format6, in human readable
format,





– financial dates, and
– relations.
5This is achieved using the OMG’s Ontology DefinitionMetamodel (ODM) specification. This provides a means
to represent OWL constructs using UML tools. This is achieved using UML’s extension capability called ‘profiles’
for OWL and for RDF Schema. The ODM UML Profiles define a number of stereotypes which apply to standard
UML metaclasses and may be used to represent OWL constructs in a consistent and meaningful way.
6https://www.omg.org/spec/EDMC-FIBO/FND/1.2/PDF
7Copies are available in three formats: RDF/XML serialised OWL, ODM UML XMI and ODM XMI from
https://www.omg.org/spec/EDMC-FIBO/FND/1.2/.
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D.2.3.3 FIBO Business Entities
The FIBO Business Entities specification provides general and finance domain-specific con-
cepts that define legal and business entities, including any entity that may open an account, take
out a loan, participate in any public or private offering of securities, or other business activi-
ties that require financial services (e.g., sole proprietorship, corporation, partnership, or trust,
as well as governmental and not for profit organizations). The purpose is to support business
scenarios such as:
• Legal Entity Identification (LEI),
• Transaction tracking, and
• Counterparty Credit Risk.
Particularly the identification of legal entities is relevant to the TE model transform/tag




• Terms definitive of or descriptive of companies incorporated by the issuance of shares
and other forms of incorporated entity.
• Terms which define the existence of other kinds of legal entity.
• Terms specific to trusts.
• Terms defining the relationships for example of ownership and control between and
among the kinds of organization listed above.
• Entities defined not by their legal structure but according to their role or function, includ-
ing but not limited to banks, non-profit entities, government bodies, non-government and
quasi-non government organizations,
• International bodies and the like.
The FIBO Business Entities ontology is published:









– EU government entities and jurisdictions,
– UK government entities and jurisdictions,
– CA government entities and jurisdictions,
– US government entities and jurisdictions,
– corporate bodies,








– private limited companies,
– sole proprietorships, and
– trusts.
D.2.3.4 Use in   data import
The   data import and transformation as described in Chapter 12 includes FactForge as a
data source. The ontologies FIBO Foundations10 and FIBO Business Entities 11 are loaded in
FactForge. The classes LegalEntity and LegalEntityIdentifier from the ontology fibo-be-le-lei
are used.
9Copies are available in two formats: RDF/XML serialised OWL and ODM XMI from https://www.omg.
org/spec/EDMC-FIBO/BE/1.1/.
10version 14-11-30, November 2014
11version 15-02-23, February 2015
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D.2.4 GLEIF
D.2.4.1 Description of the organisation
The Global Legal Entity Identifier Foundation (GLEIF) is a public domain source of identifiers
and company data. The GLEIFwas established by the Financial Stability Board12 (FSB) in June
2014. It is a global not-for-profit organisation headquartered in Switzerland that supports the
implementation and use of the Legal Entity Identifier (LEI). The GLEIF website13 states that
‘GLEIF makes available the Global LEI Index; i.e. a global on-line source that provides open,
standardized and high quality legal entity reference data. The Global Legal Entity Identifier
(LEI) Index contains historical and current LEI records including related reference data in one
authoritative, central repository. The reference data provides the information on a legal entity
identifiable with an LEI. The Global LEI Index is the only global on-line source that provides
open, standardized and high quality legal entity reference data.’
D.2.4.2 Oversight and use
The foundation is overseen by the LEI Regulatory Oversight Committee, representing public
authorities from around the globe that drive transparency within the financial markets. The LEI
Regulatory Oversight Committee publishes an overview14 of where the use of the LEI has been
made mandatory or strongly suggested. This includes most territories worldwide.
D.2.4.3 GLEIF ontologies
GLEIF publishes 4 ontologies:
• The GLEIF level 1 ontology [123] , referred to asWho is Who, covers key reference data
for a legal entity identifiable with an LEI. It builds on ISO 17442 [165].
– A legal entity is defined in the GLEIF level 1 ontology as ‘LEI-registered entities
that are legally or financially responsible for the performance of financial transac-
tions or have the legal right in their jurisdiction to enter independently into legal
contracts, regardless of whether they are incorporated or constituted in some other
12The Financial Stability Board (FSB) is an international body that monitors and makes recommendations about
the global financial system. It was established after theG20 London summit inApril 2009 and includes all G20major
economies, Financial Stability Forum (FSF) members, and the European Commission. Hosted and funded by the
Bank for International Settlements, the board is based in Basel, Switzerland. The FSB has 68 member institutions,
comprising ministries of finance, central banks, and supervisory and regulatory authorities from 25 jurisdictions as
well as 10 international organizations and standard-setting bodies, and 6 Regional Consultative Groups reaching out
to 65 other jurisdictions around the world.
13https://www.gleif.org/en/, last accessed on 19 January 2021
14https://www.leiroc.org/lei/uses.htm last accessed on 19 January 2021
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way (e.g. trust, partnership, contractual). It excludes natural persons, but includes
governmental organizations and supranationals.’
– A Legal Entity Identifier (LEI) is defined in the GLEIF level 1 ontology as ‘The
ISO 17442 compatible identifier for the legal entity referenced.’ It consists of 20
characters:
∗ Characters 1-4: Prefix used to ensure the uniqueness among codes from LEI
issuers (Local Operating Units or LOUs).
∗ Characters 5-18: Entity-specific part of the code generated and assigned by
LOUs according to transparent, sound and robust allocation policies. As re-
quired by ISO 17442, it contains no embedded intelligence.
∗ Characters 19-20: Two check digits as described in the ISO 17442 standard.
The ISO 17442 standard specifies the minimum reference data which are the fol-
lowing.
∗ The official name of the legal entity as recorded in the official registers.
∗ The registered address of that legal entity.
∗ The country of formation.
∗ The codes for the representation of names of countries and their subdivisions.
∗ The date of the first LEI assignment; the date of last update of the LEI infor-
mation; and the date of expiry, if applicable.
– A local operating unit is defined in the GLEIF level 1 ontology as "An entity that
supplies registration, renewal and other services, and acts as the primary interface
for legal entities wishing to obtain an LEI. Only organizations duly accredited by the
Global Legal Entity Identifier Foundation (GLEIF) are authorized to issue LEIs."
• The GLEIF level 2 ontology [124] , referred to as Who Owns Whom, allows to describe
legal entity parent relationships.
• The Entity Legal Form (ELF) ontology [122] defines concepts for Entity Legal Forms
and their abbreviations by jurisdiction, based on ISO 20275 [166]. The current version
of the ELF ontology, released in July 2019, lists more than 2,100 entity legal forms across
more than 90 jurisdictions. The list contains legal forms/types in their native language,
such as limited liability companies (Ltd), Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH)
or Société Anonyme (SA).
• Registration Authority ontology [125] defining concepts for Business Registries, includ-
ing the jurisdictions served.
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D.2.4.4 GLEIF data
Access to GLEIF data is available through at least the following methods.
• A web-based search tool and a file download service is offered by GLEIF to access the
publicly available LEI data pool. The data is only available in such large datasets that
these cannot be opened, queried or processed by regular applications, editors or browsers.
It is intended to be processed by dedicated applications that process the data in streaming
mode.
• DTCC, an American company, offers a Global Markets Entity Identifier Utility to access
its data in collaboration with SWIFT.
• The data is integrated in Linked Open Data sources such as FactForge which can be
queried on-line and from where data can be downloaded.
D.2.5 Linked Open Data
The term Linked Open Data refers to data that is both Linked Data andOpen Data. Linked Data
is a term commonly used to refer to data that complies to Tim Berners-Lee’s four principles15
formulated in 2006:
1. Use URIs as names for things,
2. Use HTTP URIs so that people can look up those names,
3. When someone looks up a URI, provide useful information, using the standards (RDF*,
SPARQL),
4. Include links to other URIs so that they can discover more things.
Open Data is a term commonly used to refer to data that can be freely used and distributed
by anyone, subject only to the requirement to attribute and share-alike. Linked Open Data refers
to data that complies with both terms. It is both linked and uses open sources. There are many
sources of Linked Open Data. The W3C offers an overview of well-known data sets available
in RDF at https://www.w3.org/wiki/DataSetRDFDumps.
D.2.6 DBpedia
DBpedia is a well-studied example of Linked Open Data.
15https://www.w3.org/DesignIssues/LinkedData.html
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• It extracts structured information fromWikipedia and makes it available through its pub-
lic SPARQL endpoint16.
• It is developed by the Leipzig University, the University of Mannheim, and OpenLink
Software.
• There is large body of academic publications available regarding DBpedia17.
D.2.6.1 Data extraction
DBpedia extracts data from Wikipedia’s infoboxes. An infobox is a table used to collect and
present a subset of information about its subject. It is a structured document containing a set of
attribute–value pairs, and represents a summary of information about the subject of aWikipedia
article. Each attribute-value pair of an infobox is extracted into an RDF triple according to the
DBpedia ontology. Each type of infobox is mapped to an ontology class, and each property
within an infobox is mapped to an ontology property.
For example the English Wikipedia article about London contains a ‘settlement’ infobox.
This infobox may be mapped to e.g. the class ‘populated place’ in the DBpedia ontology and
the attributes in the infobox are mapped to properties in the DBpedia ontology. This allows to
obtain a unified view over all data in infoboxes. Since this information conforms to Semantic
Web standards, it can be queried and combined by a broad range of tools.
D.2.6.2 DBpedia ontology
The DBpedia ontology is based on OWL and describes classes, e.g. person, city, country, and
properties, e.g. birth place, longitude. Information in Wikipedia articles is then mapped via the
above described mapping to this ontology.
For naming things, on top of well-known ontologies such as Dublic Core, FOAF, OWL,
SKOS etc. DBpedia uses its own ontology. According to its website18 the ontology19 covers
685 classes which form a subsumption hierarchy and are described by 2,795 different properties.






18https://wiki.dbpedia.org/services-resources/ontology, last visited 21 January 2021
19http://mappings.dbpedia.org/server/ontology/classes, last visited 21 January 2021
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• dbr-de http://de.dbpedia.org/resource/
The full list of namespaces can be obtained on-line20.
D.2.7 Wikidata
Wikidata is another example of Linked Open Data. Wikidata acts as central storage for the
structured data of its Wikimedia sister projects including Wikipedia, Wikivoyage, Wiktionary,
Wikisource, and others. The data on Wikidata is added by a community of volunteers both
manually and by using software, like other Wikimedia projects including Wikipedia.
For naming things, Wikidata has its own way of identifying things and allocating properties
to them. The Wikidata repository consists mainly of items, each one having a label, a descrip-
tion and any number of aliases. Items are uniquely identified by a character Q followed by a
number, such Q42. Statements describe characteristics of an Item and consist of a property and
a value. Properties in Wikidata have a character P followed by a number, such as with educated
at(P69). Properties can also link to external databases. A property that links an item to an ex-
ternal database, such as an authority control database used by libraries and archives, is called
an identifier. Wikidata offers a public SPARQL query service. There is also a large body of
academic publications available regarding Wikidata21.
D.2.8 Other examples
Other examples include FactForge, described in Appendix I.4, as well as output from projects
by the Open Knowledge Foundation22, and LinkedData.org23.






  data model specification in DL
The   model that is specified in Chapter 11 is provided here in Description Logic
syntax.





















ID ≡ ∃ uniqueText Datatype http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string












LivingThing ⊑ ¬ RuleBook
LivingThing ⊑ ¬ TimeInterval
LivingThing ⊑ ¬ ID







Participant ≡ Thing ⊓ NaturalPerson ⊔ Organization ⊓ ∃ identifiedBy ID
Participant ⊑ ¬ TimeInterval
Participant ⊑ ¬ RuleBook








RuleBook ⊑ ¬ LivingThing
RuleBook ⊑ ¬ TimeInterval
RuleBook ⊑ ¬ TimeInstant










TimeInstant ⊑ ¬ RuleBook
TimeInstant ⊑ ¬ LivingThing
TimeInstant ⊑ ¬ Participant
TimeInterval
TimeInterval ⊑ ¬ Participant
TimeInterval ⊑ ¬ RuleBook
TimeInterval ⊑ ¬ LivingThing
Object properties
aConformance
∃ aConformance Thing ⊑ Attestation
⊤ ⊑ ∀ aConformance Conformance
accreditationN
∃ accreditationN Thing ⊑ Accreditation
⊤ ⊑ ∀ accreditationN Norm
agreementR
∃ agreementR Thing ⊑ Agreement
⊤ ⊑ ∀ agreementR RuleBook
conformanceN
∃ conformanceN Thing ⊑ Conformance




⊤ ⊑ ≤ 1 doesIdentify Thing
∃ doesIdentify Thing ⊑ ID
⊤ ⊑ ∀ doesIdentify Thing
endorsementR
∃ endorsementR Thing ⊑ Endorsement
⊤ ⊑ ∀ endorsementR RuleBook
endsOn
⊤ ⊑ ∀ endsOn TimeInstant
enforcementR
∃ enforcementR Thing ⊑ Enforcement
⊤ ⊑ ∀ enforcementR RuleBook
identifiedBy
doesIdentify ≡ identifiedBy−
∃ identifiedBy Thing ⊑ Thing
⊤ ⊑ ∀ identifiedBy ID
identityAttestationID
⊑ topObjectProperty
∃ identityAttestationID Thing ⊑ IdentityAttestation
⊤ ⊑ ∀ identityAttestationID ID
interactionHasEvidence
∃ interactionHasEvidence Thing ⊑ Interaction
legalQualificationN
∃ legalQualificationN Thing ⊑ LegalQualification
⊤ ⊑ ∀ legalQualificationN Norm
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pAccreditation
∃ pAccreditation Thing ⊑ Participant
⊤ ⊑ ∀ pAccreditation Accreditation
pAgreement
∃ pAgreement Thing ⊑ Participant
⊤ ⊑ ∀ pAgreement Agreement
pConformance
∃ pConformance Thing ⊑ Participant
⊤ ⊑ ∀ pConformance Conformance
pDisclosure
∃ pDisclosure Thing ⊑ Participant





∃ pEndorsement Thing ⊑ Participant





∃ pEnforcement Thing ⊑ Participant
⊤ ⊑ ∀ pEnforcement Enforcement
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pIdentityAttestation
∃ pIdentityAttestation Thing ⊑ Participant
⊤ ⊑ ∀ pIdentityAttestation IdentityAttestation
pLegalQualification
∃ pLegalQualification Thing ⊑ Participant
⊤ ⊑ ∀ pLegalQualification LegalQualification
pRoleAttestation
∃ pRoleAttestation Thing ⊑ Participant
⊤ ⊑ ∀ pRoleAttestation RoleAttestation
pSupervision
∃ pSupervision Thing ⊑ Participant
⊤ ⊑ ∀ pSupervision Supervision
participatesInInteraction
∃ participatesInInteraction Thing ⊑ Participant
raLegalQualification
∃ raLegalQualification Thing ⊑ RoleAttestation
⊤ ⊑ ∀ raLegalQualification LegalQualification
roleAttestationR
∃ roleAttestationR Thing ⊑ RoleAttestation
⊤ ⊑ ∀ roleAttestationR Role
startsOn
⊤ ⊑ ∀ startsOn TimeInstant
supervisionP
∃ supervisionP Thing ⊑ Supervision




⊤ ⊑ ∀ underRuleBook RuleBook
Data properties
DisclosureURI
∃ DisclosureURI Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#Literal ⊑ Disclosure
⊤ ⊑ ∀ DisclosureURI Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2001/XMLschema#anyURI
NormURI
∃ NormURI Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#Literal ⊑ Norm
⊤ ⊑ ∀ NormURI Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2001/XMLschema#anyURI
RegisterURI
∃ RegisterURI Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#Literal ⊑ Registration
⊤ ⊑ ∀ RegisterURI Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#anyURI
RuleSet
⊤ ⊑ ∀ RuleSet Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string
name
ruleBook-digest-RIPEMD-160
⊤ ⊑ ≤ 1 ruleBook-digest-RIPEMD-160
⊤ ⊑ ∀ ruleBook-digest-RIPEMD-160 Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string
ruleBook-digest-SHA-256
⊤ ⊑ ≤ 1 ruleBook-digest-SHA-256
⊤ ⊑ ∀ ruleBook-digest-SHA-256 Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string
uniqueText
⊤ ⊑ ≤ 1 uniqueText




















This appendix provides background information on the European trusted lists that
were implemented as a consequence of the eIDAS regulation [103].
F.1 Introduction
The European trusted lists were established as part of the implementation of the eIDAS Regu-
lation [103], which was described in Section 2.2.3.1. It included the organisation of a European
scheme of trusted lists1 published by national Trusted List Scheme Operators (TLSOs).
F.2 Purpose of trusted lists
The purpose of a trusted list is to allow a TLSO to provide information about the status and
status history of the trust services from Trust Service Providers (TSPs) regarding compliance
with the relevant provisions of the applicable legislation on digital signatures and trust services
for electronic transactions. This information is provided for the benefit of parties that want to
rely on the trust services provided by those TSPs.
It can be observed that some of these TSPs (e.g. Certipost, the TSP for the Belgian electronic
identity card) do not limit themselves to eSignature services, but also provide identity-related
services.
The specification ETSI TS 119 612 [89] states the following.
EUMember States’ trusted lists were established in EUbyCommissionDecision 2009/767/EC
and aimed primarily at supporting the validation of advanced electronic signatures supported
by a qualified certificate and advanced electronic signature supported by both a qualified cer-
tificate and by a secure signature creation device, in the meaning of Directive 1999/93/EC,
1The terms trusted list and trust list are frequently used interchangeable, and are considered as such here also.
The defining specification, ETSI TS 119 612 [89] uses the term ‘Trusted Lists’ so this is used in the thesis as well.
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as far as they included as a minimum trust service providers supervised/accredited for issu-
ing qualified certificates. TLSOs could however include in their trusted lists also other types
of approved trust service providers. Hence, the cross-border use of electronic services based
on advanced electronic signatures is also facilitated, where the supporting trust services (e.g.
issuing of non-qualified certificates) are part of the listed supervised/accredited services.
Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 [i.10] extends the scope of qualified trust services and trust
service providers to a wider but definite list of harmonised trust services. The Regulation is ap-
plicable as of 1 July 2016, until when the CommissionDecision 2009/767/EC [i.2], as amended,
remains applicable. For trust services not covered by the Regulation, Member States remain
free to define other types of trust services, for national purposes where these can be considered
as qualified trust services (without effect in other Member States).
An assessment scheme for Conformity Assessment Bodies to assess TSPs is specified in
ETSI EN 319 403 [88].
An overview of the Trust Service Providers listed in the TLs is publicly available2 in a
dashboard. A screenshot of the dashboard, captured on 2 April 2021, is shown in Figure F.1.
Figure F.1: eIDAS TL dashboard
Each trusted list provides information about the status and history of the trust services of
2https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/tl-browser/\#/dashboard
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the included Trust Service Providers (TSPs) regarding compliance with the relevant legislation.
Two observations are in order.
• While the eIDAS Regulation [103] does not classify identity and authentication services
as trust services, some TSPs (e.g. the TSP for the Belgian electronic identity card) do not
limit themselves to eSignature services, but also provide identity-related services3.
• The eIDAS classification of trust services is specified in eIDAS [103] Art. 3. It includes
the creation and the verification of a signature, whichmay be executed locally or remotely.
Using the   data model terminology, such a verification is performed by a claim status
service provider. It can be observed that in practice there are only a few companies that
offer verification services. Therefore claim status service providers are out of scope for
the implementation. More background information is provided in appendix F.7.
F.3 Availability
The TLs are made available at country-specific locations (URIs). Both a human readable (PDF)
and machine readable (XML) version are published. For example the Belgian machine readable
TL can be found at http://tsl.belgium.be/tsl-be.xml. Replacing the suffix .xml by .pdf
returns the human readable version.
The trusted lists are also available through the graphical user interface of the trusted list
browser4. The location and the identity of the TL issuers can be checked in the European List
of Trusted Lists, available at https://ec.europa.eu/tools/lotl/eu-lotl.xml.
F.4 Formalisation
F.4.1 Standardisation and terminology
Trusted lists are created according to ETSI TS 119 612 [89]. The specification allows to allo-
cate the responsibilities for supervision, accreditation and scheme operation to a single actor,
or to separate them. According to ETSI TS 119 612 [89] Section 5.3.7, the allocation of re-
sponsibilities should be indicated. This allocation is different per Member State.
ETSI TS 119 612 [89] Section 3 contains definitions in natural language. These are based
on legislation. Section 4 explains the overall structure of Trusted Lists. Section 5 defines format
and content. These are specified in terms of presence (required or not), description (in natural
language), format, and value (explaining the different possible values).




Annex B specifies the XML implementation, and includes references to three XML schema
definition files (.xsd). The latter specify the actual types.
ETSI standarisation work also includes the use of Object Identifiers (OIDs) to standardise
the meaning of information fields. ETSI leverages the ITU-T Object Identifiers, and as a con-
sequence, today’s certificates may contain various OIDs, such as the Qualified Certificate (QC)
Profile OID (0.4.0.1862) which refers to ETSI TS 101 862 (QCP). The presence of this OID
within the certificate indicates it is qualified as per the ETSI Technical Specification.
ETSI TS 119 612 [89] includes the following terms and definitions in section 3.1:
• approval: assertion that a trust service, falling within the oversight of a particular scheme,
has been either positively endorsed or assessed for compliance against the relevant re-
quirements (active approval) or has received no explicit restriction since the time at which
the scheme was aware of the existence of the said service (passive approval)
• approval scheme: any organized process of supervision, monitoring, assessment or such
practices that are intended to apply oversight with the objective of ensuring adherence to
specific criteria in order to maintain trust in the services under the scope of the scheme
• conformity assessment: process demonstrating whether specified requirements relating
to a product, process, service, system, person or body have been fulfilled
• scheme operator: body responsible for the operation and/or management of any kind of
assessment scheme, whether they are governmental, industry or private, etc.
• supervision system: system that allows for the supervision of trust service providers and
the services they provide, for compliance with relevant requirements
• trust service: electronic service which enhances trust and confidence in electronic trans-
actions
• Trust Service Provider (TSP): body operating one or more (electronic) trust services
• Trust Service Token (TrST): physical or binary (logical) object generated or issued as a
result of the use of a trust service NOTE: Examples of binary trust service tokens are:
certificates, CRLs, time-stamp tokens, OCSP responses. Physical tokens can be devices
on which binary objects (tokens or credentials) are stored. Equally, a token can be the
performance of an act and the generation of an electronic record, e.g. an insurance policy
or share certificate.
• Trusted List (TL): list that provides information about the status and the status history
of the trust services from trust service providers regarding compliance with the applica-
ble requirements and the relevant provisions of the applicable legislation. NOTE: In the
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context of European Union Member States, as specified in Regulation (EU) No 910/2014
[i.10], it refers to a EU Member State list including information related to the qualified
trust service providers for which it is responsible, together with information related to the
qualified trust services provided by them. In the context of non-EU countries or interna-
tional organizations, it refers to a list meeting the requirements of the present document
and providing assessment scheme based approval status information about trust services
from trust service providers, for compliance with the relevant provisions of the applicable
approval scheme and the relevant legislation.
• (voluntary) accreditation: any permission, setting out rights and obligations specific to
the provision of trust services, to be granted upon request by the trust service provider
concerned, by the public or private body charged with the elaboration of, and supervision
of compliance with, such rights and obligations, where the trust service provider is not
entitled to exercise the rights stemming from the permission until it has received the
decision by the body
F.4.2 Formalisation in XML
TLs are specified in XML version 1 using UTF-8 encoding. The top-level element of a TL
is a tsl:TrustServiceStatusList, which contains a tsl:SchemeInformation element as first sub-
element. The latter contains a tsl:TSLType tag that identifies the trusted list type (e.g. ‘generic’
as shown).
1 < t s l : TSLType>
2 h t t p : / / u r i . e t s i . org / T r s t S v c / eS igDir −1999−93−EC−T r u s t e d L i s t /
TSLType / g e n e r i c
3 </ t s l : TSLType>
F.4.2.1 TLSO
Within the tsl:SchemeInformation element, the Member State Competent Authority is specified
as Scheme Operator using the <tsl:SchemeOperatorName> tag.
F.4.2.2 Endorsement
Also within the tsl:SchemeInformation element, a pointer to the European Commission’s List
of Trusted Lists is provided.
1 <TSLLocat ion>h t t p s : / / ec . europa . eu / t o o l s / l o t l / eu− l o t l . xml </
TSLLocat ion >
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Under <AdditionalInformation> the European Commission is specified by the <Scheme-
OperatorName> as operator of the LOTL scheme. This represents an endorsement from the
Member State to the European Commission’s trusted list5
F.4.2.3 TSPs
The TSPs included in the scheme are specified in a list which is identified by the tag<tsl:TrustServiceProviderList>.
Within this list, individual TSPs are specified in <tsl:TrustServiceProvider> elements, which
contain a <tsl:TSPInformation> element.
The latter contain elements such as <tsl:TSPName> (e.g. Certipost NV/SA), and an ele-
ment <tsl:TSPServices> which contains the individual descriptions of <tsl:TSPService> and
its <tsl:ServiceInformation>.
The latter contains a<tsl:ServiceTypeIdentifier> (e.g. http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/CA/QC),
a <tsl:ServiceName>, a <tsl:ServiceStatus> (e.g. http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/eSigDir-1999-93-
EC-TrustedList/Svcstatus/undersupervision)
Further details are provided under the <tsl:ServiceInformationExtensions> element.
F.4.2.4 Signature
The last element, <ds:Signature>, contains a digital signature of the TLSO over the XML
structure.
F.5 Comparison of transformation alternatives
F.5.1 XSL Transformations (XSLT) and XPath
Extensible Stylesheet Language Transformations (XSLT) [377] is a language for transforming
XML documents into other XML documents. It is commonly used with Xpath [334] which is
a language for identifying particular parts of XML documents.
XSLT is the first part of the XSL stylesheet language for XML. It is a Turing-complete lan-
guage that includes the XSL Transformation vocabulary and XPath, a language for addressing
parts of XML documents. The XSLT language allows to write XSL stylesheets which contain
instructions for transforming one tree of nodes (the XML input) into another tree of nodes (the
output or transformation result). As Trusted Lists are available in XML they can be used as
input. XSLT allows to add/remove elements and attributes to or from the output file. It also
allows to rearrange and sort elements, perform tests and make decisions about which elements
to hide and display. In this transformation process, XSLT uses XPath to define parts of the
5The LOTL itself contains a reference to the trusted lists of the Member States. This represents an endorsement
from the European Commission to the Member State trusted list.
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source document that should match one or more predefined templates. When a match is found,
XSLT will transform the matching part of the source document into the result document.
XPath is a language for identifying particular parts of XML documents. It allows to write
expressions to select elements and attributes of the input on the basis of position, relative po-
sition, type, content and other criteria. From the perspective of XPath, an XML document is a
tree made up of nodes, which may be nested. XPath distinguishes seven types of nodes: root,
element, text, attribute, comment, processing instruction and namespace nodes.
F.5.2 Jena
Jena is a collection of Open Source software modules which implements APIs for OWL, RDF,
SPARQL, reasoners, storage, parsing and writing (XML, N3, turtle, . . . ). Jena also offers its
own triples stores, Fuseki and TDB. Jena stores everything in RDF. The RDF document(s)
contain ’statements’ (i.e. triples). The Jena APIs support the following interfaces:
• Model: a set of statements (ontology model, inference model),
• Statement: a triple of {R, P, O},
• Resource: subject, URI,
• Property: ‘item’ of resource,
• Object: may be a resource or a literal,
• Literal: non-nested ‘object’,
• Container: special resource, collection of things.
F.5.3 SPIN
The SPARQL Inferencing Notation (SPIN) allows to represent SPARQL rules and constraints
on Semantic Web models. SPIN also provides meta-modelling capabilities that allow users to
define their own SPARQL functions and query templates. SPIN also includes a library of com-
mon functions. More information can be found at its website6. SPIN is supported in various
tools, including in the GraphDB Workbench’s OntoRefine function. The origin of SPIN is a
W3C Member Submission7. Its concepts have given rise to W3C’s SHACL8. From a transfor-
mation perspective, SPIN functions support parsing, splitting and encoding which can be used







• The capabilities of XLST and XPath match well with the task at hand, because these
languages have been created for the very purpose.
• The capabilities of Jena match less. Jena offers an API to work with triples however it
is less oriented towards the creation of such triples. Working with triples is less relevant
since the main work consists of creation and later executing the TWSEVAL, which are
implemented in SPARQL.
• The capabilities of SPIN match less. While it seems possible to use SPIN (or SHACL)
for the required transformations, a comparison of how this would have to be programmed
on the basis of the available documentation indicates it is more labour intensive than the
XSLT and XPath approach.
As a consequence, XSLT and XPath are selected to specify the transformations.
F.6 Implementation of the transformations
F.6.1 Approach
Xalan-Javawas used to specify and execute the transformations. It is anOpen Source implemen-
tation9 of W3C XSL Transformations (XSLT) Version 1.0 [377] and the XML Path Language
(XPath) Version 1.0 [334] recommendations.
Trusted lists are published in XML format which is transformed into RDF triples by XSLT.
This is done by specifying a series of XSL transformations and subsequently executing these
through a Java program over the XML input. The execution results in RDF output.
• Creation of an XSL transformer instance using the specified XSL transformation.
• Loading of the XML into memory.
• Execution of the XSL transformer over the XML.
Fig F.2 shows the flow of execution.
9http://xml.apache.org/
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Figure F.2: XSL transformation from XML to RDF.
F.6.2 Input
The input consists of an XML document, which contains elements, structured by tags. Elements
may have attributes. Consider a sample document structured as
<person born=”1912-06-23”> Alan Turing </person>
This document has one element, created by the person tag. Which has one attribute (born).
Tags can be nested.
F.6.3 Transformation
The following is required.
• According to the W3C XSLT Recommendation [377] an XSL style sheet needs to start
with:
<xsl:transform version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform">
• To get access to the XSLT elements, attributes and features the XSLT namespace must
be declared at the top of the document.
XSLT allows to select elements from the input tree using an Xpath expression and using
them to create elements and attributes in the output tree. The instruction
<xsl:template match="matcher">




matches against the toplevel element of a TL. The ‘matcher’ is an XPath expression which
can be can be absolute or relative.
• Absolute means the path starts from the root of the input tree, ‘/’.
• Relative means the path starts from the context node, i.e. the node currently selected.
The context node itself is selected with a dot ‘.’. Its parent is selected with a double dot
‘..’, and its descendants with a double slash ‘//’.
The instructions xsl:element and xsl:attribute insert an element and an attribute respectively.
Assigning the value that is inserted can be done a.o. via xsl:value-of which selects the string
value of an XPath expression, or via the an interim xsl:variable, which also selects the string
value of an XPath expression and can then be used in an expression referenced by its $name.
F.7 Claim status service providers
F.7.1 Selection of alternatives
The role of claim status service provider is specified in 6.5.2. In today’s landscape of electronic
service providers, it can be observed that most evidence service providers (such as TSPs, CAs,
IdPs) mostly provide certificates such as X.509 certificates. Some provide evidence creation
services such as signature creation. However, the number of service providers that e.g. verify
a signature are limited. It is assumed that a relying party has its own verification software at its
disposal. Adobe Acrobat, Windows Office, LibreOffice and other software offer this possibility.
As this expects users to know how to configure and perform the verification operations, on-line
verification services are increasingly available.
F.7.2 Implementation
Two claim status service providers are briefly discussed as examples. The first service provider
is offered by the Belgian Federal Government. The Belgian government provides a free eID
Digital Signature Server10. The second is the private sector e-contract service11. Both offer
signature creation and verification services. Other examples include Trustweaver’s verification






List of trusted lists
This appendix provides background information on the European list of trusted
lists that was implemented as a consequence of the eIDAS regulation [103].
G.1 Purpose
The List of the Trusted Lists (LOTL) contains the identities of the Trusted List Scheme Opera-
tors of by the EuropeanMember States and the locationswhere their Trusted Lists are published.
The LOTL is created and maintained by the European Commission.
To quote the European Commission’s website1: In order to allow access to the trusted lists
of all Member States, the Commission makes available to the public, through a secure channel
to an authenticated web server, the trusted lists as notified by Member States, in a signed or
sealed form suitable for automated processing.
The LOTL has its own entry at the trusted list browser2.
G.2 Availability
The European Commissionmaintains this list at a publicly communicated location3. It serves as
an interoperability tool to facilitate the use of national Trusted Lists. The Commission accepts
no responsibility or liability whatsoever with regard to the content of national Trusted Lists







G.3.1 Standardisation and terminology
The LOTL is created as a trusted list according to ETSI TS 119 612 [89].
G.3.2 Formalisation in XML
The LOTL is a TL, specified in XML version 1 using UTF-8 encoding.
The top-level element of a TL is a tsl:TrustServiceStatusList, which contains two elements:
• a tsl:SchemeInformation element,
• A ds:Signature element.
The tsl:SchemeInformation element contains many scheme attributes.
• a TSLType element that identifies it as the EU List of the Lists:
<TSLType> http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/TrustedList/TSLType/EUlistofthelists </TSLType>
• a <SchemeOperatorName> element that specifies the European Commission as Scheme
Operator
• a <PointersToOtherTSL> element, pointing to the Member State TLSOs
The ds:Signature contains the signature of the TLSO over the information provided. There





This appendix provides background information on the organisation of accredita-
tion and conformity assesment.
H.1 Introduction
H.1.1 Terminology
Accreditation is a third-party attestation related to a conformity assessment body (such as certi-
fication body, inspection body or laboratory) conveying formal demonstration of its competence
to carry out specific conformity assessment tasks (such as certification, inspection and testing).
An authoritative body that performs accreditation is called an ‘accreditation body’.
H.1.2 Global organisation of accreditation
The International Accreditation Forum (IAF) and International Laboratory Accreditation Co-
operation (ILAC) provide international recognitions to accreditation bodies. There are many
internationally-recognized accreditation bodies approved by the IAF and ILAC.
H.2 Accreditation within Europe
Within the European Economic Area, accreditation is regulated through the Accreditation Reg-
ulation [100].
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H.2.1 The European co-operation for Accreditation
The European co-operation for Accreditation1 (EA) is a not-for-profit association, registered in
the Netherlands. It is formally appointed by the European Commission in Regulation (EC) No
765/2008 [100] to develop and maintain a multilateral agreement of mutual recognition, the
EA MLA, based on a harmonised accreditation infrastructure. The rationale for the authority
of the EA can be summarised as follows.
• According to the Regulation, accreditation means an ‘attestation by a National Accredita-
tion Body that a Conformity Assessment Body meets the requirements set by harmonised
standards and, where applicable, any additional requirements including those set out in
relevant sectoral schemes, to carry out a specific conformity assessment activity’.
• The Regulation identifies the European co-operation for Accreditation (EA) as the sole
association entrusted to manage accreditation at European level and defines its responsi-
bilities and obligations in this respect. It places an obligation on EU Member States to
accept the results issued by the Conformity Assessment Bodies accredited by any of the
EA MLA signatories.
• The EA MLA is recognised2 at international level by IAF (International Accreditation
Forum) and ILAC (International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation), the two global
associations of Accreditation Bodies.
At the time of performing the analysis for the thesis, the first quarter of 2021, the EA had
50 Members. The EA Members are National Accreditation Bodies (NAB) that are officially
recognized by their national governments to assess and verify – against international standards
– organizations that carry out conformity assessment activities such as certification, verification,
inspection, testing and calibration. The European Accreditation publishes its information such





Sources of company data
This appendix provides background information to and a short analysis of public
sources of company data that are relevant to the thesis.
I.1 Introduction
Many sources publish data about companies. These include:
• public data sources such as business registers and National Banks, organised on a per
country basis,
• EU-wide systems such as
– the European Business Register Interconnection System (BRIS),
– the European Data Portal,
• commercial data providers, and
• Linked Open Data sources, referring to data that is both linked and uses open sources.
I.2 Public data sources per country
Information on the identity and selected attributes of companies is available frommany sources.
There are public data sources that can often be accessed for free.
I.2.1 Business registers
I.2.1.1 Description
Many countries operate a service that can be queried interactively. These include the following:
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• the UK’s Companies House1,
• the Belgian Cross-roads database service of the Federal Ministry of Economy2,
• the Italian InfoCamere3
• the Swedish Bolagsverket4,
• the Spanish Registration Authority5, the government open data website6 and the Catalan
transparency website7,
• the German Bundesanzeiger8,
• the Dutch Kamer van Koophandel9,
• the French Infogreffe10.
I.2.1.2 Analysis and interim conclusion
These data sources vary in type of information offered, in language, in format (comma separated
value, pdf, XML, ..) and in user interface. Some provide information free of charge, some
charge a fee. As a consequence using information from such sources is possible, but limited to
specific countries only, and relatively cumbersome.
I.2.2 National Banks
I.2.2.1 Description
In many countries statutory accounts can be submitted electronically to the National Bank in
eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) format. E.g. in Belgium this is possible
since 200711. The information is made publicly available by the Balance Sheet department of
the Central Bank.
XBRL is used to define and exchange balance sheets and financial statements. As XBRL














XLink, XPath, and Namespaces, such statutory accounts could be used as data source. One can
download the statutory accounts of company from the website of the Belgian Central bank 12,
and extract company and auditor records in XBRL format. These can be transformed into RDF
that uses the XBRL terms such as < EntityCurrentLegalName > (the official name of the
company), < EntitiyIdentif ier > (the VAT number) and < Auditor >.
I.2.2.2 Analysis and interim conclusion
Statutory accounts are a valuable data source, but with varying types of information offered,
in different language, and through different user interfaces. Some provide information free of
charge, while others charge a fee. As a consequence using information from such sources is
possible, but limited to specific countries only, and relatively cumbersome.
I.2.3 Aggregated public data sources
I.2.3.1 BRIS
The EU-wide Business Register Interconnection System13 (BRIS) offers an alternative data
source. However, these databases and the BRIS are limited to single interactive queries and not
in XML format, making it less suitable for the thesis.
I.2.3.2 The European Data Portal
The European Data Portal14 harvests the metadata of Public Sector Information available on
public data portals across European countries. Information regarding the provision of data and
the benefits of re-using data is also included. The Open Data used within the European Data
Portal is data published by public administrations or on their behalf. The metadata contains
the information made available with the data set by the initial publisher. Different licences, or
absence of licence may occur and re-uses are invited to check with the owners/publishers of the
data what terms and conditions apply to the re-use of the data.
The website of the European Data Portal15 mentioned it contained 1.217.377 datasets at the




15https://www.europeandataportal.eu/en, last accessed 19 January 2021
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I.3 Commercial data sources
Relevant data is sold by companies such as Graydon and Dun & Bradstreet but also made freely
available by organisations such as GLEIF. The analysis for the implementation as part of the
thesis is limited to data that is freely available.
I.3.1 GLEIF
An introduction to the GLEIF and its ontologies is provided in Appendix D.2.4. GLEIF is
particularly relevant for the implementation part of the thesis because it offers the following
features.
• GLEIF offers its data as open data as explained on its website16. It offers a free search
utility17 and various free download facilities.
• The sources of the GLEIF data can be considered as authoritative. It is based on the use
of a globally unique company identifier, the Legal Entity Identifier (LEI). The GLEIF
offers a mechanism to correct errors in its records. In case a potential error in LEI data
has been identified, the LEI data can be challenged18.
• GLEIF data is widely used. The LEI Regulatory Oversight Committee publishes an
overview19 of where the use of the LEI has been made mandatory or strongly suggested.
This includes most territories worldwide.
I.3.2 GLEIF service providers
There exist many providers of GLEIF related services, including the following.
• There are GLEIF Registration Agents, also referred to as LEI issuers or Local Operating
Units (LOUs). These are listed on the GLEIF website20.
• Although GLEIF makes LEI data freely available, as described in Section D.2.4.4 there
are alternative accesses offered for professional users. This includes the Global Market
Entity Identifier Utility21 which is offered by the Business Entity Data (BED) B.V. com-









I.4 Linked Open Data
I.4.1 Description
Linked Open Data offers an alternative to the information sources described above. It combines
Linked Data and Open Data as follows.
• Linked Data is a term commonly used to refer to data that complies to Tim Berners-Lee’s
four principles22 formulated in 2006:
1. use uris as names for things,
2. use HTTP uris so that those names can be looked up,
3. when a uri is looked-up, provide useful information, using the standards (RDF*,
SPARQL),
4. include links to other uris so that more things can be discovered.
• OpenData is a term commonly used to refer to data that can be freely used and distributed
by anyone, subject only to the requirement to attribute and share-alike. There has been a
recent increase in the importance of open data, illustrated by the publication of a dedicated
EU Directive [102] on open data and the reuse of public sector information.
Linked Open Data refers to data that complies with both terms. It is both linked and uses
open sources. There are many publicly available sources of Linked Open Data, including the
following.
• Wikipedia23 and its related data sources (Wikidata, Wikispecies, Wikisource, etc.) as
well as DBpedia24, which makes the Wikipedia data available in a structured way.
• FactForge25 is a hub of Linked Open Data and articles about people, organisations and
locations. It was created by the Bulgarian research company Ontotext as a public data
service. Ontotext participated in more than 30 research projects and related initiatives26.
FactForge represents a large scale public demonstrator of their GraphDB‘s features.
The purpose of FactForge is to serve as an index and entry point to the LOD cloud and to
present a good use-case for large-scale reasoning and data integration. This is described







– Bishop et al. [31] describe the capabilities of FactForge.
– Damova [65] describes how FactForge is made up of central LOD datasets, and
how its meta-data, ontologies and reasoning are organised. It includes more than
1 billion data elements from datasets such as DBpedia, Geonames, Wordnet, the
Global Legal Entities Identification Foundation (GLEIF) and the Panama Papers.
– Bishop et al. [32] describe how to reason over the data in FactForge.
Particularly the data from the GLEIF is relevant for the thesis, because it includes com-
pany information that was obtained from sources that can be considered as authoritative.
Entities referred to by LEIs and LEI itself are described in the GLEIF (refer to D.2.4.3)
and FIBO (refer to I.4.2.1) ontologies both in natural language and in OWL.
As per its website27, FactForge contains the Global Legal Entity Identifier profiles of
about around 3 million organizations, derived from the DTCC Global Markets Entity
Identifier Utility data dump from 2017.
• The US Library of Congress’ Linked Data Service28 provides interactive and machine
access to the Library’s authority and bibliographic metadata, along with standards and
vocabularies used and/or maintained by the Library of Congress.
• The Linked Open Vocabularies29 whose main objective is to help publishers and users of
linked data and vocabularies to assess what was available, to reuse it, and to insert their
own vocabulary production in the ecosystem.
I.4.1.1 Analysis and interim conclusion
Given the type of information available, the way the information is published and relative au-
thority of the different sources, Linked Open Data sources and particularly FactForge’s GLEIF
data were considered as valid information sources.
I.4.2 Analysis of the FactForge GLEIF data
I.4.2.1 Selection of appropriate FIBO ontology
FIBO Business Entities is structured into ontological modules that each include one or more
ontologies. There are eight modules, covering corporations, functional entities, legal entities,
ownership and control, partnerships, private limited companies, sole proprietorships, and trusts.




For mapping on the   data model, the module Legal Entities is relevant because it allows
to describe legal entities, which can be used as participants (Functional Service Providers/-
Consumers, Endorsers, etc). The module has the abbreviation FIBO-BE-LE. It contains four
ontologies:
• Legal Persons,
• Formal Business Organizations,
• Corporate Bodies, and
• LEI entities.
The ontology Legal Persons is loadable from the file FIBO_BE_LegalPersons.rdf. This
ontology of Legal Persons contains OWL classes such as BusinessEntity, identified by its URI
http://www.omg.org/spec/EDMC-FIBO/BE/LegalEntities/LegalPersons/BusinessEntity.
Further classes include LegalEntity, LegalPerson, NaturalPerson, PowerOfAttorney, Signatory
and variousmore. For every class, a definition in natural language is provided as a skos:definition,
as well as references to its source (e.g. a dictionary).
The ontology LEI entities defines concepts around contractually capable business entities.
The terms defined are those which are relevant to the Legal Entity Identifier (LEI) work. The
term known as legal entity in that work is identified as a formal organization which is recognized
in some jurisdiction as being capable of incurring some liability, whether or not is a legal
person as understood by the legal community. This is labelled as contractually capable entity,
to avoid confusion with the accepted legal term for Legal Entity. Such entities are recognized
as requiring an LEI, but the identifier itself is allocated to the formal organization which is
recognized as being contractually capable.
The ontology has the abbreviation fibo-be-le-lei and is loadable from the fileFIBO_BE_LEIEntities.rdf.
Its classes are ContractuallyCapableEntity, LegalEntity, LegalEntityIdentifier, LegalEntityI-
dentifierScheme, and some deprecated classes (MuncipalEntity, Sovereign, SupranationalEn-
tity). It has the property hasAddressOfLegalFormation.
The two remaining ontologies (Formal Business Organizations andCorporate Bodies) con-
tain complementary information.
I.4.2.2 Identification of classes and properties
The ontology fibo-be-le-lei has the classes LegalEntity and LegalEntityIdentifier. The class
LegalEntity is a subclass of AutonomousAgent / LegalPerson. Definition of the class LegalEn-
tity is isOrganizedIn exactly one Jurisdiction and LegalPerson. The ontology is stored under
the file name FIBO_BE_LegalPersons.rdf, abbreviated to fibo-be-le-lp.
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The following properties can be identified by using the the FactForge SPARQL endpoint30.
• Four properties of LegalEntityIdentifiercan be listed by the query described in Listing





• Additional properties of LegalEntity can be listed by submitting the query described in
Listing I.1.
• Additional properties of LegalPerson can be listed by submitting the query described in
Listing I.2.
Listing I.1: FactForge query for LegalEntity properties
1 PREFIX r d f : <h t t p : / / www. w3 . org /1999 /02 /22 − rd f −s yn t ax −ns#>
2 PREFIX f i bo −be−l e− l p : <h t t p : / / www. omg . org / spec /EDMC−FIBO /BE / L e g a l E n t i t i e s / Lega lPe r son s />
3 SELECT DISTINCT ? p r o p e r t y
4 WHERE { ? i n d i v r d f : t y p e f i bo −be−l e− l p : L e g a l E n t i t y ;
5 ? p r o p e r t y ? v a l u e . }
Listing I.2: FactForge query for LegalPerson properties
1 PREFIX r d f : <h t t p : / / www. w3 . org /1999 /02 /22 − rd f −s yn t ax −ns#>
2 PREFIX f i bo −be−l e− l p : <h t t p : / / www. omg . org / spec /EDMC−FIBO /BE / L e g a l E n t i t i e s / Lega lPe r son s />
3 SELECT DISTINCT ? p r o p e r t y
4 WHERE { ? i n d i v r d f : t y p e f i bo −be−l e− l p : Lega lPe r s on ;
5 ? p r o p e r t y ? v a l u e . }
Listing I.3: FactForge query for LegalEntityIdentifier properties
1 WHERE { ? i n d i v r d f : t y p e f i bo −be−l e− l e i : L e g a l E n t i t y I d e n t i f i e r ;
2 ? p r o p e r t y ? v a l u e . }
As per the FIBO Foundations specification, the fibo-fnd-aap-agt:identifies is a property of
the class AutonomousAgent. It is the relationship between something and that which provides
a unique reference for it. Its inverse is isIdentifiedBy, which can be used by queries such as
described in Listing I.4.
30http://factforge.net/sparql
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Listing I.4: FactForge query that uses isIdentifiedBy
1 SELECT ? i n d i v ?name ? i d e n t i f i e r
2 WHERE {? i n d i v r d f : t y p e f i bo −be−l e− l p : L e g a l E n t i t y ; f i bo
−fnd−aap−a g t : i s I d e n t i f i e d B y ? i d e n t i f i e r ; f i bo −fnd−aap
−a g t : hasName ?name . }
I.5 Conclusion
On the basis of the preceding analysis, the Linked Open Data source FactForge and its GLEIF
data was selected as data source for information about companies.
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Appendix J
Sources of natural person information
This appendix provides background information on, and an analysis of, available
information regarding natural persons. The focus of the descriptions is on what is
most relevant to the thesis.
J.1 Introduction
First and foremost, personal data of natural persons is protected in Europe by the General Data
Protection Regulation [101]. This imposes limitations on what can be done with personal data,
and how it must be protected in cases where its usage is allowed. Taking these limitations into
consideration, this appendix analyses three types of candidate information sources related to
natural persons.
• Section J.2 analyses public sources.
• Section J.3 analyses private sources.
• Section J.4 analyses self-published sources.
J.2 Analysis of candidate public data sources
In the public sector, information about citizens and residents is kept and used by their govern-
ments.
J.2.1 Examples of country data sources
Countries are sovereign in their organisation of such information, which includes the use of in-
formation repositories, identity attributes and the use of one or more numbers for identification
purposes. As a consequence, the systems that are in use diverge widely.
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An authoritative overview of official identity documents is provided as the Public Register
of Authentication Documents On-line (PRADO) by the European Consillium1. The register
covers EU Member States as well as other states. Each identity document is described, and
when a national identification number is printed on a document, it is shown. An overview of
the national identification numbers is not provided.
Wikipedia2 provides a non-authoritative global overview. The following cases are provided
as examples only.
• In some countries, the government oversees private sector entities they allow to manage
on-line identities and credentials for public and private sector use. Examples of this
approach include the United Kingdom and Italy.
– The UK system, Gov.UK Verify3, is described by Tsakalakis et al [315].
– The Italian system, Sistema Pubblico di Identita Digitale (SPID), is documented on
its website4.
• Other countries establish a national governmental identity management system that is
mandatory for all inhabitants, with a dedicated entity that collects, stores and manages
identity and biometric data in a single system.
– The Indian ‘National Register of Citizens (NRC)’ is a relevant example. It is a
mandatory register of all Indian citizens whose creation was mandated by the 2003
amendment of the Citizenship Act, 19555. India also established the Unique Identi-
fication Authority of India6 (UIDAI), whose Aadhaar system is arguably the world’s
largest biometric ID system.
– At a smaller scale, the Belgian National Identity Register7 provides similar services.
Each citizen and each resident is described in a set of database records and uniquely
identified by a national registration number. Regarding electronic identification and






5See https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/410520784.pdf, where Section 14A on the issue of national
identity cards states: (l) The Central Government may compulsorily register every citizen of India and issue na-
tional identity card to him. (2) The Central Government may maintain a National Register of Indian Citizens and




∗ Regarding certificates, Certipost was selected by the government as Trust Ser-
vice Provider for operating the X.509-based PKI that supports the identity reg-
ister by issuing authentication and signature certificates. Citizen certificates
are signed by the Certipost CitizenCA, which is a sub-CA of the Belgian Root
CA. The responsibilities of Certipost are described on-line on the website of
the national identity register8 and in the Certipost Certification Practise State-
ment9. Furthermore:
· There are no public registers of citizen certificates available. Citizen cer-
tificates are stored on the electronic identity card can be read and exported
from there.
· The private keys are generated and stored within the identity card, and can
only be used after authentication of the card-holder by the Java applet on
the card, using a four-digit PIN code.
· The national registration number is printed on the backside of the identity
card. Its usage is forbidden unless approval was obtained from the Privacy
Commission.
∗ Regarding on-line electronic authentication, the Belgian Federal Public Ser-
viceDigital Transformation10 offers a Federal Authentication Service11 (FAS)
for access to government applications. This service authenticates citizens and
residents. The service allows a government application to delegate the authen-
tication to the FAS server which can produce a SAML [259] or OIDC [267]
token containing the citizen or resident’s name and national register number
upon successful authentication with the national identity card. This authen-
tication requires the card to sign a random challenge from the FAS with its
private key.
· As described in the FAS Cookbook [115], in case of a SAML token the
FAS generates a signed and base6412 encoded SAML response. The re-
sponse contains an assertion with the attribute ‘issuer’, which will have
the value ‘http://www.belgium.be’ and an AuthenticationStatement el-
ement, which will contain the national register number.





12Base64 is a group of binary-to-text encoding schemes that represent binary data (more specifically a sequence
of 8-bit bytes) in an ASCII string format by translating it into a radix-64 representation. It is designed to carry data
stored in binary formats across channels that only reliably support text content.
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the FAS generates a signed access token response which contains an id-
token. Inside the id-token there is the subject’s national register number
or email address. The id-token is signed by the FAS’ authorisation server.
The token is communicated to the end-user’s browser, for forwarding to the
application. The token can be intercepted by the browser and corresponds to a
  identity attestation issued by the Federal Public Service.
• Austria protects the identification number of its citizens and residents by using unlinkable
sector-specific personal identifiers. It created a systemwith sector-specific identifiers that
are derived from a source personal identification number (SourcePIN). The country op-
erates a Central Register of Residents (CRR), where each resident has a unique number
(referred to as ‘ZMR-Zahl’ or ‘Stammzahl’). Parallel to this central register, there ex-
ist other registers which identify residents using their own numbers. These include the
Commercial Register, the Register of Associations, and the Supplemental Registers for
citizens not enrolled in the CRR (e.g. expatriates, foreigners).
The SourcePIN Register Authority operates under supervision of the Data Protection
Commission and creates a SourcePIN for each resident on the basis of the unique iden-
tifiers in the different registers. It is stored encrypted at the register. Residents are not
identified by their SourcePIN, but by a sector-specific PIN. Sectors (healthcare, taxation,
finance, ...) have a sector identifier. The SourcePIN Register Authority combines a resi-
dent’s SourcePIN with a sector identifier to create a sector-specific PIN. As this is based
on a cryptographic hash, the SourcePIN cannot be derived from the sector-specific PIN.
The Austrian Citizen Card stores an XML data structure that holds name, date of birth,
the base64 encoded SourcePIN13 and the public keys of the certificates signed by the
authority. The Citizen Card is implemented in various ways and can be used for on-line
authentication and signature. The generated tokens corresponds to a   identity attesta-
tion issued by the Austrian government.
• The Netherlands use the BSN14 as identifier. Polymorph encrypted pseudonyms, de-
scribed by Verheul et al. [329], can replace the BSN in a number of on-line authentication
use cases. Verheul [328] describes the use of such pseudonyms in context of electronic
identity. The system is based on the homomorphic properties of ElGamal encryption.
It adds a pseudonym provider, a key management authority and law enforcement point
for identity investigation to the traditional roles of end-user, identity provider and service
provider. The functioning can be summarised as follows.
13See the description at https://www.buergerkarte.at/konzept/personenbindung/spezifikation/
20050214/
14BSN goes back to the terms ‘Burger Sofi Nummer’, which can be loosely translated as ‘citizen social financial
number’.
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– The key management authority provides the pseudonym provider with a specific
public key for each identity provider, and provides each identify provider with a
specific public key for the service providers.
– End-user registration is performed as follows.
∗ An end-user registers with an identity provider that compiles a system-wide
user identifier U-id for the user.
∗ The identity provider sends this U-id to the pseudonym provider, and receives
a polymorphic pseudonym that is stored for later use.
– When an end-user wants to use the services of a service provider, the end-user au-
thenticates with the identity provider. Upon successful authentication, the identity
provider encrypts the pseudonym with the service provider’s key, and transmits the
result to the service provider. The service provider can recover the pseudonym and
relies on the identity provider for having performed the authentication of the end-
user.
– The law enforcement point for identity investigation handles two requests.
∗ ‘De-pseudonymisation’when an encrypted pseudonym and the service provider
where it was used are presented, and the pseudonym is transformed back into
the user identity. This allows the handling of complaints about user-fraud.
∗ ‘Pseudonymisation on request’ when a user identity is presented and trans-
formed into pseudonyms for one or more service providers. This allows inves-
tigations such as e.g. child grooming, where law enforcement wants to evaluate
whether an identity has been active on other services or websites as well.
Such an encrypted pseudonym corresponds to a   identity attestation issued by an iden-
tity provider.
For cross-border identification the following systems were identified.
• The international system of apostilles, based on the international treaty drafted by the
Hague Conference on Private International Law [144] allows to give legal value to pub-
lic documents. This includes administrative documents such as birth certificates. The
objective of the convention is to allow an originating state to make a public document
available to a destination state. At the end of 2020 there were 119 participating coun-
tries15 which operate Competent Authorities to issue apostilles. In 2006 the electronic
15Last retrieved on 30/12/2020 from https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/
status-table/
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apostille was launched, containing apostilles in electronic format with a digital certifi-
cate, and on-line registers that allow to verify the original document and the electronic
apostille. The registers are used to record the particulars of all apostilles issued by the
Competent Authority (i.e. paper and electronic apostilles). To avoid misuse, registers
only allow access to persons who have actually received an apostille and want to verify
its issuance.
• A number of European Member States use the personal data kept at national level to
support cross-border identification and authentication. This is done via the so-called
eIDAS nodes which act as proxy identity servers which reroute requests to the ‘home’-
identity service provider of the person that wants to be identified or authenticated. An
analysis is provided in the next section, Appendix J.2.2.
J.2.2 Examples within eIDAS jurisprudence
J.2.2.1 Core Person Vocabulary
To define the semantics of the identity data for cross-border use within the European Union,
the European Commission specified a Core Person Vocabulary. This is one of the Core Vo-
cabularies that were created to promote interoperability. The set of Core Vocabularies can be
downloaded from the Joinup website16. The ‘Core Person Vocabulary’ defines the following








• date of birth,
• date of death,




• country of death,
• place of birth,





J.2.2.2 eIDAS eID Profile
The Core Person Vocabulary is used in the eIDAS identity profile. The profile is used between
identity providers and eIDAS nodes (which serve as a gateway in cross-border on-line authen-
tication). The profile is available from the Connecting Europe Facility17 and consists of the
following four documents.
• eIDAS Message Format [82]
• eIDAS Interoperability Architecture [81]
• eIDAS Cryptographic Requirement [80]
• eIDAS SAML Attribute Profile [83]
The SAML Attribute Profile describes the mapping of the semantic definitions of the Core
Person Vocabulary onto the SAML protocol fields.
Cross-border unique identifier For cross-border identification, Implementing Regulation
2015/1501 establishes that the minimum data set for a natural or legal person shall contain a
unique identifier (besides name, surname and birth date for a natural person, and besides the
legal name for a legal person). According to the eIDAS technical specifications, the unique
identifier is composed as follows:
• The first part is the Nationality Code of the identifier. This is one of the ISO 3166-1
alpha-2 codes, followed by a slash (‘/’).
• The second part is the Nationality Code of the destination country or international orga-
nization. This is one of the ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 codes, followed by a slash (‘/’).
17https://ec.europa.eu/cefdigital/wiki/display/CEFDIGITAL/eIDAS+eID+Profile
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• The third part is a combination of readable characters. This uniquely identifies the iden-
tity asserted in the country of origin but does not necessarily reveal any correspondence
with the subject’s actual identifier in the country of origin.
‘ES/AT/02635542Y’ is an example of a Spanish eIDNumber for cross-border use by an
Austrian Service Provider.
J.2.3 Interim conclusion
J.2.3.1 Regarding the use of country-specific data
It was concluded that the information in the data sources described in Section J.2.1 is regulated
and in general not publicly available. These data sources offer only limited data that could be
used for the   model implementation. The use of such data was limited to the demonstration
that a citizen certificate issued under the authority of a national identity register can be used to
create an identity attestation. This demonstration was based on a Belgian citizen certificate.
J.2.3.2 Regarding the use of eIDAS-wide data
It was concluded that the use of the cross-border unique identifiers and of the eIDAS nodes
described in Section J.2.2 is regulated and not publicly available. As a consequence these data
sources do not offer data that could be used for the   model implementation.
J.3 Analysis of candidate private sources
J.3.1 Description
As for the European public sector, the collection and processing of personal data by the private
sector is subject to the General Data Protection Regulation [101]. Regarding electronic data
sources, the following can be observed.
• Some private sector companies offer identity checks against payment in the context of
employment or ‘know your customer’ procedures. This typically requires contractual
arrangements to be in place.
• Identity enrolment in the private sector18 identity management systems leads to having
citizen’s identity attributes available and their authentication being supported by such
systems. However neither the attributes nor the authentication are available unless con-
tractual arrangements are in place.




As a consequence it was concluded that these private data sources do not offer data that could
be used for the   model implementation.
J.4 Self-published data
Self-published data can be classified as a sub-domain of private data sources. The following
sources were identified:
• PGP’s web of trust,
• W3C’s Verifiable Credentials,
• Schema.org’s vocabulary,
• FOAF data sets.
J.4.1 PGP’s web of trust
In the web of trust created by PGP, participants generate their public key and identity attributes,
and make this information publicly available through key servers. However, the web of trust
model suffers from lack of clarity regarding its semantics, as described in Section 6.2.1. There-
fore it was decided not to use it as a data source.
J.4.2 W3C’s Verifiable Credentials
The W3C published the ‘Verifiable Credential Data Model 1.0 specification’ [378]. A Verifi-
able Credential (VC) is defined as ‘a tamper-evident credential that has authorship that can be
cryptographically verified’. Verifiable Credentials present an abstract data model for claims,
which are a list of attributes and values pertaining to a subject. Such a claim is created by an
issuer who then creates a verifiable credential, which in turn is processed by a verifier. To iden-
tify the subject of Verifiable Credentials, the W3C specified ‘Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs)’
[379]. W3C VCs and DIDs are used in the Solid architecture, proposed by Berners-Lee [232].
Halpin [141] analysed the security of Verifiable Credentials and concluded they are vulner-
able to signature exclusion and signature replacement attacks where an adversary can remove
the signature of a signed message, replace it with another signature, and trick the verifier into
falsely accepting the message as valid due to ambiguity in parsing.
As the software implementation of the Solid components and of VC and DID building
blocks is still work in progress, it was concluded that DID and VC-based data sources do not
(yet) offer data that could be used for the   model implementation.
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J.4.3 Schema.org
The Schema.org community promotes schemas for structured data on the Internet. The com-
munity was founded by Google, Microsoft, Yahoo and Yandex, and there is participation by
the larger Web community. Since April 2015, the W3C Schema.org Community Group is the
main forum for schema collaboration. See Krutil [209] for a description of how Schema.org’s
vocabulary is used for the classification of web pages. As the purpose of the Schema.org vo-
cabularies is search engine optimisation it was concluded that data sources that make use of
this vocabulary do not offer data that is relevant to the   model implementation.
J.4.4 FOAF
The Friend of a Friend (FOAF) specification aimed to create a linked information system. The
FOAF Vocabulary Specification [37] defines a dictionary of people-related terms that can be
used in structured data. The following evidence of its use was identified.
• A description of FOAF’s usage on the semantic web is provided by Ding et al. [73].
• The W3C publishes a list of sites19 that maintain FOAF records of their users.
• According to the data published by the Ontology Engineering Group of the Madrid Po-
litechnical University20 it is used in 249 data sets.
• A search on Elsevier’s Mendeley Data Search21 returned 34 FOAF data sets. These in-
clude aggregated data sets.
• Kalemi andMartiri [194] proposed a dedicated FOAF ontology for academic use, FOAF-
Academic.
• For a recent extension in the context of public health see Amith et al. [6].
J.4.5 Interim conclusion
As multiple FOAF data sets are available in RDF format, such data sets can be chosen as a data
source for the   model implementation. It was decided to use an aggregated FOAF file from
Mendeley Data Search because such a file contains information that can be mapped onto  
model predicates. The evaluation of this information is further described in Table 12.6.
19https://www.w3.org/wiki/FoafSites
20https://lov.linkeddata.es/dataset/lov/vocabs/foaf, last accessed on 5/1/2021.





This appendix provides examples of transformations used as part of the implemen-
tation of the   framework. Illustrations of both the XSL transformation and the
Java code that drives it are provided.
K.1 Data sources
As an illustration, the XSL transformation that creates the DataSource instance on the basis of
the Belgian trusted list is described in Listing K.1. The Java code that invokes it is described
in Listing K.2. Further sources can be found on-line1.
Listing K.1: TL2RDF_BE_DataSource_TL_v301.xsl
1 <?xml v e r s i o n=" 1 . 0 "?>
2 <!−−
3 Name : TL2RDF_BE_DataSource_TL_v301 . x s l
4
5 Purpose :
6 C r e a t i o n o f d a t a s o u r c e s from on− l i n e t r u s t e d l i s t p u b l i c a t i o n s
7
8 D e s c r i p t i o n :
9 XSLT s c r i p t t o c r e a t e d a t a s o u r c e s a s i n s t a n c e s o f t h e t e : Da taSource c l a s s
10
11 The on− l i n e t r u s t e d l i s t s on which t h o s e i n s t a n c e s a r e based :
12 ∗ Belgium h t t p s : / / t s l . be lg ium . be / t s l −be . xml
13 ∗ I t a l y h t t p s : / / e i d a s . ag id . gov . i t / TL / TSL−IT . xml
14 ∗ Spa in h t t p s : / / s ede . m i n e t u r . gob . e s / P r e s t a d o r e s / TSL / TSL . xml
15 ∗ Uni t ed Kingdom h t t p s : / / www. t scheme . org / s i t e s / d e f a u l t / f i l e s / t s l −uk0022s igned . xml
16
17 A f t e r e x e c u t i o n
18 ∗ OWL must be s e l e c t e d from ou t p u t f i l e u s i n g a browser , NOT a t e x t e d i t o r ( t o p r e s e r v e t h e l e s s t h an g r e a t e r t h an
s i g n )
19 ∗ Should any "<␣ " ( b l ank a f t e r < ) o r " ␣>" ( b l ank b e f o r e >) remain t h ey must be r e p l a c e d by "<" or ">"
20
21 S tep 0 C r e a t i o n o f t h e a c t i v i t y t h a t g e n e r a t e s t h e d a t a s ou r c e
22
1They can be found at http://www.marcsel.eu/ti/xsl/NAME.xsl by replacing NAME with the name of
the desired transformation
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23 S0 . 1 c r e a t e r e s o u r c e wi th ha rdcoded name based on x s l and i t s e x e c u t i o n
24 S0 . 2 c a s t i n t o t ype o f prov : A c t i v i t y
25 S0 . 3 add s t a r t e dA tT ime
26 S0 . 4 add endedAtTime
27
28 S tep 10 C r e a t i o n o f Da taSource i n d i v i d u a l s
29
30 S10 . 1 c r e a t e r e s o u r c e wi th ha rdcoded name based on o f f i c i a l u r i
31 S10 . 2 c a s t i n t o t ype o f t e : Da taSource
32 S10 . 3 add wasDerivedFrom t h e o n l i n e TL
33 S10 . 4 add wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo t h e TLSO
34 S10 . 5 add wasGeneratedBy t h e . x s l program
35
36 Author : Marc Se l
37 Date 20 /12 / 2020 l a s t upda t ed 08 /01 /2021
38
39 −−>
40 <x s l : s t y l e s h e e t v e r s i o n=" 1 . 0 "
41 xmlns : x s l=" h t t p : / /www.w3 . org / 1 9 9 9 /XSL / Trans fo rm "
42 xmlns : h tml=" h t t p : / /www.w3 . org / 1 9 9 9 / xhtml "
43 xmlns : r d f=" h t t p : / /www.w3 . org /1999 /02 /22 − r d f −syn t ax−ns # "
44 xmlns : r d f s=" h t t p : / /www.w3 . org / 2 0 0 0 / 0 1 / rd f −schema# "
45 xmlns : dc t e rms=" h t t p : / / p u r l . o rg / dc / t e rms "
46 xmlns : owl=" h t t p : / /www.w3 . org / 2 0 0 2 / 0 7 / owl# "
47 xmlns : prov=" h t t p : / /www.w3 . org / ns / p rov # "
48 xmlns : fn=" h t t p : / /www.w3 . org / 2 0 0 5 / xpa th− f u n c t i o n s "
49 xmlns : t e=" h t t p : / /www. ma r c s e l . eu / on to / t e / "
50 xmlns : f o a f=" h t t p : / / xmlns . com / f o a f / spec / "
51 xmlns : t s l =" h t t p : / / u r i . e t s i . o rg / 0 2231 / v2# ">
52
53 <x s l : t emp l a t e match=" t s l : SchemeOperatorName ">
54 <!−− Va r i a b l e s −−>
55 <!−− VAR−NAME−RULEBOOK s e l e c t s r u l e book name , f o r which t h e URI i s used becau se some scheme o p e r a t o r s p r o v i d e
whole s e c t i o n s o f t e x t i n t h e name f i e l d −−>
56 <!−− a l l on s i n g l e l i n e −−>
57 <x s l : v a r i a b l e name="VAR−NAME−RULEBOOK"><x s l : va lue−of s e l e c t=" / t s l : T r u s t S e r v i c e S t a t u s L i s t / t s l : SchemeIn fo rma t ion / t s l
: SchemeInformat ionURI " /></ x s l : v a r i a b l e >
58 <!−− <x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−NAME−RULEBOOK" /> −−>
59
60 <!−− VAR−NAME−TLSO s e l e c t s TLSO name −−>
61 <!−− a l l on s i n g l e l i n e −−>
62 <x s l : v a r i a b l e name="VAR−NAME−TLSO"><x s l : va lue−of s e l e c t=" t s l : Name" /></ x s l : v a r i a b l e >
63 <!−− <x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−NAME−TLSO" /> −−>
64
65 <!−− VAR−100 g e n e r a t e s t h e < s i g n −−>
66 <!−− a l l on s i n g l e l i n e −−>
67 <!−− a t t emp t t o r e p l a c e &l t ; by &l t r e s u l t s i n e r r o r msg : t h e r e f e r e n c e t o e n t i t y " l t " must end wi th t h e ’ ; ’
d e l i m i t e r .−−>
68 <x s l : v a r i a b l e name="VAR−100 ">& l t ; </ x s l : v a r i a b l e >
69 <!−− <x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−100 " /> −−>
70
71 <x s l : v a r i a b l e name="VAR−200 "><x s l : va lue−of s e l e c t=" t s l : Name" /></ x s l : v a r i a b l e >
72 <!−− <x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−200 " /> −−>
73
74 <!−− VAR−900 g e n e r a t e s t h e > s i g n −−>
75 <x s l : v a r i a b l e name="VAR−900 ">&g t ; </ x s l : v a r i a b l e >
76 <!−− <x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−900 " /> −−>
77
78 <owl : NamedInd iv idua l >
79 <!−− S0 c r e a t i o n o f t h e a c t i v i t y t h a t g e n e r a t e s t h e d a t a s ou r c e −−>
80 <!−− S0 . 1 c r e a t e r e s o u r c e wi th ha rdcoded name based on x s l and i t s e x e cu t i on −−>
81 <x s l : a t t r i b u t e name=" r d f : abou t ">_ h t t p : / / www. marc se l . eu / t i / x s l / TL2RDF_BE_DataSource_TL_v301 . x s l .2021−01−06</ x s l :
a t t r i b u t e >
82 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
83 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_DataSource_TL_v301_S0_1 NamedInd iv idua l A c t i v i t y c r e a t e d </ x s l : comment>
84 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
85
86 <!−− S0 . 2 c a s t i n t o t ype o f prov : A c t i v i t y −−>
87 <r d f : t y p e r d f : r e s o u r c e=" h t t p : / /www.w3 . org / ns / p rov # A c t i v i t y " />
88 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
89 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_DataSource_TL_v301_S0_2 NamedInd iv idua l c a s t i n t o t yp e prov : A c t i v i t y </ x s l : comment>
90 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
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92 <!−− S0 . 3 add s t a r t e dA tT ime −−>
93 <prov : s t a r t e dA tT ime r d f : d a t a t y p e=" h t t p : / /www.w3 . org / 2 0 0 1 /XMLSchema# da teTime ">2021−01−06T22 :33 :52 < / prov :
s t a r t e dA tT ime >
94 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
95 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_DataSource_TL_v301_S0_3 add p r o p e r t y s t a r t e dA tT ime </ x s l : comment>
96 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
97
98 <!−− S0 . 4 add endedAtTime −−>
99 <prov : endedAtTime r d f : d a t a t y p e=" h t t p : / /www.w3 . org / 2 0 0 1 /XMLSchema# da teTime ">2021−01−06T22 :33 :52 < / prov : endedAtTime>
100 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
101 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_DataSource_TL_v301_S0_4 add p r o p e r t y endedAtTime </ x s l : comment>
102 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
103
104 </owl : NamedInd iv idua l >
105
106 <owl : NamedInd iv idua l >
107 <!−− S10 c r e a t i o n o f t h e d a t a s ou r c e −−>
108 <!−− S10 . 1 c r e a t e r e s o u r c e wi th ha rdcoded name based on o f f i c i a l u r i −−>
109 <x s l : a t t r i b u t e name=" r d f : abou t ">_ h t t p s : / / t s l . be lg ium . be / t s l −be . xml </ x s l : a t t r i b u t e >
110 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
111 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_DataSource_TL_v301_S10_1 NamedInd iv idua l c r e a t e d </ x s l : comment>
112 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
113
114 <!−− S10 . 2 c a s t i n t o t yp e o f Da taSource −−>
115 <r d f : t yp e r d f : r e s o u r c e=" h t t p : / /www. ma r c s e l . eu / on to / t e / Da taSource " />
116 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_DataSource_TL_v301_S10_2 NamedInd iv idua l c a s t i n t o t ype t e : Da taSource </ x s l : comment>
117 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
118
119 <!−− S10 . 3 add wasDerivedFrom −−>
120 <!−− Name of d a t a s ou r c e i s ha rdcoded −−>
121 <prov : wasDerivedFrom r d f : r e s o u r c e=" h t t p s : / / t s l . be lg ium . be / t s l −be . xml " />
122 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_DataSource_TL_v301_S10_3 wasDerivedFrom </ x s l : comment>
123 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
124
125 <!−− S10 . 4 add wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo agen t −−>
126 <x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−100 " /> prov : wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo r d f : r e s o u r c e=" h t t p : / /www. ma r c s e l . eu / t i " /> " /< x s l : copy−of ␣
s e l e c t="$VAR−900 " />
127 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_DataSource_TL_v301_S10_4␣ wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo ␣</ x s l : comment>␣␣␣␣␣
128 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >␣␣␣␣␣␣
129
130 <!−−␣S10 . 5 ␣ add␣wasGeneratedBy␣ a c t i v i t y ␣−−>
131 <prov : wasGeneratedBy ␣ r d f : r e s o u r c e=" _ h t t p : / / www. marc se l . eu / t i / x s l / TL2RDF_BE_DataSource_TL_v301 . x s l .2021−01−06"/>
132 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_DataSource_TL_v301_S10_5 wasGeneratedBy </ x s l : comment>
133 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
134
135 </owl : NamedInd iv idua l >
136
137 </ x s l : t emp l a t e >
138
139 <x s l : t emp l a t e match=" / ">
140 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
141 <r d f :RDF>
142 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
143 <x s l : apply− t emp l a t e s s e l e c t=" / t s l : T r u s t S e r v i c e S t a t u s L i s t / t s l : SchemeIn fo rma t i on / t s l : SchemeOperatorName " />
144 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
145 </ r d f :RDF>
146 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
147 </ x s l : t emp l a t e >
148
149 </ x s l : s t y l e s h e e t >
Listing K.2: XSL TL2RDF_BE_DataSource_TL_v301.java
1




5 @author se lm
6 Date 18 /12 /2019 l a s t upda ted 17 /12 /2020
7 /
8 import j a v a . i o . F i l eNo tFoundExcep t i on ;
9 import j a v a . i o . F i l eOu t p u t S t r e am ;
10 import j a v a . i o . IOExcep t ion ;
11
12 import j a v ax . xml . t r a n s f o rm . T r an s f o rme r ;
13 import j a v ax . xml . t r a n s f o rm . T r a n s f o rme rCon f i g u r a t i o nEx c e p t i o n ;
14 import j a v ax . xml . t r a n s f o rm . T r an s f o rme rExc ep t i o n ;
15 import j a v ax . xml . t r a n s f o rm . T r a n s f o rme rF a c t o r y ;
16 import j a v ax . xml . t r a n s f o rm . s t r e am . S t r e amResu l t ;
17 import j a v ax . xml . t r a n s f o rm . s t r e am . S t r eamSource ;
18
19 import org . apache . x a l a n . t r a c e . P r i n t T r a c e L i s t e n e r ;
20 import org . apache . x a l a n . t r a c e . TraceManager ;
21 import org . apache . x a l a n . t r a n s f o rm e r . T r an s f o rme r Imp l ;
22
23 pub l i c c l a s s TL2RDF_BE_DataSource_TL_v301 {
24 pub l i c s t a t i c vo id main ( S t r i n g [ ] a r g s ) throws Tran s f o rme rExcep t i on ,
25 T r a n s f o rme rCon f i g u r a t i o nEx c e p t i o n , F i l eNo tFoundExcep t i on ,
26 IOExcep t ion , j a v a . u t i l . TooManyLi s t ene r sExcep t ion ,
27 org . xml . sax . SAXException
28 {
29 / / program name
30 S t r i n g program_name ="TL2RDF_BE_DataSource_TL_v301 " ;
31
32 / / F i l e s used
33 S t r i n g input_1_XSL = "C : / Use r s / Se l / Documents / S i e r r a / e c l i p s e −workspace−mars1−TI / TI / x s l / TL2RDF_BE_DataSource_TL_v301
. x s l " ;
34 S t r i n g input_2_XML = "C : / Use r s / Se l / Documents / S i e r r a / e c l i p s e −workspace−mars1−TI / TI / xml / t s l −be . 20201217 . xml " ;
35 S t r i n g output_1_LOG = "C : / Use r s / Se l / Documents / S i e r r a / e c l i p s e −workspace−mars1−TI / TI / l og /
TL2RDF_BE_DataSource_TL_v301 . l og " ;
36 S t r i n g output_2_RDF = "C : / Use r s / Se l / Documents / S i e r r a / e c l i p s e −workspace−mars1−TI / TI / r d f /
TL2RDF_BE_DataSource_TL_v301 . r d f " ;
37
38 / / 1 S e t up a P r i n t T r a c e L i s t e n e r o b j e c t t o p r i n t t o a f i l e .
39 j a v a . i o . F i l eW r i t e r fw =
40 new j a v a . i o . F i l eW r i t e r ( output_1_LOG ) ;
41 j a v a . i o . P r i n tW r i t e r pw = new j a v a . i o . P r i n tW r i t e r ( fw , t rue ) ;
42 P r i n t T r a c e L i s t e n e r p t l = new P r i n t T r a c e L i s t e n e r (pw) ;
43
44 / / 2 P r i n t i n f o rma t i o n as each node i s ’ e x e c u t e d ’ i n t h e s t y l e s h e e t .
45 p t l . m_ t r a ceE l emen t s = t rue ;
46 / / P r i n t i n f o rma t i o n a f t e r each r e s u l t − t r e e g e n e r a t i o n e v e n t .
47 p t l . m_ t r a c eGene r a t i o n = t rue ;
48 / / P r i n t i n f o rma t i o n a f t e r each s e l e c t i o n e v e n t .
49 p t l . m _ t r a c e S e l e c t i o n = t rue ;
50 / / P r i n t i n f o rma t i o n whenever a t emp l a t e i s i n vok ed .
51 p t l . m_ t r a ceTemp l a t e s = t rue ;
52 / / P r i n t i n f o rma t i o n whenever an e x t e n s i o n c a l l i s made .
53 p t l . m_ t r a c eEx t e n s i o n = t rue ;
54
55 / / 3 I n s t a n t i a t e f a c t o r y
56 T r a n s f o rme rF a c t o r y t F a c t o r y = T r a n s f o rme rF a c t o r y . n ewIn s t anc e ( ) ;
57
58 / / 4 Crea t e t r a n s f o rm e r from x s l
59 T ran s f o rme r t r a n s f o rm e r = t F a c t o r y . newTrans former (
60 new St reamSource ( input_1_XSL ) ) ;
61 System . ou t . p r i n t l n ( program_name + "−101␣ Input_1_XSL␣ i s ␣ i n ␣ " + input_1_XSL ) ;
62
63 / / 5 Run x s l t r a n s f o rm e r on xml
64 / / Cas t t h e Trans fo rmer o b j e c t t o T ran s f o rmer Imp l .
65 i f ( t r a n s f o rm e r i n s t a n c e o f Tran s fo rme r Imp l ) {
66 T ran s fo rme r Imp l t r a n s f o rme r Imp l = ( T r an s fo rme r Imp l ) t r a n s f o rm e r ;
67 TraceManager t rMgr = t r a n s f o rme r Imp l . ge tTraceManage r ( ) ;
68 t rMgr . a d dT r a c eL i s t e n e r ( p t l ) ;
69
70 / / Per form t h e t r a n s f o rma t i o n −−p r i n t i n g i n f o rma t i o n t o
71 / / t h e e v e n t s l og du r i ng t h e p r o c e s s .
72 System . ou t . p r i n t l n ( program_name + "−102␣Input_2_XML␣ i s ␣ i n ␣ " + input_2_XML ) ;
73
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74 t r a n s f o rm e r . t r a n s f o rm (
75 new St reamSource ( input_2_XML ) ,
76 new S t r e amRe su l t (new F i l eOu t p u t S t r e am ( output_2_RDF ) ) ) ;
77 }
78 / / C lose t h e P r i n tW r i t e r and F i l eW r i t e r .
79 pw . c l o s e ( ) ;
80 fw . c l o s e ( ) ;
81
82 System . ou t . p r i n t l n ( program_name + "−103␣Output_1_LOG␣ i s ␣ i n ␣ " + output_1_LOG ) ;




As an illustration, the XSL transformation that creates the trustworthiness monitor on the basis
of the Belgian trusted list is provided below. As the Java code only differs from the one used
for the creation of the data sources in the names of the input and output files, it is not repeated.
Listing K.3: TL2RDF_BE_TwsMo_v301.xsl
1 <?xml v e r s i o n=" 1 . 0 "?>
2 <!−−
3 Name : TL2RDF_BE_TwsMo_v301 . x s l
4
5 Purpose :
6 C r e a t i o n o f t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s mon i t o r s from on− l i n e t r u s t e d l i s t p u b l i c a t i o n s
7
8 D e s c r i p t i o n :
9 XSLT s c r i p t t o c r e a t e t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s mon i t o r s a s o r g a n i s a t i o n s wi th a TwsMo r o l e a t t e s t a t i o n
10
11 The on− l i n e t r u s t e d l i s t s on which t h o s e i n s t a n c e s a r e based :
12 ∗ Belgium h t t p s : / / t s l . be lg ium . be / t s l −be . xml
13 ∗ I t a l y h t t p s : / / e i d a s . ag id . gov . i t / TL / TSL−IT . xml
14 ∗ Spa in h t t p s : / / s ede . m i n e t u r . gob . e s / P r e s t a d o r e s / TSL / TSL . xml
15 ∗ Uni t ed Kingdom h t t p s : / / www. t scheme . org / s i t e s / d e f a u l t / f i l e s / t s l −uk0022s igned . xml
16
17 A f t e r e x e c u t i o n
18 ∗ OWL must be s e l e c t e d from ou t p u t f i l e u s i n g a browser , NOT a t e x t e d i t o r ( t o p r e s e r v e t h e l e s s t h an g r e a t e r t h an
s i g n )
19 ∗ Should any "<␣ " ( b l ank a f t e r < ) o r " ␣>" ( b l ank b e f o r e >) remain
20 t h ey must be r e p l a c e d by "<" or ">"
21
22 S tep 1 C r e a t i o n o f i d e n t i t i e s f o r TwsMo and a t t e s t a t i o n s
23
24 S10 c r e a t i o n o f i d e n t i t y f o r TwsMo
25 S11 c r e a t i o n o f i d e n t i t y f o r i d e n t i t y a t t e s t a t i o n
26 S12 c r e a t i o n o f i d e n t i t y f o r r o l e a t t e s t a t i o n as TwsMo
27
28 S tep 2 C r e a t i o n o f a t t e s t a t i o n s
29
30 S20 c r e a t i o n o f i d e n t i t y a t t e s t a t i o n _ I d e n t i t yA t t e s t a t i o n _FOD_Eco
31 S21 c r e a t i o n o f r o l e a t t e s t a t i o n TwsMo
32
33 S tep 3 C r e a t i o n o f TwsMo i n d i v i d u a l
34
35 S30 c r e a t i o n o f TwsMO based on TL TLSO
36
37 a l l o c a t e i d e n t i t y and a t t e s t a t i o n s ,
38 g i v e name , r e l a t e t o i t s own i d e n t i t y ,
39 c a s t i n t o t ype o f org : O r g a n i z a t i o n and prov : O rg an i z a t i o n ,
40 s e l f − a t t e s t i d e n t i t y ,
41 s e l f − a t t e s t TwsMo r o l e
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42 add p rovenance : wasDerivedFrom , wasGeneratedBy , wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo
43
44 Author : Marc Se l
45 Date 18 /12 / 2019 l a s t upda t ed 22 /12 /2020
46
47 −−>
48 <x s l : s t y l e s h e e t v e r s i o n=" 1 . 0 "
49 xmlns : x s l=" h t t p : / /www.w3 . org / 1 9 9 9 /XSL / Trans fo rm "
50 xmlns : h tml=" h t t p : / /www.w3 . org / 1 9 9 9 / xhtml "
51 xmlns : r d f=" h t t p : / /www.w3 . org /1999 /02 /22 − r d f −syn t ax−ns # "
52 xmlns : r d f s=" h t t p : / /www.w3 . org / 2 0 0 0 / 0 1 / rd f −schema# "
53 xmlns : dc t e rms=" h t t p : / / p u r l . o rg / dc / t e rms "
54 xmlns : owl=" h t t p : / /www.w3 . org / 2 0 0 2 / 0 7 / owl# "
55 xmlns : prov=" h t t p : / /www.w3 . org / ns / p rov # "
56 xmlns : t e=" h t t p : / /www. ma r c s e l . eu / on to / t e / "
57 xmlns : f o a f=" h t t p : / / xmlns . com / f o a f / spec / "
58 xmlns : t s l =" h t t p : / / u r i . e t s i . o rg / 0 2231 / v2# ">
59
60 <x s l : t emp l a t e match=" t s l : SchemeOperatorName ">
61 <!−− Va r i a b l e s −−>
62 <!−− VAR−NAME−RULEBOOK s e l e c t s r u l e book name , f o r which t h e URI i s used becau se some scheme o p e r a t o r s p r o v i d e
whole s e c t i o n s o f t e x t i n t h e name f i e l d −−>
63 <!−− a l l on s i n g l e l i n e −−>
64 <x s l : v a r i a b l e name="VAR−NAME−RULEBOOK"><x s l : va lue−of s e l e c t=" / t s l : T r u s t S e r v i c e S t a t u s L i s t / t s l : SchemeIn fo rma t ion / t s l
: SchemeInformat ionURI " /></ x s l : v a r i a b l e >
65 <!−− <x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−NAME−RULEBOOK" /> −−>
66
67 <!−− VAR−NAME s e l e c t s TLSO name −−>
68 <!−− a l l on s i n g l e l i n e −−>
69 <x s l : v a r i a b l e name="VAR−NAME−TLSO"><x s l : va lue−of s e l e c t=" t s l : Name" /></ x s l : v a r i a b l e >
70 <!−− <x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−NAME−TLSO" /> −−>
71
72 <!−− VAR−100 g e n e r a t e s t h e < s i g n −−>
73 <!−− a l l on s i n g l e l i n e −−>
74 <!−− a t t emp t t o r e p l a c e &l t ; by &l t r e s u l t s i n e r r o r msg : t h e r e f e r e n c e t o e n t i t y " l t " must end wi th t h e ’ ; ’
d e l i m i t e r .−−>
75 <x s l : v a r i a b l e name="VAR−100 ">& l t ; </ x s l : v a r i a b l e >
76 <!−− <x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−100 " /> −−>
77
78 <x s l : v a r i a b l e name="VAR−200 "><x s l : va lue−of s e l e c t=" t s l : Name" /></ x s l : v a r i a b l e >
79 <!−− <x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−200 " /> −−>
80
81 <!−− VAR−900 g e n e r a t e s t h e > s i g n −−>
82 <x s l : v a r i a b l e name="VAR−900 ">&g t ; </ x s l : v a r i a b l e >
83 <!−− <x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−900 " /> −−>
84
85 <owl : NamedInd iv idua l >
86 <!−− S10 c r e a t i o n o f i d e n t i t y f o r TwsMo −−>
87 <!−− S10 . 1 i d e n t i f i e r f o r TwsMo from TLSO −−>
88 <!−− as can be obs e rved i n t h e l i n e below , e v e r y t h i n g i s on a s i n g l e l i n e −−>
89 <x s l : a t t r i b u t e name=" r d f : abou t ">h t t p : / / www. marc se l . eu / on to / t e / _ID_<x s l : copy−o f s e l e c t ="$VAR−NAME−TLSO"/ ></ x s l :
a t t r i b u t e >
90 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_BE_TwsMo_v301_S10_1 NamedInd iv idua l c r e a t e d </ x s l : comment>
91 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
92
93 <!−− S10 . 2 c a s t i n t o t yp e ID and a l l o c a t e UUID −−>
94 <r d f : t y p e r d f : r e s o u r c e=" h t t p : / /www. ma r c s e l . eu / on to / t e / ID " />
95 <!−− <t e : un i queTex t r d f : d a t a t y p e=" h t t p : / /www.w3 . org / 2 0 0 1 /XMLSchema# s t r i n g ">UUID_Endorser_FOD_Eco_FIXED</ t e :
un iqueTex t > −−>
96 <t e : un i queTex t r d f : d a t a t y p e=" h t t p : / /www.w3 . org / 2 0 0 1 /XMLSchema# s t r i n g ">UUID_<x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−NAME−TLSO"
/></ t e : un iqueTex t >
97 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_BE_TwsMo_v301_S10_2 i d e n t i t y c r e a t e d wi th UUID </ x s l : comment>
98 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
99
100 <!−− S10 . 3 add wasDerivedFrom −−>
101 <!−− Name of d a t a s ou r c e i s ha rdcoded −−>
102 <prov : wasDerivedFrom r d f : r e s o u r c e=" h t t p s : / / t s l . be lg ium . be / t s l −be . xml " />
103 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_DataSource_TL_v301_S10_3 wasDerivedFrom </ x s l : comment>
104 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
105
106 <!−− S10 . 4 add wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo agen t −−>
107 <x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−100 " /> prov : wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo r d f : r e s o u r c e=" h t t p : / /www. ma r c s e l . eu / on to / t e / _<x s l : va lue−of ␣
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s e l e c t="$VAR−NAME−TLSO" /> " /< x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−900 " />
108 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_DataSource_TL_v301_S10_4 wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo TLSO </ x s l : comment>
109 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
110
111 <!−− S10 . 5 add wasGeneratedBy a c t i v i t y −−>
112 <prov : wasGeneratedBy r d f : r e s o u r c e="TL2RDF_BE_TwsMo_v301 . x s l ␣ e x e c u t i o n ␣2020−12−23 " />
113 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_DataSource_TL_v301_S10_5 wasGeneratedBy </ x s l : comment>
114 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
115
116 </owl : NamedInd iv idua l >
117
118
119 <owl : NamedInd iv idua l >
120 <!−− S11 c r e a t i o n o f i d e n t i t y f o r i d e n t i t y a t t e s t a t i o n −−>
121 <!−− S11 . 1 g i v e name −−>
122 <x s l : a t t r i b u t e name=" r d f : abou t ">h t t p : / / www. marc se l . eu / on to / t e / _ I D _ I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n _ <x s l : va lue−o f s e l e c t ="$VAR−
NAME−TLSO"/ ></ x s l : a t t r i b u t e >
123 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_BE_TwsMo_v301_S11_1 NamedInd iv idua l c r e a t e d </ x s l : comment>
124 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
125
126 <!−− S11 . 2 c a s t i n t o t yp e ID and a l l o c a t e UUID −−>
127 <r d f : t yp e r d f : r e s o u r c e=" h t t p : / /www. ma r c s e l . eu / on to / t e / ID " />
128 <!−− <t e : un i queTex t r d f : d a t a t y p e=" h t t p : / /www.w3 . org / 2 0 0 1 /XMLSchema# s t r i n g ">UUID_ID_Iden t i tyAt t e s t a t ion_FOD_Eco </ t e
: un iqueTex t >−−>
129 <t e : un i queTex t r d f : d a t a t y p e=" h t t p : / /www.w3 . org / 2 0 0 1 /XMLSchema# s t r i n g ">UUID_ ID_ I d en t i t yA t t e s t a t i o n_ <x s l : va lue−of
s e l e c t="$VAR−NAME−TLSO" /></ t e : un iqueTex t >
130 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_BE_TwsMo_v301_S11_2 i d e n t i t y c r e a t e d wi th UUID</ x s l : comment>
131 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
132
133 <!−− S11 . 3 add wasDerivedFrom −−>
134 <!−− Name of d a t a s ou r c e i s ha rdcoded −−>
135 <prov : wasDerivedFrom r d f : r e s o u r c e=" h t t p s : / / t s l . be lg ium . be / t s l −be . xml " />
136 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_DataSource_TL_v301_S11_3 wasDerivedFrom </ x s l : comment>
137 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
138
139 <!−− S11 . 4 add wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo agen t −−>
140 <x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−100 " /> prov : wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo r d f : r e s o u r c e=" h t t p : / /www. ma r c s e l . eu / on to / t e / _<x s l : va lue−of ␣
s e l e c t="$VAR−NAME−TLSO" /> " /< x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−900 " />
141 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_DataSource_TL_v301_S11_4 wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo TLSO </ x s l : comment>
142 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
143
144 <!−− S11 . 5 add wasGeneratedBy a c t i v i t y −−>
145 <prov : wasGeneratedBy r d f : r e s o u r c e="TL2RDF_BE_TwsMo_v301 . x s l ␣ e x e c u t i o n ␣2020−12−23 " />
146 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_DataSource_TL_v301_S11_5 wasGeneratedBy </ x s l : comment>
147 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
148
149 </owl : NamedInd iv idua l >
150
151
152 <owl : NamedInd iv idua l >
153
154 <!−− S12 c r e a t i o n o f i d e n t i t y f o r r o l e a t t e s t a t i o n as TwsMo −−>
155 <!−− S12 . 1 g i v e name −−>
156 <x s l : a t t r i b u t e name=" r d f : abou t ">h t t p : / / www. marc se l . eu / on to / t e / _ ID_Ro leA t t e s ta t i on_TwsMo_ <x s l : va lue−o f s e l e c t ="$VAR
−NAME−TLSO"/ ></ x s l : a t t r i b u t e >
157 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_BE_TwsMo_v301_S12_1 NamedInd iv idua l c r e a t e d </ x s l : comment>
158 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
159
160 <!−− S12 . 2 c a s t i n t o t yp e ID and a l l o c a t e UUID −−>
161 <r d f : t yp e r d f : r e s o u r c e=" h t t p : / /www. ma r c s e l . eu / on to / t e / ID " />
162 < t e : un i queTex t r d f : d a t a t y p e=" h t t p : / /www.w3 . org / 2 0 0 1 /XMLSchema# s t r i n g ">UUID_ID_RoleAttestat ion_TwsMo_<x s l : va lue−of
s e l e c t="$VAR−NAME−TLSO" /></ t e : un iqueTex t >
163 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_BE_TwsMo_v301_S12_2 i d e n t i t y c r e a t e d wi th UUID</ x s l : comment>
164 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
165
166 <!−− S12 . 3 add wasDerivedFrom −−>
167 <!−− Name of d a t a s ou r c e i s ha rdcoded −−>
168 <prov : wasDerivedFrom r d f : r e s o u r c e=" h t t p s : / / t s l . be lg ium . be / t s l −be . xml " />
169 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_DataSource_TL_v301_S10_3 wasDerivedFrom </ x s l : comment>
170 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
171
172 <!−− S12 . 4 add wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo agen t −−>
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173 <x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−100 " /> prov : wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo r d f : r e s o u r c e=" h t t p : / /www. ma r c s e l . eu / on to / t e / _<x s l : va lue−of ␣
s e l e c t="$VAR−NAME−TLSO" /> " /< x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−900 " />
174 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_DataSource_TL_v301_S10_4 wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo TLSO </ x s l : comment>
175 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
176
177 <!−− S12 . 5 add wasGeneratedBy a c t i v i t y −−>
178 <prov : wasGeneratedBy r d f : r e s o u r c e="TL2RDF_BE_TwsMo_v301 . x s l ␣ e x e c u t i o n ␣2020−12−23 " />
179 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_DataSource_TL_v301_S10_5 wasGeneratedBy </ x s l : comment>
180 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
181
182 </owl : NamedInd iv idua l >
183
184
185 <owl : NamedInd iv idua l >
186 <!−− S20 c r e a t i o n o f i d e n t i t y a t t e s t a t i o n −−>
187 <!−− c r e a t e i n d i v i d u a l o f t ype t e : I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n , r e l a t e i t t o i t s i d e n t i t y −−>
188 <!−− S20 . 1 g i v e name −−>
189 <!−− e . g . _ I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n _ C e r t i p o s t %20n . v . / s . a . −−>
190 <x s l : a t t r i b u t e name=" r d f : abou t ">h t t p : / / www. marc se l . eu / on to / t e / _ I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n _ <x s l : va lue−o f s e l e c t ="$VAR−NAME
−TLSO"/ ></ x s l : a t t r i b u t e >
191 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_BE_TwsMo_v301_S20_1 NamedInd iv idua l c r e a t e d </ x s l : comment>
192 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
193
194 <!−− S20 . 2 c a s t i n t o t yp e I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n −−>
195 <r d f : t yp e r d f : r e s o u r c e=" h t t p : / /www. ma r c s e l . eu / on to / t e / I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n " />
196 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_BE_TwsMo_v301_S20_2 c a s t e d i n t o t ype I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n </ x s l : comment>
197 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
198 <x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−100 " /> t e : i d e n t i f i e d B y r d f : r e s o u r c e=" h t t p : / /www. ma r c s e l . eu / on to / t e /
_ I D _ I d e n t i t yA t t e s t a t i o n _ <x s l : va lue−of ␣ s e l e c t="$VAR−NAME−TLSO" /> " /< x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−900 " />
199
200 <!−− S20 . 3 comment −−>
201 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
202 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_BE_TwsMo_v301_S20_3 _ I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n i d e n t i f i e d B y _ I D _ I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n _ </ x s l : comment>
203 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
204
205 <!−− S20 . 4 r e l a t e t o I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n −−>
206 <x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−100 " /> t e : i d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n I D r d f : r e s o u r c e=" h t t p : / /www. ma r c s e l . eu / on to / t e / _ID_<x s l :
va lue−of ␣ s e l e c t="$VAR−NAME−TLSO" /> " /< x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−900 " />
207 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_BE_TwsMo_v301_S20_4 i d e n t i t y a t t e s t a t i o n v i a i d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n I D r e l a t e d t o _ID_ </ x s l :
comment>
208 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
209
210 <!−− S20 . 5 add wasDerivedFrom −−>
211 <!−− Name of d a t a s ou r c e i s ha rdcoded −−>
212 <prov : wasDerivedFrom r d f : r e s o u r c e=" h t t p s : / / t s l . be lg ium . be / t s l −be . xml " />
213 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_DataSource_TL_v301_S20_5 wasDerivedFrom </ x s l : comment>
214 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
215
216 <!−− S20 . 6 add wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo agen t −−>
217 <x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−100 " /> prov : wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo r d f : r e s o u r c e=" h t t p : / /www. ma r c s e l . eu / on to / t e / _<x s l : va lue−of ␣
s e l e c t="$VAR−NAME−TLSO" /> " /< x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−900 " />
218 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_DataSource_TL_v301_S20_6 wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo TLSO </ x s l : comment>
219 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
220
221 <!−− S20 . 7 add wasGeneratedBy a c t i v i t y −−>
222 <prov : wasGeneratedBy r d f : r e s o u r c e="TL2RDF_BE_TwsMo_v301 . x s l ␣ e x e c u t i o n ␣2020−12−23 " />
223 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_DataSource_TL_v301_S20_7 wasGeneratedBy </ x s l : comment>
224 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
225
226 </owl : NamedInd iv idua l >
227
228
229 <owl : NamedInd iv idua l >
230 <!−− S21 r o l e a t t e s t a t i o n TwsMo −−>
231 <!−− c r e a t e i n d i v i d u a l o f t ype t e : R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n , r e l a t e i t t o i t s i d e n t i t y −−>
232 <!−− S21 . 1 g i v e name −−>
233 <!−− e . g . _ R o l e A t t e s t a t i o n _ C e r t i p o s t %20n . v . / s . a . −−>
234 <x s l : a t t r i b u t e name=" r d f : abou t ">h t t p : / / www. marc se l . eu / on to / t e / _Ro l eA t t e s t a t i on_TwsMo_ <x s l : va lue−o f s e l e c t ="$VAR−
NAME−TLSO"/ ></ x s l : a t t r i b u t e >
235 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_BE_TwsMo_v301_S21_1 NamedInd iv idua l c r e a t e d </ x s l : comment>
236 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
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237
238 <!−− S21 . 2 c a s t i n t o t yp e R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n −−>
239 <r d f : t yp e r d f : r e s o u r c e=" h t t p : / /www. ma r c s e l . eu / on to / t e / R o l e A t t e s t a t i o n " />
240 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_BE_TwsMo_v301_S21_2 c a s t e d t o t ype R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n </ x s l : comment>
241 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
242
243 <!−− S21 . 3 i d e n t i f i e d by −−>
244 <x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−100 " /> t e : i d e n t i f i e d B y r d f : r e s o u r c e=" h t t p : / /www. ma r c s e l . eu / on to / t e /
_ ID_RoleAt tes ta t ion_TwsMo_<x s l : va lue−of ␣ s e l e c t="$VAR−NAME−TLSO" /> " /< x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−900 " />
245 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
246 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_BE_TwsMo_v301_S21_3 _R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n i d e n t i f i e d B y _ ID_Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o n _ </ x s l : comment>
247 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
248
249 <!−− S21 . 4 r e l a t e a t t e s t a t i o n i n d i v i d u a l t o TwsMo r o l e −−>
250 <t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R r d f : r e s o u r c e=" h t t p : / /www. ma r c s e l . eu / on to / t e / _TwsMo" />
251 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_BE_TwsMo_v301_S21_4 r o l e a t t e s t a t i o n r e l a t e d t o _TwsMo r o l e </ x s l : comment>
252 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
253
254 <!−− S21 . 5 add wasDerivedFrom −−>
255 <!−− Name of d a t a s ou r c e i s ha rdcoded −−>
256 <prov : wasDerivedFrom r d f : r e s o u r c e=" h t t p s : / / t s l . be lg ium . be / t s l −be . xml " />
257 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_DataSource_TL_v301_S21_5 wasDerivedFrom </ x s l : comment>
258 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
259
260 <!−− S21 . 6 add wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo agen t −−>
261 <x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−100 " /> prov : wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo r d f : r e s o u r c e=" h t t p : / /www. ma r c s e l . eu / on to / t e / _<x s l : va lue−of ␣
s e l e c t="$VAR−NAME−TLSO" /> " /< x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−900 " />
262 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_DataSource_TL_v301_S21_6 wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo TLSO </ x s l : comment>
263 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
264
265 <!−− S21 . 7 add wasGeneratedBy a c t i v i t y −−>
266 <prov : wasGeneratedBy r d f : r e s o u r c e="TL2RDF_BE_TwsMo_v301 . x s l ␣ e x e c u t i o n ␣2020−12−23 " />
267 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_DataSource_TL_v301_S21_7 wasGeneratedBy </ x s l : comment>
268 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
269
270 </owl : NamedInd iv idua l >
271
272
273 <owl : NamedInd iv idua l >
274 <!−− S30 c r e a t i o n o f TwsMo −−>
275 <!−− S30 . 1 g i v e name −−>
276 <x s l : a t t r i b u t e name=" r d f : abou t ">h t t p : / / www. marc se l . eu / on to / t e / _<x s l : va lue−o f s e l e c t ="$VAR−NAME−TLSO"/ ></ x s l :
a t t r i b u t e >
277 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
278 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_BE_TwsMo_v301_S30_1 NamedInd iv idua l c r e a t e d </ x s l : comment>
279 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
280
281 <!−− S30 . 2 r e l a t e t o i t s own i d e n t i t y −−>
282 <x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−100 " /> t e : i d e n t i f i e d B y r d f : r e s o u r c e=" h t t p : / /www. ma r c s e l . eu / on to / t e / _ID_<x s l : va lue−of ␣
s e l e c t="$VAR−NAME−TLSO" /> " /< x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−900 " />
283 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_BE_TwsMo_v301_S30_2 NamedInd iv idua l i d e n t i f i e d B y _ID_ </ x s l : comment>
284 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
285
286 <!−− S30 . 3 c a s t i n t o t yp e o f org o r g a n i s a t i o n −−>
287 <r d f : t yp e r d f : r e s o u r c e=" h t t p : / /www.w3 . org / ns / o rg # O r g a n i z a t i o n " />
288 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_BE_TwsMo_v301_S30_3 NamedInd iv idua l c a s t i n t o t ype org : O r g a n i z a t i o n </ x s l : comment>
289 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
290
291 <!−− S30 . 4 c a s t i n t o t yp e o f prov o r g a n i s a t i o n −−>
292 <r d f : t yp e r d f : r e s o u r c e=" h t t p : / /www.w3 . org / ns / p rov # O r g a n i z a t i o n " />
293 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_BE_TwsMo_v301_S30_4 NamedInd iv idua l c a s t i n t o t ype prov : O r g a n i z a t i o n </ x s l : comment>
294 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
295
296 <!−− S30 . 5 s e l f a t t e s t i d e n t i t y −−>
297 <x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−100 " /> t e : p I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n r d f : r e s o u r c e=" h t t p : / /www. ma r c s e l . eu / on to / t e /
_ I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n _ <x s l : va lue−of ␣ s e l e c t="$VAR−NAME−TLSO" /> " /< x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−900 " />
298 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_BE_TwsMo_v301_S30_5 NamedInd iv idua l i d e n t i t y s e l f − a t t e s t a t i o n </ x s l : comment>
299 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
300
301 <!−− S30 . 6 s e l f a t t e s t TwsMo r o l e −−>
302 <x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−100 " /> t e : p R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n r d f : r e s o u r c e=" h t t p : / /www. ma r c s e l . eu / on to / t e /
_RoleAt tes t a t ion_TwsMo_ <x s l : va lue−of ␣ s e l e c t="$VAR−NAME−TLSO" /> " /< x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−900 " />
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303 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_BE_TwsMo_v301_S30_6 NamedInd iv idua l r o l e s e l f − a t t e s t a t i o n as TwsMo </ x s l : comment>
304 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
305
306 <!−− S30 . 7 add wasDerivedFrom −−>
307 <!−− Name of d a t a s ou r c e i s ha rdcoded −−>
308 <prov : wasDerivedFrom r d f : r e s o u r c e=" h t t p s : / / t s l . be lg ium . be / t s l −be . xml " />
309 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_DataSource_TL_v301_S30_7 wasDerivedFrom </ x s l : comment>
310 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
311
312 <!−− S30 . 8 add wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo agen t −−>
313 <x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−100 " /> prov : wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo r d f : r e s o u r c e=" h t t p : / /www. ma r c s e l . eu / on to / t e / _<x s l : va lue−of ␣
s e l e c t="$VAR−NAME−TLSO" /> " /< x s l : copy−of s e l e c t="$VAR−900 " />
314 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_DataSource_TL_v301_S30_8 wa sA t t r i b u t e dTo TLSO </ x s l : comment>
315 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
316
317 <!−− S30 . 9 add wasGeneratedBy a c t i v i t y −−>
318 <prov : wasGeneratedBy r d f : r e s o u r c e="TL2RDF_BE_TwsMo_v301 . x s l ␣ e x e c u t i o n ␣2020−12−23 " />
319 <x s l : comment>TL2RDF_DataSource_TL_v301_S30_9 wasGeneratedBy </ x s l : comment>
320 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
321
322 </owl : NamedInd iv idua l >
323
324 </ x s l : t emp l a t e >
325
326 <x s l : t emp l a t e match=" / ">
327 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
328 <r d f :RDF>
329 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
330 <x s l : apply− t emp l a t e s s e l e c t=" / t s l : T r u s t S e r v i c e S t a t u s L i s t / t s l : SchemeIn fo rma t i on / t s l : SchemeOperatorName " />
331 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
332 </ r d f :RDF>
333 <x s l : t e x t >&#10;</ x s l : t e x t >
334 </ x s l : t emp l a t e >
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This appendix describes how the output files of the transformations were combined
into a single file that can be used to load into an OWL-capable tool such as a graph
database.
L.1 Construction of the database load file
The outputs of all transformations were included in a single XML/RDF file. This integrated
file is referred to as the database load file. Its filename is DBL.owl.
The database load file DBL.owl was constructed as follows.
• The datamodel was inserted from the http://www.marcsel.eu/onto/te/te-data-model.
owl file.
• The legal norms and standards were inserted from the DBLN.owl file.
• The self-attestations were inserted from the DBLS.owl file.
• The output files of the transformations were added, as well as the manually created rdf
files in case no transformation was involved (e.g. in the case of the manual creation of a
data source assertion).
• Interim files were used to aggregate data as described below.
L.2 DBL1 Trusted List data
Aggregation of TL data (DBL1.owl):














The first three files were based on LOTL transformations, and the fourth file was based
on a review of the information published by tScheme.
L.3 DBL2 List of Trusted Lists data
Aggregation of LOTL data (DBL2.owl):
• Data source: TL2RDF_DataSource_LOTL_v301.rdf,
• EC as trustworthiness monitor: TL2RDF_LOTL_1_v301.rdf,
• identity and role attestations for trustworthiness monitors: TL2RDF_LOTL_2_v301.rdf,
L.4 DBL3 accreditation data
The following files were combined in DBL3.rdf :















• DBL3.EvSP.owl, which contains:
– PDF2RDF_FR_LSTI_EvSPs_v301.rdf.
L.5 DBL4 company data
Aggregation of company data (DBL.4.rdf ), which contains:
• Data source FF-DataSource-v301.rdf,
• Legal persons FFLEI2RDF_v301.extract.rdf.
L.6 DBL5 natural persons data
Aggregation of natural person data (DBL.5.rdf ) was done as follows.









L.7 DBL6 authentic sources
The DBL6.AS.owl file was integrated. It contained a copy of the file BE-AS-NRN-v301.rdf.
L.8 DBL7 rulebook
The DBL7.Rulebook.owl file, containing individuals that represent rulebooks1, was integrated.





This appendix contains additional SPARQL code. It demonstrates how SPARQL
queries can be used to query the graph that was created as part of the implemen-
tation of the   framework.
M.1 Additional SPARQL
M.1.1 IR3-M01-EvSP
IR3-M01-EvSP is a refinement of IR3-M01. The refinement is described in Listing M.1. It
adds the condition that the participant must be an EvSP to IR3-M01. The expected result is that
the potential trustee is included in the list.
Listing M.1: IR3-M01-EvSP
1 \ # IR3−M01−EvSP
2 PREFIX r d f : <h t t p : / / www. w3 . org /1999 /02 /22 − rd f −s yn t ax −ns#>
3 PREFIX t e : <h t t p : / / www. marc se l . eu / on to / t e />
4 s e l e c t DISTINCT ? P a r t i c i p a n t ? Role where {
5 ? P a r t i c i p a n t r d f : t y p e t e : P a r t i c i p a n t .
6 ? i d e n t i f i e r t e : d o e s I d e n t i f y ? P a r t i c i p a n t .
7 ? P a r t i c i p a n t t e : p I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n ? I d e n t i t y A t t e s t a t i o n O f P a r t i c i p a n t .
8 ? P a r t i c i p a n t t e : p R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n ? R o l e A t t e s t a t i o n O f P a r t i c i p a n t .
9 ? R o l e A t t e s t a t i o n O f P a r t i c i p a n t t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R t e : EvSP .
10 ? R o l e A t t e s t a t i o n O f P a r t i c i p a n t t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R ? Role .
11 }
M.1.2 IRX-Legal-Attestations
Listing M.2 implements the query whose result lists all participants for which a legal attestation
was created on the basis of a legal document.
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Listing M.2: IRX-Legal-Attestations
1 # IRX−Legal−A t t e s t a t i o n s
2 # L i s t a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s l e g a l l y a t t e s t e d i n t h e i r r o l e
3 PREFIX r d f : <h t t p : / / www. w3 . org /1999 /02 /22 − rd f −s yn t ax −ns#>
4 PREFIX t e : <h t t p : / / www. marc se l . eu / on to / t e />
5 PREFIX prov : <h t t p : / / www. w3 . org / ns / prov#>
6 s e l e c t ∗ where {
7 ?P1 t e : p R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP1 .
8 ? Ro l eA t t e s t a t i o nO fP1 t e : r a L e g a l Q u a l i f i c a t i o n ? L e g a l R o l eQ u a l i f i c a t i o n .
9 ? L e g a l R o l eQ u a l i f i c a t i o n t e : l e g a l Q u a l i f i c a t i o nN ?LegalNorm .
10 }
M.1.3 IRX-Sources-of-Role-Attestations
Listing M.3 implements the query whose result lists a selection of the sources where role attes-
tations were derived from.
Listing M.3: IRX-Sources-of-Role-Attestations
1 # IRX−Sources−of−r o l e − a t t e s t a t i o n s f o r EvSPs
2 # L i s t s a l l e v i d en c e s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r s and where t h e i r r o l e a t t e s t a t i o n s were d e r i v e d from
3 PREFIX r d f : <h t t p : / / www. w3 . org /1999 /02 /22 − rd f −s yn t ax −ns#>
4 PREFIX t e : <h t t p : / / www. marc se l . eu / on to / t e />
5 PREFIX prov : <h t t p : / / www. w3 . org / ns / prov#>
6 s e l e c t ∗ where {
7 ?EvSP t e : p R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n ? R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n .
8 ? R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R t e : EvSP .
9 ? R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n prov : wasDerivedFrom ?wasDerivedFrom .
10 }
M.1.4 IRX-Participants-conformance
Listing M.4 implements the query whose result lists all participants and the standards they have
a conformance attestation for.
Listing M.4: IRX-Participants-conformance
1 # IRX−P a r t i c i p a n t s −conformance
2 # L i s t a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s w i th conformance a t t e s t a t i o n s
3 PREFIX r d f : <h t t p : / / www. w3 . org /1999 /02 /22 − rd f −s yn t ax −ns#>
4 PREFIX t e : <h t t p : / / www. marc se l . eu / on to / t e />
5 PREFIX prov : <h t t p : / / www. w3 . org / ns / prov#>
6 s e l e c t ∗ where {
7 ?P1 t e : pConformance ? Con fo rmanceA t t e s t a t i o nOfP1 .




Selected rules of rulebook AE
This appendix describes an implementation of the discretionary rules for require-
ment IR2 for the rulebook AE.
For rulebook AE, the discretionary rules regarding transparency were specified in Tables
8.1, 8.2 and 8.3. The rules contained in Table 8.1 (the enabler-plane rules) were implemented
in the following way.
• Rules IR2-D01A-AE (a trustworthy ecosystemmust contain at least one endorser) and IR2-D01B-AE
(a trustworthy ecosystem must contain at least one enforcer) were implemented together
as described in Listing N.1. The expected response is YES.
• Rule IR2-D02-AE (a trustworthy ecosystem must contain at least one authentic source),
IR2-D03-AE (a trustworthy ecosystem must contain at least one accreditation body) and
IR2-D04-AE (a trustworthy ecosystem must contain at least one conformity assessment
body) were implemented together as described in Listing N.2. The expected response is
YES.
The rules contained in Table 8.2 (the trustworthiness provision plan rules) were imple-
mented by combining the three rules: IR2-D05-AE (a trustworthy ecosystem must contain at
least one evidence service provider), IR2-D06-AE (a trustworthy ecosystem must contain at least
one claim status service provider) and IR2-D07-AE (a trustworthy ecosystemmust contain at least
one trustworthiness monitor), as described in Listing N.3. The expected response is YES.
The rules contained in Table 8.3 (the functional plane rules) were implemented by com-
bining the two rules: IR2-D08-AE (a trustworthy ecosystem must contain at least one functional
service provider) and IR2-D09-AE (a trustworthy ecosystem must contain at least one functional
service consumer), as described in Listing N.4. The expected response is YES.
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Listing N.1: IR2-D01A-AE and -D01B-AE
1 # IR2−D01A−AE and −D01B−AE
2 ASK {
3 ?p1 t e : p R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n ? r o l e a t t .
4 ? r o l e a t t t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R t e : EnDo .
5 ? p2 t e : p R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n ? r o l e a t t 2 .
6 ? r o l e a t t 2 t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R t e : EnFo .
7 }
Listing N.2: IR2-D02-AE -D03-AE -D04-AE
1 # IR2−D02−AE −D03−AE −D04−AE
2 ASK {
3 ?p3 t e : p R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n ? r o l e a t t 3 .
4 ? r o l e a t t 3 t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R t e :AS .
5 ? p4 t e : p R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n ? r o l e a t t 4 .
6 ? r o l e a t t 3 t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R t e :AB .
7 ? p5 t e : p R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n ? r o l e a t t 5 .
8 ? r o l e a t t 5 t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R t e :CAB .
9 }
Listing N.3: IR2-D05-AE -D07-AE
1 # IR2−D05−AE −D07−AE
2 ASK {
3 ?p5 t e : p R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n ? r o l e a t t 5 .
4 ? r o l e a t t 5 t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R t e : EvSP .
5 ? p6 t e : p R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n ? r o l e a t t 6 .
6 ? r o l e a t t 6 t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R t e : CsSP .
7 ? p7 t e : p R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n ? r o l e a t t 7 .
8 ? r o l e a t t 7 t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R t e :TwSMo .
9 }
Listing N.4: IR2-D08-AE -D09-AE
1 # IR2−D08−AE −D09−AE
2 ASK {
3 ?p8 t e : p R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n ? r o l e a t t 8 .
4 ? r o l e a t t 8 t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R t e : FuSP .
5 ? p9 t e : p R o l eA t t e s t a t i o n ? r o l e a t t 9 .
6 ? r o l e a t t 9 t e : r o l e A t t e s t a t i o n R t e : FuSC .
7 }
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